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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes that a genuine European identity may emerge in the
Eastern borderlands of the European Union. This perspective is based on two lines
of thought: first, with the increasing challenges the European Union is currently
facing, such as demands for regionalisation and EU enlargement towards the East,
the progressive development of the European integration process can no longer rely
on its citizens' permissive consensus, but is in need of a genuine 'European identity';
second, clues for a genuine European identity may be found in the Eastern
borderlands of the European Union, because it is here - since the fall of the Iron
Curtain - where it has become most evident that the term 'Europe' can no longer be
viewed as interchangeable with Western Europe or the European Union (thus also
excluding the Western European non-EU countries) and where the crude East-West
division may now be replaced by a West/Central/East division. These two
dimensions have created confusion about the exact meaning of Europe and the
future of the European Union. The changing political geography seems to have left
Europe and especially the European Union with a sense of disorientation. The effect
has been the appearance of some pressing questions about Europe's core of identity,
its geographical limits and the concept ofMitteleuropa.
Within the European Union, the 'Europe 1992' project saw the gradual
disappearance of internal frontiers. Together with Schengen, this has enhanced the
EU's four freedoms and promoted the idea of the EU as an area open within itself.
Free trade, interdependence, communication and transport have contributed to the
decreasing importance of internal frontiers and have, in theory, brought the
European peoples closer together. But the existence of a European identity still
remains questionable. This is also triggered by the fact that the widening versus
deepening debate has increasingly challenged the European Union's problem of
governance. It suggests that the overall consensus concerning the finalite politique
of the European Union is still insufficiently defined. The European Union's
attempts to create a European identity - as, for example, through the concept of
European citizenship - have so far only been of symbolic importance and have not
yet had the desired impact.
Counter-effective to these inward-looking EU measures, the external
frontiers of the European Union have increased their role as a rather defensive and
symbolic barrier impermeable to undesired foreign influences. They delimited "us"
from "them" - "the other" which lives beyond a certain frontier/boundary and has
therefore different social, cultural and political characteristics, traditions and
perceptions. Although, the West versus East mentality has not yet been eliminated
with the gradual opening of the EU's external frontier, it seems as if the external EU
frontier has regained its status as a bridge rather than a barrier. This changing role
of the Eastern frontier of the European Union may diminish the need for both sides
to define themselves through the other.
In search for answers to the interrelated conflicting queries about Europe's
geographical finitude and its core identity, borderlands have increasingly come into
focus. After more than forty years of isolation, the present Eastern borderlands of
the EU seem once again to be enjoying a revival of the informal contacts,
communications and exchanges across the borders that were typical before the start
of the Cold War. This can be seen by the several transborder co-operation projects,
most of them in the form of Euroregions, that have arisen in and around the Eastern
borderlands of the European Union. It is suggested in this thesis that these regional
alliances serve as a vital stepping stone to future EU membership. More
importantly, they can be seen as a laboratory in which the parameters of a genuine
European identity are being evolved.
In this respect, it will be interesting to see the extent to which the planned
Eastern enlargement of the EU will vindicate the idea of a European identity which




2 DEFINITION OF TERMS 15
2. A Definition of nation, nation-state, region. border.




Frontiers, borders and boundaries 27
Borderlands 32
Europe 36
2. B Definition of identity, national identity and European
identity 39
The socio-psychological approach to identity 40
Issues relating to national identity 53
Issues relating to national identity in the European Union 57
Issues relating to European identity 61
2. C Europe and the 'other: Applying the socio-psvchological
model to Europe 68
The 'other' in the geographically distant lands ofEurope/
Mitteleuropa 70
The 'other' on the margins of the European Community 77
The 'other' outside and within the boundaries of the
European Union 80
3 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN
IDENTITY 86
3.A European integration and governance 89
3. A.i European integration theories 89
Neo-Functionalism 91
A critique of Neo-Functionalism 95
Domestic Politics Approach 98
A critique of the Domestic Politics Approach 100
Liberal-lnterqovemmentalism 102
A critique of Liberal-lntergovemmentalism 106
Neo-lnstitutionalism 108
A critique of Neo-lnstitutionalism 111
European integration theories and European identity 112
3. A.ii Governance and legitimacy within the European Union 120
The problem of European governance 121
The question ofEuropean legitimacy 131
The problem of the European demos 135
3. B European measures and policies oriented towards the
creation ofEuropean identity 142
3. B.i Measures and policies for the creation of a European
identity 144




The European flag, European anthem, Europe day 151
The Euro 152
European culture 154
Audio-visual, media and information about Europe 162
3. B.ii European citizenship 166
Concepts of citizenship and nationality 168
European citizenship as introduced in the 1992 Treaty on
European Union 177
Origins of European citizenship 177
Ultimate reasons for introducing European citizenship in the
TEU 182
European citizenship as it exists today 185
European citizenship and European identity 187
4 EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE EASTERN
FRONTIER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 197
4. A The Mitteleuropa debate 200
Historical Legacy ofMitteleuropa 201
Mitteleuropa after the end of the Cold War 205
4. B Transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union 212
Transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union: challenges and problems 218
Eastern borderlands as a hinge for European enlargement 218
Challenges on the Eastern frontier of the European Union 224
Problems inherent to transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union 230
Transfrontier co-operation in the wider European context 238
4. C European identity and the borderlands on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union 246
Euroregions on the Eastern frontier of the European Union 251
Euroregions and European identity 255
Eastern borderlands as a laboratory for the emergence of a
genuine European identity? 258
The role ofminorities in the borderlands on the Eastern frontier
of the European Union 265
5 EUROPEAN IDENTITY 272
5. A Which theoretical approach is best applicable to the
emergence of a European identity? 274
5. B Emergence of a European identity? 289






I would like to thank both my supervisors Malcolm Anderson and Andrew
Scott for their academic and personal support. I have benefited greatly from their
many useful comments and friendly criticisms on early papers and the final draft.
Supervision would have not been complete without the input of Eberhard Bort
who read several drafts in their entirety. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to
him for his guidance and patience, his stimulating comments and attention to
content and grammatical detail. The mistakes which remain are entirely my own
responsibility.
I am also grateful to my colleague Bregham Dalgliesh. Conversations with
him provided me with different insights into the concept of identity and made me
more critical about it. Paul Anderson read part of an early draft, for which I am
very grateful. His suggestions saved me from egregious errors and gave me the
courage to write. I would equally like to thank Anna Verges who confronted me
with thought-provoking challenging ideas that opened up new perspectives. To
Stephan Hannke, a special thank you for scanning the maps, helping me with the
formatting, as well as his encouragement and moral support. Finally, and
unfortunately a list too long to elaborate, I am very grateful for all the material,
personal and moral support which has helped me to write this thesis.
I dedicate this thesis to my parents. The thesis could not have been
completed without their infinite forbearance and constant support.
To my parents
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of European identity is nowadays very much at issue. Over the
last few years, it has become increasingly challenged whether the European
integration process must be bolstered by creating a European identity, in order to be
stable and successful.1 It seems that issues concerning the development of a
European identity can no longer be ignored by European policy-makers. Has, for
too long, too much emphasis been put on economic and political considerations?
Jean Monnet, one of the fathers of the European integration process is often quoted
who, in 1970, stated that he had disregarded the significance of cultural issues: "If I
should start it all over again, I would start with culture."2
The lack of cultural considerations in the European integration process
seems to have become more accentuated since the end of the Cold War. With the
events of 1989/90 - and the challenges of regionalisation and EU enlargement
towards the East - it has become accepted that it is no longer possible to take the
concept of European identity as synonymous with an EU identity. All of Europe is
now on the agenda. Hence, it is implausible to focus solely on Brussels, the EU's
democratic deficit, bureaucracy and lack of legitimacy, in order to find the sources
for the lack of a European identity.3 Instead, a wider understanding must be sought
and, to this end, the concept of European identity has been approached from many
different angles. Studying European identity lends itself to a multitude of
' For a first orientation, see Garcia, Soledad (ed.) (1993); European Identity and the Search for
Legitimacy, pp. 1-29; Howe, Paul (1995); "A Community of Europeans" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 1, pp. 27-45; Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity and
what could it be?" in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The Idea ofEurope:
Problems of national and transnational identity, pp. 61-74; Picht, Robert (ed.) (1994); L'identite
Europeenne, pp. 9-23; Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National Identity and the idea of European
Unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, pp. 55-76.
2 Jean Monnet cited in Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity and what could it be?"
in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The Idea ofEurope: Problems ofnational
and transnational identity, p. 68.
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interpretations across and within various disciplinary fields. Accordingly, there is
uncertainty on how the concept of European identity may be defined. Should it be
defined historically, politically, economically, socially, geographically or
culturally? The task to define European identity is complicated even further, given
the many different political, socio-cultural and socio-psychological theories of
identity, and the possible multiple layers of identity.
Concepts of European identity may be linked to the various historic,
political, economic, social, geographical and cultural understandings of Europe.
These understandings may overlap in part, while the distinctive factors common to
an ^//-encompassing European identity are subject to dispute and controversy. This
controversy is two-dimensional: one dimension represents the problem of defining
the concept of identity, the other dimension portrays the difficulty of demarcating
Europe.
Identity is an abstract, amorphous concept difficult to define. Identity is not
static, but a process, even a progressive development. It depends upon the history,
culture and territory of people4, and a more accurate and coherent account of the
concept would also have to take into consideration both the changing nature of
these general concepts and the relevant specific and contextual factors. Meanings of
the term 'identity' differ widely. On the one hand, identity may mean sameness and
imply belonging to a collectivity; on the other hand, identity may indicate
uniqueness and distinctiveness from the 'other'.5 To this one may add the level of
3 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, pp. 249-257.
4 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs ofNations, pp. 3-59; Barth, Frederik (1969); "Introduction: in Barth,
Frederik (ed.); Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organisation of culture difference, pp. 9-
38, Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, pp. 1-18.
5 Abrams, Dominic and Hogg, Michael A. (1990); "An introduction to the social identity approach"
in Abrams, Dominic and Hogg, Michael A. (eds.); Social Identity Theory, pp. 1-17; Cohen, Anthony
(1982); "Belonging: the experience of culture" in Cohen, Anthony (ed.); Belonging: identity and
social organisation in British and rural cultures, pp. 1-17; Laing, R. D. (1967); The Politics of
Experience, pp. 65-83, Tajfel, Henri (1978); "Intergroup Behaviour: Group Perspectives" in Tajfel,
Henri and Colin, Fraser (eds.); Introducing Social Psychology, pp. 423-446; Tajfel, Henri (1978);
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aggregation - individual, local, regional, national or European - from which identity
may be approached. This becomes specifically apparent when speaking about
concepts of a European identity.
Arguing that some kind of European identity existed in 1957, this European
identity and the subsequent creation of the European Economic Community was
primarily based on political and security motivations. The fathers of the EEC,
marked by the experience of two World Wars, wanted to "put an end to the state
enmities which had led to two devastating conflagrations in the twentieth century"6,
and bring peace, stability and a feeling of solidarity to the area. The best way to
achieve this was to lock the economies of the six founding member states into an
interdependent system of economic co-operation.7 Often referred to as the Monnet
method8, the European integration process became an elite driven project which
discounted the idea of identity, other than national identity.9 A permissive
consensus enabled the introduction of policies necessary to foster the economic and
political foundations of the European Economic Community. But with enlargement
- from six to fifteen member states - the existing permissive consensus may no
longer "be strong enough, or wide enough, to carry the mutual solidarity needed in
"Intergroup Behaviour: Individualistic Perspectives" in Tajfel, Henri and Colin, Fraser (eds.);
Introducing Social Psychology, pp. 401-422.
6 Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.);
European identity and the searchfor legitimacy, p. 71.
7 For an introduction, see Dinan, Desmond (1994); Ever Closer Union?, pp. 9-37; Laffan, Brigid
(1992); Integration and Co-operation in Europe, pp. 22-43; Lodge, Juliet (1992); The European
Community and the Challengefor the Future, pp. xiii-xxvi; McAllister, Richard (1997); From EC to
EU, pp. 1-40; Milward, Alan and Sorensen, Vibeke (1994); "Interdependence or integration? in
Milward, Alan et. al. (eds.); The Frontier ofNational Sovereignty, pp. 1-32; Pinder, John (1995);
European Community: the Building ofa Union, pp. 1-22.
8 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 1, pp. 81-102; Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998);
"Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4,
pp. 429-445.
9 See Milward, Alan (1992); European Rescue ofthe Nation-State, pp. 1-20.
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an enlarged Union."10 Heterogeneity has increased amongst the European member
states and consensus has become more difficult to achieve.
By looking at European integration theories11 it becomes apparent that
aspects central to the fostering of a genuine European identity were not relevant at
the outset of the European Community. The incongruity between political decision¬
making and lack of popular involvement, as well as the incongruity between
motivations and the outcome of the European integration process is perhaps
symptomatic of the EU's problem of governance and crisis of the Monnet method.
The EU enjoys formal legitimacy through its fifteen member states, but social
legitimacy emanating from the 372 million citizens of the Union is more doubtful
and fragile.12
With the growth of the European Union, the gradual disappearance of the
EC/EU's internal frontiers has enhanced the EU's four basic freedoms ofmovement,
and promoted the idea of the EU as an internally open territory. Free trade,
interdependence, communication and transport have contributed to the decreasing
importance of frontiers. Co-operation between member states has increased
considerably, with new states joining the European project intermittently. Parallel
10 Fizgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our European identity" in The Irish Times,
March 6, 1999.
" For a more detailed analysis, see Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on
Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, part 2 and 3; Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy¬
making in the European Union" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and Policy¬
making, pp. 3-23; Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical
view on integration processes" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 35/No. 2, pp. 267-299.
12 See also Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of
European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology
of Europe, pp. 275-298; Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of
Internationalism" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 18,
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/; MacCormick, Neil (1995); "Sovereignty, Democracy and Subsidiarity"
in Bellamy, Richard, Bufacchi, Victorio and Castiglione, Dairio (eds.); Democracy and
Constitutional Culture in the Union ofEurope, pp. 95-104; MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy,
Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the European Union", paper presented to the Seminar
on Legal Theory of European Integration at the University of Edinburgh, 26 - 27 April 1997,
unpublished; Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992
Europe" in Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European
Community after 1992, pp. 11-41; Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The Reformation of European
Constitutionalism" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 35/No. 1, pp. 97-131.
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to this, the Schengen agreements were introduced in order to underline the cohesion
and free movement of people and to improve immigration controls. Schengen has,
in theory, brought the European peoples closer together, but also opened a debate of
the potential of a 'fortress Europe', resembling a police state with an external
frontier which is a defensive and impermeable barrier against unwanted foreign
influences and peoples.13
The increasing politicisation of EU integration gives reason to argue that EU
policy makers have been taken aback by the fact that the European project is in
need of a European identity, and that it is difficult to construct a European identity
from above. Economic objectives and reasons are not sufficient to link the citizen to
the European project, nor to grasp the concept of a European identity satisfactorily.
The European Union appears to be currently faced with a problem of system design,
and has been described as an "ideological and doctrinal muddle"14: will a
supranationalist Europe, a 'Europe of regions' or a 'Europe of nation-states' emerge?
In order to develop genuine "community building and [an] affective
dimension of integration"15, the European Commission proposed a number of
measures oriented to create and foster a European identity. These include European
symbols, such as the European flag and anthem, and some cultural policies. Policies
such as the four freedoms of movement, the Euro and European citizenship were
primarily introduced for economic reasons, but their effect on identity should not be
ignored. In the context of this thesis, the right to European citizenship and its
connotation with identity seems to be the most interesting policy to look at, since
13 For a more detailed account, see Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of
European Union Border Controls" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and
EU Enlargement, pp. 29-33; Anderson, Malcolm (1998), "European Frontiers at the end of the
twentieth century" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, pp. 1-
10; Bort, Eberhard (1997); "Introduction" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.);
Schengen and EU enlargement, pp. 1-12; Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult
frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, pp. 91-108
14 Woollacott, Martin (1997); "An ideological muddle settles over Europe" in The Guardian, May
31, 1997.
15 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 1, p. 83.
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citizenship, which guarantees political participation, is an essential cornerstone of
democracy.16
The concept of citizenship is traditionally linked to the emergence of the
nation-state. During the period of nation-state building in the 18th and 19th century,
the European nation-states soon monopolised the various associated political, socio¬
economic and cultural developments which are also necessary components of a
common European identity. Nation-states had important homogenising effects
through culture17 and began to establish a monopoly on the right to rule over the
people in their respective areas. European nation-states fostered national
boundaries, introduced passport controls and limited the access to citizenship rights
when these were established. This synthesis ofpolitical control and cultural identity
encouraged national political development, and provided a basis for the principle of
inclusion and exclusion. For the European Union, however, the history of the
nation-state makes it difficult to gain direct access to the citizens, and to create a
European identity. Despite the increasing influence of European governance on the
national legislation process, it is probably too early to tell whether European
citizenship has more than symbolic importance. Arguably, however, economic and
political values alone are insufficient to promote and maintain a sense of identity.
According to Benedict Anderson, "in themselves, market zones, 'natural'-geographic
or politico-administrative, do not create attachments. Who will willingly die for
Comecom or the EEC?"18
16 With the introduction of the right to European citizenship, subjects of the United Kingdom, for
example, became citizens in the political sense of the word. For more information, see Meehan,
Elizabeth (1993); Citizenship and the European Community, pp. 1-35; PreuB, Ulrich (1996); "Two
challenges to European citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, pp. 534-552; Wiener, Antje (1997);
"Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-Historical Perspective" in
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 17, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/.
17 Zetterholm, Staffan (1994); "Introduction" in Zetterholm, Staffan (ed.); National Cultures and
European Integration, p. 3.
18 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 53.
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Parameters affecting the development of a European identity can also be
found outside and beyond the external boundaries of the European Union. The Cold
War, in particular, emphasised a political, socio-economic and cultural division
which impacted upon the development of a common European identity and the
definition of Europe. The Eastern frontier of the European Union represented a
physical and mental barrier which allowed people within the EU to define
themselves against the 'other' who lived beyond the EU's external frontiers.19 This
'other' was geographically distant, and different, since it was determined by
particular social, cultural and political characteristics, traditions and perceptions
different to those within the EU.
With the end of the Cold War, identified with the crumbling of borders and
blurring of boundaries, it looks as if the disappearance of this self/other has left
Europe, and specifically decision-makers in the EU, with a sense of disorientation.
The term 'Europe' is no longer interchangeable with Western Europe or the EU
(more or less overlooking Western European non-EU countries like Switzerland or
Norway). With EU enlargement towards the East in sight, the EU can no longer be
differentiated from the 'other' across its Eastern frontier in any straightforward,
comprehensible manner. It seems impossible to delineate or define Europe's
frontiers to the East in the same way as the geographic boundaries towards the
Atlantic West, the Mediterranean South and the Polar North.
Europe's internal and external frontiers are changing in status20, and new
frontiers - "fragile"21 in Michel Foucher's words - have emerged in Europe,
particularly in the Central Eastern European countries.22 Alternatively, the crude
19 See Neuman, Iver and Welsh, Jennifer (1991); "The Other in European self-definition" in Review
ofInternational Studies, Vol. 17/No. 4, pp. 327-348.
20 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard (ed.); Borders and Borderlands, p. 5. For
a more detailed account, see also Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, pp. 178-191; Foucher,
Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, pp. 471-512.
21 Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, p. 475.
22 The split of former Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as the civil
wars in Chechnya, Bosnia and Armenia show that despite their 'fragility', these new borders are far
more closed than permeable. For a more detailed account, see Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen
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East-West division may now be replaced by a West/Centre/East division, and there
may be the prospect of a new East/West division emerging between a future,
enlarged, EU and the CIS/Russia.
Moving from any attempts at fostering an inward-looking European EU
identity to the challenge of creating a wider all-encompassing European identity,
the concept ofMitteleuropa, transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union, the issue of European identity and the Eastern borderlands of the
European Union need to be taken into account. With the end of the Cold War and
prospective Eastern EU enlargement, the old concept ofMitteleuropa seems to have
again gained in momentum and may be in a process of being re-defined.23
The Central Eastern European countries are presently in the process of
democratisation and of consolidating their nation-states. In search of their own
national identity, they look westwards, envisaging full Nato and EU membership.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have become Nato members in 1999. For
these three countries plus Slovenia and Estonia, negotiations for EU membership
have started in March 1998 and EU membership may become reality in the year
2003.
The role of the Eastern border of the EU, along with the transformation
processes in the Central Eastern European countries, can be compared to a healing
der Europaischen Union, pp. 7-16; Kiirti, Laszlo and Langman, Juliet (1997); "Introduction:
Searching for Identities in the New East Central Europe" in Kiirti, Laszlo and Langman, Juliet
(eds.); Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe, pp. 1-16.
With perspective of the changing security architecture in Central Eastern Europe, see Bort, Eberhard
(1999); "Grenzen und Grenzraume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming.
23 For a first orientation, see Grusa, Jiri (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm
and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier of the European Union,
pp. 27-38; Schopflin, George (1989); "Central Europe: definitions old and new" in Schopflin,
George et. al. (eds.); In Search of Central Europe, pp. 7-29; Schubert, Markus (1993); Die
Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich Naumanns und die Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre, pp.
26-47; Seton-Watson, Hugh (1989); "What is Europe? Where is Europe?" in Schopflin, George et.
al. (eds.); In Search of Central Europe, pp. 30-46; Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and
Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-Bokic, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity ofCentral
Europe, pp. 133-144.
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process which will possibly leave a scar behind. Whether Western and Central
Eastern Europe can grow together again will only be seen in the next century. The
Eastern frontier of the European Union has become a meeting point at which EU
integration meets the disintegration of Central Eastern Europe, and at which
established nation-states in the West face states engaged in a consolidation process
of nation-building. Furthermore, the Eastern frontier of the European Union is also
a meeting point at which the contradiction between the opening of the Iron Curtain
from the East and the hardening of the EU's external Eastern frontier - entailed in
the Schengen process - comes to the fore. Despite Schengen, the external frontier of
the EU seems to have regained its status as a bridge rather than a barrier - even if
the gradual opening of the Eastern frontier of the European Union has not yet
entirely eliminated the West versus East mentality. Problems remain: such as
economic disparities, the different standards of living on either side of the Eastern
frontier of the European Union and the different approaches to national spatial
planning.
Transborder co-operation projects seem to contribute to the gradual opening
of the Eastern frontier of the European Union and seem to be essential means to
prepare the Central Eastern European countries for prospective EU membership.24
Transborder co-operation projects on the Eastern frontier of the European Union
began in 1990 and the 1991 Euroregion NeiBe-Nysa-Nisa was the first of its sort.
24 For a more detailed analysis, see Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier Co-operation -
History and Theory" in Brunn, Gerhard and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenziiberschreitende
Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie - Empirie - Praxis, pp. 78-97; Heffner, Krystian (1998);
"Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum" in NeuB, Beate, Jurczek,
Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, pp. 48-
70; NeuB, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in NeuB, Beate,
Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen
Mitteleuropa, pp. 144-161; Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co¬
operation; Council of Europe and European Commission (1996); The regional planning ofgreater
Europe in co-operation with the countries ofCentral Eastern Europe, pp. 73-82; Council of Europe
(1998); Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation on http://www.coe.fr/; Conference on
Euroregions, Frankfurt /Oder, September 28-30, 1995, Proceedings; European Parliament (1997);
Forum: Regions and cities: co-operation beyond the borders of the Union, organised in the
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Transfrontier co-operation between the borderlands on the Eastern frontier
of the European Union may resemble a bottom-up process of integration which is
closer to the people. People in the borderlands experience the transformation
processes in the wider Europe most directly. Within the framework of Euroregions,
they are given the chance to act locally, while thinking globally, or at least thinking
in European terms. Elaving been marginalised and economically depressed during
the Cold War, people and economies of these borderlands currently benefit from the
revival of informal contacts, communications and exchanges across borders that
were typical before the start of the Cold War. Borderlands may become key players
in bringing the European Union and the Central Eastern European countries closer
together. They are exposed to and influenced by national politics and culture,
international pressures from other neighbouring states, as well as the collision
between the two European traditions: those of Western and Central Eastern
Europe.25
Brought together in a series of Euroregions, borderlands transcend the
traditional national frontiers of the state, as well as the Eastern frontier of the
European Union. Hence, they may be regarded "as a particular kind of local,
politically organised ecology"26. Borderlands are heterogeneous areas and seem to
European Parliament, Brussels, June 11-12, 1997; GroB, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994);
Europas kooperierende Regionen, pp. 13-39.
25 This point is also made in Kowalski, J. S. and Funck, R. H. (1993); "Transnational networks and
co-operation in the new Europe" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional
networks, border regions and European integration, pp. 205-214; Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995);
"Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.);
Changing European Security Landscape, pp. 257-283; O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M.
(1996); "Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M.
(eds.) Borders, nations and states, pp. 1-17; Ratti, Remigio (1993); "How can existing barriers and
border effects be overcome?" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional
networks, border regions and European integration, pp. 60-69; Smith, Neil (1995); "Remaking
Scale: Competition and Co-operation" in Eskelinen, Heikki and Snickars, Folke (eds.), Competitive
European Peripheries, pp. 59-74, Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders:
Political anthropology and European integration" in Liam O'Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson (eds.)
Borders Nations and States, pp. 199-219.
26 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border Identities, p. 6; See also
Anderson, Perry (1994); "The invention of the region 1945-1990" in EUI Working Paper, 1994/2,
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be able to internalise more than one culture and more than one identity, suggesting
that different identities and cultures may be able to interact according to time,
situation and context. Borderlands may therefore be representative of one of the
"most exciting places in the world... [since they] live on the edge, on the boundaries
between cultures, places of fusion rather than uniformity."27 Consequently,
borderlands can be seen as "ideal laboratories"28 in which parameters for a genuine
European identity may evolve which incorporates multiple levels of identity,
ranging from individual identity via EU identity to an all-encompassing European
identity. Can clues for a genuine European identity already be identified in the
Eastern borderlands?
In order to embed this multiplicity of identities in a theoretical framework,
the theory of Liberal Nationalism29 seems to be able to bind various different
individual, local, regional, national and European identities together. It could act as
an umbrella encompassing particularism and universalism, diversity and
commonality. It could also become a basis for Jiirgen Habermas's 'Constitutional
Patriotism' - and Constitutional Patriotism could represent a focal point for the
development of a European identity.30 Constitutional Patriotism seems to stand for
global democratic citizenship, which promotes the co-existence of the various
approaches to national citizenship, maintained by supranational organisations, such
as the European Union. Democratic, civic principles, rather than homogeneous
pp. 1-38 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming), "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and
Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, pp. 1-24; Martinez, Oscar (1994); "The Dynamics of Border
Interaction" in Schofield, Clive H. (ed.); World Boundaries, Vol. 1, pp. 1-15.
27 Jacques, Martin (1998); "Even continents can't buck trends" in The European, January 19-25,
1998.
28 Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalisation" in Nolutshungu, Sam
(ed.); Margins ofInsecurity, p. 277.
29 See specifically MacCormick, Neil (1996), "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign
State" in Political Studies, No. 44, pp. 553-567; Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, pp. 3-12.
30 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald (ed.); Theorising
Citizenship, pp. 255-282; Waever, Ole (1995); "Europe since 1945" in Wilson, Kevin and Dussen
van, Jan (eds.); The history ofthe idea ofEurope, pp. 151-214.
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ethnic values, seem to be a plausible - if not the only - approach on which a genuine
European identity can be built.
Democratic principles are, however, only a foundation for the emergence of
a European identity. A genuine European identity will also need to incorporate
issues with which the European citizen may identify him/herself directly. To this
end, it is necessary to include a cultural scope in the European legislation process.
Most European policies - even the economic ones - now appear to have this
dimension which goes to the heart of the various different existing identities within
Europe.31 It seems as if European culture is a plausible and essential instrument32 to
foster a genuine and all-encompassing European identity.33 European culture may
be shared by different people in different places at different times.
The difficulty of defining European culture has allowed for a wide
understanding of an all-encompassing European culture. European culture has no
boundaries, it is fluid. European culture is as diverse as it is unique, since it seems
to be the fruit of the many existing different cultures within Europe. There is not
just one European culture, but there are many. Paradoxically, it may help to define
Europe. It seems impossible to do so geographically, because "Europe as an
organised entity will need to maintain a kind of fuzzy or at least blurred geopolitical
31 See also European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration ofCultural Aspects in
European Community Action, 17.4.1996, COM(96) 160 final, pp. 32-39 and 86-93; European
Forum for Arts and Heritage (1996); Cultural Aspects in European Community Action: Article
128(4) of the Maastricht Treaty, http://www.eurplace.org/; Camps, Victoria (1992); "L'identite
europeenne, une identite morale" Lenoble, Jacques and Dewandre, Nicole (eds.); L'Europe au soir
du siecle, pp. 99-105.
32 This argument is also made in European Communities (1997); La Commission Europeenne a
I'ecoute du changement, pp. 23-68; Oberndorfer, Dieter (1996); "Die politische Gemeinschaft und
ihre Kultur" in Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 52-53, pp. 37-46; Riekmann, Sonja (1996); "The Myth
of European Unity" in Hosking, Geoffrey, and Schopflin, George (eds.); Myths andNationhood, pp.
60-71; Rietbergen, Peter (1998); A Cultural History ofEurope, pp. xvii-xx; Wintle, Michael (1996);
"Introduction: Cultural diversity and identity in Europe" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, pp. 1-8; Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared
experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, pp. 9-32.
33 Similar arguments are made in: Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste; Europe: a history of its people, pp. 13-
21; Morris, James M.; "Europe: More than a Configuration of Land and Water",
http://wwics.si.edu/.
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logic to deal with its new peripheries"34; politically, socially and culturally it is also
difficult, due to the legacy of the creation of the nation-state and, more recently, the
Cold War.
Axguably, European identity must be detached from the traditional
understanding of national identity, since European identity, as culture, seems to
represent a composite of all co-existing European identities. It therefore seems
reasonable to argue that European identity may only be defined through its cultural
diversity and "tradition of uncertainty"35. Culture rather than politics tends to be a
more helpful means to define Europe.36 Is it therefore feasible to suggest that the
terms Europe and European identity must remain insufficiently defined? Does the
finalite politique of the European Union need to remain an open-ended concept?
The overall aim of this thesis attempts to demonstrate that the long existing
discrepancy between an embryonic EU identity and a wider, all-encompassing
European identity may and must be overcome in order to give rise to a genuine
European identity. Given that there is an abundant literature on the concept of
European identity, but only a minority taste in European identity and the Eastern
border of the European Union, least its borderlands, this thesis will concentrate on
the EU's Eastern borderlands as laboratories in which parameters for a genuine
European identity may evolve.
To do this, important English and non-English speaking literature on the
topic will be taken into account, in order to accommodate the considerable range of
different issues necessary to the analysis. These various topics will be examined
individually and contextually, in order to demonstrate a possible comprehensive
and extensive approach to European identity. The focus will then be on
34 Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its long-lasting variable geography" in Bort, Eberhard and
Keat, Russell (eds.); The Boundaries of Understanding: Essays in Honour ofMalcolm Anderson, p.
165.
35 Fraser, Nicholas (1997); "What state are we in?" in The Guardian, September 13, 1997.
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investigating the emergence of possible parameters of a European identity in the
borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Given the multiplicity
and interdependence of influential factors, there are structural difficulties and
problems of presentation. The thesis, however, attempts to overcome this problem
by referring to these issues in different contexts and according to different levels of
aggregation.
In order to lay out the framework within which a European identity may be
located, and in view of the multiple understandings and ambiguities surrounding the
following terms and concepts, chapter two starts with a definition of the terms
nation, nation-state, region, border, borderland, Europe, identity, national identity
and European identity. Chapter three then discusses issues and factors central to
European integration. It addresses the theories explaining the European integration
process, as well as the various EU policies and measures oriented to create and
foster a European identity, including citizenship. Chapter four will highlight the
historic legacy of Mitteleuropa in view of conceptualising the challenges and
problems faced by transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union. It will then look at the issue of European identity and the Eastern
borderlands of the European Union. Given the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
character of the Eastern borderlands, chapter five will embed the multiplicity of
identities in a theoretical framework. Liberal Nationalism and Habermas's
Constitutional Patriotism will be taken as useful formats, supported by the
dimension of culture as a means to help define the concept of European identity. By
way of conclusion, the contextualisation and interpretation of European identity and
European culture will be examined and summed up.
36 Munkler, Herfried (1995); "Die politische Idee Europa" in Delgado, Mariano and Lutz-
Bachmann, Matthias (eds.); Herausforderung Europa: Wege zu einer europaischen Identitat, p. 11.
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2 DEFINITION OF TERMS
Difficulties of defining terms perhaps highlight the procedure of defining
itself. Defining is a stepping back, an attempt to locate oneself in the environment,
with all the security, power and perspective needs that go with it. It is, moreover, a
stepping out of the floor which is the sense of action, of change, and of
impermanence - the source of the problems for those who define. It is difficult to
give exact definitions to words without taking into account the contexts they live in.
Various existing definitions of one term are bound together, according to Ludwig
Wittgenstein's "family resemblances"1. Terms are bound together in interaction,
interdependence and complementarity. This complexity will become especially
clear in this thesis, and specifically in this chapter. In order to assess European
identity and the Eastern borderlands of the European Union, we will first look at the
definitions of the nation, the nation-state, the region, the border, borderlands,
Europe, the social psychological approach to identity and European identity. It will
hopefully become clear that the definition of 'European identity' depends largely on
one's conception of identity - and, from a more scholarly point of view, European
identity depends on the adopted nationalist doctrine.
2. A Definition of nation, nation-state, region, border, borderlands and
Europe
The nation
According to Ernest Renan, nations are "everyday plebiscite[s]" which "are
not eternal. They have had beginnings and will have ends; and will probably be
replaced by a confederation of Europe"2. Although the argument of this thesis will
not go as far as to proclaim the replacement of the nation by a future European
' Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1994); Philosophical Investigations, p. 32, remark 67. According to
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'family resemblances' refer to "a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." (p.
32, remark 66).
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confederation, the emergence of a European identity does depend upon one's
conception of the nationalist doctrine. Our conception of the nationalist doctrine
will then have an influence on whether we think that the prospective development
of a European society is possible.
Scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds have yet to agree on the
exact definition of the 'nation'. The term 'nation' is often taken for granted. It is used
widely, with little precision, and sometimes confused or treated interchangeably
with nation-state, government, country, ethnie, or peoples living within a state. Not
one single feature characterises the nation, although one particular variable may
predominate. When attempting to define the nation, one should take into account a
complex array ofmultiple factors. These may be cultural, political or psychological
in character. They sometimes overlap and seem ambiguous. They shift according to
situational, temporal or contextual circumstances and one's perception of the term
'nation'.
The term 'nation' is relatively new. It was not until 1884 that the term
'nation' appeared for the first time in a Dictionary, the Dictionary of the Royal
Spanish Academy.3 It had primarily a political meaning, following Jean-Jacques
Rousseau's writings which emphasised citizenship and sovereignty as cornerstones
of the nation. The nation was understood as a political community, "a product of the
Enlightenment's understanding of the individual as a rational and free being capable
of directing his own affairs without guidance from above."4 This French conception
of the term 'nation' stood in contrast to Herder's interpretation of the nation.5 In his
late writings, towards the end of the 18th century, and specifically referring to the
German 'nation', Herder had described the nation as primarily a cultural community.
It was held together by a common language and culture and endured any political,
economic and administrative fragmentation.
2 Renan, Ernest (1882) "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 203 and 204.
3 Hobsbawm, Eric (1990); Nations and Nationalism since 1780, p. 14.
4 Loughlin, John (1996); "Nation, state and region in Western Europe" in Bekemans, Leonce (ed.);
Culture: Building Stonefor Europe, p. 233.
5 Heywood, Andrew (1997); Politics, p. 105-6.
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In 1908 the historian Friedrich Meinecke was one of the first scholars to
clearly distinguish between the 'cultural nation' and the 'political nation'. He
identified the Kulturnation as a largely ethnic, homogeneous and "passive cultural
community"6. The Staatsnation, in contrast, was an "active, self-determining
political nation"7 in which citizenship is more important than ethnic identity. This
typology was later taken up by Hans Kohn in his influential book The idea of
nationalism of 1945.8 Here Kohn includes his famous typology of Western and
Eastern nationalism. He made a clear distinction between the two: Western
nationalism was classified as a relatively positive, liberal, civic-territorial and
political phenomenon which "was the product of social and political factors" and
"arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the struggles of the
present without too much sentimental regard for the past"9; Eastern nationalism, on
the other hand, was portrayed as a violent, aggressive, ethnic-organic and pre-
political form of nationalism, tending to politicise culture and tradition, since it is
"not rooted in a political and social reality", but was "created out of the myths of the
past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland... expected to become
sometime a political reality."10
Anthony Smith takes up this typology and goes a little further, categorising
the term nation into three broad groups. Each group is subject to a different
formation process and will consequently also have a different conception of its
national identity:
- The ethnic nation stresses the ethno-cultural characteristics of the nation.
Anthony Smith defines the ethnic nation as a "named human population with a
myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an
historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity."11 Given the co-existence
of these factors, one may argue that the nation precedes the state, namely the nation
creates the state (e.g. Italy and Germany in 1866 and 1871 respectively).
6 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 8.
7 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 8.
8 Kohn, Hans (1945); The Idea ofNationalism.
9 Kohn, Hans (1945); The Idea ofNationalism, p. 331 and 330.
10 Kohn, Hans (1945); The Idea ofNationalism, p. 330.
" Smith, Anthony D. (1993); "The ethnic sources of nationalism" in Survival, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 49.
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- The civic nation describes the nation formation via the high elites and their
bureaucratic means. Its members show allegiance to civic institutions which
represent "a community of shared culture, common laws and territorial
citizenship"12. According to this territorial and political unity, the civic conception
of the nation implies that the state creates the nation, regardless ofpeoples' ethnic or
regional background.13
- The plural nation is composed by various different ethnic communities.
These ethnic communities "give primary allegiance to a public mass culture" and
their "residence and ethnic descent are subordinated to an overarching civic
religion"14.
One should note, however, that these types of nations are not mutually
exclusive and "[w]e should avoid seeing or defining the civic and ethnic in
straightforward either/or terms."15 The term 'nation' is a far more complex and
multidimensional term. Its characteristics are linked to varying degrees. With this in
mind, Eric Hobsbawm has identified a collection of multiple objective and
subjective variables, in an attempt to define a nation and determine its association
with either nationhood or statehood, or both.
According to Hobsbawm, objective criteria include common cultural
features, such as ethnicity, language, religion, territory and myths. However, it is
rarely the case that all objective variables coincide. Most nations are subject to a
great degree of diversity, such as the Swiss nation with its three main national
languages. Consequently, objective criteria are not sufficient to define a nation;
subjective criteria need to be taken into account as well. Subjective variables refer
to the will, choice and consciousness of the nation to be a nation. Each individual
12 Smith, Anthony D. (1993); "The ethnic sources of nationalism" in Survival, Vol. 35/No. 1, p. 55.
13 The creation of a civic nation by central authorities is made specifically clear in Eugene Weber's
book (1979); Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernisation ofrural France, 1870-1914. Weber sets
out in how far the French state created "the French" during the Third Republic. It introduced
conscription and compulsory school attendance, and built roads and railtracks reaching the
periphery of the country. See also Sontheimer, Kurt (1989); "Nation" in Leenhardt, Jacques and
Picht, Robert (ed.); 100 Schliisselbegriffefur Deutsche und Franzosen, pp. 195-198.
14 Anthony Smith cited in Harris, Henry (1995); Identity, p. 152.
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nation is a socio-psychological construct which sets itself apart from other existing
nations.16
In addition, Eric Hobsbawm describes the nation as an "invented
tradition"17, and Benedict Anderson suggests that nations are "imagined
communities"18. Both these accounts might point to the assumption that nationalism
creates nations, rather than the other way around. Accordingly, nations are artificial
and "conscious constructs created over history"19, so that "[w]hat appears (or is
claimed) to be a 'nation' at one moment in history can suddenly turn out to be a
fabrication."20 Indeed, Anderson suggests that nations are mental images
"constructed for us through education, the mass media and a process of political
association"21. This is close to the orthodox Marxist theory which regards the nation
as a construction of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie created a national identity by
binding the working class to its power structure rather than to a sense of class
consciousness and solidarity.
Similarly, scholars such as Karl W. Deutsch and Anthony Giddens
emphasise the political and statist bond of the nation, namely that the state is a form
of expression of the nation. For Deutsch, "the nation is a people in possession of a
state"22, and for Giddens, the nation "only exists when a state has a unified
administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed"23. He
uses the term nation interchangeably and synonymously with the term 'nation-state'
and therefore gives the term 'nation' the meaning of political community. Civic and
15 McCormick, Neil (1996); "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political
Studies, No. 44, p. 563.
16 Hobsbawm, Eric (1990); Nations and Nationalism since 1780, p. 5-9.
17 Hobsbawm, Eric (1983); "Introduction" in Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence (eds.); The
Invention ofTradition, pp. 1-14.
18 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined communities, pp. 1-7.
19 Raymond Crew cited in Boerner, Peter (1986); "Introduction" in Boerner, Peter (ed.); Concepts of
national identity - an interdisciplinary dialogue, p. 8.
20 Winichakul, Thongchai (1996); "Siam mapped - the making of Thai nationhood" in The
Ecologist, Vol. 26/No. 5, p. 215.
21 Heywood, Andrew (1997); Politics, p. 107.
22 Deutsch, Karl W. (1978); "Nation und Welt" in Winkler, Heinrich August (ed.); Nationalismus, p.
50. My translation.
23 Giddens, Anthony (1994); "The Nation as Power-Container" in Hutchinson, John and Smith,
Anthony D. (eds.); Nationalism, p. 34.
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political loyalties to the nation state become paramount, whilst sovereignty and the
general will lie within the nation. This statist conception of the term 'nation',
however, should not be confused with the terms 'nation-state' or 'national state'24.
The nation-state
The term state "refers to the centralised, territorial, sovereign polity which
began to take shape in the thirteenth century and was completed, in its essentials, by
the seventeenth century"25. The modern state, according to Max Weber, is "that
agency within society that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence"26, and
Gellner adds that the "state exists where specialised order-enforcing agencies, such
as police forces and courts, have separated out from the rest of social life. They are
the state."27 Nevertheless, the distinction between the state and the nation is often
blurred, as it
is an important feature of the modern state that it transmogrifies itself into a nation
('an imagined community', as B. Anderson aptly puts it), which is an object of
love, attachment, devotion and even passion, and for which one is prepared to
make the most harrowing sacrifices (including one's life) and commit the most
horrendous of crime (against other nationals or against 'traitors').28
Since "the fortunes of nations and states are obviously intertwined and
interdependent"29, it now seems appropriate to come back to the concept of the
'nation-state'. The perfect nation-state is a state in which a nation's frontiers coincide
with state/political frontiers, in order to form a single societal and politico-
administrative territorial unit. The perfect nation-state would match the state with
its society, or vice versa, and enjoy maximum homogeneity.
24 Nor does, according to Tilly, "national state... necessarily mean nation-state" in Llobera, Josep
(1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity
and the searchfor legitimacy, p. 64.
25 Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.);
European identity and the searchfor legitimacy, p. 66.
26 Max Weber cited in Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle,
Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 104.
27 Gellner, Ernest (1996); Nations andNationalism, p. 4.
28 Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.);
European identity and the search for legitimacy, p. 65.
29 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 17.
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According to the realist school of thought, the formation of the nation-state
and nationalism was a result of increasing capitalism, industrialisation, technical
advances, advanced transportation methods, the invention of printing, mass
communication and education.30 As a result, these developments led to
the clotting of sizeable collections of people into homogenised communities,
sharing the same law, religion, life-style and often language. Large homogenised
societies benefit from economies of scale. Standardisation and mass production
offer the possibility of the greatest affluence for the largest number of people. It
was this reality that made nationalism a viable proposition and gave it mass
support.31
Mass support, however, does not mean homogeneity. John Stuart Mill
already noted in 1861 that "there were major difficulties in implementing the
national ideal of a state for each nation, the most prominent being the geographic
one."32 The end of the first World War is a testimony to this statement. Wilson's
fourteen points soon revealed "homogeneous nation-states... as a pipedream"33, and
[mjodern nation-states have attempted to blur the fact that they are composed of
different national groups by fostering a liberal-democratic definition of the nation.
According to this definition, all those who inhabit a particular territory and live
under the rule of the same government are members of the same nation, but
modem history has time and again refuted the claim that citizenship and
membership in a nation are one and the same.34
"[Mjankind is made up of 5,000 ethnic groups with only 190 countries to
live in"35 and according to Walker Connor, only about 12% of existing nation-states
are homogeneous. The remaining nation-states are 'multinational' in the sense that
they contain subsections of ethnies which aspire to nationhood in the form of a
political collective.36
30 Gellner, Ernest (1996); Nations andNationalism, pp. 19-38.
31 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 108.
32 John Stuart Mill cited in Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p.142.
33 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 145.
34 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p.143-144.
35 McKie, Robin (1998); "Flames of conflict in the melting pot" in The Observer, September 20,
1998.
36 Walker Connor cited in Billig, Michael (1997); Banal Nationalism, p. 27, and Connor, Walker
(1994); "A nation is a nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a..." in Hutchinson, John and Smith,
Anthony D. (eds.); Nationalism, p. 39.
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The nation-state is, however, not only to be seen through the national-
territorial lens. The nation-state is also a sovereign state. Traditionally, a nation-
state's external frontiers delimit the nation-state's exclusive authority. They thus
define its limits to sovereignty. Sovereignty is an essential qualification for states to
assert themselves in the international community. The sovereign nation-state should
not be subject to any decisions made outwith. All important decisions concerning
the affairs of the nation-state are concentrated at one point. The sovereign nation-
state could (virtually) override all decisions which affect it, but which are made
elsewhere.
For this reason, the European member states are often regarded as being no
longer sovereign in this traditional sense. They have surrendered part of their
sovereignty to the decision-making bodies of the European Union, since the
European integration process promotes unity across the European Union and
favours the pooling of national sovereignties. The member states' external
boundaries no longer function as hermetic seals, but have become permeable
membranes enabling the four freedoms of movement within the EU. In addition to
this challenge from above, the European member states are also challenged from
below. Most European nation-states face regional demands for subsidiarity and
decentralisation from central government. It was Denis de Rougement who created
the image of the European nation-state which is "squeezed between regionalism and
supranationalism"37. Both developments affect the political, economic and cultural
values and national identities of the various European nation-states. Although
regionalism and supranationalism have different effects on the European member
states, they seem, however, to be complementary. Transborder co-operation on the
internal and external borders of the European member states is a good example for
this.
37 Denis de Rougemont cited in Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs ofNations, p. 5. Supranationalism refers
to the forces from within the European integration process. Regionalism indicates that some of the
European regions wish to free themselves from central governments, in order to decide over their
own regional affairs and to be able to assert their identity in Europe - such as, for instance the
Scottish National Party and its aim to create an 'Independent Scotland in Europe'. The EU tends to
represent an opportunity for the co-existence of different nations, regions and minorities.
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Nevertheless, one should be cautious about announcing the end of the
sovereign nation-state. Challenges by various different forces from above or below,
specifically regionalism and the rise of the European Union, may have "weakenend
the grip of Europe's main nation-states but without threatening to break them up"38.
The nation-state remains the territorial and sovereign form of polity.39 The nation-
state is not isolated, but "exists in a complex of other nation-states"40. Its demise is
still far from imminent, as it continues to remain "a bounded power-container"41 in
international and European42 politics.
The region
The term 'region' has changed its meaning over time and, being subject to
national forces and context, it is also "highly indeterminate"43. Setting up the
complexity of the term 'region' makes it a rich unit to examine, specifically because
political analysts have increasingly agreed that "the concept of region... is
associated with identity."44 In the past, the term 'region "was never central in the
political vocabulary of the early modern state"45. Although the term 'region' derives
its meaning from the Latin word 'regere' = to govern*6, the 'region' designated a
fairly neutral entity which was mainly defined by its geographical and natural
features. During the time of industrialisation, this conception of the 'natural region'
then developed into an 'economic region'. In addition, "[tjhere was the older
38 The Economist (1997); "Devolution can be salvation", September 20, 1997.
39 Eckard Fuhr in Weifimann, Karlheinz (1993); "Wiederkehr eines Totgesagten: Der Nationalstaat
am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts" in Politik undZeitgeschichte, B 14/1993, p. 3.
40 Giddens, Anthony (1981); A contemporary critique ofhistorical materialism, p. 190.
41 Giddens, Anthony (1985); The Nation-State and Violence, p. 120.
42 This is especially the case with reference to the European Council of Ministers, the most
intergovernmentalist institution of the European Union, in which the individual member states,
rather than the EU as an autonomous entity in itself, decide on EU policies and politics.
43 Anderson, Perry (1994); The invention ofthe region 1945-1990, p. 6.
44 Eger, Gyorgy (1996); "Region, Border, Periphery" in Eger, Gyorgy and Langer, Josef (eds.);
Border, Region and Ethnicity in Central Europe, p. 15. See also Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil
(1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p.
8 and 18.
45 Anderson, Perry (1994); The invention ofthe region 1945-1990, p. 6.
46 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1983); "Frontier regions: future collaboration or conflict?" in Anderson,
Malcolm (ed.); Frontier Regions in Western Europe, p. 123.
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political sense of the term as an administrative unit within a sovereign state - but
also the diplomatic usage denoting the area containing several such states."47
With the rise of nationalism at the turn of the 19th century, however, the
term 'region' has received another different meaning. The term region began to be
distinguished from its mere geographical definition and became identified with
today's understanding of 'cultural region'. To the present day, the term 'region' is
defined as "a community bounded by either customs and traditions (the weaker
version), or language and literature (the stronger version)"48 which has a social
dynamic on its own. The 'region' often carries connotations of being a 'sub-national'
unit which resides in individual nation-states. The majority of regions are seen as
parts of a larger entity49 that stand in relation to their respective nation-states.
This 'dependence' on the nation-state unjustifiably evokes ideas about
regional economic backwardness, underdevelopment and socio-economic
deprivation. Increasing urbanisation has marked the difference between cities and
provinces and gave the term 'region' a negative undertone connected with the term
'periphery' or 'provinciality'.
Within the EU, the concept of 'region' is used differently in each member
state. The definition of the 'region' as a socio-cultural, economic and political 'sub-
national' entity may be useful in relation to the reality of multi-level governance, or
in explaining different conceptions of regionalisation and 'federalism'. Regions vary
in size, administrative rights and obligations, national and international status,
human and physical geography and economic activity. It is still up to each
individual member state to decide how many levels of governance are installed.
Regionalisation is closely linked to the individual country's socio-political history.
In unitary states, such as the United Kingdom, the degree of political power
enjoyed by regions is low. Although this is changing slowly, the disparity between
47 Anderson, Perry (1994); The invention ofthe region 1945-1990, p. 8.
48 Anderson, Perry (1994); The invention ofthe region 1945-1990, p. 8.
49 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans,
Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 18. The term 'region' varies according to context and may
become a problem of scale: the United States encompass regions which are bigger than the whole of
Scandinavia. In geographical and international relations literature, Europe, South East Asia or the
Maghreb may also be treated as a 'region'.
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centre and 'periphery' is still marked very clearly and 'regions' are dependent on the
state. They may be easily overruled by Westminster, since the British government
sees regionalisation as undermining the unity of the nation-state. In contrast, federal
states, such as Austria, Germany and Belgium, give a large degree of decision¬
making autonomy to their regions. Each region possesses its own constitutional
rights and legislative powers and is not subject to its respective central
government's tutelage. Regionalisation in these countries is the result of the federal
willingness to advance democracy and to enhance the balance of power.
Regionalisation seems essential in maintaining the coherence of the nation-state,
since the relation between democracy and region "might seem more like one of
completion."50
If a region "seeks to maintain or to alter rules governing the formation of
material or symbolic prices related to symbolic expressions of (objective or
intentional) social identity"51, the movement behind it is often referred to as
'regionalism'. Regionalism is associated with "mobilisation and action"52. It is
expressed in different forms, but is commonly regarded as to include demands for
regional autonomy and independence from central government. Regionalism is
often condemned as anti-centrist, anti-statist and separatist, specifically since
regions have gained in economic and political importance - functions which were
once only reserved to the state or, more precisely, central government.
But the revival of (regional) territorial politics is not delinked from the
regions' cultural dimension. Regions - even if some may not fall into the traditional
definition of the term 'region'53 - have developed their own raison d'etre and may be
delimited by intra-nation-state frontiers.54 They have become important alternative
50 Anderson, Perry (1994); The invention ofthe region 1945-1990, p. 13.
51 Pierre Bourdieu cited in Eger, Gyorgy (1996); "Region, Border, Periphery" in Eger, Gyorgy and
Langer, Josef (eds.); Border, Region and Ethnicity in Central Europe, p. 18.
52 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans,
Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 8.
53 This is specifically the case with Scotland. Scotland may be referred to as a cultural 'region', but
not in the political and administrative meaning of the word. See footnote 49.
54 The creation of intra-nation-state frontiers does not only focus on the geographical dimension. It
also includes a socio-cultural and political dimension, as for example the difference between
Scottish and English law and the special status of the Free State of Bavaria in Germany, illustrated
in the presence of the Christian Democratic Union's sister party, the Christian Social Union.
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sources of identity to the nation-state. Regions "carry much emotional charge"55,
because they are "small enough to be closer to the people and big enough to
organise reliable consensus"56. Regions seem "more coherent and focused"57. This
places them in an advantageous position to master their own politics. Problem-
solving is quicker, since decision-making processes generally do not need to pass
through the national - often complex - bureaucratic machinery, but are dealt with
more effectively 'on location'.
Cross-regional co-operation is central to the European Union's political
culture and, focusing on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, it is also a
fundamental category in the analysis of this thesis. The European Union defines the
term 'region' as the administrative unit below the national level of government. For
its Structural Funds, the EU categorises each region according to its GDP, rate of
unemployment, industrial structure and economic activity. According to the
European Commission, a region is part of a
national economic space which is divided into a certain number of territorial units.
These engage in complementary and strongly linked economic activities which
gravitate around urban centres where important economic functions, especially
decision-making powers are located. The region's economic activities emerge
from the polarisation structures which are subject to interdependence, geographic,
economic and social complementarity.58
Unfortunately, this definition ignores the most important objective of many
regionalists: to attain self-government or political representation, ft is not an
objective definition, since it leaves out the cultural dimension of the 'region'. The
definition focuses on the criteria to attain regional funds from the European Union,
55 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans,
Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 20.
56 Kalbfleisch-Kottsieper, Ulla (1994); "Theses for ISCOMET Conference on Regionalism and the
Europe of the future", paper presented during ISCOMET Conference, Foundation for International
Understanding, Copenhagen, July 26, 1994.
57 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans,
Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 8.
58 European Commission (1964); "Rapport du Groupe 1 charge d'examiner les problemes des
regions" in Rapports des groupes d'experts sur la politique regionale dans la Communaute
Europeenne Economique, p. 19. My translation.
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ignoring the cultural dimension and other forces within member states which are
also essential for defining the term 'region'.
There is not one unified approach to the definition of 'region': "everybody
talks about 'region', but everybody means something different"59. This suggests the
need for a broad definition of the term 'region' which takes into account minimum
standards and thresholds. Different criteria apply to different circumstances. Not all
characteristics belonging to a region coincide in such a way that they form a
complete homogeneous entity with a distinctive historical, cultural, geographical
and economic-political identity, and on the assumption that the 'region' is subject to
a mixture of different elements, this thesis will focus on the 'region' as an entity
which is diverse and lacks uniformity.
Preserving the diversity of the many European regions proves difficult to the
development of a European regional policy and European spatial planning.
Subsequently, these difficulties also bear problems for transfrontier co-operation.
Governments in Central Eastern Europe regard their national territories as
homogeneous entities, divided into quasi regions with little administrative power.
The move from these quasi regions to the unclear definition of the region by the
European Union will be difficult, as transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier
of the European Union already shows.60
Frontiers, borders and boundaries
"Frontiers cannot be separated from the entities which they enclose"61. They
have "two faces, one to the interior of the system and the other to the external
environment".62 Given this Janus-face, one may describe "borders ...[as] indicators,
...[as] symbols. They signalise the state of relations between two governments, even
the nature of the government which administers the border"63. J. Ancel defined
59 Massart-Pierard, Franqoise (1970); "De la Notion de Region" in Colloque de l'A.I.E.; L'Europe
des Regions, p. 5. My translation.
60 This will be further explored in chapter four.
61 Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 178.
62 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From barrier to junction, p. 5.
63 Gross, Feliks (1973); "Registering and Ranking of Tension Areas" in Institute of International
Sociology; Boundaries and Regions, p. 325.
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borders as "political isobars"64. Indeed, borders may be taken as points of references
from which to view the consolidation, administration and co-operation processes of
the states in question.
The study of borders is multidisciplinary. It includes a number of various
forms of discourses: the political, legal, economic, sociological, historical and
anthropological.65 These discourses always "overlap but never coincide"66. Each
school gives the border a different meaning and interpretation. Until recently,
border studies concentrated on the historical formation of borders as limits to
national sovereignty, rather than on the borders' effects on the organisation and
development of territories.67 Nonetheless, four main functions of borders can be
identified according to the Swiss geographer Raffestin.68 First, the frontier is "the
basic political institution [which is] established by political decisions and regulated
by political texts."69 Frontiers are instruments of translation. They determine the
beginning and the end of a state. They are the first lines of contact, defence,
institutions of social coercion, and symbols of a variety of state powers."70 From a
legal point of view, borders delimit a state's national sovereignty. In either the
physical or symbolic sense, borders are a powerful expression of those who create
them, since it is the creators who decide on the length, extent and function of the
respective borders. Ideally, governments wish to construct, establish and sometimes
redraw borders "to secure territories which are valuable to them because of their
human or natural resources, or because these places have strategic or symbolic
64 J. Ancel cited in Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le geographe et les frontieres" in Renard,
Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le geographe et les frontieres, p. 47. My translation.
65 Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 2. See also Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From barrier
to junction, p. 1.
66 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "European Frontiers at the end of the twentieth century" in Anderson,
Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 5.
67 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le geographe et les frontieres" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le
geographe et les frontieres, p. 46.
68 C. Raffestin cited in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (1996); "Frontiers of Sovereignty in
the new Europe" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (ed.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 7.
69 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "European Frontiers at the end of the twentieth century" in Anderson,
Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 4.
70 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 10.
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importance to the state."71 The drawing of boundaries is usually done in such a way
as to protect the state's national interest and to maximise power and prosperity.
Second, frontiers are a means of regulation, to control "much of the traffic of
persons, goods and information"72. Frontiers can act as barriers and protect (or at
least attempt to protect) the respective state from unfavourable external influences.
Third, frontiers may also be bridges, connecting points. Increasing globalisation has
made the majority of frontiers permeable and encourages transfrontier co-operation
between neighbouring states. Fourth, frontiers are markers of identity and
differentiation.73 Frontiers may promote a sense of belonging and mark the unity of
the people living inside. This is usually materialised in frontier controls which
foster the
psychological significance of frontiers because they mark the limits of an authority
and define territory which one human group considers as a homeland from that of
another homeland.74
Frontiers may include by excluding. According to anthropologist Benedict
Anderson the non-existence of boundaries would make agglomerations of people
vulnerable to outside threats and put their identity into question. Virtually all
human groups draw boundaries according to their 'needs' - which explains the
existence of many different kinds and functions of boundaries. One may therefore
argue that frontiers are artificial, created by man in order to control peoples and
territory. Even the most "artificial frontier, the frontier most indifferent to its
physical or ethno-cultural human environment, as in Africa and the Belgo-French
frontier, creates differences amongst the peoples it divides by the simple reason that
it remains"73 and may become natural over time.
71 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 9.
72 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "European Frontiers at the end of the twentieth century" in Anderson,
Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 5.
73 See specifically Barth, Frederik (1970); "Introduction" in Barth, Frederik (ed.); Ethnic Groups
and Boundaries, pp. 9-38.
74 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU Enlargement, p. 31.
75 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le geographe et les frontieres" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le
geographe et les frontieres, p. 55. My translation.
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According to F. Ratzel, there are no good or bad frontiers, but the "quality
of the frontier depends as much on the country and its people as on its situation."76
In order to better understand the functions of boundaries, Oscar Martinez has
identified a model of four types of border interaction. He distinguishes between
alienated, co-existent, interdependent and integrated borderlands.77 We will see in
more detail in chapter four how and to what extent Martinez bases these distinctions
on the different "dialectical relationships between borders and their states"78,
between border and borderlands, and the respective neighbouring countries.
Historically speaking, the location and function of frontiers are not static. Frontiers
are "time written in space"79 or, according to Michel Foucher "time written in
spaces"80. They "are spatial and temporal records of relationships between local
communities and between states."81 The variables of time and space shift either
accordingly or disproportionally.
Differences in the definition of the term 'border' prevail. The terms 'frontier',
'border', or 'boundary' are often used synonymously. However, each of them has a
slightly different meaning. They are subject to different linguistic variations.
Whereas English distinguishes between the three terms mentioned above, German
only uses one word for all three - Grenze. French, in contrast, employs four words, -
frontiere, front, limite and marched
76 F. Ratzel in Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le geographe et les frontieres" in Renard, Jean-
Pierre (ed.); Le geographe et les frontieres, p. 54. My translation.
77 Martinez, Oscar (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive (ed.); World
Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 2. A similar model is also developed by Ratti, Remigio (1996);
"Problematique de la ffontiere et du developpement des regions-frontieres" in Territoires
frontaliers: Disconitnuite et cohesion, Sciences de la Societe, No. 17/ February 1996; pp. 38-42.
78 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 3.
79 J. Rupnik cited in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (1996); "Frontiers of Sovereignty in the
new Europe" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (ed.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 1. See
also Foucher, Michel (1998); "The geopolitics of European Frontiers" in Anderson, Malcolm and
Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 249; Ratti, Remigio (1996); "Problematique de la
frontiere et du developpement des regions-frontieres" in Territoires frontaliers: Disconitnuite et
cohesion, Sciences de la Societe, No. 17/ February 1996, p. 38.
80 Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, p. 472. My translation and emphasis.
81 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 5.
82 Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 9. Frontiere derives from the military term front and
determines the limit of a territory's expansion. Front defines the frontier line, that is the position line
from which the enemy was to be faced (cf. I'af/rowtement = confrontation). Limite describes the line
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In English, the term 'frontier' has the widest meaning. It can refer to the
exact line at which a state's national jurisdiction supposedly ends, as well as to the
'limes', the territorial frontier zone which extends across or away from the
aforementioned line into a state's territory. This frontier zone may have a socio-
cultural system at its basis83, but should be distinguished from the term 'borderland'.
This frontier or frontier zone is also called an imperial border, "forming a corridor
between two kingdoms"84 for defensive reasons. Similar to 'frontier', the word
'border' can also refer to either the line of delimitation or to a zone next to the edges
of the nation-state. This zone, however, is much narrower than the area implied by a
'frontier'. It may be a zone acting as a filter or a gateway. As opposed to the
frontier's association with limitation and confrontation, shock or rupture,
'borderland' suggests life, animation and creation in relation to the boundary85 (see
below).
Finally, 'boundary' has the narrowest meaning of all three terms, since it has
a "linear, one-dimensional quality"86. In 1895, the German geographer Frederik
Ratzel equated the state's boundaries to the skin of a living organism.87 It defends
and controls exchanges passing into and out of the state. Accordingly, 'boundary'
limits itself to the line of demarcation alone. It describes the definite barrier per se.
Malcolm Anderson, in his book Frontiers, uses the term 'boundary' to demarcate
sub-state "frontiers of political and administrative authorities"88; 'frontier' is used to
describe an international boundary, the edge at which states meet.
which separates two territories. Marche refers to a state's frontier region. See also Foucher, Michel
(1998); "The geopolitics of European Frontiers" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.);
The Frontiers ofEurope, 235-236, and for an even more detailed analysis, distinguishing between
different types of frontiers, see Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, pp. 38-47.
83 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From barrier to junction, p. 18.
84 Winichakul, Thongchai (1996); "Siam mapped - the making of Thai nationhood" in The
Ecologist, Vol. 26/No. 5, p. 216.
85 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le geographe et les frontieres" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le
geographe et lesfrontieres, p. 55.
86 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From barrier to junction, p. 18. See also Kramer, Raimund (1998);
Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 13.
87 Prescott, John R. V. (1987); Political Frontiers and Boundaries, p. 10.
88 Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 10.
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In the United States, the reverse is the case. 'Frontier' refers to a zone, a
moving section, "a point where wilderness and civilisation collide."89 The American
usage of 'border', however, usually relates to the international frontier as seen
above.
Borderlands
The definition of 'region' is, as we have seen, problematic. When it comes to
borderlands, the definition is even further complicated. The following questions
arise: should the definition of border region be limited to quantitative features, in
terms of distance of the region in question from the actual border area? Or, should
one rather rely on qualitative terms, that is to say on the natural economic, political,
historical and social structure of a region close to the border with a strong sense of
regional border identity?
The European Union remains vague about the definition of borderlands. It
comes close to defining borderlands when it speaks about transfrontier co-operation
on its Eastern frontier. Regulation No. 94/C 180/13, concerning Interreg II, refers to
"all areas along the internal and external borders of the Community delineated at
administrative level III of the Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical Units (NUTS)
III"90. However, this definition is not satisfactory, since it does not take into account
that borderlands are marked by the existence of frontiers, to the extent that "border
regions are structured by the frontier; they either reject or live in communion with
the frontier."91
Given the different interpretative definitions of the term 'frontier', border
regions may either refer to "a region lying astride the boundary"92, namely the line
demarcating a state's legal sovereignty, or to "a concept of a marginal or peripheral
89 Frederick Turner cited in Heindl, Waltraud and Saurer, Edith (1998); Grenzen und
Grenziiberschreitungen, pamphlet for Bundesministerium fur Wissenschaft und Verkehr. My
translation. See also Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 10.
90 European Communities (1994); Official Journal of the European Communities, No.C 180, p.61.
91 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le geographe et les frontieres" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le
geographe et les frontieres, p. 57. My translation.
92 Ratti, Remigio (1993); "How can existing barriers and border effects be overcome?" in Cappellin,
Riccardo and Batey, Peter J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European integration, p.
60.
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zone"93, that is a 'frontier' or 'border'. Indeed, the centre/periphery relation often
justifies the definition of borderlands. Borderlands are often perceived as being
remote and isolated, because they are located at the outer edges of nation-states,
both the geographical and sovereignty margins of the respective nation-states. As
Martinez states rightly:
border zones are distinct within their respective nation-states, because of their
location, which in many cases is far from the core, and because of the international
climate produced by adjacency to another country.94
In the past,
every state concentrated on the development of its own interior and thought of
borders mainly in military terms, as points of possible invasion or as bases for
further conquest; in both cases, as possible battlefields. Industrial and civilian
development of such areas was often considered unwise; communication
infrastructures thinned out and often disappeared in the area close to the border.95
Accordingly, some borderlands may be classified as "strategically important
(because of possible conflict), others may be marginalised and 'unimportant' from
the point of view of the core areas, both economically and strategically."96 Like the
individual region, each borderland is particular. Each has its own history and
characteristics. The borderlands' specific problems depend on the region's location,
as well as the national economic and social structure. Some border regions may
"suffer from economic and social marginalisation.... [T]he existence of frontiers
undeniably obstructed the development of the border regions"97. In order to survive,
"areas along the border were primarily nationally oriented"98, leading to a strong
93 Ratti, Remigio (1993); "How can existing barriers and border effects be overcome?" in Cappellin,
Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European
integration, p. 60.
94 Oscar Martinez (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive (ed.); World
Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 8.
95 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1983); "Frontier regions: future collaboration or conflict?" in Anderson,
Malcolm (ed.); Frontier Regions in Western Europe, p. 123.
96 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Co-operation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen, Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 257.
97 Veen van der, Anne and Boot, Dirk-Jan (1995); "Cross-border co-operation and European
regional policy" in Eskelinen, Heikki and Snickars, Folke (eds.); Competitive European Peripheries,
p. 76.
98 Veen van der, Anne and Boot, Dirk-Jan (1995); "Cross-border co-operation and European
regional policy" in Eskelinen, Heikki and Snickars, Folke (eds.); Competitive European Peripheries,
p. 76.
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dependency on the centre. As a result, co-operation amongst borderlands "can be
seen as an attempt to diminish this dependency and to achieve more autonomy with
the help of other regions facing similar circumstances"99.
Other important elements also influence the nature of border regions, such
as social, cultural and ethnic factors. Borderlands are exposed to "foreign values,
ideas, customs, traditions, institutions, tastes and behaviour"100 and therefore enjoy
a high degree of cultural and ethnic diversity. As we will see in chapter four, with
the example of the Eastern frontier of the European Union, borderlands may share
unique local ethnic and economic characteristics which are more likely to tie them
to each other rather than to their respective national culture. Malcolm Anderson
takes into account human geography when he defines border region as "an area
adjacent to an international boundary, whose population is affected in various ways
by the proximity of that boundary."101 Borderlands on either side of a border are
often historically and culturally linked and the
unique forces, processes, and characteristics that set apart borderlands from
interior zones include transnationalism, international conflict and accommodation,
otherness, and separateness.102.
Borderlanders may come to "think of themselves as different from people of
interior zones and outsiders perceive them that way as well... People in border
regions are frequently closely associated with foreigners, particularly in cases of
intense cross-boundary interaction."103 Borderlanders may feel detached from
central government's bureaucratic machinery, and may "frequently develop interests
that clash with central governments or with mainstream culture"104. In extreme
cases, they might even consider to circumvent laws in order to preserve and develop
99 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Co-operation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen, Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 267.
100 Oscar Martinez (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive (ed.); World
Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 9.
101 Anderson, Malcolm (1983); "The political problems of frontier regions" in Anderson, Malcolm
(ed.); Frontier regions in Western Europe, p. 1.
102 Oscar Martinez (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive (ed.); World
Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 8.
103 Oscar Martinez (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive (ed.); World
Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 12 and 6.
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their own regional interests, such as to maintain the special relationship they enjoy
with the respective neighbouring countries.
Increasing trends in globalisation and internationalisation have developed
growing interdependence and co-operation between nation-states. The majority of
frontiers are losing their traditional roles and are becoming bridges rather than
barriers. It is now "the border region which becomes the most pertinent object of
study"105, since "[b]orders and borderlands present the image of a typical
paradox."106 The eradication of frontiers has enhanced the borderlands' stance in the
international environment. Borderlands may now be described as
regions and areas in which transborder co-operation projects take place... as
concrete areas which are functionally interconnected. Other characteristics for
borderlands is the meeting of different national systems and structures, such as
legal systems, administration structures, economies, norms, financial systems and
cultural communities.107
Frontier regions often seem to be the hinge and motor for increased
interaction between nation-states. This was certainly the case in the European
Union. According to the 1980 Council of Europe's Madrid Convention of
Transborder Co-operation, "past experience... shows that co-operation between
local and regional authorities in Europe makes it easier for them to carry out their
tasks effectively and contributes in particular to the improvement and development
of frontier regions".108
104 Oscar Martinez (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive (ed.); World
Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 13.
105 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le geographe et les frontieres" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.);
Le geographe et les frontieres, p. 52. My translation.
106 Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalisation" in Nolutshungu, Sam
(ed.); Margins of Insecurity, p. 277.
107 Gabbe cited in Morhard, Bettina (1995); "Lokale grenziiberschreitende Kooperation in der
deutsch-polnischen Grenzregion im Spannungsfeld regionaler, nationaler und europaischer Politik"
in Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September
28-30, 1995, Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 36. My translation.
108 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, Preamble.
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Europe
The growth of the European Union and prospective EU enlargement
towards the East, has rendered the question of defining Europe more urgent and
important.109 It has become increasingly evident that Europe is difficult to define,
since it has "little geographical coherence: it is not even a continent, strictly
speaking"110. Europe can be described in many different ways from as many
different perspectives. It carries
political significance and immense symbolic weight, but without clear definition
or agreed boundaries. The word 'Europe' has been... freely used in political
debate..., though rarely defined,... mixing geographical space with economic and
social interaction and with political and cultural identity.1"
In the EU member states, the concept of the European Union is often
incorrectly perceived as being representative of the term Europe. Already, "[fjrom
the outset, the Community had considered itself as synonymous with Europe."112
This made the distinction between Central Eastern European and (Western)
European countries even more pronounced. Member states of the European
Community, together with other liberal democracies lying to the West of the Iron
Curtain, were clearly defined as European, or Western European. Western Europe,
and specifically the European Union have hence become a pars pro toto for Europe.
This was enhanced by the slogan "Europe 1992" which referred to the European
Union only and blurred Europe's entire common geographic, cultural or social
features.
Europe has never had any natural frontiers - such as a mountain range like
the Pyrenees which divides France and Spain"1 - to the East. It may therefore be
109 Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (1994); "Introduction: The Anthropology of
Europe" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 26.
110 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans,
Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 6.
111 Wallace, William (1991); The transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 7.
112 Dinan, Desmond (1994), Ever closer Union?, p. 158.
113 It may, however, be suggested that the geographical features determining the present Eastern
frontier of the European Union are the Oder-NeiBe rivers, as well as the metalliferous mountain
range between Germany and Czech Republic; Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, p. 485.
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argued that Europe's borders are "a matter of politics and ideology"114 which takes
into account other concepts, such as politics, culture, language and nationhood to
define a space. Applying them to Europe, however, is not easy, since Europe is a
conglomeration of different nations, ethnic communities, religious and political
beliefs which are affected by various economic, societal, political, military and
environmental factors. Many attempts to delimit Europe's boundaries have failed,
since its various historical, geographical, political, economic and cultural patterns
do not overlap simultaneously.
Ancient maps115 of Europe depict the geographical area of Europe as an
homogeneous unified space. With Jerusalem at the centre of the map, ancient maps
do not clearly demarcate any boundaries and entities, nor do they show any clear
boundaries delimiting Europe from the rest. The names of kingdoms and empires
were indicated, but the area was not precisely delineated. In addition, areas beyond
Europe were either incomplete or not shown at all. Soledad Garcia argues that these
maps were solely "tools for self-location and for expanding knowledge"116.
Similarly, David Leshock argues that these medieval maps helped to define and
place the European space within an highly ordered already existing hierarchical
space.117 This abstract depiction of Europe delimited Europe against the unknown
'other'.
The meaning of the term Europe has not always implied the same thing, but
it has changed over time and according to contexts and its many socio-cultural,
religious, political and economic elements. To the present day, these factors are
deeply enmeshed, and one may argue that it is exactly the mixture of these variables
which define 'Europe'. Europe remains subject to "mental maps, imagined space"118
114 Wallace, William (1991); The Transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 8.
115 For a more detailed account, see Wintle, Michael (1996); "Europe's image: Visual representations
of Europe from the earliest times to the twentieth century" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe
1,6 Garcia, Soledad (1993); "Europe's fragmented identities and the frontiers of citizenship" in
Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, p. 6.
117 Leshock, David (1996); To conquer our right heritage, p. 2. "Michel Foucault calls medieval
space the 'space of emplacement' because of this need to define where spaces fit within in an already
accepted hierarchy."
118 Wallace, William (1991); The Transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 7.
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and, as will be suggested in chapter five, Europe is a myth whose "hybrid nature"119
remains enigmatic and elusive. In an attempt to understand Europe, the
juxtaposition of an assumed united 'Europe' against the 'other' - specifically on
religious and political grounds - has helped scholars to perceive 'Europe'. But as
will be shown later, this 'other' has also changed at different times in history.
Historically, the 'other' was generally from the East, namely Asia. The 'other' was
feared and thought of being territorially and mentally different from the known 'us'.
119 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.);
Schengen and the Southern Frontier of the European Union, p. 35.
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2. B Definition of identity, national identity and European identity
When writing about European identity, one should also take into account the
social dimension of group identities. Consequently, this section will look at the
socio-psychological approach to identity1, without losing sight of the fact that
the most essential feature of identity is its multiple nature. It is possible to have a
single identity, but it will always be made up of several other if not myriad
separate identifications or identities, some of which may be contradictory. Some
will be stronger than others, and the pattern will change over time. Individuals
have identities, as do groups (families, nations, ethnies, classes, age-groups, etc.),
and it may be that one has rather more choice about one's individual identity than
one does over one's group identity.2
Henri Tajfel has referred to this multiple nature of identity as a social
toolbox.3 The Social Identity Theory, as developed by Tajfel, describes the process
in which identity is constructed through a number of socio-psychological factors. It
is applicable to all sorts of group identity formation, including that of national
identity. In fact, Tajfel uses the term 'group' in accordance to Emerson's definition
of the 'nation': "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a
body of people who feel that they are a nation"4. Only the body of people 'A' can
feel like nation 'A', and the body of people 'B' as nation 'B'. Each specific kind of
group identification belongs and is exclusive to the group in question. Strong group
identification, however, does not imply that the group remains isolated from its
greater environment. On the contrary. Interaction with other groups must continue,
in order to reinforce group identification. In fact, it is widely argued that group
identification processes are subject to social interaction.
1 Although social psychology is the usual term, this thesis will employ the term socio-psychology,
since the prefix 'socio' may imply that there is a wider socio-political awareness to the social-
psychological approach.
2 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.);
Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 22.
3 Tajfel, Henri and Fraser, Colin (1978); "Social Psychology as Social Science" in Tajfel, Henri and
Colin, Fraser (eds.); Introducing Social Psychology, Penguin, London, pp. 21-53.
4 Tajfel, Henri (1978); "Intergroup Behaviour: Individualistic Perspectives" in Tajfel, Henri and
Colin, Fraser (eds.); Introducing Social Psychology, p. 402.
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Belonging to a group "implies a boundary: you belong because others do
not."5 Group identification may, in fact, be intensified by contrasting 'us' against
'them'. Since any kind of identity - individual, group, local, regional, national or
European - is a jigsaw of different kinds of pieces, characteristics, factors and roles,
it often seems easier to juxtapose the identity in question against another identity
which may be fictional and invented or even known to be different, foreign or - in
the extreme case - malignant and hostile. R. D. Laing even argues that if "[tjhere is
no external danger, then danger and terror have to be invented and maintained. Each
person has to act on the others to maintain the nexus [identity] in them."6 Related,
Kristeva argues that the "search for identity is always... a 'hate reaction', a
determination to isolate, exclude and oppress others."7 A comparison with this
'other' reinforces 'our' sense of identity, our self-image and self-identification. In
return, "[o]ne way of understanding our neighbours better is to compare them with
ourselves."8 The distinction between 'us' and 'them' draws a line between insiders
and outsiders and determines the inclusion/exclusion criteria for belonging to a
specific group. 'They' construct 'us', as much as 'we' construct 'them'.
The socio-psychological approach to identity
'Identity' is an amorphous abstract concept difficult to define. The definition
of the term may be approached from various different angles: socio-psychology,
philosophy, anthropology, sociology, politics, culture, history and many other.
Nonetheless, not one of these approaches is sufficient enough to define the term in
an appropriate and precise manner; none takes into account all the different
variables of identity. Hence, there is not one single theory which embraces all the
aspects implied by the term 'identity'.
5 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Edwards,
Geoffrey and Pijpers, Alfred (eds.); The Politics ofEuropean Treaty Reform, p. 266.
6 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 74.
7 Kristeva cited in Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and the Other Europeans" in Journal ofCommon Market
Studies, Vol. 35/No. 1, p. 87.
8 Millar, Stuart (1998); "Europe: a single market divided by a common set of statistics" in The
Guardian, March 21, 1998.
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Orrin Klapp suggests that members of society are nowadays more and more
concerned with questions relating to their personal identity, turning their attention
inwards. This turning inwards may be attributed to increasing social welfare and
economic abundance, since "it is only as material problems are solved that we get
time to sit around and ask questions about ourselves"9. Jurgen Habermas also
asserts that "modernity is the obsession with determining identities, of defining self
and other."10 The central questions we ask ourselves revolve around our distinctive
features and characteristics which distinguish 'us' from 'them', 'What am I?', 'Wfio
am I?'", 'To what extent am I a product of society or self-created?' and "Why and
how do I persist and change?"12.
Identity is not a determinate, 'whole' thing. It is not fixed, but fluid and
under constant transformation. Identity ensures continuity of history and traditions.
It is forged over time by different traditions, aspirations and interactions. It is an
ever-changing variable which may be constructed by real and fictional political,
social and cultural processes. Sometimes the account of the past, claimed to be a
true historical record, is invented in its entirety as an "image of the desired present
and future"13. Each generation tends to rewrite its own history with hindsight and in
terms of present needs. Memory is very selective.
Identity can be shared. Identity is part of our existence and central to our
sense of ourselves, particularly our psychological well-being. An 'identity crisis', for
example, easily leads to individual discomfort, depression and sense of loss.
Identity both provides us with a sense of belonging and is the result of social
interaction. Identity describes the "ways and circumstances in which peoples define
9
Klapp, Orrin, E. (1969); Collective Searchfor Identity, p. 4.
10 Jurgen Habermas cited in Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and Other Europeans" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 35/No. 1, p. 87. See also Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of
Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 2.
" According to Richard Rorty, the "What are we?" is quite different from the traditional
philosophical "Who are we?". To him, the "what?" question is scientific or metaphysical, the
"who?" is political. Rorty, Richard (1996); "Moral Universalims and Economic Triage" during
UNESCO Philosophy Forum, Paris, www.unesco.org/phiweb/uk/2rpu/rort/rort.html, p. 1.
12 Bat Smit de la, Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change prompt changes in
personal and social identity?", paper presented during European Student Chaplain's Conference,
Conference in Visegrad, June 1-7, 1994, p. 5.
13 Strauss, Anselm L. (1969); Mirrors and Masks, p. 167.
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themselves and are defined by others"14. It provides us with the tools to facilitate
different interactions with different peoples. These different tools make up the
different aspects of identity. The totality of such aspects determines the individual's
identity, as much as the individual and his/her environment constructs each of these
aspects of identity. Each individual or group may have multiple identities,
attachments and loyalties. If we were to take the individual as a receptacle or the
actual toolbox15 - to remain with the analogy - used above, then the different circles
of identity are the content(s). They are the different tools which either lie orderly or
disorderly in this social toolbox. It is the toolbox which holds the different tools
together and may bring them in relation to each other - and it is the tools which give
meaning to the toolbox.
The same may be said about the different circles of identities fluctuating in
an individual, as well as the "hybrid nature of Europeanness."16 An individual "can
hold a number of identities concurrently,... many personal and social identities,
which are in a state of flux or development."17 In this sense, Anna may have an
identity as a woman, French citizen, Catholic, student (sub-section: Ph.D. student),
tutor, and so on. It is she who, according to the situation, adopts consciously or
subconsciously, the respective identity and goes "shopping for the 'most suitable'
identity as we go shopping for our seasonal wardrobes."18 To a great extent, then,
identity is chosen, but usually, as we will see below, identity is all-pervasive. In
extreme situations, Anna might be forced to mediate between conflictual identities
14 MacDonald, Sharon (1993); "Identity complexes in Western Europe" in MacDonald, Sharon (ed.);
Inside European identities, p. 6.
15 Philosopher Martin Heidegger has also used the analogy of the actual toolbox, together with its
tools, in order to explain his theory on relativism. Similarly, Michel Foucault has made reference to
a toolkit.
16 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.);
Schengen and the Southern Frontier ofthe European Union, p. 35.
17 Bat Smit de la, Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change prompt changes in
personal and social identity?", paper presented during European Student Chaplain's Conference,
Conference in Visegrad, June 1-7, 1994, p. 7.
18 Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question
ofIdentity, p. 2.
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and settle with one specific identity which will help her act according to the
situation.19
Aquinas and later John Locke have described a state of mind which is
untouched by experience or sensation as a tabula rasa, an empty slate. This empty
slate suggests that "[w]e enter the world as purely physical beings", and as we grow
older, "we labour pridefully to establish identities, selves distinct from our bodies.
Not what we are but who we are."20 During this identity formation process, post-
Marxists and post-structuralists would argue that different structures and discourses
influence, or may even create, our state of mind and formation of personal identity.
On the other hand, Marxists argue that Marxist economic determinants are of
primary importance to an individual's and, on a higher level, a nation's creation of
identity.
This chapter will demonstrate that there is no closure to identity formation.
Day after day the toolbox gets filled with more and more tools, with one tool lying
on top of the other. Some older tools may lie at the bottom of the toolbox, only to
be crushed by other tools. The toolbox will soon contain a collection of multiple
tools: often used tools (possibly lying handy on top), improved tools which may
incorporate many other tools (such as a Swiss army knife), and new tools which
might replace some older tools, because these are broken or unsuitable. Everyday
structures and discourses, hence, may engender the individual's identity and
multiple sub-identities. According to the situation and the individual's choice, only
one of these identities or a set of identities might be dominant and at work.
Different parts of identities in such a set of identities may complement each other,
overlap or be carried from one context to another, even if often grossly
contradictory.21 However, it is "fo]nly rarely [that] they come into conflict, and only
19 This mediation between conflictual identities is, as will be mentioned later in the thesis, central to
the European Union's institutional architecture and its mediation between normative structures
emerging from the European integration process.
20 Oates, Joyce Carol (1998); "Jail bait" in The Guardian, October 10, 1998.
21 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 82.
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rarely... does one allegiance override others. Identity, in other words, is
'situational'."22
It is particularly interesting to concentrate on the clash of identities, which,
on a European level, is a fundamental aspect of analysis of this thesis. Anna's
identity as a student and a tutor would clash, for instance, if she were to meet her
supervisor and one of her students at the same time. Such an identity clash may
suggest that each individual's identity is an independent field. However, these fields
are not always independent, but rather interdependent. They may be accommodated,
since they are transcendental independent fields. Robin Cohen has called this the
"fuzzy frontiers"23 of identity - a term which will gain in importance later in the
thesis with Michel Foucher's account of the Eastern frontier of the European Union.
Cohen's term suggests that depending on the situation, different aspects of identity
may complement each other or overlay one another. In how far an overlay can
actually change an aspect of identity, or in the extreme case, the entire individual's
toolbox, from square to round and blue to red, was at the centre of debate during the
Karla Faye Tucker case.24
Karla Faye Tucker's change of identity from a drug consuming prostitute to
a girl that "had been touched by the Lord and ought to be spared"25 aroused much
controversy in the United States. Should Karla Faye Tucker still be executed for a
crime she committed fifteen years ago - when she was a prostitute - although she
has now become religiously converted and would not be regarded as being able to
commit another such crime? Would Karla Faye Tucker have committed the murder
if she had been a believer in 1983? Similarly, would Karla Faye Tucker have
become religiously converted if she had not been imprisoned? Karla Faye Tucker
22 Smith, Anthony D. (1993); "The ethnic sources of nationalism" in Survival, Vol. 35/No. 1, p. 49.
See also Parin, Paul (1994); "Heimat, eine Plombe" in Die Zeit, December 23, 1994.
23 Cohen, Robert (1994); The Fuzzy Frontiers ofIdentity.
24 Karla Faye Tucker was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1983 by a jury in Texas. At
that time, Karla Faye Tucker was a prostitute and under the heavy influence of drugs. She admitted
the murder, first robbing and then killing her victim with a pickaxe, each swing of which gave her a
sexual thrill (The Economist (1998); "Man, woman, death and God", February 7, 1998, pp. 58-59).
Imprisoned, however, Karla Faye Tucker put aside her past and turned to religion. Her religious
conversion went as far as to marry the prisoner's chaplain. International pleas for clemency,
including one from Pope John Paul II kept pouring into the Texas governor's office - however, in
vain. Karla Faye Tucker was executed on February 3, 1998.
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would have probably not married the prisoner's chaplain if she had continued to be
a drug-consuming prostitute.
The Karla Faye Tucker case is interesting, because it raises the question of
how far identities may change - whether it is one single aspect of identity or the
individual's entire identity which is able to change? Is it an identity renewal? If it is,
then
[i]dentity renewal and assimilation teach us that individuals can reflect not only
about the kind of human beings they would like to be, but also about the kind of
communal identity they would like to develop.26
Although Karla Faye Tucker is an extreme example, it clearly shows how
identities may overlay one another and how they sometimes conflict, even if they
are part of one and the same person. Karla Faye Tucker may not think that the
change from her past to her present personality or identity is an identity overlay or
even identity clash - certainly not in the same way as the public perceives it. Karla
Faye Tucker is possibly acting and living her dominant identity trait according to
the situation and moment in time. It is the public which is suspicious of the
sustainability and endurance of her 'latest' dominant identity. Individuals possess a
wide variety of different identity cards, each of which may become dominant in
specific situations. The environment, thereby, has an important impact on our sense
of private and public identity, our "individual identity and... shared identity..., that
is some kind of'social' or 'political' identity."27
Personal identity is often associated with the self as known by the self. This
assumes that each individual can be differentiated from all others. It is the sense of
our individual and unique sense of biography which makes this possible. Each
individual is assumed to have a unique biography, and the "embracing singleness of
life line is in sharp contrast to the multiplicity of selves one finds in the
individual".28 Personal identity, composed ofmultiple selves, however, does usually
not remain isolated. The individual feels the need to belong to a group, to a
25 The Economist {1998); "Man, woman, death and God", February 7, 1998, pp. 58.
26 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 29.
27 Bryder, Tom (1996); "A contribution from political psychology", unpublished, p. 2.
28 Goffman, Erving (1963); Stigma, p. 63.
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community, a social organisation. In it, the individual's personal identity "can and
does play a structured, routine, standardised role... just because of its one-of-a-kind
quality."29 Similarly, Tajfel and Turner have argued that this personal identity
changes when individuals find themselves in groups. In many situations, personal
identity might even give way to social identity. But the translation of the individual
identification process is not easily translated to the group level.30 According to
Tajfel and Turner's model, specification about group membership, social identity,
social comparison and psychological distinctiveness is a three-stage process. This
brings us back to the ever-changing content of the above-mentioned toolbox.
At the basis of Tajfel and Turner's model lies the argument that each
individual seeks a positive social identity or a positive self-conception in a group.
Hence, s/he searches for his/her specific niche in which s/he feels comfortable. In
order to conform to special expectations of the group, individuals may even change
some aspects of their behaviour and perception of identity criteria according to the
identity parameters of the group they wish to belong to. Group members hence
become subject to certain social pressures and roles31. They may internalise some of
the group's aspects, and it is this "reciprocal interiorisation by each of each other...
[which has] a primary function as a kind of group 'cement'."32 Each group has
different criteria at its basis and
in order that a group really jell, 1 must realise that you think of yourself as one of
Us, as I do, and that he thinks of himself as one of Us, as you and I do. I must
ensure furthermore that both you and he realise that I think ofmyself with you and
him, and you and he must ensure likewise that the other two realise that this We is
ubiquitous among us, not simply a private illusion on my, your or his part, shared
between two of us but not all three.31
Different criteria may present different social significances for different
groups and for their feeling of identity. While "people with blue eyes do not
29 Goffman, Erving (1963); Stigma, p. 57.
30 Tajfel also questioned whether individual behaviour influences group behaviour, or whether
group behaviour reflects upon individual behaviour.
31 Turner argues that - in the extreme case - group identification together with its social pressures
and roles may lead to a process of depersonalisation, i.e. we might loose sight of our personal
identity and stereotype ourselves according to our social identity.
32 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 72.
33 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 71-72.
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generally form a social group in distinction from those with brown eyes... people
with dark skins (even if their birthplace, language and culture do not distinguish
them from others around them) do form a 'group' in a variety of social situations"34.
The social significance of such features may be closely attributed to the question of
salience, i.e. the felt identity of group members may shift according to situational
and temporal circumstances. In this sense, specific group identities may become
salient in specific situations. Protestants in Northern Ireland, for instance, will not
think of themselves as having a Protestant identity unless they are in a setting which
includes Catholics and 'the other' dimension comes into play. Similarly, a British
working man will not think of himself as British in Sunderland, but will do so when
he is despised in Eastern Berlin. In the same sense, and an example suggesting a
sense of European identity, Neil MacCormick said on one occasion that "when I am
in London, I feel Scottish; when I am in Brussels, I feel British; when I am in
America, I feel European."
Once in the group in which the individual feels comfortable, s/he hopes that
her/his set of beliefs, distinctive characteristics and reference symbols are not a
private fantasy, but also shared by other group members. Individuals begin to define
themselves by their membership to a group and consider themselves as sharing the
characteristics of that group. Social categorisation becomes more important than
their individual attributes. Group membership can hence describe the individual as a
female, student, Catholic, British, and so on. Social groups present new identity
possibilities. Personal identity factors might become particularly salient - or in the
other extreme - suppressed in specific situations.
Such 'social behaviour' is central to the question of both individual and
group identity. Henri Tajfel defines social identity as the "individual knowledge
that he/she belongs to certain groups together with some emotional and value
significance to him/her of the group membership"35. The identity of the group is
constituted by the identities of its members. Group identity is not just the sum of its
34 Tajfel, Henri (1978); "Intergroup Behaviour: Group Perspectives" in Tajfel, Henri and Colin,
Fraser (eds.); Introducing Social Psychology, p. 425.
35 Abrams, Dominic and Hogg, Michael A. (1990); "An introduction to the social identity approach"
in Abrams, Dominic and Hogg, Michael A. (eds.); Social Identity Theory, p. 2.
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constituent parts, but it is more than that. "The group is a reality of some kind or
other"36 and translating this onto the European level, the same may be said about
Europe and European identity.
The constituent parts of a group are at the basis of this group identity, but
the interaction between these parts adds a certain dynamic to the group. The group
hence disposes of its own dynamic - a new kind of identity emerges for the group -
a revised form of the totality of all identities. According to Anselm Strauss, "groups
exist as such only because of the common symbolisation of their members"37. Henri
Tajfel also suggests that groups are not a thing, but the result of "cognitive
construction"38. They are formed out of psychological/symbolic rather than physical
reasons. Group formation is often initiated from similarities, such as a common
fate, ideologies, beliefs and interests, or even a shared threat. In addition, there are
also other visible and invisible common features - such as pigmentation, gender and
religion - which enhance interpersonal attraction and liking, and facilitate group
behaviour.
But, as Abrams and Hogg argue, "social identity only acquires meaning by
comparison to other social groups"39. Just as individuals seek positive social
identity, so too groups yearn for positive identification.40 To achieve this, groups
will tend to compare themselves positively with an out-group. They will emphasise
those aspects which they fare well with. The more favourable a group represents
itself, the more attractive it will be to individuals. But simply gathering around
symbolic points of agreement and taking a certain picture as the picture is not
enough. A group's existence needs to be recognised and validated by an 'other'.
Individuals, as well as groups, do not want to be ignored, but need awareness,
respect, recognition and a sense of validation. Their existence as such
(individuals/groups) stands in mutual dependence to the 'other', i.e. they want to see
36 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 76.
17 Strauss, Anselm L. (1969); Mirrors and Masks, p. 149.
38 Tajfel, Henri (1982); Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, p. 485.
39 Tajfel, Henri (1982); Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, p. 435.
40 This urge for validation and liking is a basic human need already analysed in the great classics of
political theory: Aristotle and later Hegel, for example, supported the theory that a group attempts to
gain recognition by armed conflict. In the case of victory, this kind of competition would boost the
group's self-esteem and identity.
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and to be seen. On a larger European scale, and as will be analysed below, this may
also apply to Europe.
Groups and individuals depend on each other by regarding themselves in the
mirror of the 'other' and the others' judgements. There is not just one mirror, but
"[i]t is probably better to think ofmany mirrors..., otherwise identity is assumed to
be a single entity."4' Jean-Paul Sartre explores this 'mirroring' to a great extent in his
play No Exit. Here, Sartre looks at interpersonal relationships and describes the
ways we perceive ourselves through the thoughts, perceptions and especially the
eyes of the 'other'. Sartre concludes that we cannot exist without the 'other', that we
are unable to define ourselves by us alone. In fact, we depend on the 'other' to
define ourselves. The frustration over this dependency has led Sartre to his famous
statement: "Hell is other people".42
Indeed, individuals and groups seek to be roughly regarded by the other as
'they' (we) see themselves (ourselves). According to R. D. Laing, we seek to
maintain this consensus, since "[w]e seem to need to share a communal meaning to
human existence, to give with others a common sense to the world"43. More
importantly, however, it gives a sense to ourselves. However, consensus is not
always self-evident, because both perceptions (the self and the other) do not always
coincide. Perceptions of us and them about ourselves may in fact sometimes oppose
each other. Still, opposites attract and it is in this way that each individual or group
attempts to define the self. This is often done through direct positive social
comparison. This comparison, however, is only to succeed if I were to emphasise
what I am not in relation to the 'other'.
Each of us creates the 'other' by renouncing his/her own identity, in
particular the negative aspects thereof. Hardly anybody wishes to be reminded of
his/her own mistakes. For some of us, it is already difficult enough to admit our
mistakes to ourselves. Nevertheless, we do not mind to point them out in other
41 Bat Smit de la, Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change prompt changes in
personal and social identity?", paper presented during European Student Chaplain's Conference,
Conference in Visegrad, June 1-7, 1994, p. 6.
42 Sartre, Jean-Paul (1943); "Huis Clos" in Gore, Keith (1987) (ed.); Jean-Paul Sartre: Huis Clos, p.
95. My translation.
43 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 65.
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people. In fact, pointing them out in other people might even help develop our self-
evaluation, since we do not expose our, even the same, mistakes at that very
moment. Seeing certain aspects of identity in the other sometimes makes us aware
of traits that we actually carry in ourselves. We see them clearer, but are
nonetheless not as strongly affected by them, because we see them in an indirect
rather than direct way, that is not in us, but 'them'. We see them through the 'other'
and become observers of ourselves. This observer-status allows us to look upon
ourselves as objects rather than subjects. One could therefore argue that we become
alienated from ourselves.
This form of objectivity may also be regarded as a form of self-denial,
particularly a self-denial of our own mistakes. Such objectivity then, may even help
us to control our behaviour vis-a-vis the other. Objectivity also induces us to
portray specific aspects of our self in certain situations. It may, for instance, help us
to keep up good appearances, because approaching somebody with our assumed
infallibility44 creates a positive image of our selfhood and also makes us stand in a
positive light in the eyes of the other. Furthermore, we might seem invulnerable and
thus may be viewed as dealing from a position of strength. Our positive appearance,
hence, may heighten the level of recognition amongst the other45, as well as bolster
our self-esteem. For the group, a positive conception of itself is important to the
group's continuing existence.46 In order to uphold this favourable conception of
ourselves versus the other, individuals and groups often develop stereotypes of the
other.47
44 For a philosophical understanding of assumed infallibility, see John Stuart Mill (1962);
Utilitarianism, Fontana Press, London, pp. 143-144.
45 Despite having said that individuals and groups define themselves against the 'other' by what they
are not, and having specifically focused on an individual's or group's negative traits, positive traits
may also have a great influence on our sense of identity, even if not to such a considerable extent.
46 Billig, Michael (1997); Banal Nationalism, p. 66.
47 Stereotypes describe "a set of fixed ideas and beliefs held by members of one or more groups
about members of another group" (Tajfel, Henri (1978); "Intergroup Behaviour: Group
Perspectives" in Tajfel, Henri and Colin, Fraser (eds.); Introducing Social Psychology, p. 427).
Stereotyping does not necessarily differentiate between good or bad, but "determines the dimensions
along which the bias ofjudgement takes place" (Tajfel, Henri (1978); "Intergroup Behaviour: Group
Perspectives" in Tajfel, Henri and Colin, Fraser (eds.); Introducing Social Psychology, p. 429).
Generally, however, stereotypes distinguish between favourable and flattering characteristics of the
in-group, and unfavourable demeaning ones for the out-group.
Chapter 2.B - 50
Our quest for recognition, nevertheless, might soon lead ourselves into a
never-ending spiral, since the other is also in search of the same quest and uses us
as his/her other. As much as other individuals and groups are they to us, we are they
to them. R. D. Laing carries this model even further by stating that "[e]ach person is
expected to be controlled, and to control others, by the reciprocal effect that each
has on the other. To be affected by the other's actions or feelings is 'natural'"48. "The
common bond between Us may be the other."49 However, this is not always the
case. It only seems as if all members of a group may take part in this model of the
never-ending spiral, for "members are themselves aware of their belonging to
different entities."50 This brings us back to the toolbox analogy, in which the group
is the toolbox and its constituent part are the different tools in this toolbox. A
group, in fact, consists of an infinite number of sub-groups or layers. A group may
only bond in some situations and contexts, but not in others. The juxtaposition
against the other does not always work for the entire group, since a comparison
against the 'other' only focuses on a few of the alleged group characteristics.51
Overlapping interests of sub-groups from different groups may lead to
disputes and conflicts between the different constituent parts of the individual
group. In addition, internal mistrust may result in prolonged internal conflict52 - an
important problem inherent to the European Union and its constituent member
states. Mistrust may even occur in the smallest of groups. In the extreme case, some
sub-groups of group 'A' may become part of group 'B', since they identify with
other sub-groups of group 'B'. According to the toolbox analogy then, some sub¬
groups would probably be better off in another toolbox (as for instance the kitchen
drawer).53 Different parts of a group may hence regard each other as the 'other',
although they are members of the same group.
48 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 75.
49
Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 77.
50 Cohen, Anthony (1982); "Belonging: the experience of culture" in Cohen, Anthony (ed.);
Belonging: identity and social organisation in British and rural cultures, p. 16.
51 Wetherell, Margaret (1996); Identities, groups and social issues, p. 34.
52 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 164.
53 Later in this thesis, a similar argument will be made about border regions, which are tied to
national politics, law, some common cultural traits and national boundaries, but which may
nonetheless share a common identity with border regions on the other side of the frontier. Cultural,
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A
In order to settle these disputes, language is regarded as an important
instrument, although
[o]ur language is only partially adequate to express this state of affairs. On level 1,
two people, or two groups, may agree or disagree. As we say, they see eye to eye
or otherwise. They share a common point of view. But on level 2 they may or may
not think they agree or disagree, and they may or may not be correct in either case.
Whereas level 1 is concerned with agreement or disagreement, level 2 is
concerned with understanding or misunderstanding. Level 3 is concerned with a
third level of awareness: what do I think you think I think? That is, with realisation
of or failure to realise second level understanding or misunderstanding on the
basis of first level agreement or disagreement. Theoretically, there is no end to
these levels.54
But although there might be no end to these levels, there might be a way
into these levels, by breaking them up to bring about understanding. Jacques
Derrida, the main founder of the deconstructionist movement, proposes that
language should not be taken as the ultimate end. Instead, words only become
meaningful when put into relation with one another. Meanings of words depend on
context. As a result, given the many different possibilities of contexts and relations
between words, there is not just one sole way of interpretation of things, but an
infinite multiplicity thereof. A word, a text may be interpreted and re-interpreted in
many different ways, so as to give a new meaning. Language is hence not static, but
has "formative and relational power"55. More importantly, however, language also
has a "social function of co-ordinating diverse social actions."56
Language "is amongst the most salient dimensions of group identity"57,
since group life "is organised around communication, which does not only consist
in transmissions of ideas but also signifies shared meanings."58 Language is an
essential instrument to create understanding, linguistically and contextually. It
historic and socio-economic forces across the frontier may sometimes be stronger than forces
working within the national territory.
54 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics ofExperience, p. 66-67.
55 Shorter, John (1993); Cultural Policies ofEveryday Life, p. 202.
56 Mills cited in Shorter, John (1993); Cultural Politics ofEveryday Life, p. 202.
57 Sachdev, Itesh and Bourhis, Richard (1990); "Language and social identification" in Abrams,
Dominic and Hogg, Michael A. (eds.); Social Identity Theory, p. 216.
58 Strauss, Anselm L. (1969); Mirrors and Masks, p. 148.
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defines, delineates and/or denies the existence of particular groups.59 This
underlines Karl Deutsch's argument that identity may be forged through the "ability
to communicate more efficiently, and over a wider range of subjects, with members
of one large group than with outsiders."60 Similarly, Ernest Gellner suggests that an
effective communication system is able to maintain a nation-state's culture.61 This,
however, is not to claim that language is the central factor to identity. Nevertheless,
it is an essential tool to understand verbal discourse, such as songs and writing, or
to interpret hidden non-verbal signs of communication, such as religion,
pigmentation, ethnic dress and ornamentation. Language may act as a bridge
between the different emerging identities within a group, so as to avoid radical
misunderstanding and opposition and to reach a consensus.
Language helps to categorise the social environment by naming and placing
it. This in turn helps us to classify and put 'us' and the 'other' into perspective and
relation with each other. It defines 'us' and the 'other' by marking the boundaries of
'us' and 'them'. Language and its respective group are interrelated, because they
stand in a two-way process: the group influences the language and the language the
group - its apogee being the ethnolinguistic identity of a group, namely the
institutionalisation of language. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the
relation between language and a group's identity is static, because identity is also
dependent on other non-linguistic means, such as the economic social development
of the respective group.
Issues relating to national identity
As we have seen, the socio-psychological approach to identity is the result
of social construction and describes the ways in which people define themselves
and are defined by others. This social interaction between the individual and the
group certainly challenges the idea that identity is 'given' and that identity is solely
the result of either the individual will or the volonte generate. "Nationalists stress
59 Laszlo, Kurti and Langman, Juliet (1997); "Introduction: Searching for Identities in the New East
Central Europe" in Laszlo, Kurti and Langman, Juliet (eds.); Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural
Identities in the New East and Central Europe, p. 11.
60 Karl Deutsch cited in Schlesinger, Philip (1991); Media, State and Nation, p. 157.
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the inescapable social aspect of personal identity"62 and argue that an individual's or
group's identity is formed by a multitude of independent and interdependent factors.
Nations, in fact, may be subject to the same processes. It seems as if the social
aspects or social consciousness of the individual become objectified in the nation.63
Indeed, a nation's boundaries, specifically a nation-state's borders are much clearer
defined than a group's. They may, in fact, become "unconsciously identified with
the boundaries of the individual and the group."64
It is difficult to define all the elements constituting a national identity and to
determine how the different identities of an individual, group or nation relate one to
another. The
meaning of the term 'national identity' is quite broad, covering all aspects of the
nation [territory, population, independence and sovereignty, government and
administration, religion,... culture and dignity] to the extent that it may cause some
confusion and unclear understanding.65
National identities can be formed in many different ways and the formation
of the nation and nation-state does influence its contemporary politics and makes
political action possible. The nation-state usually imposes and maintains a certain
national identity system, i.e. the ethnic or civic societal model,66 and it seems that
"[t]o date, the nation-state is the optimal 'identity-securing interpretative system'
which man has created for himself."67
Hobsbawm's subjective and objective identity criteria - which have been
discussed in the preceding section - may describe a "process of political
identification [which] involves generalisation from objective perception to
61 Gellner, Ernest (1996); Nations andNationalism, p. 51-52.
62 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 17.
63 Lutz Hoffmann cited in WeiBmann, Karlheinz (1993); "Wiederkehr eines Totgesagten: Der
Nationalstaat am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts" in Politik undZeitgeschichte, B 14/ April 2, 1993, p. 4.
64 Evolution ofEuropean Identity and Racism', http://www.access.ch/tuerkei/GRUPI/Racism2/, p. 1.
65 Winichakul, Thongchai (1996); "Siam mapped: the making of Thai nationhood" in The Ecologist,
Vol. 26/No. 5, p. 219.
66 The former implies a bottom-up process in which culture and the will and consciousness to be a
nation determines the overall national identity; the latter, however, presupposes a (political) identity
which determines culture, i.e. identity is formed according to the top-down model. See also
definition of the nation in preceding section.
67 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 110.
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subjective wish-fulfilment."68 It may originate from and is nurtured by national
history and the ongoing construction of the national 'other'. According to Ernest
Renan, "[t]o forget and... to get one's history wrong, are essential factors in the
making of a nation"69. Indeed, national identity is often formed and analysed in
retrospect and in relation to the nation's real or Active history. In the extreme case,
the formation of national identity might "savagenise 'peripheral' identities."70
Certainly, the formation of a nation does carry with it many implications for future
developments, but the selective memory of each nation blurs the actual facts and
tends to partly replace the original historical picture with a reinvented one. And as
historical situations change, each generation will 'create' its own national identity,
adapting it to the current situation. Once framed, this creation or idea of national
identity
tend[s] to trickle down in society, providing people through education, literature
and the media with largely unconscious mental representations (images) of what it
means to belong to a particular nation. (Of course the 'idea-makers' themselves
were, and are, also influenced by such images).71
Contemporarily, the nation is often associated with a political system, even
if the political executive and its subjects do not share the same common values.72
Indeed, "perhaps the most remarkable feature of national identity and feeling is that
it can unite sometimes wildly different people into powerful alliances, without them
even sharing the same ideology."73 National cultural values and national identity are
often used interchangeably and regarded as one and the same thing. There is
certainly an important link between these two concepts, because they complement
68 Dittmer, Lowell (1977); "Political culture and political symbolism" in World Politics, Vol. 29/
No. 4, p. 573.
69 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 190.
70 Coulon, Christian (1994); "Etat et identites" in Martin, Denis-Constant (ed.); Cartes d'identite:
Comment dit-on "nous" en politique?, p. 287. My translation.
71 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 115.
72 In an equal system, the definition of societal and individual identity roles may not be as clearly
defined as in an unequal society, which has great potential for many different identity formations.
73 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.);
Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 23.
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each other. One cannot exist without the other: identity is determined by culture, as
much as culture is determined by identity.
It may be argued that the national 'we' is linked to the common cultural
political and economic values, whether they are real or not. This set of shared
values is assumed to establish a coherent system of political and social beliefs, it
binds the national 'we' together and seems to wipe out any potential conflicts which
may arise. It reflects the harmonisation between the individual and general will, as
well as the relationship between the state, its citizens and the general will.
Ulf Hedetoft in Signs of Nations, explains this process very well in his
'Nationalist Square'74. The 'Nationalist Square' describes the transformation process
from the individual will to national identity and even national 'obsession'.75 Once
the abstraction of the individual will has been achieved and translated successfully
into the wider framework of the state and, subsequently, a collective national
identity, the preservation of both state and national identity becomes a prime
interest for the individual. The state is then regarded as an end in itself, for which
the individual is prepared to sacrifice his/her life (to die for the fatherland). As a
result, the individual has become "the instrument of [its] own instrument"76. The
seemingly existing unity between the state and its citizens normally creates a kind
of fence which "separate[s] good from bad"77, or the known from the frightening
unknown. The entity living within the national boundaries becomes aware of its
identity when it engages with the 'other'.78 It will also foster "[positive] images of
[its] national selfhood"79, whereas the 'other', living beyond those boundaries, is
74 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs ofNations, p. 29-34.
75 According to the Realists' argument, life is nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes). For Hobbes, man is
born into the world, neither shaping nor creating it. Instead, man is expected to adapt to the existing
order and, eventually, the limits of man's passiveness and flawed human nature will be discovered.
Given the flawed nature of man, the civic state is reduced to the natural state, in which individuals
lead a 'war against all'. The situation in the state of nature is only to be stabilised if each individual
relinquishes a part of his/her natural right to property, namely to get ahead of the expense of others,
and gives it to an authoritative sovereign. It is this sovereign/Leviathan that is the provider of the
'good' life and that guarantees security as well as physical and economic well-being.
76 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs ofNations, p. 34.
77 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs ofNations, p. 17.
78
see also Barth, Frederik (1969); "Introduction" in Barth, Frederik (ed.); Ethnic groups and
boundaries: the social organisation ofculture difference.
79 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs ofNations, p. 17.
Chapter 2.B - 56
considered as negative or even frightening. So, "[jjust as there is no 'me' without a
'you', there is no image of'the national self without an image of'the other'."80
Issues relating to national identity in the European Union
Given the increasing European integration process, Alan Milward argues
that "the strength of the European Community... lies in the weakness of the nation
state"81. This controversial statement immediately gives rise to the question whether
the idea of the 'nation state' and the concept of national identity have become
obsolete82 within the European integration process. It will be argued below that the
nation-state and national identity remain relevant for the European project. This is
based on the assumptions that both concepts seem to be "key obstacles to European
union", and "the formation of European nation-states provides useful parallels,
perhaps even a model, for understanding some of the processes involved in
European political integration and state-formation."83 Despite the fact that most
European 'nation states' incorporate areas with a strong regional identity, this
section will nonetheless consider the European 'nation state' as a unique entity. It
will be suggested that the European 'nation states' do not regard one another as the
'other', but that the image of the 'other' has shifted to the European Union for such
notions. Since we will look at border regions in detail later in this thesis, we will
here solely focus on the relation between the nation-states and the EU.
Ernest Renan, in his famous speech Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? in 1882,
suggested that nations are not everlasting and that they might be replaced by a
European confederation. Once the birthplace of the nation-state, it is questionable,
however, whether this European confederation was meant to replace the currently
existing European 'nation states' or introduce a Europe of the nations or regions.
80 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 120.
81 Milward, Alan (1992); European Rescue ofthe Nation State, p. 446.
s~ Hoffman, Stanley (1966); "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of
Western Europe" in Daedalus, No. 95.
" Black, Annabel and Shore, Chris (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 277.
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According to Alan Milward, in European Rescue of the Nation-State, the
architecture of the European project was designed precisely to facilitate a
regeneration of the nation-state, rather than its demise. Milward argues that the
European Community fostered the member states national identities, rather than a
Community identity.84 With the evolution of the European Community and, in a
way, with the unintended outcome of the European integration process, however,
[t]he politicisation of integration and its expansion into sensitive political space
necessitates renewed attention to questions of community-building and the affective
dimension of integration.... The legitimacy crisis in the Union demonstrates the
limits of the Monnet method at a time when national governance structures are
challenged.85
Laffan hitherto argues that the European integration process has moved
from low-politics (insensitive issues) to high politics (sensitive issues), but that the
principle of transitivity did not follow. Built on the basis of market forces, the
concept of European identity was implicit and uncontested. National identity
remained uncompromised and was buttressed by the European integration process.
This will no longer be the case and, as will be indicated later in the thesis,
permissive acquiescence can no longer be taken for granted.
With the growth of the European Union, both the European project and its
member states are undergoing important transformation processes. The European
Union is faced with new pressures, such as globalisation and Eastern enlargement,
forcing its institutional architecture to adapt to new situations and to mediate
"between overlapping normative orders"86. Equally, the process of continuous
change and adaptation affects the political, economic and cultural values, as well as
the national identities of the different European 'nation states'. It is therefore
questionable in how far these challenges could bring about a diversification of
identity and "point towards an increasing possibility in Western Europe of
84 Milward, Alan (1992); European Rescue ofthe Nation-State, pp. 1-20.
85 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 1, p. 83.
86 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-
State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 442.
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organising political units more pragmatically... instead of from forced national
considerations"87.
The European member states' domestic and foreign policies have become
increasingly interconnected and interdependent. During this process, member states
of the European Union have largely overcome the enemy-like images of the 'other'
amongst themselves. The perception of the hostile 'other' has become less
paramount, though it has not yet disappeared. The EU member states are still
foreign to each other. The different perceptions one European national member
state holds vis-a-vis another European member state may vary to a great extent:
whereas France and Germany have greatly overcome their historical enmity and
now work in close co-operation on many issues and initiate many projects (for
instance, school exchange programmes, the bilingual television channel ARTE and
Eurocorps), in Britain successive governments believe that the British national
interest differs from the national interest of 'other' European member states.
Amicable co-operation and the resulting cultural pluralism of the EU has certainly
relativised, though not erased, the differences amongst the EU member states'
national identities and interests. According to the identity-model used above, then,
the member states' multifaceted national identities include areas which are
complementary, as well as areas which contest one another. Stereotypes have
gradually emerged, in particular if the respective 'other' does not behave in
accordance with the rest of the member states, i.e. in an extremely non-European
way or an extremely pro-European manner.
Yet, the various national identities of member states live relatively
peacefully next to each other. The European Union, considered to be the Brussels
bureaucracy rather than the EU's component member states, is perceived as a
challenge to the 'nation state'. A number of European 'nation-states', in some
respects, international actors with complete sovereignty, feel threatened by the
possibility of an emerging supranational EU and fear that a fairly independent and
s7
Buzan, Barry (1991); The European Security Order Recast, p. 56.
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supranational European Union could easily override their national interests.88
Increasing institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the European Union are
perceived to be erosive of national autonomy, sovereignty and identity. European
Community Law, for example, already represents an incursion to national
sovereignty (because of its superiority to domestic law) and the 1993 Maastricht
Treaty seems to touch
on almost all the core functions of the European 'nation state': control of the
national territory and borders, police, citizenship and immigration, taxation,
financial transfers, management of the economy, promotion of industry,
representation and accountability, foreign policy and defence.89
The European 'nation states' wish to preserve their national interests and, in
a number of cases, the dominance of member states within the European integration
project has "restricted the capacity of the EU to adjust or police common policies,
or respond to emerging problems in ways which satisfy the explicit and implicit
objectives of European integration."90
There is a vast amount of diverse values and cultural models which underpin
the member states. So far, these national interests are substantively different from
one country to another - they are deeply-seated in the respective nation state's
histories, traditions, cultures and socio-political structures. Contemporarily, a
definition of a set of common interests or common values to all nation states would
be unsatisfactory as well as impossible. It would be an unachievable task to take
each of the national interests into consideration. On the other hand, national
identities amongst the EU member states tend to converge when faced with an
external threat to the EU, in order to fight for one and the same cause.
Yet, it would be premature to speak of a common supranationalist interest.
So far, the architecture of the European Union continues to be built on the
88 It should be noted that the integration process of the European Union is perceived differently
among the fifteen European 'nation states'. The EU member states' attitudes towards further
integration vary. Different member states are willing to pool their national sovereignty to diverse
degrees.
89 Wallace, William (1994); "Rescue or Retreat?" in Political Studies, Vol. 42/ Special Issue, p. 66 -
67.
90 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-
State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 429.
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assumption that national identity remains inviolable. This sees identity as
monolithic and suggests that a supranational Europe does not contest national
identity. The roles for both the EU and its member states continue to remain
unclear. Whereas national identity is very much linked to the "existence of symbols,
rituals, collective representations and political myths... born of shared history and
experiences"91, the European Union remains a nebulous term to many of its citizens.
The majority of citizens are still in relative ignorance on the basic issues concerning
the EU. Due to this uncertainty, national identity continues to being buttressed by
external stimuli, specifically the press and media which selects and often interprets
EU information negatively. European integration, as will be analysed in chapter
five, is yet unable to replace existing national identities. Even if opinion polls show
that some European citizens ally themselves to a European identity, the European
identity they proclaim does probably not involve deep emotional issues, since
national identities are still too important.92
Issues relating to European identity
The concept of identity is contextual and situational because, as we have
seen, there is not one distinct factor which can be singled out. When one speaks of
'European identity', the search for a prevalent identity factor is even more
complicated. The notion of 'European identity' consists of two abstract terms which
shift according to the ideological, cultural, historical, political, geographical and
national perceptions at hand.
At the beginning of the European integration process, the concept of
European identity was implicitly fashioned through market forces, which was, in
part, "a product of the peculiarly West European (social) system of governance that
has emerged post-1945 and which involved the collective provision of wide range
of public services."93 But with the growth of the European Community (and its
91 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 291.
92 This will be explored further in chapter 5b.
93 Carter, Caitrlona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-
State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 432.
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emphasis on social rather than solely economic policies), the present meaning of
European identity diverges from member state to member state, because it is
interpreted differently and involves selective, subjective and emotional factors. To
the outside, the EU seems to present itself as one actor, and European identity
seems to refer to the common European cultural values, as well as to the unbounded
economic and political space of the European Union.
In this thesis, 'European identity' does not mean the summation of all
European and national identities. Identity factors which apply to personal, local,
regional or national identities cannot simply be transferred to the European level.
European identity cannot be based on the national identity model. Just how far one
can extrapolate from national identity to a supranational European identity in the
same model is questionable. European identity allows for a degree of diversity and
multiculturalism, and needs to mediate, like Anna, between various, sometimes
conflicting, cultural and political identities - even if this seems impossible at times.
This brings us back to the toolbox analogy, in which the EU would be the actual
toolbox and the different identities its tools.
For this reason, 'European identity' is an umbrella term, in which
multidimensional local, regional and national identities, together with individual,
political, economic and cultural identities, develop, but are not merged. These
identities should co-exist, in order to preserve different values, maintain pluralism
and "avoid disempowering homogenisation"94. Europe is often characterised by its
different families of culture, whereby concentration is often put on Europe's
divergences and many different 'ways of doing things', giving rise to stereotypes,
prejudices and conflicts.
Focusing on Europe's commonalities, one would soon come to realise that
the roots may be found in classical antiquity, in Greek civilisation, "the heritage of
Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism,
Enlightenment rationalism and science, [industrialisation,] artistic classicism and
94 Jacques Derrida cited in Ward, Ian (1994); "In Search of a European identity" in Modern Law
Review, Vol. 57/No. I, p. 319.
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romanticism, and, above all, traditions of civil rights and democracy"95. Michael
Wintle adds two other shared European experiences: language - in spite of being
"problematic"96 - and the geological and geographical environment.
Indeed, most authors concerned with European identity and Europe's
cultural heritage stress that the Greek-Roman civilisations, Christianity and
Enlightenment are key factors which influenced Europe's shared historic, cultural,
political and social commonalities. To them, the
Roman Empire is really a shorthand for certain values of the Ancients, including
especially the Greeks and the Roman Republic. The Roman rule of law survived
from the end of the Empire in small pockets, but was rediscovered, together with
much of the rest of Ancient civilisation, through the Renaissance, Greek ideas of
art, philosophy and politics were transmitted through the Roman experience,
together with the more specifically Roman legacy of military, bureaucratic and
inffastructural organisation.97
The different historical, political and cultural patterns of Europe are highly
intertwined through the development of "complex relationships between tribes and
nations, dynasties and social classes, states and Empires which have become refined
and increasingly dense through constant change."98 They connected the East and
West, North and South of the European continent - elements which are visible today
and which will gain in importance in view of further enlargement.99
Next to these historical, political and cultural factors, socio-economic
factors have also brought the European peoples closer together. Social life
improved through economic development, although it created different social
classes at the same time. Ironically, this increasing class consciousness gave rise to
transnational identification patterns, as may be witnessed by slogans such as
'Workers of the world, unite!'. Although European industrialisation has long been
overtaken by other non-European countries, the heritage of Europe's industrial
95 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 174.
96 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
97 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 13.
98 Jansen, Thomas (1996); "Comment exprimer aujourd'hui et demain l'identite europeenne?",
Diskussionspapierfur den Carrefour von Coimbra, April 11-13, 1996, p. 1. My translation.
Jansen, Thomas (1996); "Comment exprimer aujourd'hui et demain I'identite europeenne?",
Diskussionspapier fur den Carrefour von Coimbra, April 11-13, 1996, p. 1-3.
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revolution and the exportation of it to other parts of the world fostered Europe's
position in the world. Within Europe, increasing trade and exchanges of goods
eased and fostered social and cultural contacts among the different European
nations and states. It is a basis which even the Second World War could and did not
eradicate.
So much for the often quoted common European patterns, which barely take
into account Europe's linguistic and environmental features. According to
Delouche, there are some forty-three languages and three different alphabets in use
in Europe.100 Most of these languages share Latin, Greek or Slavonic roots. During
the first part of the Roman Empire, Greek was the essential "empirical link between
most European languages"101 - only to be replaced by Latin and much later by
Italian and French. Possibly since the Second World War, English became Europe's
and the world's universal means of communication.102 According to a survey in The
Economist, "[o]ne in three" of the European Union's people "now speaks English
well enough to get along in conversation, making it the Union's lingua franca.
French is spoken by 15% of EU citizens (outside France)"103.
According to Karl Deutsch's method of measuring the intensity of
communication among Europe's constituent units, Europeans' communication has
certainly increased over the last few years. This may be due to economic and
political changes, as well as Europe's relatively compact geographical area and the
fact that "most Europeans understand more of each others' languages than they do
of non-European ones"104. More specifically, most EU Europeans understand more
of each others' languages than they do of non-EU Europeans.
Lastly, one may argue that Europe shares a unique environment and a
particular climate. Compared to America and Russia, Europe seems extraordinarily
100 Delouche cited in Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in
Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
101 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
102 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
103 The Economist (1997); "Euro-tongues wag in English", October 25, 1997.
104 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
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coherent and small. "From the plains of Belgium to the plains of Moscow, one
cannot point to a geographical feature which interrupts Europe's spatial
homogeneity"105. Europe may also be defined by its relatively mild oceanic climate,
its different soil types and, more importantly, its good accesses to the sea.106
Already in the past, Europe's climate was described as being one of the best and
distinctive in the world. In political thought, from Machiavelli to Montesquieu,
"personal qualities such as bravery, cunning and political skill"107 were regarded as
deriving from Europe's environmental factors. More recently, W. H. Parker claimed
that "Europe's physical geography... made it defensible against the Eastern hordes,
[which] led to healthy rivalry, material progress, and civilisation: 'Europe became
culturally distinct because it was geographically different."108
Although most European states may be able to identify with these common
features, these parameters still do not seem specific or powerful enough to create an
over-arching European identity. They lie too far in the past and precede the rise of
the nation-state. The modern nation-state has consolidated, and continuously
reinforces, legal, political and social norms. Political institutions acquired
legitimacy and national identities were able to develop in an arena of political
democracy and national sovereignty, recently buttressed by the European
integration process. One may therefore argue that "in the past two centuries the
nation-state has represented the main place of expression of political identity."109
Europe, however, cannot (yet) be read within the context of a common history,
culture and set of political values or orientations. Instead, Europe is shaped by the
long-established divergent national identities and cultures of its member states.
105 Bafoil, Francis (1996); "Un conflit de representations: le cas de la frontiere Oder-Neisse" in
Territoires frontaliers: Discontinuity et cohesion in Sciences de la Societe, No. 17/ February 1996,
p. 65. My translation.
106 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
107 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 16.
108 H. W. Parker cited in Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in
Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 16.
109 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National Identities and Citizenship in the European Union" in
European Public Law, Vol. 1/ No. 4, p. 634.
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If, as Pocock states, "all human cultures... have indeed been constructed by
human effort of one sort or another"110, then the European Union seems to be a
more artificial construct than its individual member states. Attempts have been
made to rewrite European history in its entirety111, but these were partly in vain,
since the European Union generally lacks emotional ties. The European integration
process, despite the acclaimed surrender of sovereignty of its composite nations,
has not yet gained full support of 'its' citizens, in order to be able to claim full
legitimacy (this will be analysed further in chapter three). The EU is often defined
in political and economic terms, so that "[w]e are to give up being citizens and
behave exclusively as consumers. This is why the European Union is ineffective as
an empire"112.
The EU has not yet created any new values; and even new European
common values, such as those placed on environmental issues, often only find
expression within national new social movements. The EU lacks a "pre-modern
past - a 'prehistory' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical
depth."113 The European Union's attempt to develop a European identity has not yet
had the desired success. It only has a limited number of artificially created symbols
as points of reference, which, as we will see in the following chapter, are a weak
substitute for European identity, since they do not reflect what a European identity
might be. This delays the development of a European identity, because without a
common European ideology, common cultural values and a lingua franca, a
European identity will remain located somewhere "between national revival and
global cultural aspirations"114, lacking any clear definition.
So far, the selling of a European identity has been left to the bureaucrats in
Brussels who emphasise a common European culture - a European 'high culture', as
110 J. G. Pocock cited in Morris, James; "Europe: More than a Configuration of Land and Water",
http://wwics.si.edu/, p. 1.
111 Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people.
112 Morris, James M; "Europe: More than a Configuration of Land and Water", http://wwics.si.edu/,
p. 2.
113 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 62.
114 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National Identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 67.
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well as Europe's different beliefs, norms, institutions and traditional 'ways of doing
things'. The latter, the Europeans' various modes of life, would be a good working
instrument to create a European identity and represent a sound foundation on which
a European identity could be based on. However, they are often taken for granted,
since they are part of everybody's daily life.
Given the co-existence ofmany different identities, European identity could
become a toolbox - a supranational and multicultural umbrella under which the
various different tools, or identities, could interact and complement each other - just
as a toolbox which holds the different tools together and puts them in relation to
each other. In return, the various existing identities would give meaning to a
European identity - "based on the cultural diversity of its countries and regions, but
at the same time [aware] of its common heritage"115. European identity would not
limit the various local, regional or national identities. It would neither be an
alternative to these various identities, but be complementary to them. This
awareness and conception of a common European culture and identity still needs to
be constructed. However, one must be careful not to limit this term to the European
Union only, but to include the wider European continent as well. Europe, as will be
indicated in chapter five, is not a clearly delimited cultural entity and "European
identity as it is currently codified is simply a cultural reification"116.
115 Stereotypes ofEuropeans, http://ultra.infoseek.com/European identity
116 Delanty, Gerard (1996); "Beyond the Nation-Sate: National Identity and Citizenship in a
Multicultural Society", p. 6.
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2. C Europe and the 'other': Applying the socio-psychological model
to Europe
From the above, we have seen that the delimitation of 'us' versus 'them'
generates a strong sense of identity, and that identity is a variable dependent upon
time, situation and action. Inconsistencies among the various factors of identity are
sometimes ignored, in order to find the lowest common denominator among
existing identity factors. Different concentric circles of identity can complement
and buttress each other, as we have seen in the example of Anna's different
identities. As much as this happens within groups of individuals and communities,
this theoretical statement may also apply to nations and Europe. Within the
European framework, national identity may be buttressed by the European
integration process, while factors that may be common to an all-encompassing
European identity have been subject to dispute and controversy. European identity -
allegedly based on common historical, cultural, political and social conditions -
may acquire "saliency only when pitted against that which is 'non-European'"1, i.e.
against the 'other'.
Given the "endless debates about the ethnographical and historical meanings
of the word Europe"2, the term 'Europe' or the attempts for European integration -
there were about 300 in total3 - have been classified differently at different moments
in time. Accordingly, one may suggest that the idea of European identity has also
changed respectively. Taking the socio-psychological approach to identity and
applying it to Europe might shed some light on this problem of definition.
This section will treat Europe as a cultural entity and look at the European
'other' from a fictional common European perspective. To consider Europe's shared
history is conducive to an apparent common identity formation in Western Europe
1 Goddard, Victoria A., Llobera, Josep R and Shore, Chris (1994); "Introduction: The Anthropology
of Europe" in Goddard, Victoria A., Llobera, Josep R and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of
Europe, p. 27.
2 Boxhoorn, Bram (1996); "European identity and the process of European unification" in Wintle,
Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 134.
3 Boxhoorn, Bram (1996); "European identity and the process of European unification" in Wintle,
Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 134.
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against the 'other'. One may even argue that taking this historical approach is the
best way to define Europe and a European identity. This is so because the different
identity factors important to the definition of Europe such as, for instance, culture,
religion and politics, seem to overlap best when taking such a broad historical
approach. When looking at Europe's changing historical situations, one should take
into account that Europe is "the result of contradictory dynamic cultures-
successive consciousnesses, which are born every time a general threat emerged"4.
In return, the definition of the 'other' has also changed over history. These
various 'others' do not necessarily interrelate one with the other. They are subject to
historical developments, and the following should not be a judgement or
prioritisation on the respective's 'other' impact on European identity. The historical
account should, however, demonstrate how the mirror-image and recognition
dynamic mentioned above is maintained. Furthermore, it should point to the fact
that this mirror-image has a corresponding effect in the receptive mirror, in
Europeans' image of themselves.
It will be argued that from the 14th to the 19th century, Mitteleuropa
regarded the Ottoman Empire as a menace. Europe's Eastern borders represented
zones beyond which religion was suppressed and within which religion played an
important political role. It was only after the Second World War that the definition
became increasingly confined to Western Europe's liberal democracies. For most of
the 20th century, it seemed as if the definition of Western Europe followed
naturally from the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The European
Community of the Six faced the Communist threat of Central Eastern Europe and
fostered "the gradual emergence of a distinctive European model of society: social-
democratic, or social-capitalist, with developments in different national societies
learning from one another."5 Arguably, these developments became materialised in
the institutional structure of the European Community and its member states.
4
Rougemont de, Denis (1980); "L'Europe, invention culturelle" in History ofEuropean Ideas, Vol.
1/No. 1 p. 31. My translation.
5 Hartmut Kaelble cited in Wallace, William (1991); The transformation of Western Europe, p. 33.
Although it is mostly Western Europe which is associated with the values of democracy, peoples of
Central Eastern European countries, who lived under non-democratic regimes during the Cold War,
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The events of 1989/90 have again emphasised the fact that Europe cannot be
defined as a bounded entity. Borderlands on the current Eastern frontier of the
European Union are already becoming a social link or bridge between the former
Central Eastern European countries and the EU. Certain 'European' economic,
political and cultural factors which were thought to belong to the European Union
only, are now also openly shared by the Central Eastern European countries.
Subsequently, today's Europe is fighting against the 'threat' of immigration. The
Central Eastern European countries have already restricted their immigration laws.
The 'other' in the geographically distant lands ofEurope/Mitteleuropa
From the 14th to the 19th century, the most significant 'other' to Europe
were the Ottomans. During the early years of the Ottoman Empire, it already
occupied an important part of Europe, i.e. Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Thrace and
parts of Greece. In 1453 it captured Constantinople (Istanbul), and during the 16th
century the Ottomans "increased their conquests by both force of arms and
diplomacy"6, culminating in the 1529 siege of Vienna. Although Vienna survived
the siege, the Ottomans kept advancing further into Europe. Their threat was not
only felt in Mitteleuropa, but also in the Mediterranean area. During the height of
the Ottoman rule, Islam religion stretched from India to Spain, enabling the
Ottomans to control the Southern shore of the sea.
In effect, not only the geographical body was at stake, but also the European
cultural body and soul7. Europe's Greco-Roman heritage was regarded as a "home¬
grown European product", and Christianity - although it had its origins in the near-
East - became European by accident and universal by design.8 As early as during
the eighth century, Europe became assimilated with Christianity which "has been
the majority religion of the continent... and at times the geographical extent of
may now also be taken into account, since the Central Eastern European countries are currently
undergoing an important transition towards Western-style democracy and market economy.
6 Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people, p. 199.
7 Rene Grousset cited in Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people, p. 200.
8 Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe (ed.) (1994); The Times guide to the peoples ofEurope, p. 11. See also
Rietbergen, Peter (1998); A Cultural History ofEurope, pp. 79-174.
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Roman Christianity has closely approximated to the boundaries of what was called
'Europe'."9 (Figure 1)
It was the Frankish king Charlemagne, hailed as the 'king of Europe', who
"wanted to magnify his kingship by filling his court with evidence of Christian
culture."10 Charlemagne accepted that his empire had territorial limits, so he did not
extend his empire, nor clashed with the Byzantine empire or the Eastern church.11
Charlemagne's Carolingian empire roughly coincided geographically with the
'Europe of the Six' in 1957; and "it is striking,... how often,... Europe's great
unifiers, from Frederick Barbarossa and Louis XIV to Napoleon and Hitler and on
to Jean Monnet and Helmut Kohl, have uttered [Charlemagne's] name as they have
sought, variously, to emulate his achievement."12 (Figure 2)
The second attempt to unify Europe under the Christian faith was the Holy
Roman Empire. However, it was not until the eleventh century that the European
nations united to protect Jerusalem from Muslim occupation. These "'holy wars'
served as an occasion for the vast stereotyping and demonising of Muslims, Arabs,
and Turks, the effects ofwhich are still perceptible."13
It was only much later, during the 17th century and the era of
Enlightenment, that the conception of Europe and a truly European consciousness is
believed to have developed. During this period, Due de Sully developed his 'Grand
Design for Europe', followed by Abbe de Saint Pierre and his 'Project for bringing
about everlasting peace in Europe'. The powerful military monarchs grew together
into a kind of European confederation, which was, paradoxically, held together by
their conflicts and competitions as well as the importance of commerce. More
importantly, however, Europe was identified with Christendom which stood against
the Islamic Ottoman Empire14 - Erasmus, in 1526, in Praise ofFolly and Ofthe War
9 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.);
Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 13.
10 Roberts, John M. (1996); A history ofEurope, p. 110.
" Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 17.
12 The Economist (1998); "A modern ancient", January 3, 1998.
13 The Evolution ofEuropean Identity and Racism; p. 2.
14 The fact that "the Christian world comprise[d] all of Europe" already became clear during the
Turkish occupation of Constantinople, when the "filthy Turk [was] occupying the finest part of the
world", meaning "Europe,... our country,... our own house,... our domain." Jon Bressarion (1392 -
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to be Fought against the Turks identified Europe with Christendom. Similarly,
Edgar Morin suggests that
it was the Arab conquest which, 'islamising' the Orient and Africa, limited,
partitioned and shut Christendom into Europe for centuries. One may also say that
at the beginning, Islam made Europe by enclosing Christianity into it (seventh
century), and that later, Europe made itself in contrast to Islam, by making it
retreat at Poitiers.15
Despite explicit and implicit calls for European resistance, a crusade against
the Turks never took place. There was no Europa nostraF This, however, did not
imply that Christendom and the idea of a European Christiana communitas had
vanished all together. During the 15th and 16th century, Christian conscience and
solidarity against the Turks continued to hold its ground and, simultaneously, it
became confusingly entangled with the raison d'Etat,17 The raison d'Etat did not
gain in importance at the expense of the Christian faith, but was a result of
conflicting ideologies and competing social, economic and political systems and
logic of cultures.
Towards the middle of the 17th century, and more precisely through the
Treaty ofWestphalia in 1648, the concept of the 'nation state' gained in importance,
pushing Christendom into the background. It has been argued that nationalism
became essentially a religion-substitute, since "the secularising consequences of
Enlightenment caused a form of spiritual horror vacui."n At the turn of the 17th
century, Gottfried William Leibniz already demanded an "European peace order as
a politically constituted 'artificial' answer to the decline of the 'Corpus
Christianum'."19 Nationalism, rather than Christianity, became the pivotal concept
for distinguishing between 'us' and the 'other', and hence between states in the West
15 Morin, Edgar (1992); Penser I'Europe, p. 37. My translation.
16 In 1536, Francis I of Spain and the Ottomans had signed a treaty to attack the Italian states. In
1571, only the combined strength of Venice, Spain and the Pope led to the victorious battle in
Lepanto against the Ottoman Empire. In 1588, Francis I sought again the alliance with the Ottoman
Empire, in order to go to war with England's Charles V.
17 See Machiavelli's writings on the raison d'Etat, which were not based on theological arguments,
and laid the foundation for modern political thought.
18 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 109.
19 Greven, Michael (1992); "Political Parties between national Identity and Eurofication" in Nelsen,
Brian et. al. (eds.); The Idea ofEurope, p. 77.
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and those in the East. Consequently, it was now the diverging conceptions of the
state between West and East20 which marked the differentiation against the 'other'.
The European idea of the state - bolstered by ideas of the Enlightenment and the
Western conception of civilisation21 - was foreign to Islamic or Eastern political
theory.
In the 18th century, Edmund Burke recognised that, in spite of the shift from
Christendom to nation-state, a politically fragmented Europe still had a common
base, one which certainly rose to force when the Turks threatened. He spoke of a
Commonwealth of Europe [of] cultural similitude, because of the monarchical
type of government, Christendom, the Roman law heritage, Germanistic customs
and feudal institutions, in which no citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile
in any part of it.22
Similarly, Voltaire (1694 - 1778) regarded "Christian Europe... as a great
Republic, divided into various states, some monarchies, others mixed, some
aristocracies, some popular, but with something still in common"23.
During the 19th century, "politicians continued to seek further arguments in
support for their political projects in Europe"24. The 1856 Treaty of Paris recognised
the Ottoman Empire as an important part of the European balance system and
accepted it as such. Nevertheless, Turkey was only partially recognised, since the
logic of European culture still continued to hold sway. Europe wanted the Ottomans
to renounce Islam and to tailor their domestic realities to European standards in
order to be fully included in Europe. Over hundred years later, this demand is still
traceable today.
20 The Eastern conception of politics regarded the state as a man-made entity that should be adjusted
to the already existing community. It was the value system, rather than the political system which
bound the community together. Being a peoples' state, thus, encouraged the community to fulfil its
obligations to God, rather than to a political system. In contrast, the West generally saw its states
foremost - as a result of cultural revolutions - forming the nation within the boundaries of an already
existing state. Given this development, Benedict Anderson - as we have seen in the preceding
section - has defined nations as "imagined communities". See also Kohn's account of the different
forms of nationalism between East and West, which have been discussed in the preceding section.
21 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europdischen Union, p. 56.
22 Neumann, Iver and Welsh, Jennifer (1991); "The Other in European self-definition" in Review of
International Studies, Vol. 17/No. 4, p. 341.
23 Aaron, Raymond (1976); "The Crisis of the European Idea" in Government and Opposition, Vol.
11/ No. 1, p. 6.
24 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 56. My translation.
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Nowadays, religion still seems to play an implicit political role and the
historical distinction of Europe's differentiation from Asia "has faded in the
subconscious on Europe's Western edge"25. But a distinction continues to be
asserted by the media, which focuses on the worst cases of Islamic fundamentalism.
The Muslim faith is taken synonymously with Islamic fundamentalism, which is
depicted as violent, expansionist and dangerous. One broadsheet had "mad mullahs,
campus jihad and the Islamic hordes"26 battering at the gates of Europe; whilst
another proclaimed that since the collapse of the Cold War, Islam has become "the
new menace to the West"27 and to 'Christian Europe'. Is this Samuel Huntington's
"clash of civilisations"28 between the old rivalries, namely Western Christendom
and Islam, come true? Will "the emergence of a new security architecture in
Europe... create new frontiers"29? Will this frontier "coincide with the most durable
religious frontier in Europe, namely the one which separates latin Christianity from
the Orient"30?
Present relations between the European Union and Turkey reveal this kind
of 'West-Islam' depiction very clearly. Turkey is a member of the Council of
Europe and NATO, and its efforts to join in the EU go as far back as to 1963
(Turkey's most recent wish to be included in the EU enlargement process was in
March 1998). The official reason for the Commission's negative opinions on
Turkey's EU application
is not, heaven forbid, that Turkey is a Muslim country, or that its present prime
minister is the leader of an Islamist party. The explanation is that Turkey still
needs to improve its treatment of its Kurdish minority and its general human-rights
performance.31
25 Wallace, William (1991); The Transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 17.
26 cited in The Observer (1996); "A gentler face of Islam", December 26, 1996.
27 The Observer (1996); "A gentler face of Islam", December 26, 1996.
28 Huntington, Samuel (1993); "The clash of Civilisations?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72/ No. 2.
29 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort,
Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 104.
30 Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, p. 514. My translation.
31 The Economist (1997); "Eastern reproaches", April 19, 1997.
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To this could be added: "as well as its neighbourly relations to Greece."32 It
could be argued that these arguments serve to distract, rather unsuccessfully, from
Europe's past visions of the Ottoman Empire and Europe's cultural notion of
Christendom. Despite increasing secularisation during this century,
few Europeans would deny the importance of Judeo-Christian ethics in European
civilisation today, and the strength of Christian-Democrat centre parties in
European countries and indeed the EU Parliament are further testaments to the
lasting influence of Latin Christianity on Europe.33
Accordingly, most European leaders believe that Turkey does not conform
to Europe's idea of the raison d'Etat. It seems that its democratic credentials still
need to be brushed up if it is to join the EU. Turkey is indeed "often perceived as a
country oscillating between military dictatorship and fundamentalism."34 More
directly, six of the European leaders considered the Turks as "too poor, too
numerous and too Muslim."35
However, a complete dialogue stand-still of Turkish-European relations
might generate a number of serious political consequences. It might give Turkey a
new consciousness - possibly a consciousness "which does not regard European
culture as the only true culture anymore."35 When the IGC decided in Luxembourg
in 1997 not to begin accession talks with Turkey, but to devise a strategy which
"would lead to the broadening and deepening of relations with Turkey"37, Ankara
broke off all political dialogue with the European Union. This had serious
consequences for the talks concerning Cyprus and nurtured anti-Western
sentiments, based on the argument that Turkey was not admitted on grounds of its
majority religion. In autumn 1998, however, the diplomatic doors have been re¬
opened between Turkey and the European Union.
32 Landfried, Christine (1997); "Ein Markt der Kulturen bote vielen Landern Platz" in Die Zeit,
December 26, 1997. My translation.
33 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 14.
34 Landfried, Christine (1997); "Ein Markt der Kulturen bote vielen Landern Platz" in Die Zeit,
December 26, 1997. My translation.
35 The Economist (1997), "Turkey's troubles", March 8, 1997.
36 Landfried, Christine (1997); "Ein Markt der Kulturen bote vielen Landern Platz" in Die Zeit,
December 26, 1997. My translation.
37 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The Week in Europe, 5 March 1998.
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The 'other' on the margins of the European Community
After the Second World War and "throughout the Cold War era political
discourses typically emphasised the differences separating eastern and western
Europe"38. Eastern Europe became Western Europe's 'other', and vice versa. As a
result of power politics between the two superpowers, the United States and the
former Soviet Union, Europe found itself in an unprecedented geo-political
situation. The European whole became divided by a formidable military and
ideological frontier, giving rise to Western Europe and the 'other' Eastern (Central)
Europe. According to some scholars, such as Joseph Joffe39 and John
Mearsheimer40, the bipolarity of the Cold War built an indispensable basis for co¬
operation in Western Europe. The locus of Europe's politics was with the United
States and the then Soviet Union. Each superpower set certain rules and norms of
state behaviour in their respective sphere of influence. Within Europe, the dividing
line between Eastern and Western Europe - running through Germany - became
close to a sealed and fixed border. Western and Eastern Europe were fenced off by
the Iron Curtain - a development which gave each region on either side of the Iron
Curtain a certain kind of economic, political, social, cultural and geographical
boundedness.
The Eastern part of Europe came under Soviet influence and the common
historical past of Mitteleuropa and its cultural commonalties was soon to be
forgotten. Central Eastern Europe's mosaic of different national, ethnic, linguistic
and religious groups were suppressed under Communist rule, and the Central
Eastern European countries became "peripheral Europe, separate from but
dependent upon its Western neighbours. This is as evident in culture,
communications as in trade."41
38 Goddard, Victoria A., Llobera, Josep R and Shore, Chris (1994); "Introduction: The
Anthropology of Europe" in Goddard, Victoria A., Llobera, Josep R and Shore, Chris (eds.); The
Anthropology ofEurope, p. 21.
39 Joffe, Joseph (1984); "Europe's American Pacifier" in Survival, Vol. 26/ No. 4.
40 Mearsheimer, John (1990); "Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" in
International Security, Vo\. 15/No. 1.
41 Wallace, William (1991); The Transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 17.
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By contrast, the presence of the United States of America in the West played
an important role in the formation of the European Union. The US supported
Western European integration in order to overcome historical European conflicts.
Since both coal and steel represented the main primary resources for industrial
production in the post-war period, the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) was created in 1951. It was a means to get the West German economy
going again and to make war "between Germany and France not only unthinkable
but materially impossible"42. The 1957 Treaties of Rome embedded the young,
liberal democratic West Germany in a close-knit European economic framework,
and it was certainly "no geographical coincidence that the European Community
was established with the Treaties of Rome, free of protestant, orthodox or
unchristian influences."43 The European Community's external border flowed
naturally from the definition of the 1955 Warsaw Treaty.
European economic recovery and prosperity was boosted by the United
States' Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.
Between 1953 and 1973 there was an unprecedented growth of the Western
European economies, and in the "assumingly fixed world order, the peoples of
Europe could, of their own accord, devote themselves to the improvement of their
well-being."44
The US definition of the Soviet threat seemed to draw the Western
European nations closer together; and just as the United States looked upon the
former Soviet Union as a threat, the European Community also identified itself in
contrast to a communist totalitarian 'other' which lay beyond its immediate Eastern
boundaries. Politically and economically, Western Europe identified with the
United States' liberal democratic system and market economy, exemplified in their
membership of Gatt, the IMF and Nato. On the cultural side, Tony Judt, however,
argues that - despite increasing Americanisation in Europe - "[f]or most of the
period 1948-1973, the cultural identity of Western Europe was heavily colored by
42 Lodge, Juliet (1993); "Preface" in Lodge, Juliet (ed.); The European Community and the
Challenge for the Future, p. xviii.
43 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europdischen Union, p. 57. My translation.
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anti-Americanism... many Europeans in the 1960s were sympathetic to de Gaulle's
vision of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals"45, emphasising that an
European identity should be defined against the United States.
Specifically during the major depression of the 1970s and the early 1980s -
'Eurosclerosis' - the establishment and fostering of both an internal and external
identity was seen as crucial. Given the relatively stable bipolar world order and the
"permanent entanglement of the United States"46 in Europe, questions related to a
European defence identity - a European external identity - came to the fore. On the
one hand, external factors compelled Europe to strengthen and clarify the European
identity concept; on the other hand, it was argued that European identity should not
become a "by-product"47 of Europe's foreign policy affairs. European Community
countries should rather demonstrate "their European identity in uniting amongst
themselves, that is to say by concrete action."48
Following the breakdown of the Cold War, questions regarding the
European integration process and European identity are presently at issue. The
disintegration processes in Central Eastern Europe have liberated rather than
consolidated various regional and national identities in Western Europe. Steps for
future EU enlargement towards the 'East' prove to be difficult, not only because of
the political, cultural and security questions, but also because Central Eastern
Europe is a "region faced with complex and difficult demands for political
adaptation"49. Recent struggles for liberation revealed a deeply rooted nationalism,
ancient rivalries and historical disputes, as well as unresolved claims to territories.
44 Picht, Robert (1994); "Introduction" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite Europeenne, p. 10. My
translation.
45 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); Eastern
Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 37.
46 Joffe, Joseph (1984); "Europe's American Pacifier" in Survival, Vol. 26/ No. 4, p. 175.
47 Agence Europe; Daily Bulletin, 25 July 1973/No. 1332, p. 1.
48
Agence Europe; Daily Bulletin, 25 July 1973/No. 1332, p. 1.
49 Wallace, William (1994); "Rescue or Retreat?" in Political Studies, Vol. 42/ Special Issue, p. 76.
To date, democratisation, westernisation and efforts toward economic co-operation in the Balkans,
Romania, Bulgaria and the CIS are still in the early stages of development. The rise of nationalism
and religious fundamentalism in these republics have shown that they do not have many common
values. This leads to mutual distrust and the lack of will to co-operate with one another. In contrast,
there are only few countries in the 'East', such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia
and Estonia which have become more or less stable liberal democracies. They are the forerunners
for European integration and EU enlargement towards the East.
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Within the Central Eastern European countries tensions continue to exist between
urban-liberal progressive groups which look towards the EU and rural-parochial
groups, inward looking groups which emphasise communist, national and
traditional values.
Since the developments of the early 1990s, there have been attempts to
move beyond a politically democratic Europe to a culturally united community. It
could even be argued that the European Union currently tries to establish its own
identity vis-a-vis the United States. It attempts to detach itself from its former high
US dependence and to establish a European identity independent of, but
economically, politically and military non-conflicting with, the US. Examples
which testify the difficulty of this twofold challenge are plentiful: attempts to create
a common European Security and Defence Identity, tensions in the GATT
negotiations between the EU and US, as well as the emphasis on European culture
against Americanisation.
The 'other' outside and within the boundaries of the European Union
Despite the economic recovery of the 1980s, questions about the European
welfare state, the European integration process and European identity remain
important issues to be addressed. The end of the Cold War, together with the
transformation of the former Communist states, changed the long-established status
quo of the bipolar international order. Western Europe welcomed these changes, but
at the same time began to question its new position in the international sphere: will
Europe now lose its security guarantee that it gained during the Cold War, or will it
benefit from its newly attained greater freedom and flexibility? Will it be able to
establish an economic, political and security dimension on its own? Since the
United States' protective wing can no longer be taken for granted, Europe now
needs to fend for itself. Questions such as "Who are we? Where do we come from?
Where will we go? What do we expect? What expects us?"50 have come to the fore.
More importantly, however, the question has arisen whether the demise of the Cold
War threat has brought about an identity crisis for Europe? Has immigration now
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become the substitute for the Cold War threat, just as nationalism became a
substitute of religion in the 17th century?
Indeed, one could argue that the most striking 'other' for Europe lies both
outside and within its boundaries - the 'other' being the various groups of
immigrants and immigration communities in Europe. Since 1992, immigration into
the European Union has halved, bringing the figure down to 1.5 million.51 Europe
receives only 5% of the world's total migration movements, of which Germany has
received over 50% until 199352. There are currently 6 million non-Europeans
resident in the European Union53, numbers increasing.
Immigration is not homogeneous. There are many different kinds of
immigrants54 coming from all over the world. In addition, the receiving country's
historical, political, economic and colonial ties, together with its economic and
social opportunities, also shape migration flows. In general, migration into the
European Union is mainly perceived as a 'migration to wealth' which mainly refers
to a flow from highly politically, economically and socially insecure areas to the
EU - an area of considerable security where personal benefits can be maximised and
costs reduced. In this respect, "being relatively poor in a rich country [is perceived]
as more enviable than being relatively rich in a poor country"55.
When social, economic, demographic and cultural contributions outweigh
the costs of immigration, immigration and the resulting influx of many 'others' is,
generally, welcome. In this sense, immigration into Europe was even politically
planned and promoted during the post-war years. The young and predominantly
male immigrants contributed to the expansion of markets as workers. However,
with the beginning of recession in the early 1970s, the worsening situation of the
50 Bloch, Ernst (1959); Das Prinzip Hoffnung, p. 1. My translation.
51 The Economist {1998); "Millions want to come", April 4, 1998.
52 This was partly due to Germany's geographically central position in Western Europe, as well as
Germany's liberal asylum law, which has been drastically tightened in June 1993. Since then,
immigration into Germany has decreased considerably.
53 Foucher, Michel (1998); "The Geopolitics of European Frontiers" in Anderson, Malcolm and
Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 242.
54 These include forced/voluntary, economic/political/social, temporary/permanent,
regional/transcontinental and legal/illegal migration.
55 Entzinger, Han and Carter, Jack (1989); "New Immigration in Eastern Democracies" in Mercuro,
Nicholas (ed.); Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, Vol. 1, p. 4.
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labour market and decreasing availability of work made migrants less wanted.56
Flagging economies and increasing unemployment showed a drift towards more
negative and restrictive immigration policies throughout Europe.
Up to the present day, immigration control is an attempt to prevent the
arrival and settlement of unregulated immigration. In some people's view, it is in
the national interest to "preserve the culture, [to guard the state] against alien and
contaminating influences"57 and protect it from hostile 'external' forces. Although
most nations always have had national minorities and minority problems which
challenged the respective 'nation state', immigration control is a policy based on
fear concerning the economic and social order. It addresses questions of national
and ethnic identity and seems to ignore that tightening legal entry regulations,
makes "illegal channels thrive"58.
The fear and alleged threat of large streams of immigrants give rise to
xenophobia and anti-immigrant opinions, especially in times of crisis. Immigrants
seem to be portrayed as bearers of cultural contamination who create unfair
competition for natives. This can sometimes result in attacks against immigrants as
has been the case in Germany - and feeds the electoral successes of some right-wing
extremist parties, such as the Front National in France.
A 1997 EU-wide survey "found a third of the 16,000 people questioned
openly admitting feeling quite or very racist"59, and in the Central Eastern European
countries', "[t]he rising tide of xenophobia,... is emerging as the biggest obstacle...
for European integration."60 In Frankfurt and Slubice, on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union, 38% of young Germans and 20% of young Poles believe that
foreigners living in their country are a burden to the social system, and nearly a
56 Immigrants were soon economically and socially marginalised. The majority of immigrants
acquired a permanent working-class status and entered the lowest strata of the labour force, i.e.
enduring hard physical labour, and insecure, low paid work. This sets them apart from middle-class
society, upward social mobility for immigrants was and is often impossible. Their status as outsiders
- of not being part of the majority 'us' - is therefore emphasised.
57 Smith, Anthony D. (1993); "The ethnic sources of nationalism" in Survival, Vol. 35/No. 1, p. 57.
58 The Economist (1998); "Millions want to come", April 4, 1998.
59 Bates, Stephen (1998); "EU set to accept anti-racism law" in The Guardian, March 15, 1998. See
also European Communities (1998); "One in three Europeans claims to be racist" in Eur-Op News,
1998/No. 1.
60 Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in The Independent on Sunday, June 7, 1998.
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third of those questioned (34% Germans and 33% Poles) think that foreigners are
more likely to commit crime than Germans/Poles.61 In a move to encourage
reflection and to combat racism, the member states of the European Union
proclaimed 1997 as the European Year Against Racism. In addition, there are
currently plans to put Europe-wide anti-racism legislation into force.62
The future admission of new member states into the European Community
will increase the population movements within its boundaries and thus the number
of 'others'. This will challenge the EU in two ways: firstly, to control its outer
frontiers vis-a-vis the diverging influx of foreigners without creating a fortress
Europe; and secondly, the need to develop a common European immigration and
asylum policy applicable to all European member states.63 It is also important to
stress a policy for the immigrants' integration into the host society. Immigration
opens up new opportunities for today's European Union and will enrich it with
growing racially, ethnically and culturally mixed populations, so that the 'other'
gains better prospects for integration with 'us'. In general, the problem of integration
is based on national and ethnic identities, thus creating a hierarchy of preference
among immigrant groups. The culturally and ethnically most distant cultures are
most difficult to integrate and, even if differences can be overcome, race and colour
distinctions persist. The perception of the diverse immigrant groups is also partly
created by the mass media which portray either a positive or negative image of the
ethnic minorities concerned. One must therefore ask whether the media manipulate
the image of immigrants as the 'other', and to what extent is the European self-
image manipulated as well? Is it really the case that the 'other' ethnic groups tend to
be "utilised by European societies as suitable targets of externalisation onto which
61
Klipper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein FluB, zwei Stadte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999.
62 Bates, Stephen (1998); "EU set to accept anti-racism law" in The Guardian, March 15, 1998.
63 The European Commission "intends to propose an EU law on asylum procedures after the
Amsterdam Treaty comes into force". The Commission has already approved a working document
which "sets out the different options for such a proposal... it envisages laying down certain
procedural safeguards with which all Member States would have to comply to make the processes
fair and efficient." European Commission Representative Office - UK (1999); The Week in Europe,
March 4, 1999.
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the parts that they unconsciously reject as incompatible with European identity are
projected"64?
This chapter has defined the various different variables important to the
analysis of this thesis. The terms nation, nation-state, region, border, borderlands
and Europe form the cornerstones of the framework within which the concept of
identity will be used in this thesis. Identity, it has been argued, is not static, but in a
constant state of flux. Identity is multifaceted and different aspects of identity may
complement each other, be buttressed by one another or conflict with one another.
This model is applicable to the individual, as well as to larger entities, such as the
nation-state or Europe/the European Union. There is no closure to identity and
external developments may induce transformation and adaptation processes of
various identity aspects.
In order to be able to focus on the concept of identity more precisely,
imaginative borders of identity are constantly forged in opposition to which either
the individual or the larger entity attempts to establish its identity. Creating this
border has repercussions on both the outside as well as the inside of the entity in
question. It has been assumed that Europe's external border works in the same way
too, stimulated by historical, cultural and political developments. By virtue of the
argument of this thesis, however, understanding Europe and European identity
solely in opposition to something non-European could have severe consequences
for Europe's cultural diversity, as well as its global role.65
Despite the flaws involved, the following chapter will delimit Europe to the
European Union and - in view of further enlargement towards the East - analyse in
how far the EU has managed to consolidate and accommodate the various different
identities of its member states. In order to do so, the following chapter will first
focus on European integration theories and problems of governance, before
64 The Evolution of European Identity and Racism; http://www.access.ch/tuerkei/GRUPI/Racism2/,
p. 1-2.
65 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.);
Schengen and the Southern Frontier ofthe European Union, pp. 34-35.
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concentrating on how far the European Union has - even if implicitly - attempted to
create a European-EU identity.
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3 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY
On the assumption that the concepts of Europe and European identity
depend on their juxtaposition against the 'other', this chapter focuses on the EU's
attempts to define itself internally, on the basis of an internal, EU-European
identity. By looking at the most important European integration theories, it will
become apparent that European integration theories do not fully explain the
European integration process and that each theory attempts to explain the European
integration process differently. The chapter will also highlight that there is no direct
link between European integration theories and the concept of European identity.
This is mainly due to the fact that European integration theories generally tend to
concentrate on the nation-state or federal assumptions of state building via an
institutional design. Neither approach is 'in need' of identity. In the former, national
identity is collapsed within it; in the latter, identity is assumed to flow from the
institution-building mechanism. It will become clear that the Monnet-method has
reached its limits.
The emergence of a European identity cannot be explained properly with the
existing European integration theories. Only assumptions may be made -
assumptions which draw their logic from the factors inherent in the European
Union's problem of governance and lack of legitimacy. If one assumes that
integration is about governance, governance about legitimacy and legitimacy about
identity, then integration and identity may be indirectly linked and overlap in the
issue of European governance, specifically the problem of constitutionalism and
legitimacy. It is often suggested that the European Union is still, by definition, not
democratic or legitimate.
The European Union may be described as a
political arena without fixed boundaries or a centralised political structure,... a
multi-level polity, with a weak core... which cannot claim the legitimate monopoly
of force over a population within a bounded territory.1
1 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 2.
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On the one hand, this multi-level polity ensures that the direct link
between citizens and their national polity is not broken. On the other hand, it also
creates a symbolic and indirect link between the citizens and the European Union.
This, however, is not enough. Instead, one could argue that the European Union's
democratic failure is due to the non-existence of a European nation or demos, which
is essential to legitimacy, and ultimately necessary for the emergence of a European
identity. Since governance is largely about legitimacy, formal legitimacy links the
issue of European integration with European constitutionalism, while social
legitimacy would constitute the link between constitutionalism and European
identity.2
Whereas the European Union already enjoys a considerable degree of
formal legitimacy through the membership of its constituent member states, it still
lacks the element of social legitimacy through popular consent. In order to bridge
this gap, the heads of states and governments of the EU's member states have opted
for a number of measures to enhance the feeling of belonging amongst the peoples
of Europe, and foster credibility and public support for the European Union. These
measures have been introduced without losing sight of the fact that the European
Union was not meant to become a nation. However, not one of these policies
addresses the issue of identity entirely and fully. European citizenship comes
perhaps closest to incorporating most factors which affect the citizens of the
European Union directly. Indeed, citizenship, as a traditional cornerstone of
democracy, may be the way forward to create a European identity. However, the
theory of European citizenship does not yet correspond with reality. So far,
European citizenship is only a juridical or political statute which is complementary
to and based on national citizenship. The management of European citizenship still
remains intergovernmental, and it looks as if European citizenship, as it exists
today, is not sufficient to bring about a fully legitimised European supranational
citizenship. Even in the near future, the replication of a European citizenship and
2 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, pp. 250-251.
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identity as a national citizenship or identity is unthinkable. Still, one should note
that
[t]he importance of the TEU citizenship provisions lies not in their content but
rather in the promise they hold out for the future. The concept is a dynamic one,
capable of being added to or strengthened, but not dismissed.3
Given the multinational and multicultural composition of the European
Union, European citizenship could not be based on ethnicity. Instead, it should be
based on civic features, in order to be able to hold together the vast array of local,
regional and national identities inherent to the European Union. Indeed,
European citizenship did not mean either the sum of the member states' types of
national citizenship or, simply adding a new circle of rights. Instead, it meant
constructing citizenship of the Union anew and with its own character.4
Such a European citizenship would be able to foster the European Union's
pluralism, allowing local, regional and national identities to shift around according
to circumstances, while at the same time becoming a unifying agency which holds
these various identities together. This would be congruent with Habermas's
'Constitutional Patriotism'5, based on the concept of dual - ethnic and civic -
legitimacy. Accordingly, a European identity would eventually emerge and, ideally,
be defined as the "'coming together' in shared values, a shared understanding of
rights and societal duties and shared rational culture which transcends organic-
national differences"6, rather than threaten the existence of cultural pluralism among
the EU's nation-states and communities.
3 O'Keefe, David (1994); "Union citizenship" in O'Keefe, David and Twomey, Patrick (eds.); Legal
Issues ofthe Maastricht Treaty, p. 106.
4 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 12.
5 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald (ed.); Theorising
Citizenship, pp. 255-282. See also Gebhardt, Jiirgen (1993); "Verfassungspatriotismus als
Identitatskonzept der Nation" in Politik undZeitgeschichte, supplement to Das Parlament, B 14/ 93,
pp. 29-37.
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3.A European integration and povernance
3. A.i European integration theories
Although the European Union may be defined as the "most successful
example of institutionalised international policy-co-ordination in the modern
world"7, explanations for its development and integration process vary. European
integration theories are usually an attempt to help us understand the background to
European integration and to help us analyse what integration is all about, its process
and expectations, rather than motivations. Integration theories may also shed some
light on the decision-making process and governance within the European Union.
More importantly, though, they may help us understand the characteristic features
of the European Community/Union - is it supranational or intergovernmental? This,
however, is far from claiming that European integration is complete. In this sense,
one may agree with Walter Hallstein who said in 1969:
The construction of Europe is unfinished. And it will not grow by itself. If nothing
is to be done to refine it, even those parts, which are already set up, could be
jeopardised too.8
There is not one single theory sufficient on its own to explain the whole
integration process as such. Each integration theory focuses on different aspects,
actors and time periods of the European integration process. Neo-Functionalism,
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism and the Domestic Politics Approach mainly focus on
the distribution of wealth among the EU member states and stress the importance of
economic and political union. Neo-Institutionalism, on the other hand, emphasises
institutional factors and the EU's
need to be accountable simultaneously to the member states and to 'the citizens'
('multiple accountability') and its dual function of providing executive government
and public administration ('politicised bureaucracy') for the European polity.9
6 Joseph Weiler cited in Shaw, Jo (1998); "Citizenship of the Union: Towards post-national
membership?" in Academy of European Law (ed.); Collected Essays of the Academy ofEuropean
Law, Vol. 6/ Book 1, p. 281.
7 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 473.
8 Walter Hallstein cited in Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who Needs European Identity and What Could It
Be?" in Nelsen, Brian, Robert, David and Veit, Walters (eds.); The Idea of Europe. Problems of
National and Transnational Identity, p. 67.
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Nevertheless, one should not and cannot dismiss any of these theories, but
"admit that different kinds of theories are appropriate for different pieces of the EU
puzzle."10 The 'inconsistency' between the different European integration theories
makes the European integration process appear rather dynamic, specifically since
the present constitutional and institutional arrangement of the EC is the
culmination of a multi-level, multi-faceted process of change and adjustment. As
the policy competence of the EC has expanded, so the Community's constitutional
and institutional basis has evolved. The transition from sectoral integration to
political union has thus been accompanied by the piecemeal consolidation and an
ad-hoc extension of the institutional capacities of the Community."
European integration theories are more concerned with the 'practicalities' of
the European integration process. They do not explicitly deal with causality, nor do
they deliver an explanation on how, and whether, a European identity might emerge
from the European integration process. They tend to concentrate on the underlying
reasons for the European integration process, rather than the construction of a
European identity. The nation-state is pre-supposed and its survival is regarded as
essential to the European project. At the outset of the European Community, the
concept of identity was not necessary or required for European integration, since it
was assumed that identity would follow automatically from the nation-state.
But given the challenges both the European Union and its nation-states are
currently facing, European integration theories have become superseded. A gap in
the conceptual framework of European integration has emerged and given rise to
contradiction, incongruity or even competition between the various European
integration theories. This may generate some confusion over the governance of the
European Union, and in turn, bring the salience of European identity to the fore.
In this sense, this section seeks to illustrate that the theory which best
explains the European integration process is not necessarily the theory which best
explains the possible emergence of a European identity. There exists an ambiguity
9 Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European governance: politicised bureaucracy and
multiple accountability in the European Commission" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 4/
No. 1, p. 73.
10 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 427.
11 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 26-27.
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between the elite-driven European project and popular acquiescence, as well as
between a Europe built on a bureaucratic and economic level and a Europe which
involves the citizens concerned. However, integration and identity are
interdependent. One concept cannot implement itself without the other: "integration
presupposes a common identity"12, and identity must be subject to a minimal degree
of integration, in order to be able to refer to a common basis, from which to build a
common European identity.
Neo-Functionalism
The theory of Neo-Functionalism derives from the theory of Functionalism.
After the Second World War, the Functionalist approach suggested that - in order to
ensure peace and order - the European nation states'
aim must be to call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and
opportunities for co-operation, while touching as little as possible the latent or
active points of difference and opposition.13
The Functionalist theory assumed that economic welfare and peace would
come about if international disputes were settled in peaceful co-operation.
Functionalists did not see the "need for any fixed constitutional division of
authority and power"14, since economic or functional co-operation would "set going
lasting instruments and habits of a common international life."15
This view that economic problems could be solved without political
interference soon led to criticism, specifically from the supporters of the Neo-
Functionalist theory. Although Neo-Functionalists adopt the Functionalists' basic
idea of international co-operation, they take the Functionalist integration theory
12 Lubkemeier, Eckard (1997); "Woran es noch fehlt" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 28,
1997. My translation.
13 Mitrany, David (1994); "A working peace system" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European
Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 58.
14 Mitrany, David (1994); "A working peace system" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European
Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 73.
15 Mitrany, David (1994); "A working peace system" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European
Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 58.
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further. Neo-Functionalists strongly support the idea that the European integration
process is primarily about economic and political factors.
Neo-Functionalism gained momentum as a European integration theory in
the 1960s and 1970s. It was mainly developed by Ernst Haas and Leon N.
Lindberg. The theory of Neo-Functionalism draws on general democracy theories,
general system theories and group behavioural theories.16 As seen in section 'b' of
chapter two, group behavioural theories describe the way people interact and form
groups, in order to accommodate or to put forward their interests and be able to
defend these against the 'other'. According to Neo-Functionalism, then, the last
stage of this group formation is reached when group members shift their loyalties
towards a new supranational decision-making centre.
Applying this general model of group formation to the level of the European
Union, one may argue that "the same complexity is likely, over the longer term, to
trap governments in a web of unintended consequences spun by their own previous
commitments."17 Indeed, Haas described Western Europe as a "living laboratory"18
in which the European states interact, share interests and are, to some extent,
involved in collective activities. Since national governments would soon come to
realise that co-operation allows them to engage in mutually beneficial policy¬
making decisions they alone would not achieve, support for European integration
would grow. This would, in some cases, mean a re-orientation of the national
interest, but as
the process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that values will undergo change,
that interests will be redefined in terms of regional rather than a purely national
orientation and that the erstwhile set of separate national group values will
gradually be superseded by a new and geographically larger set of beliefs....
Political integration is a process whereby political actors in several distinct
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political
activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction
over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political
16 Lindberg, Leon (1994); "Political Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses" in Nelson, Brent et. al.
(ed.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 99.
17 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 475.
18 Haas, Ernst B. (1958); The Uniting ofEurope, p. 4.
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integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing
19
ones.
The emerging new central institutions would become the agents of
integration or "honest broker[s]"20. They would facilitate international agreements
and ensure that these would lead toward increasing unity and prosperity of the
integrated area. National governments would be willing to adapt their current and
future policies and expectations according to these institutions "as soon as these are
perceived as more efficient and capable of better handling policy-making than the
old national institutions"21. The interaction of members and the sharing of the
decision-making process would guarantee the international consensus of all
member states. Haas did not believe in a European indoctrination. On the contrary:
national interests and belief-systems would eventually cede in favour of the
common good. Integration would, thus, be the sum of the ideological commitments
of the national elites.
According to the Monnet method, national elites would be engaged in the
European integration project and the masses would follow their national elites.
Given the permissive consensus22, national elites would be able to take mass
attitudes and commitments of the European populations for granted. The end
product of this could be a new political society, Gesellschaft, different from
Gemeinschaft23 and the member states themselves.
19 Haas, Ernst B. (1958); The Uniting ofEurope, p. 13 and 16. Similarly, Leon Lindberg argued that
political integration is a process in which member states may have "the will to proceed" (rather than
being persuaded) to shift their loyalties toward a new centre (Lindberg, Leon (1994); "Political
Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European Union:
Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 100).
20 Haas, Ernst B. (1958); The Uniting ofEurope, p. 524.
21 Zetterholm, Staffan (1994); "Introduction" in Zetterholm, Staffan (ed.); European Cultures and
European Integration, p. 2.
22 At the time, in 1970, Lindberg and other Neo-Functionalists described public support in terms of
Valdimer O. Key's permissive consensus. This meant that "public opinion had not played a decisive
role [but] was part of the hostile or congenial context as constraining or facilitating but not
determining the growth of the Community system" (Reif, Karlheinz (1993); "Cultural Convergence
and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European Identity" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity
and the Search for Legitimacy, p. 133).
23 One should note that Haas and Lindberg differed in their Neo-Functionalist formulations on this
aspect: whereas Haas believed that European integration, according to the concept of Neo-
Functionalism, would automatically lead to the development of a political community, Lindberg
asserted that this might not necessarily be the case. According to Lindberg, European integration
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A way of achieving the transfer of legitimacy and national loyalties to these
supranational institutions, Neo-Functionalists would argue, is by means of the spill¬
over effect24, the "[advancement from one stage to another,... dependent upon
achieving... respective targets. All this is to be supervised by institutions specially
might remain subject to collective interaction and a collective conflict and decision making process,
in which spill-back rather than automatic spill-over could occur.
24 Lindberg, Leon (1994); "Political Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses" in Nelson, Brent et. al.
(ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 100.
There are four components to the spill-over effect, which should not be confused: First, functional
spill-over describes "the tightly interlinked nature of modern economies, in which government
intervention in one sector engenders economic distortions elsewhere" (Moravcsik, Andrew (1993);
"Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 475). This means that if member states
integrate one sector of their economies, the integration of other sectors - even formerly unrelated or
autonomous sectors - would follow automatically. It is a snowball-effect-like process, which "begets
its own impetus toward extension to the entire economy even in the absence of specific group
demands and their attendant ideologies" (Haas, Ernst B. (1958); The Uniting of Europe, p. 297).
According to Neo-Functionalists, the increasing degree of integration, the politicisation of means
and the spill-over effect would then enable the transfer from economic integration to political
integration. The establishment of the ECSC, for instance, can be taken as a first step into this
direction. Although the means were economic and non-political at the outset, the objectives were
political and security-oriented. Jean Monnet's assumption was that the integration of steel and coal -
two primary resources to the reconstruction of the Western European industries and economies after
World War II - would automatically lead to the integration of other industry sectors, and eventually
the whole economy. Second, political spill-over is the logical consequence of functional spill-over.
The close economic co-operation of member states may eventually generate political pressures.
These, in turn, would develop the convergence of national interests and push the integration process
among member states even further. As a result, national elites would be prepared to transfer their
loyalties to new authorities, and these "authorities would inevitably gain a certain measure of
autonomous initiative" (Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol.
31/ No. 4, p. 475) and look after the member states' interests better than the individual member
states themselves. A Gemeinschaft, based on supranationality, might emerge as a result. Third,
cultivated spill-over refers to the role of central supranational institutions to help with the decision¬
making processes. In this respect, the "role of leadership of the European Commission as a possible
future government is seen as crucial,... the Commission plays a central role in ensuring the success
of the negotiations on the timetable for the common market, the level of the common external tariff,
and the details of the common agricultural policy" (George, Stephen (1985); Politics and Policy in
the European Community, p. 27). The Commission was assumed to become the major decision
making organ within the EEC. It was to gain great influence in the planning and development of the
European integration project, as an "instrument of co-ordination, a catalyst, who animates, and who
pulls conclusions from the meetings in which those responsible for economic policy in the six
countries participate" (Revue du Marchee Commun (1959); "La Communaute a l'epreuve des faits",
No. 20, p. 427. My translation). Given the success of this economically and politically integrated
area, the fourth element in the spill-over effect is the geographical spill-over. Geographical spill¬
over describes the situation in which the economic and political co-operation amongst one group of
states may easily have effects - positive or negative - on excluded states. As a result, negotiations or
association agreements would become necessary, in order to ensure the continued balance and
longevity of the integrated group.
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set up by the Treaty."25 Integration via the spill-over effect would start with "small,
incremental steps in sectors where the issue of national sovereignty was less
contentious than in 'high politics' areas such as defence and foreign policy."26 It
would then end with engrenage21a locking-in process of the various areas. It was
assumed that economic union would automatically lead to political union and
eventually to a fully integrated European Union. Monnet stated:
We believed in starting with limited achievements, establishing a de facto
solidarity from which a federation would gradually emerge. I have never believed
that one fine day Europe would be created by some great political mutation.... The
pragmatic method we had adopted would... lead to a federation validated by the
people's vote, but that federation would be the culmination of an existing
economic and political reality.28
A critique of Neo-Functionalism
Although Neo-Functionalism is a comprehensive European integration
theory, it is often being criticised as too "static"29 and mechanic, since it advances a
linear development of the European integration process, which would lead to a
"'gradual, 'automatic', and 'incremental' progression toward deeper integration and
greater supranational influence"30. Indeed, Neo-Functionalism failed to explain the
empirical reality of the European integration process, since it "lacked a theoretical
core clearly enough specified to provide a sound basis for precise empirical testing
and improvement."31 The Neo-Functionalist theory does not take into account
national motivations for the European integration process, nor does it pay attention
25 Lindberg, Leon (1994); "Political Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses" in Nelson, Brent et. al.
(ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 101.
26 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 29.
27 Groom, Arthur J. R. (1994); "Neo-Functionalism: a case of mistaken identity" in Nelson, Brent et.
al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 117.
28 Jean Monnet cited in Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in
Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 24.
29 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 427.
30 Ernst Haas cited in Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol.
31/No. 4, p. 476.
31 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 476.
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to global trends. Indeed, it focuses too much on economic co-operation within the
EC, the European integration process per se and its supranational features.
In fact, the European Union is not as self-sustaining as this and cannot "be
treated as a sui generis phenomenon"32. Instead, Moravcsik depicts Neo-
Functionalism as conventional with orthodox international relations theory. The
European integration process is dependent on the developments in both domestic
and international political economy. International events, such as the oil crisis and
recession of the early 1970s, were the first examples which demonstrated the
enormous consequences external developments have on the European project. The
same may be said of the national states' impact on the European integration process.
This was made particularly clear when Charles de Gaulle blocked Britain's EU
membership in 1963 and 1967, as well as during the 1965 French 'empty chair'
policy and the subsequent Luxembourg Compromise33. De Gaulle's strong
leadership of France and his disagreement over CAP showed that the Neo-
Functionalist theory did not pay much attention to the role of national governments
in both European integration and the EC's decision making processes.
These developments increased the level of criticism of the Neo-
Functionalist theory. From within the international relations theory came the
criticism that Neo-Functionalism attached too much importance to supranational
actors, although national governments still remained politically powerful. Neo-
Functionalism seems to ignore that national governments wish to retain their
national sovereignty; it did "not ask the crucial question about where the locus of
power lay in the post-war period"34. National elites do not automatically transfer
their legitimacy to a new, central decision-making centre and are not prepared to
give up their position of bargaining that easily. Neo-Functionalism underestimates
the various forms of policy co-operation among individual member states, which
32 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 477.
33 The Luxembourg Compromise changed the meaning of qualified majority voting. It established a
procedure in which decision should either be taken on the basis of unanimity or consensus, so that
no member state could be overruled if its national interest was at stake.
34 Milward, Alan and Sorensen, Vibeke (1994); "Interdependence or integration? A national choice"
in Milward, Alan et. al. (eds.); The frontier ofnational sovereignty, p. 3.
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take place outside the framework of the European political community and its
supposedly supranational decision-making centre.
The networks of economic interaction and increased economic
interdependence between member states have not yet brought about the desired
shift of loyalties, sovereignties and political activities toward a new decision¬
making centre of an EC wide economic community. In fact, engrenage and the
locking-in of the various sectors prove to be difficult tasks. The spill-over effect has
not yet been able to transcend, nor replace, the nation state. The European
Commission has so far been unable to become the major-decision making power
amongst the European institutions. It still lacks enough popular legitimacy, and, as
will be explained later, it might be claimed that
the Monnet method of integrating the separate economies and polities of (thus far)
Western Europe lacked a mechanism for establishing (and constantly renewing)
the legitimacy of the process,... that under the Monnet method tension between the
nation-state and supranational levels of governance was unavoidable, and that,
inevitably, this would trigger a nationalistic response on the part of individual
citizens.35
Although one may argue that political and economic consensus is of vital
importance for a peaceful coexistence of a community of states, one should not
ignore the fact that disagreements emerging out of socio-cultural issues can also
have important impacts on political co-operation. Neo-Functionalist theory seems
to ignore the influence of socio-cultural issues on member states, as well as the
multiple divergences amongst and within the member states of the European
Community. Neo-Functionalism presumes the existence of fairly unitary states and
a certain degree of homogeneity in their political, economic and social structures
and values. Non-state actors barely exist in Neo-Functionalism. Critics of Neo-
functionalism would further argue that member states' belief systems are different,
and that agreements are sometimes difficult to achieve. In the extreme case,
disagreements may lead to "spill-back or disintegration"36, since the impacts of EU
35 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-
State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 437.
36 Groom, Arthur J. R. (1994); "Neo-Functionalism: a case of mistaken identity" in Nelson, Brent et.
al. (ed.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 118.
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membership and decisions on member states may be regarded as being to the
nation-state's disadvantage.
So far, neither "the pursuit of rational interests, nor the growth of new
networks of interaction have translated into that shift of loyalties, expectations and
political activities toward a new centre."37 The Neo-Functionalists' presumption that
national elites are able to impose their motivations onto the population has proven
wrong. The masses do not necessarily follow their elites and, as we will see later,
the European Union has not yet acquired the necessary level of recognition from its
peoples.
Domestic Politics Approach
As a counterweight to Neo-Functionalism, the Domestic Politics Approach,
as the name implies, focuses on the domestic and sub-national forces working
within the nation-states. It seeks to explain the "linkages between the domestic and
EC tiers"38 and suggests a model of multi-level governance. Domestic Politics
Approach provides scope for feedback and is based on the assumption that "an
understanding of the internal domestic politics of the member states [is] crucial to
any rounded understanding of the integration process."39
This means that the EC's policy making process should be analysed in the
same way as the domestic policy making process, because "European policy¬
making is one facet of national policy-making".40 European politics is, according to
the supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach, made at home. Therefore, they
argue, the European Union derives its legitimacy from the member states' national
and sub-national actors.
37 Wallace, William (1995); "European integration and the problem of popular consent" in Western
European Politics, Vol. 18/No. 3, p. 153.
38 Simon Bulmer cited in Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European
policy process" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 50.
39 Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in
Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 50.
40 Lodge, Juliet (1993); "Preface" in Lodge, Juliet (ed.); The European Community and the
Challenge ofthe Future, p. xxii.
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According to the Domestic Politics Approach, subnational and national
forces are the key actors in the European integration process. The Domestic Politics
Approach could hence represent a bottom-up model in which sub-national forces
actively take part in the European integration process, and where all of the EU's
member states' different preferences and politico-socio-economic and cultural sub-
national forces are incorporated.41 This works in line with the principle of
subsidiarity42, which allows for "alternative arenas for the political activities of
domestic actors. Private groups can sometimes bypass national governments by
pursuing their objectives in EE! arenas."43
Furthermore, the Domestic Politics Approach may also be congruent with
the concept of policy networks. Policy networks "may be defined as an arena for the
mediation of the interests of government and interest groups."44 According to policy
networks, the drafting of legislation, that is the meso-level of decision-making, is
important to the policy outcome. Taking other forces into account, the nation state's
central "monopoly over European policy in a climate of deeper European
integration and growing (subnational authority) mobilisation is unsustainable."45
The state no longer monopolises the decision-making process at the European level.
41
see specifically Marks, Gary, Hooghie, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration
from the 1980s: State-centric v. Multi-level governance" in Journal of Common Market Studies,
Vol. 34/ No. 3, pp. 346-356.
42 According to Article 3b of the TEU, the principle of subsidiarity describes that"... the Community
shall take action... only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty."
The principle of subsidiarity is an ambiguous term, because it can be interpreted in two ways: as a
means to further integration and identity from below, as well as a means for the supranational
institutions to accommodate cleavages within the EU. The principle of subsidiarity regulates what
can and should be done at Community level, and what should be left to the various authorities of the
member states. The principle of subsidiarity was introduced for the first time in the Treaty on
European Union, since the EU bureaucracy is often criticised as too centralist, too independent, too
powerful, uncontrollable and not transparent enough. Directing decision-making processes towards
the 'bottom' hopes to create more proximity amongst the peoples of the Union and between the
peoples and the Union, - eventually giving rise to a future European identity.
43 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 420.
44 Peterson, John (1995); "Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework of
analysis" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 2/ No. 1, p. 76.
45 Jeffery, Charlie (1997); "The Emergence of Multi-Level Governance in the European Union: A
Domestic Politics Approach" in Politiques et Management Public, 8eme Colloque, Session: 4.2, p.
11.
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Instead, the sovereignty of the state is "diluted"46 and merged into a multi-level
polity. As a result,
one can begin to identify a pattern of interdependence between actors from
different national, European and sub-national levels of government in European
decision-making, which, though ill-defined and hitherto rather haphazard, has
helped to 'transform the nation-state' in the EU.... The result is that instead of a
bipolar decision-making process involving member states and Community
institutions, one finds a complex, multi-layered process' stretching beneath the
state as well as above it."47
One should note, however, that the EU policy outcomes and implementation
procedures into the national legislation may induce constitutional, policy or even
institutional changes at home, since
on the one hand, national governments monitor the executive powers of the
Commission closely, though they do so in conjunction with subnational
governments and societal actors. On the other hand, the Commission has become
involved in day-to-day implementation in a number of policy areas, and this
brings it into close contact with subnational authorities and interest groups. As in
the initiation and decision-making stage, mutual intrusion is contested.48
Supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach may hence suggest that it
would be foolish to separate the EU policy from its member states' domestic
policies - even if this might sometimes lead to the adoption of the lowest common
denominator.
A critique of the Domestic Politics Approach
The Domestic Politics Approach bases its analysis on specific stylised
situations, such as the assumption that the European member states are true
homogeneous nation-states in which regional interests equal national interests. This,
however, is not always the case. One needs to look further down the scale and
analyse the relationship between the member states' elites and their public in order
46 Marks, Gary, Hooghie, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-centric v. Multi-level governance" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, pp.
341 and 371.
47 Jeffery, Charlie (1997); "The Emergence of Multi-Level Governance in the European Union: A
Domestic Politics Approach" in Politiques et Management Public, 8eme Colloque, Session: 4.2, p.
4.
48 Marks, Gary, Hooghie, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-centric v. Multi-level governance" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
366-367.
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to understand the workings of Community institutions and the European integration
process as a whole. Indeed, "by definition, the building of a political community
means the creation of a sense of community or solidarity among the people of a
given region."49
So far, however, the national governments of the EU member states have
restricted the transfer of their sovereignty to the supranational institutions of the
EU. They are not prone to throw away their monopoly over European policy¬
making. This has certainly hampered the integration process of the European
Union. Each member state wants to ensure that its national interest is respected
against a possible antagonistic Community interest. It has even been argued that
the Community has increasingly become the stage on which national rivalries are
fought out.... During the past decades, the European Community appears to have
become increasingly beleaguered by national differences, and the resulting
inability to develop common policies.... Thus, the failures of the EC to achieve
consensus among its member states should be seen in the context of the serious
cleavages that exist in national political systems with regard to government
policies.50
In addition, supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach seem to ignore
that policies regarding European integration issues are often defined as foreign
policy matters. As a result, given the member states' different regionalisation and
territorial structures, this may allow those sub-national authorities "with a strong
constitutional base and embedded in formalised intergovernmental infrastructure,...
to claim a far greater share in the fields of competence in European decision¬
making"51 than those subnational authorities which do not enjoy such intra-state
organisation.
Furthermore, the Domestic Politics Approach does not take into account
eventual changes, such as possible constraints external to the respective
49 Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in Nelson,
Brent et. al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration,
p. 155.
50 Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in Nelson,
Brent et. al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration,
p. 159, 167 and 169.
51 Jeffery, Charlie (1997); "The Emergence of Multi-Level Governance in the European Union: A
Domestic Politics Approach" in Politiques et Management Public, 8eme Colloque, Session: 4.2, p.
16.
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governments, or a possible emerging gap between a member state's capacities and
resources to pursue certain national policies or self-interest. Indeed, the Domestic
Politics Approach puts too much emphasis on the domestic harmonious ongoings
within the EU's member states, without taking into account the international
political system, cross-national links among the EU member states, intra-state
differences, the role of the EU's institutions, the EU's internal dynamics and its
treaties.
Liberal-lntergovernmentalism
During the 1970s and 1980s, mainly as a result of the Luxembourg
Compromise and Europe's stagnating integration process - also called "'dark age' or
'Eurosclerosis'"52 -, the theory of Liberal-lntergovernmentalism came to the fore. In
contrast to Neo-Functionalists, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists do not see the nation-
state withering away, and diverging from the Domestic Politics Approach, national
governments remain the key political players in international politics in the Liberal-
Intergovernmentalist theory.
The Liberal-Intergovernmentalists' focus on the importance of national
governments follows the Realists' perception of world politics. Realists value the
state as the provider of the good life and security; for them, "international politics,
like all politics, is a struggle for power"53. According to this assumption,
interaction between states in a conflictual international environment was central
and the balance of power was constantly shifting.... [C]o-operative ventures
between nation-states were likely only to constitute a temporary equilibrium, from
which the partners were at liberty to withdraw should they no longer feel that their
interests were best served by membership.54
For the EU policy-making process, this means that member states remain
the central political actors. The "EC governments' importance is institutionalised in
52 Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann cited in Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer
fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration processes" in Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 35/No. 2, p. 285.
53 Morgenthau, Hans (1964); Politics amongst nations, p. 27.
54 Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in
Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 48.
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the Council of Ministers, the European Council and explicitly the
intergovernmental machinery of political co-operation."55 Liberal-
Intergovernmentalists regard the European integration process as being subject to
national policy co-operation (namely intergovernmentalism). For them, the
"European nation-states seem too small, so that they should organise themselves
into a bigger unit."56 The European integration process may therefore be
characterised as
the result of strategies pursued by rational governments acting on the basis of then-
preferences and power.... [T]he EC can be analysed as a successful
intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through
negotiated policy co-ordination."57
According to Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, the EC is based on an
"institutionalised international policy co-ordination"58 model. De Gaulle's 'empty
chair' policy and famous statement that "[tjhere is and can be no Europe other than
a Europe of States - except of course a Europe of myths, fictions and pageants"59,
may be examples to support the Liberal-Intergovernmentalist theory. A similar
thought was also echoed by Margaret Thatcher in her 1988 speech in Bruges, in
which she advocated "co-operation between independent sovereign states."60 For
Thatcher, this voluntary co-operation would not imply "a remote centralised,
bureaucratic organisation... [that] would suppress nationhood."61 Thatcher insisted
that "we should keep power at the national level"62, and Tony Blair, ten years later
55 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "Domestic Politics and EC Policy-making" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.),
The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 142.
56 WeiBmann, Karlheinz (1993); "Wiederkehr des Totgesagten: Der Nationalstaat am Ende des 20.
Jahrhunderts" in A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte, supplement to Das Parlament, B 14/1993, p. 5. My
translation.
57 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 496 and
474.
58 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/No. 4, p. 474 and 473.
59 Charles De Gaulle cited in Pinder, John (1996); "The European Union of the Future: Federal or
Intergovernmental?" in Barbour, Philippe (ed.); The European Union Handbook, p. 283.
60
Margaret Thatcher cited in Pinder, John (1995); European Community: the Building of a Union,
p. 228.
61 Margaret Thatcher cited in Pinder, John (1996); "The European Union of the Future: Federal or
Intergovernmental?" in Barbour, Philippe (ed.); The European Union Handbook, p. 283.
62 Margaret Thatcher cited in Pinder, John (1996); "The European Union of the Future: Federal or
Intergovernmental?" in Barbour, Philippe (ed.); The European Union Handbook, p. 283.
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and in a more subtle tone, called for "a Europe that works together as a team, in
which our countries retain their distinctive identities... but work together to tackle
common problems for the practical benefit of all."63
But despite these pledges for the independent nation-state, the Liberal-
Intergovernmentalist theory also sees "state executives... [as] state arenas that
connect subnational groups to European affairs."64 The interaction and bargaining
between each member state and its society is seen as an important aspect in the
Liberal-Intergovernmentalist theory. Governments first aggregate their peoples'
interests, before translating these into national goals and preferences. They then
"bargain among themselves in an effort to realise these interests"65. This
intergovernmental bargaining is done under the watchful eyes of a supranational
institution, such as the European Commission. It will hence "be shaped by EU
rules."66
Despite the risk of being overruled by the qualified majority vote, the EU
member states still regard the seemingly supranational character of the EU as
beneficial. In fact, and according to Alan Milward, the European Community came
to the rescue of the European nation-state.67 Although there might be a viable
antithesis between strong supranational institutions and intergovernmentalism58,
63 Tony Blair, setting out his vision for the UK Presidency at the official launch at the Eurostar
terminal in Waterloo station/ London on December 6, 1997, cited in The European Commission
Representative Office - UK (1998); Background Report, January 1998.
64 Marks, Gary, Hooghie, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-centric v. Multi-level governance" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
345.
65 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/No. 4, p. 481.
66 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 418.
67 Alan Milward suggests national motivations for the European integration process in Milward,
Alan (1992); The European Rescue of the Nation-State, pp. 1-20; also for a brief, but specific
account, see Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions europeennes et leur contribution a
l'emergence d'une identite et d'une politique culturelle europeennes" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite
europeenne, p. 69.
68 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/No. 4, p. 507.
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Liberal-Intergovernmentalists welcome the EC and its institutions as a "two-level
game"69 or a "common negotiating forum"70 in which
decision-making procedure, and monitoring of compliance reduce the costs of
identifying, making and keeping agreements, thereby making possible a greater
range of co-operative arrangements.... [T]he unique institutional structure of the EC
is acceptable to national governments only in so far as it strengthens, rather than
weakens, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals
otherwise unachievable... EC institutions strengthen the autonomy of national
political leaders vis-a-vis particularistic social groups within their domestic polity.71
Governments consciously evaluate the costs and benefits of economic
interdependence, since national self-interests still enjoy priority over supranational
impulses. Thus, one should not forget that "recurrent interactions can change
official perceptions of [the nation-states'] interests"72, specifically if the outcomes
seem to be advantageous to the member states.
Indeed, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists argue that EU policies are a
prolongation, and not simply the adoption of the member states' different domestic
politics. European integration is therefore regarded as the result of the respective
member states' voluntary decision-making, rather than the immediate consequence
of the Neo-Functionalist spill-over effects. For this reason, the supranational
character of the EU and the existence of the nation-state does not need to conflict.
The level of co-operation and bargaining between the member states within the
European Union stresses the intergovernmental character of the EU's supranational
institutions.
The European integration process is subject to the nation-states' choices and
willingness. Liberal-Intergovernmentalists seem to see the Community as a "formal
organisation [with] recognised patterns of practice around which expectations
69 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 507.
70 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 507.
71 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/No. 4, p. 507. For a more detailed account of this, see specifically
pp. 496-507.
11 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye cited in Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of
the European policy process" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy¬
making, p. 50.
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converge"73. It gives expression to national interests and might eventually become
"a means to advance selfish national interests."74 According to Liberal-
Intergovernmentalists, then, the nation-state remains 'obstinate' and has not yet
become 'obsolete'75.
A critique of Liberal-lntergovernmentalism
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism could be seen as an attempt "to combine... a
certain reawakening of nationalism and an indispensable internationalism"76. But as
idealised as this may sound, the theory also shows certain flaws in its logic. Liberal-
Intergovernmentalists put too much emphasis on states as the central actors in the
international arena. As a result, interstate bargaining does not explain sufficiently
enough why intergovernmental bargaining leads immediately to integration, rather
than to international co-ordination or multi-lateral policies alone. In addition, it tells
"us nothing about how the institutional context shapes preferences and EU decision
making."77
Liberal-Intergovernmentalists assume that the EU's member states are
domestically and internationally autonomous. Although Liberal-
Intergovernmentalists may take into account some sub-national forces, they seem to
eliminate the determining impact domestic politics may have on state activity.78
Liberal-Intergovernmentalists ignore sub-national forces which may contend
national authorities, such as central governments. These subnational forces are, for
example, regional differences and - in the extreme case - regional demands for more
autonomy, devolution and self-determination.
73 Robert Keohane cited in Nagengast, Emil (1996), "Coming to terms with a 'European identity': the
Sudeten Germans between Bonn and Prague" in German Politics, Vol. 5/ No. 1, p. 81.
74 Lodge, Juliet (1993); "Preface" in Lodge, Juliet (ed.); The European Community and the
Challenge ofthe Future, p. xxi.
75 Hoffman, Stanley (1966); "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of
Western Europe" in Daedalus, No. 95.
76 Henri Spaak cited in Wallace, William (1995) "European integration and the problem of popular
consent" in Western European Politics, Vol. 18/No. 3, p. 139.
77 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 404.
78 Wincott, Daniel (1995); "Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday
critique of Liberal-lntergovernmentalism" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 4, p.
601.
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Moreover, Liberal-Intergovernmentalism does not seem to consider issues
of transnational importance, such as the dangers of ethnic conflicts, migration,
crime, terrorism and environmental pollution. These factors are often beyond the
control of the respective member states and may sometimes only be effectively
dealt with at Community level.
Furthermore, the
intergovernmentalist approach is inherently static, analysing snapshots of the
'grand bargains' that have established or revised the treaties but ignoring the
processes that were remoulding norms, institutions and interests in the periods
between them.79
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism underestimates the important working forces
within the EU itself - such as the institutions of the European Union. It "plays down
the role of supranational institutions in European integration."80 Although
intergovernmental bargaining might be, to a great extent, a voluntary collaboration
between member states, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists seem to be blind to the fact
that external circumstances might compel nation-states to work together. Hence,
Wincott rightly raises the question "why the political institutions of states can have
impact, but those of the European Community have not."81 He concludes that
Liberal-Intergovernmentalists have "taken for granted the existence of nation-states,
and the fact that European treaty negotiations and the more general process of
integration in Europe must reproduce and reinforce those states."82
Given this theoretical separation between the member states and the
assuming supranational character of the European Union, Liberal-
79 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 427.
80 Wincott, Daniel (1995); "Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday
critique of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 4, p.
598.
81 Wincott, Daniel (1995); "Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday
critique of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 4, p.
602.
82 Wincott, Daniel (1995); "Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday
critique of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 4, p.
607.
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Intergovernmentalism could be defined as a "loose approach, based on actual
developments rather than theoretical preconditions"83.
Neo-lnstitutionalism
Up to the present day, the European Union differs from state governments in
several aspects: its institutions are not built upon a common identity or territorial
sovereignty. The working principle of the EU is based on the concept of the
functional separation of powers84, which does not follow the traditional concept of
the organic separation of powers. This means that there is no clear-cut identification
of the three basic organs of public authority - legislature, executive and the
judiciary - within the EU. In order to apply an organic principle and to make the
Community more transparent, the Community would need to undergo some
institutional adaptation. On the other hand, the European Union also differs from
other international organisations, because it provides more than just a framework in
which interactions between member states can take place. The European Union has
an important legal system of its own, which defines the supremacy of European law
over national law.
These are only some of the reasons why the European integration process,
together with the new and unusual set of European institutions, cannot be analysed
on the basis of traditional international relations theories or regime theories.
According to Neo-Institutionalists, the European integration process is subject to
two major tensions: 'institutional accountability' and 'decisional rigidity'. The
former "describes the conflict between member state control, on the one hand, and
direct accountability of the European institutions to the citizens, on the other."85 The
83 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "Domestic Politics and EC Policy-making" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.),
The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 147.
84 Laenerts, Koen (1991), "Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European
Community" in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 28, pp. 11-35.
85 Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European governance: politicised bureaucracy and
multiple accountability in the European Commission" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 4/
No. 1, p. 75.
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latter refers to the "tension between the political and legal nature[s] of the Union
system."86
Neo-Institutionalists, therefore, have taken it upon themselves to concentrate
on the study of governance within the European Union. In order to do so, Neo-
Institutionalists look at how "institutions affect the ways in which governments, as
well as other political actors, perceive and pursue their interest."87 Neo-
Institutionalists wish to analyse how institutional interaction "provides an additional
crucial element to the process of integration."88 This represents a change from the
traditional studies of Community governance which "have tended to focus on, or
include, the policy level, paralleling the public policy literature's concentration on
the policy or issue level."89
Often, the institutions of the European Union are regarded as being a huge
and insurmountable bureaucracy. Neo-Institutionalists, however, do not see the
European Union as a bureaucracy. Rather, they see the European integration
process as being subject to supranational/intergovernmental institutions, inter-
institutional relations, internal institutional organisations and procedures and
institutional norms.90 For Neo-Institutionalists, the European Union is a multi-tiered
state-like system. Its institutions are not simply conceived as "formal arrangements
carrying out assigned functions in political, social and economic life, but are treated
as reflections on the development of societal value systems and tensions within
them"91. The Neo-Institutionalist theory suggests that "EU institutions may develop
86 Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European governance: politicised bureaucracy and
multiple accountability in the European Commission" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 4/
No. 1, p. 75.
87 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 407.
88 Wincott, Daniel (1995); "Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday
critique of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 4, p.
603.
89 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "The governance of the European Union: a New Institutionalist approach"
in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, 13/4, p. 371.
90 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "The governance of the European Union: a New Institutionalist approach"
in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, 13/4, p. 358. For a more detailed account see specifically pp.
357-364.
91 Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European Governance" in Journal ofEuropean Public
Policy, 4:1, p. 74.
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their own agendas and act autonomously of allied interest groups."92 Neo-
Institutionalists claim that institutional interaction has an essential influence on the
initiation, formulation and implementation of the decision-making within the
European Union. They seek to "demonstrate how EU institutions have influenced
the agenda-setting, policy-formulation and implementation processes"93; and in
order to understand this circle of interrelatedness between institutions and society,
Neo-Institutionalists take into account the following instruments of EU governance:
treaties, constituent agreements, international law, EC jurisprudence and political
agreements94 - all of which form the ground on which the functioning of the
European integration process is based. Accordingly, Neo-Institutionalists argue that
institutions do not only have governance functions for society but that they also
define a style of living... provide symbolic guidance for society... stand for
specific values about how political and social life should be organised.95
Political institutions are not only the result of their environment,
but create those environments at the same time.... Political institutions affect the
distribution of resources, which in turn affects the power of political actors, and
thereby affects political institutions.96
Neo-Institutionalists argue further that the outcomes of EU institutional
bargaining may have an impact that goes beyond the traditional boundaries of
negotiation. As a matter of fact, interaction between the
institutions of the EU can affect political behaviour and outcomes in at least three
broad ways. They become partially autonomous political actors, create options for
societal actors in their choice of allies and arenas, and induce changes in domestic
policies and institutions.97
92 Peterson, John (1995); "Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework of
analysis" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 2/ No. 1, p. 81.
93 Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in
Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 53.
94 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "The governance of the European Union: a New Institutionalist approach"
in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, 13/4, p. 358. For a more detailed account see specifically pp.
364-370.
95 Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf
and Halstrom, Par (eds.); Principles ofJustice and the European Union, p. 30. (italics in original)
96 March, James and Olsen, Johan (1989); Rediscovering Institutions, p. 162 and 163.
"7 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 405.
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Looking at the European integration process in this way, Neo-
Institutionalists argue that the EU institutional interaction is a means to introduce a
"multi-tiered"98 model of governance, in which the EU may alter domestic politics
of its constituent member states and the member states themselves may mould the
institutional and governance structure of the European Union. Traditionally,
institutions are representative of public opinion99, as well as influence public
opinion by reinforcing a sense of identity and belonging.100 Similarly, and according
to Neo-Institutionalists, the European institutions should translate popular
expectations, as well as contribute to the development of a European identity.
A critique of Neo-lnstitutionalism
Neo-Institutionalists tend to emphasise too much the institutional aspect of
the European Union. They view the European institutions as being too autonomous,
since they assume that institutional development would guarantee and enhance the
European integration process. According to Neo-Institutionalists, political
institutions can
change the distribution of political interests, resources, and rules by creating new
actors, and identities.... Institutions affect the ways in which individuals and
groups become activated within and outside established institutions, the level of
trust among citizens and leaders, the common aspirations of a political
community, the shared language, understanding, and norms of the community,
and the meaning of concepts like democracy, justice, liberty and equality101.
The European institutions could, accordingly, become the bearers of rules
and certain norms of behaviour, if they had the legitimacy required. However, this
is not yet - and may not come to be - the case. Neo-Institutionalists tend to ignore
the vitality of integration, together with the 'ups' and 'downs' related to it. These
'ups' and 'downs' may be subject to sub-national, national or even international
98 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "The governance of the European Union: a New Institutionalist approach"
in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, 13/4, p. 358. For a more detailed account see specifically p.
351.
99 Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions europeennes et leur contribution a l'emergence d'une
identite et d'une politique culturelle europeennes" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p.
62.
100 Vandamme, Jacques (1994); "La citoyennete europeenne element de l'identite europeenne" in
Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p. 258.
101 March, James and Olsen, Johan (1989); Rediscovering Institutions, p. 164.
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forces which interfere with the European integration process either directly or
indirectly. It seems that Neo-Institutionalists tend to believe in the '"stickiness' of
institutional arrangements"102, namely their linear development and unchanging
character.
The functional separation of power within the European Union contributes
to the fact that the relationship between the European institutions seems unclear.
This has led to a lack of "institutional accountability"103 between the European
Union and its member states, as well as between the European Union and its
citizens. Compared to national governance, the European Union disposes of
relatively few resources of its own. This includes - compared to the municipal
offices in Paris or Birmingham104 - a relatively small administration apparatus
which is, nevertheless, often described as too bureaucratic, too technocratic, too
complex and too remote from the peoples of Europe. In addition, one may also be
able to claim that EU governance is still very much subject to intergovernmentalism
rather than institutional supranationalism. It seems that heads of governments and
states, together with national ministers, are "entrusted with the duty to govern
Europe."105
European integration theories and European identity
Given the fact that each integration theory places different emphasis on the
various aspects of the European integration process, there "is no single dynamic of
European integration and, therefore, no single theoretical framework [that] can
102 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "The governance of the European Union: a New Institutionalist
approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, 13/4, p. 369.
103 Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European governance: politicised bureaucracy and
multiple accountability in the European Commission" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 4/
No. 1, p. 75.
104 The EU bureaucracy is "small, some 20,000 people in all, fewer than the municipal officials in
Paris or in Birmingham" (Walker, Martin (1999); "Sniping at Europe's elite" in The Guardian,
January 12, 1999).
105 Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions europeennes et Ieur contribution a l'emergence d'une
identite et d'une politique culturelle europeennes" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p.
63. My translation.
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encapsulate the totality of European integration."106 One should, however, not
dismiss any theory as non-viable to explain the European integration process.
Rather, the theories are all interlinked and complement each other, despite - or
perhaps due to - their differences, flaws and internal contradictions. Therefore, the
European integration process may be described as
a multi-faceted, multi-actor and multi-speed process.... At different times in the
Community's history, different actors, institutions and pressures have been
influential in either facilitating or limiting the further development of the EC
broadly defined.107
But, apart from assigning different periods of time or aspects of the
European integration process to a theory on European integration, it is also worth
looking at how the concept of European identity might emerge according to each
theory.
The Neo-Functionalists' supranational approach has been criticised as being
too idealistic, predictive and theoretical. This is due to the fact that Neo-
Functionalism only seems to describe in part what is currently happening at EU
level. It tends to limit its "definition of integration almost exclusively to
institutional characteristics of the EC - the scope and institutional form of common
decision-making."108 In order to create a fundamentally political union, the Neo-
Functionalist means are fundamentally non-political. As a matter of fact, Neo-
Functionalists assume that a fully integrated European Union would eventually
come about through the spill-over effect. Following this logic, then, Neo-
Functionalists would possibly explain the emergence of a European identity in the
same way: European identity would be an inevitable consequence of the economic
and institutional spillover, that is an "identity to be constructed"109.
On its own, however, one may claim that Neo-functionalism is an
insufficient theory to explain the eventual emergence of a European identity, since
106 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 25.
107 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 25.
108 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 479.
109 Massart, Franfoise (1993); L'Europe et tous ses Etats, p. 218. My translation.
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it underestimates the importance of national governments and the interplay of the
various existing identities. Indeed, materialistic measures from the top seem to be
insufficient for a European identity to develop. Nor should one take public consent
and commitments for the European integration process for granted. The masses
have so far not followed the elites. However, one should not be too dismissive of
Neo-Functionalism, since the
post-war debate on the future of European co-operation was... clearly an issue of
'high polities'; as such, it was dominated by intense, intergovernmental
negotiations between politico-administrative elites, whose support (or, in the case
of Britain, non-support) for European integration can be explained primarily in
terms of perceived national interest."0
After the Second World War, the six founding member states of the EC
were primarily concerned with the reconstruction of their own countries and
national identities. There was virtually no significance given to the concept of a
European identity. It would have been an inappropriate time to focus on the
development of a European identity, since "people weren't ready to agree to
integration, so you had to get on without telling them too much about what was
happening."111 Economic and political factors were prioritised, despite the political
relevance of ethnic and cultural issues.
The Domestic Politics Approach stands at the other extreme of the
integration theory continuum, namely the Neo-Functionalist approach. It stresses
the importance of domestic politics and tends to ignore European or intra-national
anti-centric forces. Nevertheless, supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach
would claim that the EU is a product of its member states and subnational actors.
Consequently, the EU policy making process should also be examined in this way.
In return, the Domestic Politics Approach suggests that the European integration
process transforms the nation-state without eroding the national arena.
110 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power andpolicy-waking, p. 27.
111 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. I, p. 83.
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Supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach would have a potentially
strong argument for the emergence of a European identity, since they almost take
sub-national, national and European interests as co-termini. Their multi-level model
of governance encourages subnational (constitutional arrangements allowing),
national and European forces to have their respective share in the shaping and
development of the European integration process. These different levels are then
melded together into one. Subnational forces see this as an opportunity to
circumvent central government, and central government, in return, may be willing
to give up part of its sovereignty to supranational authorities. Governments count
on the fact that
political benefits may outweigh the costs of losing political control or there may
be intrinsic benefits having to do with shifting responsibility for unpopular
decisions or insulating decision-making from domestic pressures."2
Although this multi-level approach may inevitably lead to competitions
between the different forces to gain the upper hand in the European integration
process, the following section will demonstrate that the Domestic Politics Approach
and its multi-level governance might be the most plausible approach to overcome
the problem of governance in the European Union."3
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism can be seen as a compromise between Neo-
Functionalism, the Domestic Politics Approach and Neo-Institutionalism - Liberal-
Intergovernmentalism may be placed at the middle of the European integration
theory scale. Focusing on the differences between Neo-Functionalism and Liberal-
Intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik points out:
Where neo-functionalism emphasises domestic technocratic consensus, liberal-
intergovernmentalism looks to domestic coalitional struggles. Where neo-
functionalism emphasises opportunities to upgrade the common interest, liberal-
intergovernmentalism stresses the role of relative power. Where neo-functionalism
emphasises the active role of supranational officials in shaping bargaining
112 Marks, Gary, Hooghie, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-centric v. Multi-level governance" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
349.
1,3 In addition, chapter 4 will show how transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union is congruent with the Domestic Politics Approach and may be taken as an example
to explain the emergence of a genuine European identity.
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outcomes, liberal-intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive institutions, and
the autonomy of national leaders."4
Liberal-Intergovernmentalists strive to describe the EU as a 'two-level game'
which allows member states to improve their efficiency during interstate
negotiations at European level, and at the same time strengthen their influence and
autonomy in their domestic polity.
Indeed, Liberal-Intergovernmentalism may be the most plausible European
integration theory to explain the European integration process. Its basis is strong
enough to support the emergence of an identification with the European integration
process, rather than a European identity per se. This is because Liberal-
Intergovernmentalism precludes the concept of European identity if it is congruent
with the national interest. Liberal-Intergovernmentalists emphasise the member
states' national interest, that is their fear to lose a great degree of loyalty, legitimacy
and autonomy to the supranational institutions of the EU. National identities still
predominate and will not - in the distant future - give way to the emergence of a
European identity.115 Consequently, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists attempt to
accommodate the member states' national interests with those of the EU integration
process. Nevertheless, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists lose sight of the fact that the
European integration process is still interpreted and managed through the lens of its
constituent national and sub-national actors. Accordingly, the existence of national
and sub-national forces, national and regional identities still play an essential part in
the European integration process, and they may not be that easily merged into one
European identity.
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism may regard - to come back to the analogy
used in chapter two - the European integration process as a toolbox. This toolbox is,
as we have seen, able to accommodate the many different national identities. In
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, the tools - the member states - rather than the
toolbox itself - here, the European Union - remain the key central actors. Both
member states and the European Community continue to complement each other.
114 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 518.
115 This will be further explored in chapter 5b.
Chapter 3.A.i - 116
Eventually, increasing co-operation between member states may produce a
collective identification with the European integration process, supplementary to
the existing national identities. In this sense, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists would
argue that identification with the European Union does not necessarily need to lead
to the loss of national sovereignty and that "[sovereignty is not virginity, which
you either have or you don't"116. Liberal-Intergovernmentalists do not interpret the
European integration process as a zero-sum game, but as flexible and open
bargaining - in which the member states continuously evaluate the costs and
benefits of their EU membership.
It is difficult to place the Neo-Institutionalist theory within the spectrum of
the European integration theories. Neo-Institutionalism does not follow any
traditional international relations theory and needs to be examined separately. Neo-
Institutionalists focus on the relationship between the European institutions, rather
than the relationship between the different possible political forces. Neo-
Institutionalism seeks to analyse the relation between the European Union's
bureaucratic intransparency and its lack of popular legitimacy. Neo-Institutionalists
understand "institutions as mediators between individual action and structural
foundation [which] makes them the crucial arena for social change."117 Neo-
Institutionalists recognise that tensions within the European integration process and
within the governance of the European Union might emerge; they do not, however,
take into account the dynamics of the integration process itself.
Given the EU's complex and often incomprehensible institutional set-up,
Neo-Institutionalists would argue that a genuine European identity is not likely to
emerge. Instead, supporters of Neo-Institutionalism would claim that a European
identity could emerge if a clear insight into the increasing institutional integration
process is produced: a European identity could be the result of a clear
understanding of European Union governance.
116 Geoffrey Howe cited in Ulf Hedetoft (1994); "The State of Sovereignty in Europe" in
Zetterholm, Staffan (ed.); European Cultures and European Integration, p. 21.
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We have seen that Neo-functionalism stresses supranational forces, and
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism relies on intergovernmental co-operation to assess
the European integration process. As a result, both approaches - although in part
true to the European integration process - do not seem to be sufficient enough to
explain the emergence of a genuine European identity. On the other hand, Neo-
Institutionalism and the Domestic Politics Approach seem to shed some light on the
institutional structure of the European Union, which might in turn create a
framework in which a European identity could emerge.
Neo-Institutionalists have shown that there is an institutional contradiction
at work within the European integration process. Therefore, Neo-Institutionalists
tend to concentrate on the institutional interaction within the EU. This seems to
demonstrate that the EU is more democratic and transparent than usually described.
Indeed, Neo-Institutionalists would argue that the more transparent and
comprehensible the interaction between the European institutions, the closer the
European citizen will feel drawn to the European institutions. S/he would "be
concerned about the functioning of the European institutions, be prepared to
participate and therefore identify with them"118, perhaps even be "prepared to make
personal sacrifices for European integration."119 Domestic Politics Approach, on the
other hand, proposes that European integration is based on multi-level governance.
As a result, Domestic Politics Approach may be a plausible approach to explain the
governance of the European Union, since it takes into account the various actors of
the European integration process. This could then become a basis from which one
may explain the emergence of a European identity. Neo-Institutionalism may be
pre-conditional to the Domestic Politics Approach, in order to demonstrate that
117 Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European governance: politicised bureaucracy and
multiple accountability in the European Commission" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 4/
No. 1, p. 74.
118 Vandamme, Jacques (1994); "La citoyennete europeenne element de l'identite europeenne" in
Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p. 258. My translation.
119 Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in
Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European
Integration, p. 158.
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subsidiarity, defined as multi-level governance, "links transparency, efficiency and
democracy"120.
Whereas the Domestic Politics Approach may be better described as a
European integration theory which explains the European integration process, the
theory ofNeo-Institutionalism is rather a theory which concentrates on some of the
fundamental problems central to the European polity, namely European
governance. The following section will show that, although it seems necessary to
distinguish between the process and causality of European integration, it is also
important not to overstate the division between the two.121 To this end, the problem
of governance and legitimacy within the European Union will be examined.
Supporting the "maxim that as we organise, so we behave"122, the next section will
ask in how far the European integration process shapes popular acquiescence? And
in how far popular acquiescence also influences the European project and our sense
ofEuropean identity?
120 Lodge, Juliet (1994); "Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy" in Journal ofCommon Market
Studies, Vol. 32/ No. 4, p. 366.
121 Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in
Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 54.
122 Shackleton, Michael (1991); "European Community between Three Ways of Life: A Cultural
Analysis" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 29/ No. 6, p. 600.
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3. A.ii Governance and legitimacy within the European Union
The problem of governance within the European Union should not be
confused with the problem of government or public representation, since the
European Union "is plainly not a sovereign state"1, not a government, "not a
traditional alliance of states,... not a confederacy - it is impossible, at least up until
now, to define it positively."2 Although some scholars, such as David Coombes,
suggest that "the objectives of public policy in the Maastricht Treaty demand in
principle that the European Union be founded with its own government"*, this
section will suggest that
we need to abandon the notion that the Union is evolving towards traditional state
or nationhood. The Union is crafted onto existing forms of political order but in
turn contributes to the transformations of such forms.4
The governance within the European Union
implies that political goals are set intentionally and that sustained efforts are made
in order to assure that the behaviour of domestic or international actors is guided
by these goals. This general definition does not say anything about the concrete
form of governance beyond the state.... the idea of governance beyond the state
does not necessarily mean governance above the state.5
Indeed, the output of European governance has not transformed the
European Union into a superstate6. It is rather the case that the problem of
governance within the European Union refers to the problems of policy mediation
and system design. Both aspects suggest that the EU has no "formal institutions
which can facilitate bargaining between interested actors"7 or involve the public in
EU governance. This lack of transparency and lack of public involvement is
1 Brewin, Christopher (1987); "The European Community: a Union of states without unity of
government" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 26/ No. 1, p. 1.
2 PreuB, Ulrich (1996); "Two Challenges to European Citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p.
549.
3 Coombes, David (1994); "Problems of Governance in the Union" in Duff, Andrew, Pinder, John
and Pryce, Roy (eds.); Maastricht and Beyond, p. 158.
4 Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of Internationalism" in
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 18, p. 5.
5 Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf
and Hallstrom, Par (eds.); Principles ofJustice and the European Union, p. 40.
6 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1995); "European Democracy and its Critique" in Western European
Politics, Vol. 18/No. 3, p. 4.
7 Peterson, John (1995); "Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework of
analysis" in Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 2/ No. 1, p. 86.
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directly linked to the problem of institutional frameworks and the problem of
legitimacy; it is indirectly linked to the problem of national and European
sovereignty, public representation, identity, culture territory and boundaries.
To look at the relationship between the subnational, national and the
European dimension, the relationship between the different institutions of the EU,
and the effects these have on the EU decision making process, might help to define
the problem of governance within the European Union. Depending on the level of
aggregation and analysis, the organisation and governance of the EU is defined
differently. The intention of this section is not to find a solution to the problem of
governance within the EU, but to shed some light on some of the central factors
contributing to this existing problem. One may then be able to understand and
assess to what extent the problem of governance has had, and will have, an
influence on the development of a European identity and the European integration
process as a whole.
The problem of European governance
European integration theories have so far "tended to focus on the question of
degrees of integration"8 rather than the policy-making and bargaining process
involved in the European Union. Furthermore, the issues of identity and culture
have largely been ignored in the European integration theories. Public consent was
taken for granted, whereas economic factors were prioritised for the restructuring of
the individual European member states' economies in the post-World War II period.
This gives reason to believe that the European integration process was primarily
driven by national interests rather than regional or European interests, and by
economics and politics rather than the involvement of citizens. Until 1992, one may
argue, the European integration project was an "ideologically neutral programme
around which the entire European polity could coalesce in order to achieve the
8 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European
Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 5.
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goals of European integration."9 The Treaty on European Union, however, can no
longer be qualified as ideologically neutral. The introduction of qualified majority
voting, makes it
possible for policies to be adopted within the Council that run counter not simply
to the perceived interests of a member state but, more specifically, to the ideology
of a government in power.10
Prior to the introduction of qualified majority voting, decision-making
processes transcended the traditional Left-Right scale of political party systems, so
that "policies verged toward centrist, pragmatic choices,... [t]he tendency toward the
lowest common denominator also applied to the lowest common ideological
denominator."11
The ideologically neutral approach to the European integration process, as
well as the adoption of the lowest common denominator, was prompted by both the
initial economic incentives to build the European Community and, more
importantly, by the supremacy of European law over national law. The Van Gend
en Loos case in 1962 led the European Court of Justice to conclude, in 1963, that
the
Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations
between the contracting states.... the Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign
rights.12
Has the European Court of Justice focused on the level of uniformity across
the Community territory, without actually having a preconceived idea of what a
political Union should be? Subsequent to the 1962 Van Gend en Loos case, the
1964 Costa case gave the European Community a new important impetus, since it
9 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
1992, p. 33.
10 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
1992, pp. 34.
11 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
1992, p. 33.
12 cited in Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1983); "Community, Member States and European Integration: Is
the Law Relevant?" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 21/ No. 4, p. 43.
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became evident that the "EEC Treaty had created its own legal system"13.
Accordingly, the Court commenced to refer "to the Treaties as the Constitutional
Charter of the Union"14, since it became evident that the Treaties were
distinct both from general international law and from the laws of the member
states, that this law had direct effect in conferring rights and obligations directly
on citizens of the member states, not only on the states and their organs, and that
within the spheres covered by the treaties the law so constituted necessarily had
supremacy over the law of member states, for otherwise there would not be a
common body of European Community law that would have the same impact
everywhere where it was binding.15
The EU's system of judicial review makes the European Union
distinguishable from any other international organisation. This 'new legal order' is
subject to what Joseph Weiler has called the "all or nothing effect"16. European law
is either accepted as being superior to national law, or it is not. European law, in
fact, gains its superiority from
a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their
nationals and themselves.17
For Neil MacCormick, this shows that law does not "belong either
paradigmatically or only within the framework of a sovereign state; it has other
equally important theatres"18, even if these theatres lack the adequate apparatus to
implement the law legitimately. EC law is "implemented and enforced through
13 Weale, Albert (1995), "Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of Europe" in Bellamy,
Richard, Bufacchi, Victorio and Castiglione, Dairio (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional Culture in
the Union ofEurope, p. 84.
14 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 520.
15 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, p. 4.
16 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1983); "Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law
Relevant?" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 21/ No. 4, p. 53.
17 European Court of Justice cited in Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1983); "Community, Member States and
European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 21/ No. 4,
p. 44.
18 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, p. 1.
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national courts... [which] is inadequate as a modality for legitimation, for it ignores
the domestic... mechanisms whereby national law is made."19
Political integration, on the other hand, is not subject to this 'all or nothing
effect'. It is only in some matters that "institutions of the EU take 'collective
decisions' which are 'binding' on states and citizens."20 Indeed, EC policies "now
affect far more peoples than in the past... [and] are now considered much more
seriously by national politicians, interest groups and the general public than in the
past."21 As a result, the European Union may be credited with having "acquired for
itself at least the policy-making attributes of a modern state, across an increasingly
wide range of policy areas"22 - and the tendency of the proportion of policy-making
at the EU level (currently possibly 60%23) and the overall fields of policy-making
continues to rise.24 This might give reason to believe that the member state "no
longer monopolises European level policy-making or the aggregation of domestic
interests"25 and that the "European states are losing their grip on the mediation of
domestic interest representation in international relations."25 The ratification of the
Treaty on European Union, for example, necessitated changes in the traditional
constitutional order of the European member states, and in France, for instance, "the
European Union became, for the first time, part of the constitution [and altered] the
legal definitions of French sovereignty and legitimacy."27 The Europeanisation of
19 Bankowski, Zenon and Scott, Drew (1996), "The European Union?" in Bellamy, Richard (ed.);
Constitutionalism, Democracy andSovereignty: American and European Perspectives, p. 92.
20 Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration
processes" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 35/No. 2, p. 269.
21 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power andpolicy-making, p. 36.
22 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European
Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 3.
23 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European
Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 3.
24 Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration
processes" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 2, p. 277.
25 Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
346.
26 Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
341.
27 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Membership Matter: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 425.
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these traditionally national areas may be regarded as a challenge to the existing
national policy processes. The European integration process may even be seen as a
zero-sum game. However, this is not entirely the case, since the locus of power has
not shifted from the European member states to the institutions of the European
Union. National actors are not being substituted by any sort of European
supranational actors, since the idea of the European Union
rests on the very fact that it does not involve the negation of the state... The idea of
community seeks to dictate a different type of intercourse among the actors
belonging to it, of self-limitation in their self-perception, of redefined self-interest
and, hence, redefined policy goals. To the interest of the state must be added the
interest of the Community. But, crucially, it does not extinguish the separate actors
who are fated to live in an uneasy tension with two competing senses of the
polity's self - and committed to search, destined to be elusive, of an optimal
balance of goals and behaviour as between the community and its actors.28
As a result, the European Union policy makers' aim is
to create a regime which seeks to tame the national interest with a new discipline.
The idyllic is a state of affairs which eliminates the excess of nationalism. The
challenge is to control at societal level the uncontrolled reflexes of national
interest in the international sphere.29
The European Union has a complex structure of multi-level policy-making.
This, we have seen is congruent with the Domestic Politics Approach. Multi-level
governance represents
a continuum from highly integrated policy communities to loosely integrated issue
networks [which] enable us to focus on the possibility of changes in the nature of
the policy process over time and from sector to sector.30
According to Dominique Wolton, the model of European governance makes
it impossible to describe the European Union as a "Europe of nations, but as a
mosaic of governmental models and responsibilities: supranational, regional, local,
municipal - where sovereignty is shared between the different levels of
28 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
1992, p. 38.
29 Joseph Weiler cited in Laffan, Brigid (1995); "Identity, Legitimacy and Political Order in
Europe", paper presented during The European Union and the Changing European Order,
Conference organised at Loughborough University, March, 17 -18, 1995.
30 Rhodes, R. A. W. cited in Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson,
Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 9.
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government."31 This may be considered as a challenge to the individual member
states' national sovereignty, particularly since
[t]he community vision is... premised on limiting (or sharing) sovereignty in a
select (albeit growing) number of fields - on recognising, and even celebrating,
the reality of interdependence and of counterpoising to the exclusivist ethos of
statal autonomy a notion of community of states and peoples sharing values and
aspirations.32
Neil MacCormick refers to member states as "not-fully-sovereign states"
and to the European Union as a "not-sovereign Union"33. Traditionally, sovereignty
"has connotations of inalienabililty, indivisibility and a competence of communities
within their territories that is untrammelled by past tradition, the laws of God and,
arguably, the laws of nations."34 In the European Union, however, the principle of
sovereignty does not follow this example. If, as Brewin argues,
sovereignty is a doctrine of power as well as right, the loss of competence in
individual republics has already happened. The political consciousness of Europeans
has been transformed in the attempt to recover that power at a higher regional
level.35
The principle of sovereignty is shared between the European Union and its
member states. No party has an absolute sovereignty over the other, and all parties
involved in the European integration process need to adjust "to the empirical reality
of this situation. They have all 'lost' some power in a common pooling of policy¬
making sovereignty."36 As has been asserted in chapter two, this situation gives no
reason to write off the existence and influence of the nation-state. Member states
still retain a large degree of political authority, a kind of common sovereignty
31 Wolton, Dominique (1993); La derniere utopie. Naissance de I'Europe democratique, p. 218. My
translation.
32 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
1992, p. 37.
33 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, p. 10.
34 Brewin, Christopher (1987); "The European Community: a Union of states without unity of
government" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 26/ No. 1, p. 5.
35 Brewin, Christopher (1987); "The European Community: a Union of states without unity of
government" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 26/ No. 1, p. 22.
36 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European
Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 3.
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which melds member states "gently into a multi-level polity by their leaders and the
actions of numerous subnational and supranational actors"37 - "institutional and
non-institutional, governmental and non-governmental"38, public and private actors.
Sovereignty has been "subjected to a process of division and combination
internally, and hence in a way enhanced externally."39 Therefore, the question is not
about sovereignty, yes or no? Rather, it demands a redefinition of the term.
But,
why do states give up sovereignty in the process of European integration?... why
do particular actors (party leaders in national governments) change institutional
rules (e.g. shift competencies to the European Union)?40
One of the reasons may be that member states sometimes use the European
Union as a means to "compel changes [particularly unfavourable ones] at home that
they would be unable to achieve through purely domestic processes."41 Indeed, the
EU may sometimes be "too convenient a scapegoat"42 when member states
try to externalise responsibility, not just claiming that a particular decision was 'the
best compromise we could get', but talking about decisions as if they were made
by some generalised 'other' of which the national government is no part.43
In order to meet demands of both the member states and the Union - which
might eventually lead to a "Europeification of decision-making"44 - it may be
argued that the Union needs to be based on a distinct constitution based on some
37 Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
371.
38 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European
Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 5.
39 MacCormick, Neil (1995); "Sovereignty: Myth and Reality" in Scottish Affairs, Vol. 11/ No. 1, p.
10.
40 Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
348.
41 Sandholtz, Wayne (1996); "Limits of the Functionalist approach to European integration" in
Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p. 423.
42 Wallace, Helen (1993); "European government in turbulent times" in Journal ofCommon Market
Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 3, p. 302.
43 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 2, p. 202.
44 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 2, p. 208.
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common values and a commitment to a collective identity.45 So far, the institutional
architecture and constitution of the European Union have been taken for granted. It
is often believed that the European Union is based on constitutionalism without a
constitution, rather than a constitution without constitutionalism.46 Given the
difference between the notions of constitutionalism and constitution, and assuming
that the Treaties represent a Constitutional Charter of the Union, PreuB questions
what kind of constitutional model this Union Constitution should be, or is partly,
based on. PreuB defines Constitutionalism as including
the key tenets of a polity which is based on the idea that the ruled are not merely
passive objects of the rulers' willpower but that the ruled have the status of active
members of the political community.... The characteristic of constitutionalism is a
horizontal order of state authority, in which a system of careful co-ordination of the
functionally specified powers produces a web of mutual and almost circular
dependence whereby either one state power can only act on the antecedent action of
another or it is subject to subsequent scrutiny and, if need be, censure.47
Taking this statement as a point of reference, the Treaty on European Union
resembles a mixed constitution.48 It merges, "without replacing one level, several
functional, legal and political sources of legitimacy"49 and reconceptualises the
traditional principle of constitutionalism. A mixed constitution is based on the
principle of "[cjombined and divided state-and-community sovereignty [which]
seems [to be] the enemy of popular sovereignty."50
The "enmeshing of the national and the European has neither been smooth
nor linear. Rather, it has been partial, patchy and contested."51 The legal, political
45 Wallace, Helen (1993); "Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy" in Garcia, Soledad
(ed.); European identity and the Searchfor Legitimacy, p. 101.
46 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 518.
47 PreuB, Ulrich (1996); "The political meaning of constitutionalism" in Bellamy, Richard (ed.);
Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, p. 12 and
17.
48 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, p. 18.
49 Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration
processes" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 2, p. 291.
50 MacCormick (1995); "Sovereignty, Democracy and Subsidiarity" in Bellamy, Richard, Bufacchi,
Victorio and Castiglione, Dairio (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of
Europe, p. 102.
51 Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of Internationalism" in
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 18, p. 6.
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and cultural aspects of European integration do not follow or coincide
simultaneously. So far, legal integration is ahead of political integration. This has
given rise to a number of problems which are presently at issue. Legal integration
does not take into account "popular institution-building and there is no democratic
legitimation process in evidence: it is a largely unseen process."52 But since "law
necessarily implicates politics and politics necessarily implicates law"53, the clash
between legal and political integration raises fundamental questions of legitimacy -
politics can no longer lag behind law.
As was indicated in chapter two, the Union
is moving from issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions
about its nature as a part-formed polity... and... the politics of identity have
enormous salience in the new Europe and for the European Union at this juncture
in its development."54
The European integration project can no longer be driven by national elites,
nor can the EU's legitimacy any longer be exclusively derived from its member
states, but should be derived directly from the EU-citizens.55 Arguably, the EU-
citizens become increasingly affected by the structure of the European Union, but
seem unable to identify or control this power.56 The Monnet method seems to have
lost its ground as the 'period of popular consent' has come to an end.57 Popular
consent can no longer be linked to the European Community's economic benefits.
Issues concerning culture and identity should not lag behind politics, as the
"growing salience of identity politics takes place against a backdrop of considerable
economic and not just political change"58. It seems as if national identities can no
52 Bankowski, Zenon and Scott, Drew (1996), "The European Union?" in Bellamy, Richard (ed.);
Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, p. 86.
53 MacCormick, Neil (1995); "Sovereignty, Democracy and Subsidiarity" in Bellamy, Richard,
Bufacchi, Victorio and Castiglione, Dairio (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the
Union ofEurope, p. 96.
54 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 1, p. 82.
55 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-
State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 431.
56 Joffe, Josef (1999); "Europaische Heuchelei-Union" in Siiddeutsche Zeitung, January 16/17, 1999.
57 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-
State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 429.
58 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 1, p. 83.
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longer be buttressed by the European integration project, but they have, as Brigid
Laffan suggests, become increasingly challenged by the growing European
integration process and its search for 'European identity', political nationalism,
specifically correlated with the politicisation of immigration, as well as the revival
of territorial politics and regional identities.59
The intermittent course of integration of economic, legal and political
factors has led many scholars to interpret the European integration process
differently. There is no blue-print for the constitutional architecture of the European
integration process - and even if there were, then this blue-print would possibly be
"inspired (voluntarily or not) by an idealised model of the state."60 The absence of a
blue-print might explain the reason why the European integration process goes
through periods of stability and depression. At different stages during the European
integration process, as well as according to the level of aggregation and analysis,
the European Community/Union has had the following labels attached to it:
pluralistic security community, regime, Zweckverband, Staatenverbund, civitas
europea, concordance system, unvollendeter (uncompleted) Bundesstaat, federal
union, quasi-state, post-modern, liberal intergovernmentalism, multilevel
governance61 or commonwealth62. Since each one of these terms only describes part
of the European reality, William Wallace, as has already been mentioned, has
settled for the description of the European Union as a political system which is
something "less than a federation - more than a regime"63. Along the same lines,
Brigid Laffan refers to the "'betweeness' [sic] of the European Union [which]
hovers between politics and diplomacy, between states and markets and between
59 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 1, pp. 85-92.
60 Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf
and Hallstrom, Par (eds.); Principles ofJustice and the European Union, p. 34-35.
61 All terms, together with bibliographical notes, are found in Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever
closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration processes" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 35/No. 2, p. 268.
62 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, p. 11.
63 Wallace, William (1983); "Less than a federation - more than a regime: the Community as a
political system" in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William and Webb, Carol (eds.); Policy-making in the
European Union, p. 3.
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government and governance."64 These two vague expressions about the 'status' of
the European Union describe the ambiguity surrounding the undefined roles for
both the national member states and the European bodies within the governance of
the European Union.
The question of European legitimacy
So far, there has not been one theory which grasps the question of European
legitimacy in full. Until recently, scholars contended that the problem of European
legitimacy might be solved if the democratic deficit and the problem of European
intransparency were to be overcome.65 Certainly, this is a viable solution - however,
it is incomplete. More needs to be done, since the concept of legitimacy
refers not merely to the validation of rules and rule making, i.e. legal rights or
entitlement, but also to the acceptance of legal decisions by individual citizens,
even when their own lives and livelihoods are affected.66
While the member states of the European Union may claim to enjoy full
legitimacy - if not in the traditional sense, then in the symbolical one - the European
Union is still far from being able to make such a claim. As a matter of fact, the
European Union derives its legitimacy - little as it may be - from the legitimacy of
its constituent member states; and, despite the constitutional characteristics of the
Treaties, the EU's constituent nation-states are able to act as nation-states and its
individuals as Europeans.
According to Charles de Gaulle, states are the source of identity,
plebiscitary democracy and legitimacy67 - formal and social legitimacy. Both forms
64 Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of Internationalism" in
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 18, p. 1.
65 Lodge, Juliet (1994); "Transparency and Democratic legitimacy" in Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 32/ No. 3. According to Annabel Black and Chris Shore, however, "attempts at
simplification and solving the 'democratic deficit' have only resulted in the invention of ever more
complex procedures" (Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the
Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.);
The Anthropology ofEurope, p. 280).
66 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 2, p. 194.
67 Wallace, William and Smith, Julie (1995); "Democracy or Technocracy? European integration
and the problem of popular consent" in West European Politics, Vol. 18/ No. 3, p. 143.
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of legitimacy are necessary, but on their own neither is sufficient. According to
Joseph Weiler, formal legitimacy rests "on some democratic foundation, loosely
stated as the people's consent to power structures and process"68. This was
particularly the case during Weimar Germany, whose government was based on
legal and democratic principles, but it enjoyed little legitimacy. On the other hand,
social legitimacy depends on the strength of national consensus over values and the
perception of fairness. It
connotes a broad societal acceptance... and is achieved when the government
process displays a commitment to, and actively guarantees values that are part of,
the general political culture - such as justice and freedom.69
This might even be the case if the government is not based on democratic
and legal principles, such as during Nationalist Socialist Germany, when legitimacy
was an organic concept70 which "was acquired by an appeal to deeper strata in the
human psyche where profound existential needs for meaning and belonging were
met with captivating national myths."71
If legitimacy is two-fold, then it may be argued that the European Union is
subject to a tension between both formal and social legitimacy, since the European
Union enjoys formal - or legal - legitimacy, but lacks social legitimacy. However, it
is not enough for the European Union to enjoy solely formal legitimacy72, since one
could then suggest that the crisis over European legitimacy is, in fact, a crisis
68 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
1992, pp.19.
69 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
1992, pp. 19-20.
70 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 2, p. 195.
71 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 251.
72 Daniela Obradovic adds to this the notion of 'utilitarian support', namely the gain of legitimacy
through the appeal to the economic welfare the Union may provide. For a more detailed account, see
Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 2, pp. 198-201. See also Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998);
"Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p.
431.
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generated by the member states themselves.73 The European Union needs to acquire
social legitimacy. Without social legitimacy, the European integration process
could end up in a cul-de-sac.
Although legitimacy cannot be measured according to one strict standard -
since it is too diverse and complex74 it becomes evident that the problem of
legitimacy within the EU goes beyond the problem of the democratic deficit. The
democratic deficit usually addresses two dimensions of the European Union: on the
one hand, there is the institutional framework. The institutional structure of the
European Union is "too bureaucratic [and] too remote from the voting public and
too locked in arcane procedures to attract popular interest."75 This institutional
deficit rests on the lack of accountability and legitimation of the European
Parliament vis-a-vis the peoples of Europe and its lack of power in relation to the
other European institutions. The European Parliament is not yet representative of a
European demos76, and empowering the European Parliament would therefore not
solve the European Union's legitimacy crisis. A strong Parliament would weaken
the Council and therefore aggravate the legitimacy crisis within the European
Union. On the other hand, the EU is often criticised for its lack of transparency.77
This may be largely due to its functional separation of powers78, which have been
explained in the preceding section. In addition, the EU's legislation and policy¬
making seems too technocratic and too bureaucratic. According to William Wallace
and Julie Smith,
73 Galloway, David, Secretariat Council of Ministers (1998); "Institutional Architecture of the EU",
paper presented at the Europa Institute, University of Edinburgh, March 12, 1998.
74 Markus Jachtenfuchs, however, assumes that there are three broad notions of legitimacy which
can possibly make it measurable: first, the legitimacy to a core of fundamental rights; second, the
legitimacy of the citizens measurable in public opinion; and third, Habermas' reconstructive notion
of legitimacy. Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in
Bernitz, Ulf and Hallstrom, Par (eds.); Principles ofJustice and the European Union, pp. 42 -43.
75 Walker, Martin (1999); "Delors plans new federalist coup" in The Guardian, January 4, 1999.
76 This is due to the fact that the European Parliament does not have the same parliamentary powers
as national Parliaments. The turnout at EP election is usually uneven and low, since elections are
essentially fought on a national rather than European basis and since there is not a European party-
system per se.
77 Lodge, Juliet (1994); "Transparency and Democratic legitimacy" in Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 32/No. 3, p. 366.
78 Laenerts, Koen (1991), "Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European
Community" in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 28, pp. 11-35.
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[technocratic policy-making was acceptable among six countries, with a limited
agenda and within the wider context of American leadership and the external
Soviet threat. For the agenda which an enlarged - and still enlarging - EU now
faces, without constructive American guidance or the solidarity engendered by any
clear or present danger, there can be little hope of generating any comparable
permissive consensus.79
The Maastricht ratification crisis is often cited as an example which
challenged the EU's 'permissive consensus'. It raised important questions about
democracy, legitimacy and identity within the European Union80 and "heralded an
important change in the method of the [sic] European integration."81 The ratification
crisis is hardly ever taken as an example which showed the peoples' discontent with
their national governments.82
The post-Maastricht period demands a "redefinition of political boundaries
in Europe"83. Throughout the European integration process, the formal political
boundaries of states have remained intact, while functional political boundaries
were redrawn. This has led to a clash between the European Union's problem of
system design and its problem of territory. The EU is not a state and its territorial
boundaries do not correspond to its political boundaries84. With the adoption of the
Maastricht Treaty, it became clear that the
redrawing of political boundaries... can occur only if, and can be ascertained only
when, a European people can be said to exist. Since this, it is claimed, has not
occurred, the Union and its institutions can have neither the authority nor the
legitimacy of a Demos-cratic state.85
Member states, however, remain reluctant to agree to a congruity between
the two, since - traditionally - the political boundaries of a state are analogous with
79 Wallace, William and Smith, Julie (1995); "Democracy or Technocracy? European integration
and the problem of popular consent" in West European Politics, Vol. 18/ No. 3, p. 154.
80 Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of Internationalism" in
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 18, p. 2.
81 Mazey, Sonia (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 36.
82 Franklin, Mark, Eijk van der, Clees and Marsh, Michael (1995); "Public Support in the wake of
Maastricht" in Western European Politics, Vol. 18/ No. 3, p. 114, states that the "legitimacy of the
EU was put into question purely as a result of government unpopularity".
83 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 2, p. 208.
84 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1995); "European Democracy and its Critique" in Western European
Politics, Vol. 18/No. 3, p. 6 and 13.
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political independence, territorial integrity and the very democratic nature of the
polity.86
The problem of the European demos
We have so far seen that Maastricht goes beyond a purely institutional
framework. Furthermore, it brings the relationship between individuals and the
European integration process to the fore. Art. 8 of the TEU, the introduction of the
right to European citizenship, is a prime example of this. More importantly,
however, Art. 8 was an attempt to bring the European Union closer to the peoples
and to create a feeling of belonging amongst the peoples of Europe. We will come
back to the concept of European citizenship in the subsequent two sections, as well
as in chapter five.
Since a considerable number of citizens still feel alienated from the
European Union, let alone represented by the authorities of the EU, the problem of
representation may be indirectly linked to the problem of European governance.
Representation is, however, directly linked to questions of legitimacy.
Representation is usually co-terminus with democracy.
Democracy, according to the Greek meaning of the term, means 'rule
(,kratos) by the people {demos)', in other words 'people govern themselves'. This
concept of self-rule of the people has developed into the concept of representative
democracy, a "limited and indirect form of democracy based on the selection
(usually by election) of those who will rule on behalf of the people."87 The selection
of these people, usually institutionalised in a representative assembly such as
Parliament, represents the demos, which is generally taken as being the nation. In
return, "the role of citizens assumes a pivotal position in the legitimation and
85 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 524.
86 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 523. We will see in the following
chapter, chapter four, how transborder co-operation and borderlands are essential means to achieve
this redefinition of national, cultural and political boundaries.
87 Heywood, Andrew (1997); Politics, p. 412.
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validation both of the state itself and of the laws enacted therein."88 Citizens are the
demos of the polity and "[djemos, thus, is a condition of democracy."89
Applying this model of democracy to the European Union, however, could
go horribly wrong, since there is no European demos. Instead, it is important to note
that the
issue about Europe ought not... to be whether it is totally or completely
democratic, but whether it is adequately so given the kind of entity we take it to
be.... Rather, it provides a salutary reminder that merely to point out some un- or
non-democratic element in a given constitutional set-up is not eo ipso to damn
if,9°
The European Union is composed of the peoples of its constituent member
states - and each member state presupposes a demos which is primarily answerable
to its respective national government. There is "no European demos - not a people
not a nation."91 Hence, Joseph Weiler concludes that, due to the absence of a
European demos, "there cannot, by definition, be a democracy or democratisation at
the European level."92 One should be reminded, however, that the European
Community, from its outset, was not destined to become a self-governing body, nor
to develop into something similar to a European nation-state. On the contrary. The
"origins of the EC lay precisely in an attempt to build hopes of better governance
for (western) Europe through the integration project"93, not to build a nation or
"nation-state aimed at homogenising societies and cultures"94. It is about
88 Bankowski, Zenon and Scott, Drew (1996), "The European Union?" in Bellamy, Richard (ed.);
Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, p. 78.
89 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 257.
90 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, pp. 19 and 21.
91 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The Reformation of European Constitutionalism" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 116.
92 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The Reformation of European Constitutionalism" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 116. Neil MacCormick's similar argument can be found
in MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, pp. 11-13.
93 Wallace, Helen (1993); "European government in turbulent times" in Journal ofCommon Market
Studies, Vol. 31/No. 3, p. 293.
94Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal of Common
Market Studies. Vol. 34/No. 2, p. 213.
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recognising and preserving the EU's plurality of cultures and identities. The
member states assert this in the preamble of the Treaty on European Union which
affirms that it is the object of the European integration process to create an "ever
closer union among the peoples [demoi] of Europe".95
If the preamble had referred to a people, the European integration process
could be regarded as being analogous to the attempt of creating a European nation,
an ethnic demos. This would then bring us back to chapter two and Anthony
Smith's ethnicist definition of the nation, "which pre-dates historically, and
precedes politically the modem state"96. It is also an indication to Hobsbawm's
objective and subjective factors for nationhood, specifically the will of a people or
peoples to be a nation. According to this view, then, "[ojnly nations 'may have'
states. The state belongs to the nation - its Volk, and the nation (the Volk) 'belongs'
to the state."97
For the European Union, however, this concept of an ethnic demos is not
feasible. Given the European Union's national and cultural pluralism, a European
'we-feeling' or eventual demos could not be based on the same definition as the
national 'we-feeling' or demos, since both objective and subjective elements are
missing. Pluralists, in particular, would argue that a "European demos should not be
based on the ethno-cultural mode"98, because "the emergence of a European demos
in a European polity enjoying legitimate democratic authority would signify... the
replacement of the various member state demoi"99. Instead, a European demos
would need to include all of the EU member states' different national demoi and
95 European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Preamble.
96 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1995); "European Democracy and its Critique" in Western European
Politics, Vol. 18/No. 3, p. 11.
97 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 257.
98 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1995); "European Democracy and its Critique" in Western European
Politics, Vol. 18/No. 3, p. 24.
99 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics of European Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 259.
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identities. It would have to be decoupled100 from the traditional notion that a demos
belongs exclusively to a nation-state, in order to give way to two demoi - the
national ethno-cultural demos and the European civic demos. In order to achieve
this, Neil MacCormick speaks of the European demos as a "'civic' demos"101 or 'thin'
demos. This civic demos will "not become a people,... demos and democracy are
not synonymous with ethnos."102 But in order to give this civic demos some
validity, it may rest on Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism which will re-surface
in the last section of this chapter and will be explored in greater detail in chapter
five. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that Habermas's Constitutional
Patriotism, embodies "at the societal and individual, rather than the statal level,... an
ideal which diminishes the importance of the statal aspect of nationality"103.
Constitutional Patriotism, hence, depends "upon pre-existing statehood and
membership of the Union only via the member states."104 A 'thick' demos, on the
contrary, is based on the fusion of demos, state and citizenship.
Basing the European integration process on a civic demos seems to be a
good way out of the overall European demos problem. It would in part be
congruous to Carl Friedrich's conception of federalism. In 1968, Friedrich
suggested that "in a federal system of government, each citizen belongs to two
communities - that of the state and that of the nation."105 A civic demos would
enable to build the European integration process on the idea of democracy - albeit a
100 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The 1997 Jean Monnet Lecture: European Union citizenship and
national citizenship", paper presented during New Forms of Citizenship in the European Union,
Seminar at the London School of Economics, March, 20 - 22, 1997.
101 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, p. 14.
102 La Torre, Massimo (1996); "L'identite et la citoyennete europeennes [sic]", p. 5 and 6. My
translation.
103 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 268.
104 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration, ESRC Seminar at
the University of Edinburgh, April 26 - 27, 1997, p. 14.
105 Friedrich, Carl cited in Weale, Albert (1995), "Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of
Europe" in Bellamy, Richard, Bufacchi, Victorio and Castiglione, Dairio (eds.); Democracy and
Constitutional Culture in the Union ofEurope, p. 83. Is Germany a case in point? With the 1990
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representative democracy - in order to preserve the pluralistic character and
different identities of and within the European Union. It seems to be a framework
able to encompass many different ethnic peoples or demoi.
This civic demos, however, should not be exclusive, since this would go
against the principle of the Community itself. It should rather attempt to include the
citizen in the European integration process, since the European Union
like any other kind of power-structure, must develop policy legitimacy: not so
much to function, or even to survive over a period of time, but to achieve the
purposes that depend upon the support of its population, and to maintain its
political system intact in the face of challenge or serious policy failure.106
Questions concerning the legitimacy and identity within the European
Union will remain unsolved until the problem of governance within the European
Union and the relations between the many different actors involved in the European
integration process are resolved. European governance is still undefinable, loose
and "prismatic"107, since "the dichotomy between state and organisation [the EU] is
not clear and flexible, but inadequate and misleading."108 It may even be argued that
Brussels
has developed into a diversified, atomised and complex political space with many,
though not all, national actors. The asymmetry in the involvement of groups of
actors as compared to traditional national systems highlights some of the essential
features of this new polity.... The EU is faced with fifteen different policy systems,
each reflecting national power structures (and national policy networks) and
national compromises in determining the 'national interest'. If European
integration is to take place, these national policy arrangements must be challenged
in some way and new policy settlements agreed.109
As has been argued in this section, there is enough reason to believe that the
EU institutions have developed their own dynamics and that the
unification, two German states merged, but the Volk, it seems, remains partly divided, giving rise to
the 'Ossi/Wessi' thinking.
106 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 2, pp. 193.
107 Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of Internationalism" in
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 18, p. 10.
108 Brewin, Christopher (1987); "The European Community: a Union of states without unity of
government" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 26/No. 1, p. 21.
109 Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on
integration processes" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 2, p. 284; Richardson,
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EU could be, and in some senses already is, a catalysing agency for inculcating
certain political norms and rights within the EU and enticing non-EU states
towards similar values as the price for entering the club."0
On the other hand, member states "no longer serve as the exclusive nexus
between domestic politics and international relations."111 The interrelationship
between member states and the European Union has altered the member states. This
was necessary in order to adapt the member states' traditional policy-making
processes, constitutional arrangements and conceptions of sovereignty and
legitimacy to be congruous with the new polity of the European Union. However, if
no further changes take place in the member states' polities, the European
integration project will be doomed to fail. The Europe of fifteen can not work under
the same conditions as the Europe of six. The European integration process can no
longer be driven by its original, initial ideals, since a
technocracy and elite-driven process seems no longer an adequate basis for EC
governance. The gap between governed and governors within and between
countries is serious and has created havoc in the debate about Maastricht to which
technical and legalistic devices seem an inappropriate response."2
This has become specifically evident in view of further EU enlargement
towards the East, "which could bring the membership of the EU up to between 25
and 30 within the next decade."113 Costs for enlargement will be very high on both
sides and conditions for a smooth working of the European integration process will
have to undergo changes as well. Popular consensus might be even more difficult to
achieve, in particular after the January 1999 allegations of fraud and
mismanagement in the European Commission.
It is the first time that the European Union prepares enlargement with six
member states at once and the acquis communautaire, that is "[t]he range of EU
Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power
and Policy-making, p. 11.
110 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 1, p. 100.
Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996); "European Integration from the 1980s:
State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance" in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 3, p.
372.
112 Wallace, Helen (1993); "European government in turbulent times" in Journal ofCommon Market
Studies, Vol. 31/No. 3, p. 302.
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treaties, laws and regulations that new members must accept has grown hugely
since 1986. Worse, existing EU members must reform large chunks of them,"114
specifically CAP, budget policies, benefit cuts and structural funds. More
importantly, the European integration process needs to adapt to these new
developments. Proposals to reform the internal structure of the Union, such as the
introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, to restructure
the Commission and to extend the co-decision procedure for the European
Parliament are only a few examples the European Union is currently reviewing
under its Agenda 2000115 programme, in order to adapt its internal structure to the
changing international environment.
113 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort,
Eberhard (eds.); The frontiers ofEurope, p. 92.
"4 The Economist (1998); "Awkward would-be partners", February 28, 1998.
115 European Commission (1997); Agenda 2000, Vol. 1 and 2, COM(97) 2000 final.
Chapter 3.A.ii - 141
3. B European measures and policies oriented towards the creation of
a European identity
We have seen that the European Union suffers from a problem of
governance and a lack of legitimacy. The institutions of the European Union do not
yet have enough representative status and seem to be too remote from the average
citizen. The full integration of the European Union into everyday life is often
hampered by legal, financial, practical and psychological barriers. It proves difficult
to show that the EU is not just about rules and regulations. The integration and
involvement of the European citizen is essential to create a veritable Community of
Europeans and to reinforce the sense of belonging to the European Union. The EU
seeks to get closer to its peoples, in order to be built with citizen support and
enthusiasm. To this end, it needs to become part of the citizens' every day concerns
and interests1 - in economics, politics, culture, media or sport.
It was during the Copenhagen summit in 1973 that the notion of a European
identity appeared for the first time in the official documents of the European
Community. According to the Copenhagen "European Manifesto", European
identity was defined as involving "a common heritage,... acting together in relation
to the rest of the world,... taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European
unification."2 This broad definition was mainly the result of the ambiguity
surrounding the concept of European identity; the definition of the term oscillated
between an external and internal identity.
On the one hand, it was believed that the definition of a European identity
was "merely the definition of a series of common policy objectives, objectives
which must at a given moment be pointed out and defended with one sole voice"3.
There was
' Leo Tindemans, in his report to the European Council in 1975, cited that "the construction of
Europe is not just a form of collaboration between states. It is a rapprochement of people who wish
to go forward, together adapting their actions to the changing conditions in the world while
preserving those values which are their common heritage" in Fontaine, Pascal (1991); A Citizens'
Europe, p. 5.
2
Agence Europe (1973); Europe Documents, No. 779/ 15.12.1973, p. 1.
3 Agence Europe (1973); Daily Bulletin, No. 1349/3./4.9.1973, p. 1.
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fear that the concept of this European identity will be defined because of the
dialogue with the United States, that is to say that it is almost a 'by-product' of this
dialogue.4
On the other hand, and in order to avoid this situation, the heads of
European governments and states became aware that European identity should also
describe a
deep-rooted commitment to pursue a certain policy, even from within each of our
countries. Vis-a-vis ourselves, feelings of identity unite for it is a question of
common and shared characters, interests and objectives.... [T]his definition of
principles of identity should be sufficiently clear and definite for there to be no
room for misunderstandings and ambiguities.5
Nevertheless, the misunderstandings and ambiguities over a European
identity as either an external or internal identity continued. During the 1980s, the
notion of European identity was relaunched in a number of projects, such as
'Citizen's Europe' and the 'Solemn Declaration on the European Union' in 1983.
During both initiatives, cultural aspects and the need to bring Europe closer to the
people were emphasised. The Single European Act of 1987, however, reverted back
to the definition of an external identity when it considered that "closer co-operation
on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the
development of a European identity"6. In the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, both
concepts of identity were taken up again. In the Preamble, the High Contracting
Parties assert that they are
resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a
common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence
in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.7
Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty also includes the member states'
wish to associate the peoples of Europe more closely with the process of European
integration,... reflected, in particular, in the creation of European citizenship... and
4
Agence Europe (1973); Daily Bulletin, No. 1332/25.7.1973, p. 1.
5
Agence Europe (1973); Daily Bulletin, No. 1355/ 12.9.1973, p. 1.
6 European Communities (1987); Single European Act, Title III, 30(6).
7 European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Preamble.
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in the explicit inclusion of new areas within the jurisdiction of the Community
(education, youth, culture, public health, consumer protection, etc.)-8
Given that it is the primary aim of this thesis to locate the emergence of a
genuine internal European identity, the following section will look at those
European policy-making attempts which consciously intend to promote a European
identity, keeping in mind that a European identity "cannot be created by means of
diplomatic instruments or in a secret meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs"9.
Attention will concentrate on 'European' symbols10 and some European policies
which affect the European citizen directly11. These measures and policies may have
a considerable effect - whether positive or negative - on the future development of
European society, and consequently of a European identity.
Although these policies are mainly geared towards the area of the EU, they
may still be considered as guiding principles on which a genuine European identity
- in view of EU enlargement - may be based on. Some non-EU European states
already have restricted access to some of these policies - specifically European
cultural policies. Central Eastern European countries have hence - to a limited
extent - the opportunity to take part in the activities and cultural life of the
European Union.
3. B.i Measures and policies for the creation ofEuropean identity
The supremacy of European law
Amongst all international organisations, such as for instance NATO, the
United Nations and the World Bank, the European Union is unique in the sense that
it distinguishes itself from these organisation by its legal status. As we have already
seen, the European Union has its own legal system - and since the European
Community is a Common Market and not just a Free Trade Area, its legal
8
European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration ofCultural Aspects in European
Community Action, 17.4.1996, COM(96) 160 final, p. 1.
9
Agence Europe (1973); Daily Bulletin, No. 1333/26.7.1973, p. 1.
10 These symbols include the European flag, anthem and the 9th ofMay as Europe Day.
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framework is of great necessity. European law, embodied in the four main treaties
of the European Community/Union (Rome, SEA, TEU and Amsterdam),
distinguishes itself from domestic law in that it is superior to the member states'
national legislation. European law derives its supremacy from international law,
according to the principle pacta sunt servanda (treaties are to be respected).12 All
Treaty legislation must be respected by national courts and the Community
institutions, and national courts and EC institutions are subject to EC law.
The European Court of Justice ensures that interpretations and application of
the Treaty law are observed by both member states and the Community institutions.
This uniformity in legislation emphasises that all European member states, together
with the institutions of the European Union, are equal before the law. Indirectly, it
may also be an attempt to generate a sense of belonging and a 'we are a community'
feeling. Depending on whether EU legislation comes in the form of regulations,
directives or decisions, member states are generally not allowed to apply the rulings
selectively or in an incomplete way. This is underlined in Art. 5 of the Treaty of
Rome, which stresses that it is in the "Community context in which national action
[must] occur"13.
European law is not retroactive, but applies to the present. Each newly
developed law replaces the former, with the aim of building a federal/confederate
system in the future. This dynamism of European law has necessitated and
produced a vast amount of lawyers who specialise in the various different aspects of
European law; it has also attracted scholarship. European law is therefore often
identified with professionalism and may hence be criticised as being elitist. The
importance of European law is certainly felt at the 'high' level, since it has a
11 These include the issuing of European personal documents, such as the European passport; the
introduction of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty; cultural policies, etc. (see section
below).
12 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented to the Seminar on Legal Theory ofEuropean Integration at the
University of Edinburgh, 26 - 27 April 1997, unpublished, p. 4; Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996);
"European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order"
in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 520.
13 Weatherill, Stephen (1994); "Beyond Preemption?" in David O'Keefe and Patrick Twomey (ed.);
Legal Issues ofthe Maastricht Treaty, p. 31.
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significant impact on the 'high' economic and political life inside and outside the
European Union.
National governments often perceive European law as a threat to their
national sovereignty, since it seems to ignore national politico-legal and cultural
differences. Indeed, European law is mainly taught in relation to the Union's
institutions, emphasising its political and economic norms, rather than stressing
moral rights and national cultural differences. Hence, there is still great need for
more harmonisation between European jurisprudence and the different national
legislations, in order to create a sense of belonging to the Union not just among the
elites, but also among the citizens of the European Union.
Freedom ofmovement
Another characteristic of the European Community/Union, and for which
the EU is known internationally, is the introduction of the four freedoms of
movement for goods, persons services and capital. These freedoms were mainly
developed out of economic reasons - the freedom of movement for persons being
referred to as the "fourth freedom"14. The role of borders, and of overcoming
borders as obstacles, soon became a key policy area for the European Community.
In order to ensure that Europe became a "'tangible reality for its citizens',...
unhindered movement was crucial for the development of a feeling of belonging to
the Community."15 Lord Cockfield's White Paper of 1985 and the 1988 Cecchini
Report16 suggested measures in order to overcome physical, fiscal and technical
barriers within the Single European Market. The majority of these measures were
accepted by the Council and became the Blueprint for the 'Europe 1992'
programme, which was "a new principle in interstate and proximity relations"17.
'Europe 1992', to be achieved by January 1993, was the first big step to
withdraw customs and border controls and formalities at the EU's internal borders.
14 Foucher, Michel (1998); "The Geopolitics of European Frontiers" in Anderson, Malcolm and
Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 237.
15 cited in Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A
Socio-Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 11.
16 Cecchini, Paolo (1988); The European Challenge 1992: the Benefit ofa Single Market, pp. 3-10.
17 Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, p. 472. My translation.
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It enhanced the freedom of movement for persons, and ensured that citizens could
travel without any restrictions from one member state to another, as if moving in
one big space. This unhindered movement - which is traditionally restricted to the
area within each member state only - was and still is complemented by
Schengenland. At the outset, Schengen was to remove all frontiers between the
Schengen member states so as to leave one common external frontier. Schengen
was primarily regarded as a laboratory which - if successful - would be translated to
the Community level. The Schengen agreements were signed in 1985 by, initially, a
group of five European member states (Benelux, France and Germany). Schengen
came into effect on March 26, 1995. Thirteen EU member states - bar the United
Kingdom and Ireland - plus Norway and Iceland (in order to maintain the Nordic
free trade zone) are currently signatories of Schengen. However, Schengen is only
fully operational in nine states.18 In Greece, regulations are solely operational at
Athens airport, since the full implementation of Schengen still creates some
problems.19 Delays between the signing and the implementation of the Schengen
agreements have usually been due to
technical problems, arising for example from the setting up of an international data
system, or... legal problems, for example the constitutional changes necessitated in
both Germany and France... and political concern about the impact of immigration
and other internal security problems.20
With the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen acquis was integrated into
the EU's acquis communautaire, but "there is no provision... to ensure a role for the
European Parliament to be involved in the process of incorporating a Schengen
acquis,"21 It needs yet to "be determined which decisions under the acquis do not
need to be allocated to either the First or the Third Pillar".22 The Treaty further
18 These are: the Benelux, Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. States, in which
Schengen is not fully operational are: Denmark, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway.
19 This refers, in particular, to the myriad number of islands in the Aegean sea, also called Greece's
'blue frontier'.
20 Anderson, Malcolm, Boer den, Monica and Miller, Gary (1994); "European Citizenship and Co¬
operation in Justice and Home Affairs" in Duff, Andrew (ed.); Maastricht and beyond, p. 106.
21 Boer den, Monica (1998); "Introduction" in den Boer, Monica (ed.); Schengen's Final Days?, p.
7.
22 Boer den, Monica (1998); "Introduction" in Boer den, Monica (ed.); Schengen's Final Days?, p.
6.
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guaranteed an opt-out provision for both the United Kingdom and Ireland, although
both countries may soon allow the abolition of passport controls and accept greater
police co-operation.23
Judging by the incongruity between the Schengen signatories and the
problems concerning the implementation of Schengen, member states seem to be
constantly weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of co-operation in
sensitive areas, such as immigration. This incongruity between Schengen-states and
non-Schengen states within the EU has led many to believe that "Schengen would
be a graveyard instead of a laboratory for the EC."24
[T]he consequences of the lack of cohesion, the overlapping of increasing internal
controls, financial complications, etc., will soon be felt [and] a boomerang effect is
to be feared, given the already considerable aversion... the European citizen is
showing for Brussels.25
Still, one should not dismiss that, together with the introduction of European
citizenship, the freedom of movement for persons has supplied European citizens
with economic and social rights they did not enjoy before. One must add to this that
the free movement of people does not only confine itself to travelling. It also
includes the right to residence, work, study26 and stay in all EU member states. To
ease the rights of citizens within the internal market, the European Commission has
put together approximately eighty recommendations in 1998.27 In addition, the
European Commission is also planning "a series of initiatives to facilitate the free
23 Smyth, Patrick (1999); "State is likely to move on Schengen accord" in The Irish Times, March 3,
1999. Both Britain and Ireland are likely to sign up to two of the three elements of the Schengen
Information System (SIS), a computer database linking police and immigration forces: the database
of stolen vehicles, and the listing of those against whom extradition warrants are being sought. Both
states will, however, refrain from linking to the SIS listing of immigrants.
24 Martin Bangemann cited in Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union
Citizenship - A Socio-Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No.
17,p. 11.
25 MEP van Outrive cited in Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union
Citizenship - A Socio-Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No.
17,p. 11.
26 Especially concerning the conditions of working and studying in a different member state, the EU
has opted for new integration strategies during the 1980s and shifted from the harmonisation of
education and training towards the recognition of diplomas and different periods of study. Whether
this responds to reality is, however, questionable.
27
European Communities (1998); "Free movement within the EU" in Eur-OP News, 1998/No. 2.
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movement of people within the EU"28, necessary for the feeling of belonging to a
common area and to improve co-operation between member states.
European citizenship
Although the last section in this chapter will discuss the concept of
European citizenship in more detail, a short description of this EU policy will be
given here, in order to complement the list of European measures and policies
oriented to foster a European identity. The free movement for persons was one of
the major reasons to introduce the right to European citizenship for the first time in
the Treaty on European Union. Art. 8 of Title II states that "citizenship of the Union
is hereby established".
Art. 8 embeds European citizenship in a legal framework and establishes a
legal relationship between citizens and the supranational European level. It provides
European citizens with economic, political and social rights.29 It may even be
argued that the Treaty on European Union adds another layer of rights to already
existing national rights and therefore "marks a new stage in the process of creating
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as
openly as possible and closely as possible to the citizen." (Treaty of Amsterdam,
revised TEU, Title I, Art. A).
As will be argued in the following section, the introduction of European
citizenship will not automatically bring about a cosmopolitan European identity.
European citizenship, as defined in the TEU, means relatively little. So far,
European citizenship has only had symbolic value. European citizenship still
depends upon the member states' definition of nationality, so that each individual
member state retains the right to decide who is to be a national citizen, and thus a
European, and who is not. In future, however, a reformed European citizenship may
create a common sense of identity and origin which could advance the
28 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, July 2, 1998.
29 Social rights are limited according to the third pillar of the TEU, Justice and Home Affairs.
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legitimisation and further development of the EU into an "effective post-national
political community"30.
Personal documents
To underline European citizenship, the European passport became the
"symbol par excellence of membership"31 of the European Community/Union. The
passport came into being on June 23, 1981, after member states' long negotiations
about the format, colour, wording and language. Although the European passport
still remains, by law, a priori a national passport, the passport is an important
symbol for the freedom ofmovement of EC/EU citizens within the EC/EU territory
and, specifically, Schengenland. The European passport distinguishes EU citizens
from the 'other' non-EC/EU citizens. The differentiation between EU and non-EU
citizen is most evident at the external borders of the European Union and the
EU/non-EU citizens' channels.
In addition to the European passport, there were also plans to introduce
European identity cards. Elaving a very similar function to the European passport,
the issue of European identity cards was nevertheless highly disputed: in four EU
member states - the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom -
identity cards do not exist. In these countries, the possible introduction of European
identity cards was regarded as being a retrograde step for civil liberties and the EU
was accused of becoming a big police union.
Another important personal document for EU citizens is the European
driving licence. Since January 1, 1986, every driving licence must conform to the
Community model. This should - in the true sense of the word - facilitate free
circulation within the EU territory and may be an essential tool to improve road
safety due to stricter regulations for obtaining a licence.
30 Montani, Guido (1994); "European citizenship and European identity" in The Federalist, Vol. 36/
No. 2, p. 109.
31
European Communities (1987); European File, No. 6/1987, p. 6.
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The European flag, European anthem, Europe day
The most distinguished symbol with which the European Union is
associated is the European flag. The flag is recognised internationally as
representing the European Union. The twelve golden stars aligned in a circle on a
blue background were hoisted for the first time on May 29, 198632. In addition, the
"twelve-star Euro-totem [also] decorates shop windows, coffee cups, car number-
plates, advertising hoardings".33 The twelve stars represent the peoples of Europe,
united in a circle of union, the symbol of unity, consensus, plenitude and
perfection.34 Since the stars do not stand for the member states themselves, the flag
does not need to be altered with every accession of a new member state. Although
the flag is used at national as well as international occasions, it often only supports
the other national flags of the European member states - currently being the
complementary sixteenth flag. Each country, of course, keeps its own national flag.
The hoisting of the European flag is often accompanied by the European
anthem. It was adopted during the European Council summit in Milan in 1985. The
European anthem is the prelude to the fourth movement of Ludwig van Beethoven's
Ninth Symphony 'Ode to Joy'. The text was written by Friedrich von Schiller and
was possibly chosen to reflect the construction of the European Union, namely that
"All men will become brothers under thy gentle wing."35 The European anthem is
far from replacing each member states' national anthem - each country keeps its
own national anthem.
32 The blue and golden flag did exist before. It was used by the Council of Europe since 1955.
33 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 288.
34 The idea of the symbol stems from Paul Levy, when Levy walked past a statue of the Madonna.
Lit by the sun, the Madonna's garland of stars shone before the background of the blue sky.
Alternatively, the number twelve has had a special meaning since the ancient times: twelve is
associated with unity, security and the guiding principle. The Egyptians believed in the twelve gates
of the underworld, in Greek mythology Herakles had to solve twelve tasks, Jesus chose twelve
Apostles and the Romans used twelve slates to write down their rule of law. There are twelve star
signs, twelve months in the year, twelve hours in the clock and twelve is the product of three times
four - three representing the Holy Trinity and four the four directions of the skye. The garland,
usually associated with success and victory, represents woman's invincibility (Pinzka, Thomas
(1998); "Der Sternenkranz ist die Folge des Gelubdes" in Die Welt, August 26, 1998).
35 Beethoven's Ninth, text from Friedrich von Schiller.
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Next to a flag and an anthem, the European Union also celebrates 'Europe
Day' on May 9th. Europe Day is not a bank holiday. On May 9, 1950, Robert
Schuman held his speech which lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1951, the forerunner to today's European Union. Robert Schuman
emphasised that
Europe will not come about at a single stroke, nor as a seamless construction. It
will come about through concrete realisations which create first of all a de facto
solidarity. Bringing together the nations of Europe demands an end to the many
centuries of conflict between France and Germany.36
Europe Day was only celebrated for the first time 36 years later, shortly
before the first hoisting of the European flag. Following the 9th May in 1986, the
first two Europe weeks were held as well, as a celebration of the centenary of
Robert Schuman's birthday. Which other anniversaries will be celebrated in the
future is questionable, but one may argue that if Europe Day were a bank holiday,
the public might be more aware of the existing EU symbols and the EU's role in
their everyday life.
The Euro
Currency is possibly another important symbol with which citizens assert
their national consciousness and identity.37 The European Union started with
bilateral conversion rates on January 1, 1999. The EU's single currency, Euro notes
and coins, will be issued on January 1, 2002. Following this date, the single
currency and national domestic currencies will run concurrently, in order to pave
the way for the full implementation of the single currency. The Euro is classified as
primarily an economic tool which will possibly bring about "profound economic,
social and political change, but at different speeds in different sectors."38 It is an
essential tool to bring about a smoother economic European integration process, but
its seemingly unpopularity suggests that it touches upon psychological aspects and
36 The Symbols of the European Union, http://europa.eu.int/.
37 See Bort, Eberhard (1998); "German Identity after Reunification" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A
Question of Identity, pp. 197-211. In this article, Bort argues that the Deutschmark played an
important role in the creation ofGermany's post-war identity.
38 Norman, Peter (1999); "The experiment goes live" in Financial Times, January 2/3, 1999.
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questions of identity; in spring 1998, 60% of the European citizens supported the
Euro and 28% were against it. On May 2, 199839, the launch of the Euro currency
was celebrated with a "collective shrugging of shoulders" which
summed up the extent to which popular apprehension and even hostility has
characterised the entire project from the start. Huge publicity campaigns are about
to be launched. But it is difficult to see how the hearts will be won.40
Only 27% people feel well informed about the Euro, and 89% agree on the
need for more information campaigns on the Euro.41 Due to the Euro's "quirky
rate"42, Frenchmen are confused by double pricing and Germans believe that their
Deutschmark is only worth half its original value. In order to alleviate this problem,
the European Union seeks to distribute more information about the Euro, the latest
being an information strategy for the 1999-2002 period: "[practical guidelines to
help businesses prepare financial systems for a smooth changeover to the euro"43, as
well as a German children's book called 'The Eurokids'.44
The main reasons to introduce the Euro was to lock the Deutschmark in, to
"establish a reserve currency to match the dollar and the yen"45 and to enhance
Europe's presence on the international monetary scene. Most importantly, however,
the Euro is a means to integrate and intertwine the European markets better and to
create a veritable single market. The Euro will save money for traders and tourists,
since it eliminates the costs and risks resulting from currency exchange and
transactions. This, it is hoped, will make the European Union less vulnerable to
international monetary developments and money speculations. Elowever,
preparations for the Euro seem slow as some businesses and companies are either
reluctant or ill-informed about introducing the necessary legal or technical
framework for the introduction of the Euro.
19 The European Central Bank was officially inaugurated in Frankfurt/Main on June 30, 1998.
40 Butler, Katherine (1998); "Apathy and taut nerves greet dawn of the Euro" in Independent on
Sunday, May 2, 1998.
41
European Commission (1998); Eurobarometer: Report Number 49, pp. 44-60.
42 Webster, Paul (1999); "Mixed reception" in The Guardian, January 2, 1999.
43 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 5 February 1998.
44 Schonlau, Rolf and Knor, Gabriele (1998); Die Euro Kids - Unterwegs in Sachen Euro', in "The
Editor" weekly review of The Guardian, July 11, 1998.
^ Editorial {1999); "Challenge of the year of the euro" in The Scotsman, January 1, 1999.
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It is not the first time that Europe sees the attempt to create a monetary
union. The Romans had
the denarius, the chief silver coin. Then came the gold standard. The French tried a
Latin currency union - which failed - last century. Two attempts at economic
union were made this century; both failed.46
This does not mean, however, that the Euro will fail as well. In a small town
in Spain, Churriana, "villagers swapped pesetas for dummy versions of the single
currency"47 for three days. Surprisingly, the villagers seemed "to have little
difficulty adapting"48 and purchases in Euro increased steadily, from 30% on the
first day to 80% on the second day.
European culture
Robert Schuman once recollected that Europe's "common cultural heritage
is the soul of Europe"49 and wrote, in 1963, that "[b]efore becoming a military
alliance or an economic entity, Europe has to be a cultural community in the highest
sense of the world."50 Still, the "Community's emphasis on economic affairs and its
generation of elite association, rather than interaction among ordinary Europeans"51
pushed cultural issues aside and devoted "relatively little attention... to the cultural
and psychological issues associated with European unification - to questions of
meaning, value and symbolism."52 But what exactly is culture?53 Although culture
"is undoubtedly an element of the life of citizens"54, the term remains nebulous. The
definition of culture
46 Walker, Martin (1998); "Pass notes and coinage" in The Guardian, May 2, 1998.
47
Hooper, John (1998); "Spanish cash in on euro dry run" in The Guardian, October 3, 1998.
48 Hooper, John (1998); "Spanish cash in on euro dry run" in The Guardian, October 3, 1998.
49 Europazentrum Graz (1996); Europa wachst, p. 33.
50 Robert Schuman cited in Riekmann, Sonja (1997); "The Myth of European Unity" in Hosking,
Geoffrey and Schopflin, George (eds.); Myths andNationhood, p. 61.
51 Howe, Paul (1995); "A Community of Europeans: the Requisite Underpinnings" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 1, p. 28.
52 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p.57.
53 We will come back to this question in chapter five.
54 Banus, Enrique (1996); "Some remarks about the Cultural Policies of the European Union" in
Svob-Bokic, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 164.
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has posed perennial problems for European institutions. At its narrowest it can
refer solely to the high visual, literary performing arts, At its broadest it can
encompass almost all aspects of human behaviours. Clearly neither is satisfactory
for framing policy.55
Following the 1983 "Solemn Declaration of the Creation of European
Union", which contained proposals to include cultural aspects in future European
co-operation projects, the 'Committee for a People's Europe' - also called after its
founder the 'Adonnino Committee' - was formed as an ad-hoc Committee in 1984.
It "proposed numerous concrete measures aimed at involving the citizens of Europe
more determinedly in the construction of the Community"56 and stressed the
importance of cultural aspects for the European integration process. In June 1985,
the Committee's reports and definition of areas of action were proposed to the
Commission and to the national governments, supported and furthered by the
European Parliament, and accepted by the European Council. The Committee -
today known under the 'Citizens First' or 'Europe Direct' initiatives - works in the
interest to "suggest ways how to strengthen the identity and improving the image of
the Community"57 among its peoples and the wider world. The Committee wishes
to confirm the solidarity of Europe and ensure - together with the European
Communities - that the
Community's purpose is to act on behalf of culture rather than on culture and that
consequently this action must fully respect the principles of freedom of
expression, pluralism and national values which constitute an integral part of the
cultural identity.58
Since the Treaties of Rome, the 1992 Treaty on European Union is the first
document to introduce cultural policies into the legal Community framework, in
order to sharpen the cultural dimension of the European integration process. The
55 European Forum for Arts and Heritage (1996); Cultural Aspects in European Community Action:
Article 128(4) ofthe Maastricht Treaty, p. 2.
56 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 2, p. 211. See also Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens'
Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore,
Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope, p. 285-287.
57
European Communities (1986); European File, No. 3/1986, p. 3.
58 European Communities (1983); Official Journal of the European Communities, No. 342/129,
19.12.1983.
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TEU states that "Community action with regard to culture will henceforth be of
permanent nature and become an acknowledged branch of Community activity."59
The "drafters of the TEU... were careful enough to talk about cultures in
plural"60, remaining ambiguous about the 'diversity within unity' principle. Art. 128
of the TEU stresses that it is one of the Community's objectives to make "a
contribution to education and training of quality and to the flowering of the cultures
of the Member States"61 while respecting subsidiarity and the national and regional
cultural diversities of the member states at the same time. In the decision-making
process on cultural policies, the Council has no right to qualified majority voting,
but acts according to the principle of unanimity. In addition, Title II expresses the
EU's aim to bring the "common cultural heritage to the fore"62 and
aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect
trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary
to the common interest.... The Community shall take cultural aspects into account
in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect
and promote the diversity of its cultures.63
In December 1993, the Canavarro Report of the European Parliament stated that
the achievement of the European Union is inseparable from the demonstration and
promotion of Europe's cultural identity, which is the product of interaction
between a civilisation and a plurality of national, regional and local cultures."64
In April 1996, the European Commission's 'First Report on the
Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community Action' re-emphasised
Art. 92 of the TEU by stating that culture must be respected in any other activity
fields of the European Union. The report concluded that it
59
European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration ofCultural Aspects in European
Community Action, 17.4.1996, COM(96) 160 final, p. 1.
60 European Communities (1995); "Should Europe have a common cultural policy" in European
Dialogue, September/October 1995, p. 25.
61 European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Title II, Article 3 (p).
62
European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Title II, Article 128/1.
63 European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Title II, Article 92 (3d) and European
Commission (1997); Treaty ofAmsterdam, Article 128/4.
64
European Parliament (1993); Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media on
Community Policy in the Field of Culture (Pedro Canavarro), Session Document, A3-386/93, 1
December 1993, Motion for Resolution, p. 5.
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has been necessary to strike a bargain between the provisions of the Treaty and
cultural objectives, and although this bargaining has led to a degree of
consideration of the cultural aspects, these have not received the priority treatment
that they could expect in certain Member States (for example in respect of book
prices, taxation of certain cultural goods and services, or the field of
competition).65
More importantly, however, the report saw "that a great majority of the
policies implemented by the Community now include a cultural dimension or have
an impact on certain cultural fields"66. This was followed by a resolution of the
Cultural Council in December 1996 which agreed on "the integration of cultural
aspects into other areas of Community policy"67. It certainly fostered the EU's aim
to preserve and safeguard the European cultural heritage and to improve the
knowledge about European history and culture amongst the peoples of Europe.
As was mentioned earlier, the EC's cultural policies were primarily oriented
towards the cultural dimension of the European Community, in order to "affirm the
awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity"68.
With prospective EU enlargement towards the East, however, European cultural
policy should shift towards all European countries, since they have all been subject
to the same European cultural developments. It would be an essential step to help
the new democracies' integration into the European Union's cultural life, and
towards rekindling a distinctive European identity in Central Eastern European
countries.
The Community and its member states have already introduced agreements
which "are committed to the openness of Community cultural programmes."69 It
was agreed that
outside the European Union, Community cultural policies must promote an
expansion in the cultural influence of European people and the European model of
65 European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration ofCultural Aspects in European
Community Action, 17.4.1996, COM(96) 160 final, p. 91.
66
European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration ofCultural Aspects in European
Community Action, 17.4.1996, COM(96) 160 final, p. 91.
67
European Commission Representative Office - UK (1996); The week in Europe, 19 December
1996.
68
European Communities (1983); Official Journal of the European Communities, No. C342/127,
19.12.1983.
69 European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration ofCultural Aspects in European
Community Action, 17.4.1996, COM(96) 160 final, p. 87.
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society,.... built on a set of values common to all European societies.... Owing to
its richness of character and its diversity, culture is a major component part of this
European model society. Community action must promote the preservation and
enrichment of that which goes to make up the cultural and linguistic identities and
realities of the peoples of Europe. It must allow strengthening of citizens' feeling
of belonging to one and the same Community.... If it constitutes an integration
factor within the Union, for the outside it represents an instrument of co-operation
which must be used to promote dialogue between cultures.70
In accordance with Article 128 of the TEU, the EU introduced three
sophisticated action programmes to develop and enhance the notion of European
culture:
- RAPHAEL acts in the field of cultural heritage and aims at the
preservation and restoration of European architectural heritage, monuments and
sites. It also provides grants for training schemes in restoration and conservation
and supports cultural events revolving around European cultural heritage. In
1997/98, RAPHAEL supported 91 pilot projects on European cultural heritage
worth 9.4 million ECU.71
- KALEIDOSCOPE supports cultural and artistic activities, such as the
promotion of the European City of Culture (1997 Thessaloniki, 1998 Stockholm,
1999 Weimar) and the European Cultural Month held in primarily Central Eastern
European countries, in order to encourage cultural co-operation with the European
Union (1997 Ljubljana, 1998 Linz/Valetta, 1999 Plowdiv). During these events,
each nominated city represents its country, peoples and culture to the rest of
Europe, in order to bring the peoples of Europe - both the European Union and the
Central Eastern European countries - closer together. Furthermore,
KALEIDOSCOPE also funds the European Youth Orchestra, the European Union
Baroque Orchestra, as well as the European Chamber Orchestra.72
- ARIANE promotes books and reading, and the translation of works by
European authors - especially into less-widely-spoken languages. ARIANE is also
70
European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration ofCultural Aspects in European
Community Action, 17.4.1996, COM(96) 160 final, p. 93 and 92.
71
European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 8 January 1998.
72
European Commission Representative Office - UK (1997); The week in Europe, 27 November
1997.
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involved in the presentation of the European literature prize and the European
translation prize.73
Despite the promising nature of these policies, the cultural sector does not
enjoy much priority and is under-funded. RAPE1AEL has received 30 million ECU
for a 4 year period (1997-2000). KALEIDOSCOPE and ARIANE (26.5 million)
will terminate by the end of 1999. All three schemes will then be replaced by the
four-year framework programme Culture 200074 which will receive a budget of 167
million ECU. In comparison, in 1996, the EU spent a total of 26 million ECU on
culture (excluding the audio-visual sector), whereas the agricultural sector received
41.3 billion ECU. An even more striking comparison are the 112 million ECU
needed to clean and maintain the buildings of the EU institutions.75
In addition to these cultural programmes, sport is also regarded as a great
means of communication among people since the ancient times of the Greek
Olympics. The Community's dimension in sport is mainly represented by the EU's
EURATHLON programme. This programme supports events such as, for example,
the European Yacht Race, the European Tennis Championships and the European
Swimming Championships. Football is the most widely supported sport, but the
Eurocup still remains an event which is largely organised by the national member
states and through UEFA. Sport events make aware of how wide the concept of
Europe is, since non-EU countries, such as Armenia and Georgia, take part in them
as well.
Furthermore, the EU also supports measures which promote and encourage
non-commercial cultural and educational exchanges. These programmes are now
also available to the new democracies in the Central Eastern European countries,
where "young people... are in favour of the EU [and...] see many advantages in
73
European Commission Representative Office - UK (1997); The week in Europe, 27 November
1997.
74 Within the Culture 2000 programme, and in line with the Agenda 2000 guidelines, the EU's First
Framework Programme for Culture (2000-2006) is currently being developed.
75 Banus, Enrique (1996), "Some remarks about the Cultural Policies of the European Union" in
Svob-Bokic, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 170.
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Membership"76. The programmes' primary aim is to foster the free movement of
students and employees (according to Articles 126 and 127 of the TEU), to enable
participants to deepen their knowledge of foreign languages77, European history and
European culture, as well as to gain experience and improve their future
employment opportunities.
The youth exchange programme 'Youth for Europe' (YES), for instance, is
only one example to increase the awareness of belonging to Europe and to foster a
European identity amongst the young peoples of Europe. It caters for 15-25 year
olds and is based on the Franco-German youth exchange programmes which started
in 1963.78 The bilateral and multilateral youth exchanges should teach young people
more about the political, economic, social and cultural life in the various member
states and improve their knowledge about the Community's guiding principles of
democracy, social justice and respect for human rights. Young people, specifically,
are the main targets to develop a European identity.
Next to the above mentioned YES, the EU also promotes successful
educational programmes such as, for example, LEONARDO, SOCRATES and
ERASMUS. The first action programme on education was introduced in 1976.
LEONARDO79 (1.55 billion ECU for the period 2000-2006) supports vocational
training programmes and focuses on the acquisition of new skills, promoting
investment in human resources and establishing closer links between educational
and/or training establishments in both EU and non-EU states. Since 1998, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Romania and Cyprus are also included. SOCRATES (1.15
billion ECU) - also available to some Central Eastern European countries - enjoys a
great success and has a vital role in furthering co-operation in higher education and
76
European Communities (1998); "Young Europeans Awards" in Eur-Op News, 1998/ No. 4. The
young peoples' opinion was reflected "in a competition where students and young professionals...
submitted articles on 'What does my country's future EUmembership mean to me?"'.
11 This is also fostered by the European Union's programme LINGUA which was established to
promote language training, in particular ofminority languages.
78 Vandamme, Jacques (1993); "La citoyennete europeenne comme element de l'identite
europeenne" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p. 356.
79 LEONARDO is complemented by PETRA which promotes vocational training for young people
and persons, by FORCE which supports in-service training and by IRIS which is specifically
destined to training of young women.
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prepare young people to live and work within the area of the European Union.80
YES, SOCRATES and LEONARDO will be replaced by the initiative Towards a
Europe ofKnowledge by the year 2000.
ERASMUS, together with COMETT, is the widest known educational
programme. Named after the travelling scholar Desiderius Erasmus, the programme
ERASMUS develops and supports higher education exchange programmes.81
Currently over 1.600 universities and 20.000 students take part in ERASMUS82.
Since the 16th century, educational exchanges such as ERASMUS have already
been in place. The rich and powerful of Europe, especially the princes, politicians,
noblemen and gentlemen, travelled around the Continent in search of influential
contacts, a greater understanding of international politics and in search of new
concepts and ideas. The literature, art and architecture of the countries were studied
and collected en route, finding expression in literature and art.83 In order to promote
exchanges between the European Union and the Central Eastern European states, an
equivalent to ERASMUS - TEMPUS - has been introduced during the late 1980s. It
will extend co-operation with Central Eastern European countries, the New
Independent States and Mongolia in 1999.84
It is in the interest of the European Union that the European dimension is
incorporated at the member states' level via the national education systems and the
dispersal of Community information material and provisions for training and co¬
operation. This should not, however, lead to a unified European educational or
cultural system. On the contrary: it should become a well-tuned European system of
80 This is supplemented by the Fifth Framework Research Programme (14.960 million ECU for the
period 1999-2002) which enables funding for researchers.
81 To this end, Article 126/2 of the Treaty on European Union encourages the mutual recognition of
diplomas and qualifications across all member states in order to ensure equal treatment and
unhindered access to employment and the labour market. This does not mean that the European
Union seeks an harmonisation of diplomas and qualifications across the EU territory, but it seeks to
enhance the mutual trust amongst the EU member states (European Communities (1998); Report of
the High Level Panel on thefreedom ofmovement ofpersons, March 17, 1998, Executive Summary,
point 4).
82 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 28 May 1998.
83 Tate Gallery (1996); Grand Tour, Exhibition Guide, October 10, 1996 - January 5, 1997,
Introduction.
84 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 10 December
1998.
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education, which transcends national boundaries and allows the (young) individual
to feel at home in different member states.
Audio-visual, media and information about Europe
The European Union also lays great emphasis on the audio-visual and media
sector. 1988 saw the first European Cinema and Television Year, following a
proposal of the Adonnino Committee. The European Union has a wide network of
European cinemas which are supported by the MEDIA programme. This
programme comprises over 100 cinemas in Europe, reaching from the Edinburgh
Filmhouse to the Wanda cinema in Cracow. MEDIA was primarily set up to protect
the European film industry against Americanisation, i. e. Hollywood, but also
promotes multimedia technology and "offers financial assistance and other forms of
co-operation with European cinema industries."85 In order to promote the European
film industry further, Jacques Santer suggested in April 1998 that Europe should
launch an European equivalent of the Oscar, in order to make the already existing
'European Film Award' (formerly Felix) "more transnational, commercial and
accessible to the public"86. In addition, Santer also proposed to set "up a mechanism
to lever more private sector investment into audiovisual production, [create] a
European film and television school; and [strengthen] the EU's MEDIA programme
in training, distribution, script development and marketing."87
The European Community believes that "the media can have a decisive
impact on its audience, and that if the media is directed appropriately, this impact
can be one of increased integration."88 Citizens depend directly on the media for
information about the EU, and the European Union regards the media as a chief
means to convey information and culture to the European citizen. In 1984, the
European Community's 'Television without frontiers' Green Paper stated that
85 Lot Polish Airlines (1997), "Smaller dose of Hollywood" in Kaleidoscope, p. 8.
86 Pam Murray, Media Antenna Scotland - Glasgow, in conversation with the author, November 25,
1998. The 1998 December awards, according to the German Press Agency, were the second most
important international film award. (Rodek, Hanns-Georg (1998); "Ein starker Europa-Jahrgang" in
Die Welt, December 4, 1998)
87 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 9 April 1998.
88 Bakir, Vian (1996); "An identity for Europe? The role of the media" in Wintle, Michael (ed.);
Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 179.
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[information is a decisive, perhaps the only decisive factor in European
unification.... European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it.
Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity. A
European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At
present, information via the mass media is controlled at national level.89
Since the newspaper media usually reflect "a fundamentally national or
regional structure"90, the European Union tends to concentrate on the audio-visual
media. Accordingly, the EU's 'Television without frontiers' Directive enables the
free movement of television broadcasting across the territory of the EU.
Broadcasters must comply with the 'Television without frontiers' Directive which
establishes a legal framework for broadcasting in the EU. This means that member
states are not allowed to create national restrictions against the reception and
transmission of broadcasts from their fellow member states. The 1997 'Television
without frontiers' directive (97/36/EC) seeks to "ensure that public interest is
protected by the co-ordination of national rules in fields such as advertising,
sponsorship, tele-shopping, the right to reply, and the protection of minors and
human dignity."91 Offensive material, such as pornography and gratuitous violence
are prohibited according to Article 22 of the Directive.92
At the time of writing, more than 50% "of the television programmes
broadcast by most television channels in the EU [were] of European origin."93 In
addition, the EU also welcomes European-wide television broadcasting, such as the
European television channels Euronews and Eurosport which are modelled on the
example of the French-German co-operation ofARTE. Furthermore, one should not
forget to mention the 'Eurovision' song contest which is not restricted to EU
member states alone, but includes a variety of non EU countries (even non-
European), such as Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Israel and Morocco.
89
European Commission (1984); Television without frontiers: Green Paper on the establishment of
the Common Marketfor Broadcasting, especially by satellite and cable, COM (84) 300 final, p. 2.
90 F. Heinderyckx cited in Bakir, Vian (1996); "An identity for Europe? The role of the media" in
Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 191.
91 European Communities (1997); "Television without Frontiers" in Eur-Op News, 1997/No. 3.
92 Similarly, it is also in the EU's interest to restrict and combat the use of illegal activities on the
Internet. But according to David Harrison of The Observer, funds to control the spread of child
pornography on the Internet are currently being cut in the European Union; "Fight against child
pornography set to be victim of EU cuts" in The Observer, June 12, 1998.
93
European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 9 April 1998.
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In spite of these efforts to support European-wide media and broadcasting,
the EU's resources and provisions of information are not as widely spread as they
could be. Culture needs information.94 Hence, the EU is concerned to improve
public access to information and to creating new sources of information about the
European Union, since "it is important to understand the system in order to feel
close to it."95 As we have seen above, the European Union does not possess its own
mass media. Other resources of information confine themselves to EU information
centres, Commission representative offices and the Internet. Euro Info Centres and
the European Commission representative offices in all major cities distribute free
information and booklets concerning the EU. The majority of these centres and
offices hold most EU legal documents, EU databases and CD-ROMs. In addition,
the various institutions, policy areas, activities, events and publications of the
European Union, such as the Official Journal (EUR-Lex) can also be viewed on the
Internet. The European Union is present on several websites, the main server being
EUROPA which, amongst other things, runs an 'Information Programme for
Citizens' and 'Europe Direct' which offers an information service to citizens and
businesses. Various European Commission representative offices are also
accessible via the Internet.
In February 1994, the Commission and Council "have put in place a system
which is destined to ensure citizens the access to internal documents"96. The access
to these internal documents of the European institutions guarantee the citizen "the
fullest possible access to information"97 - only documents concerning internal
security are excluded. Access to these internal documents may be supplemented by
the 'Citizens First' telephone, which enables citizens to obtain free information
about the EU.
94 Europazentrum Graz (1996); Europa wachst, p. 38.
95 Galloway, David, Secretariat Council of Ministers (1998); "Institutional Architecture of the EU",
paper presented at the Europa Institute, University of Edinburgh, March 12, 1998.
96 Janssen, Veronique (1997); "L'acces du public aux documents de la Commission" in CD, No. 58/
June 5-11, 1997, p. 3. My translation.
97
European Council (1996); Report by the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Council
Decision on Public Access to Council Documents, July 1996, p. 1.
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In spite of these policies of openness and transparency, "discourses and
documents about the European Union are not always known to the exterior"98. On a
scale from 1 ("Know nothing at all") to 10 ("Know a great deal"), the spring 1998
Eurobarometer results show that the average score for perceived knowledge about
the EU is 4.19. This compares to 23% who feel that they really need to know a lot
more about the EU, whereas 29% are happy with what they already know, and 45%
of all EU citizens would like to have more information about the EU, specifically
about European citizen rights (49%), the European currency (45%), employment
policy (42%) and health and social policy (3 8%).99
But the implications of both the lack of openness and transparency are far
more extensive.100 On the one hand, "publicity [about the European Union] is all too
often negative."101 On the other hand, the secrecy and lack of information
surrounding the EU influence the confidence-building measures of the EU. The lack
of information amongst citizens contributes to the EU's unintelligibility, inadequate
transparency and democratic deficit. It is nurtured by the relatively low numbers of
citizens using the services available: the number of citizens who wished to obtain
internal documents increased from 180 in 1994 to 500 in 1996. In contrast, more
than 450,000 people across Europe made use of the Citizens First Telephone
number during the 1996/1997 period.102 In addition, the EU is interested in further
expanding the role of the Internet for its provision of information. As part of the
Trans-European telecom networks, the EU's information society is taking steps to
do so, including the Central Eastern European countries.
98 Ryba, Barbara-Christine (1995); "La Politique Etrangere de Securite Commune" in Biblio-
Europe, p. 8. My translation.
99 European Commission (1998); Eurobarometer: Report Number 49 , pp. 2 -8.
100 Lodge, Juliet (1994); "Transparency and Democratic legitimacy" in Journal ofCommon Market
Studies, Vol. 32/No. 3, p. 366.
101 Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in
Nelson, Brent and Stubbs, Alexander (eds.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and
Practice ofEuropean Integration, p. 158.
102 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1997); The week in Europe, 20 March 1997.
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3. B.ii European citizenship
We have seen in the preceding section that there has so far not been one
single comprehensive European policy aimed directly at creating a European
identity. Among the many existing policy areas, European citizenship, alongside a
European common currency, probably comes closest to affect the European citizen
directly. It has become increasingly apparent that
developments in the European Union have brought forth the possibility of
membership in various overlapping and strategically interacting political
communities on supranational, national and subnational levels and have unleashed
the potential for rethinking citizenship, community and identity. However, the
dynamics of European Union citizenship have not been fully and properly
explored.1
Accordingly, it is the aim of this section to show that the concept of
citizenship introduced in the Treaty on European Union in 1992 may be an essential
instrument to create a European identity. In order to elucidate this, the following
questions demand an answer: how and why was European citizenship introduced in
the TEU? Is the concept of citizenship actually powerful enough to create identity?
In how far is citizenship divorced from nationality and from notions of national
homogeneity? Does the concept of citizenship increase an 'us' versus 'them'
thinking? Is the concept of citizenship internally orientated or does it tolerate
external factors? Does, as PreuB rightly asks, "our quest for identity set the
boundaries to our sense of justice?"2
For the European Union, European citizenship is primarily an economic,
political and social tool which relates to the concept of European identity implicitly
rather than explicitly. European citizenship was introduced through a "step-by-step,
area-by-area, and group-by-group"3 approach. Originally, European citizenship had
predominantly economic reasons, since - together with other citizenship-like rights
- it accrued around the right to free movement which was necessary for the full
1 Kostakopoulou, Theodora (1996); "Towards a theory of constructive citizenship in Europe" in
Journal ofPolitical Philosophy, Vol. 4/No. 4, p. 338.
2 PreuB, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of Europe, p.
117.
3 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 13.
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enjoyment of the four freedoms and the completion of the Single Market. Political
or cultural dimensions of European citizenship seem to be side-effects of this which
promoted "the economically irrelevant people... to the status of persons".4 The
social element of European citizenship, for instance, empowers the individuals'
status in the European Union and provides the latter with a greater degree of
legitimacy. Ideally, European citizenship should become a supranational bond
which binds together the European Union's diversity.
But the discrepancy between diverse national belief systems and
nationalities renders the full implementation of European citizenship difficult. The
concept of citizenship and identity are understood differently by different people,
governments and political theorists. The debates surrounding the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty are evidence to this. The majority of the Danish people, for
example, feared that the introduction of European citizenship could threaten their
Danish national identity. Similarly, it was argued in the United Kingdom that
European citizenship is "almost a contradiction in terms, and undermines national
citizenship. It would be counterproductive to push this concept very far.... [It] is not
in any way essential to the internal market and other EU policies."5
European citizenship is only bestowed on "every person holding the
nationality of a member state."6 European citizenship is not analogous to
nationality. Instead, it is complementary to national citizenship and nationality.
European citizenship excludes all other non-EU third country nationals resident in
the member states and draws a line between 'us' EU-Europeans and 'them' non-EU
Europeans. Given that European citizenship has not yet had the desired impact, it
has been argued that
the channels at ports of entry separating EU from other nationals is giving a basic,
if minimal, sense of common identity to citizens of EU member states. The latter
are aware that they enter a EU country as of right and they enjoy certain important
4 D'Oliveira, Hans Ulrich J. (1994); "European citizenship: its meanings, its potentials" in Dehousse,
Renaud (ed.); Europe after Maastricht: an ever closer union?, p. 126.
5 Euro Citizen Action Service (1997); European Citizenship: giving substance to citizens' Europe in
a revised Treaty, http://www.eurplace.org/.
6
European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Art. 8.
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rights of employment, establishment, permanent residence, limited voting rights
and social security benefits on a reciprocal basis.7
Concepts of citizenship and nationality
Lately, a great deal of attention has been given to the idea of citizenship in
general. This is due to several factors as, for instance, the dismantling of the welfare
state and the growth of both regionalism and globalisation. Citizenship and identity
are most strongly flagged when travelling. On entering the European Union, for
example, non-EU citizens need to fill out landing cards. However, discrepancies
also exist within the EU between the Schengen countries and the non-signatories to
the Schengen agreement. Before assessing European citizenship, a more general
look at the concepts of both citizenship and nationality may be useful.
In ancient times, the term citizenship had two different meanings. In ancient
Greece, citizenship related to the citizen, who, "inscribed in a network of
community affiliations which constituted the very structure of the city, was
characterised by his objective personal status, be it hereditary or quasi-hereditary."8
This hereditary or quasi-hereditary status has connotations with what we nowadays
understand as an ethnic community. It helps to distinguish between citizens and
non-citizens, i.e. indigenous populations and strangers. Citizens enjoyed citizenship
rights, and were able to engage and participate in the development of their
respective polity. The citizen was integrated in a political community and became
part of the whole, so that "[t]o rule and be ruled in turn means that at least some of
the time the governors can be 'us' and not always 'them'."9
In ancient Rome, on the other hand, citizenship described the "status of
(rational) property-owners who had certain public duties and responsibilities within
the city-state".10 Property was linked to a number of positive rights and the
possibility to political participation. Freemen were excluded from these 'privileges'
7 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU Enlargement, p. 33.
8 Balibar, Etienne (1996); "Is European Citizenship possible?" in Public Culture, No. 8, p. 358.
9 Charles Taylor cited in Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner,
Ronald (eds.); Theorising Citizenship, p. 262.
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and were forced to work the property-owners' lands for their subsistence. Yet, this
social division gradually diminished as Rome started to expand its empire. Rome
extended its citizenship rights to all free individuals in the ever-increasing empire.
Consequently, citizenship in Rome referred to the ensemble of citizens unified
under one single authority. The principles of exclusion and political participation
are essential to citizenship.
The congruence of citizenship and nationality came about with the rise of
the nation-state at the time of the French Revolution. The nation-state supposedly
merged the state with the nation, and seemed to make the concepts of both
nationality and citizenship synonymous. The slogan "liberte, egalite, fraternite" was
fostered during the French Revolution and has gained in importance ever since.
Citizenship and nationality became increasingly fused with the rise of the
multinational state. 1789 laid the foundations for the emergence of the nation-state,
as well as the development of the concept of citizenship as we know it today. It
helped to bring about a change in the relation between the individual and the state.
In the 18th century,
only two sets of relations were thought to be important: relations of individuals
inter se, governed primarily by contract, and relations of individuals and state,
summed up in the notion of citizenship."
The nation-state was perceived as a national and political unit, able to preserve the
cultural and identity homogeneity of its members.12
After the French Revolution, citizenship played a functional role and was a
symbol for popular sovereignty. It
became descriptive of the status of the individual as a free man in the state to
which he belonged.... The state accorded rights and privileges to, and accepted
direct responsibility to support and protect, those whom it regarded as its citizens
in return for the loyalty it expected and discharge of duties it imposed.13
10 B. S. Turner cited in O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept ofCommunity Citizenship, p.
5.
11 O'Higgins, Thomas F. (1995); "Foreword" in Hyland, Niamh, Loftus, Claire and Whelan,
Anthony (ed.); Citizenship of the European Union, p. 9.
12 Martiniello, Marco (1995); "Introduction" in Martiniello, Marco (ed.); Migration, Citizenship and
Ethno-national Identities in the European Union, p. 3.
13 O'Higgins, Thomas F. (1995); "Foreword" in Hyland, Niamh, Loftus, Claire and Whelan,
Anthony (ed.); Citizenship of the European Union, p. 3.
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Citizenship described the individual's status in a polity, endowed the citizen
with specific rights and duties to the respective polity, and gave the individual's
identity political and legal expression.14 "Rights, access and belonging are therefore
termed the three historical elements of citizenship."15
As political participation was extended to a large section of society, the
distinction between nationals and citizens became less significant. The nation
became a pre-political entity and the source of state-sovereignty. The exercise of
civil rights replaced, or at least supplanted cultural and ethnic values as important
elements constituting national identity. As a result, the nation defined the national
and "political identity of the citizen within a democratic polity"16. Nationality
depicted one's membership of a polity - nationals became citizens who gave their
consent to the respective polity. This "signified the transformation of authoritarian
into self-legislated power"17, since political power was founded in civil society,
rather than coming from above. The basic elements for this change were outlined in
Rousseau's political writing on the 'social contract' in 1762. Rousseau's social
contract stressed the need for consensus amongst equal and free citizens of a civil
society and implied that everybody was dependent on everybody and everyone was
respected by everyone.
The 'us' versus 'them' or 'inclusion' versus 'exclusion' criteria came about
later. According to O'Leary,
[t]he transformation of nationality and/or citizenship as mechanisms for exclusion
took some time. The growth of industrial society required states to act in an
increasingly protectionist manner in order to protect their economic interests.18
Together with national provisions of welfare benefits, individual nation-
states began to foster their national boundaries by introducing border and passport
controls. This closure of nation-states limited the access of citizenship rights to
14 Vandamme, Jacques (1994), "La citoyennete europeenne comme element d'identite europeenne"
in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p. 261.
15 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 2.
16 Habermas, Jtirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald (ed.); Theorising
Citizenship, p. 258.
17 Habermas, Jurgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald (ed.); Theorising
Citizenship, p. 260.
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citizens only. At the same time, it promoted the 'us' versus 'them' thinking, and
contributed strongly to the fostering of the respective national identity. Non-citizens
were generally excluded from most citizenship rights and were thus not treated
equally to citizens.
The British sociologist T. H. Marshall described citizenship as 'membership
in a community'. Taking England as an example, he divided the notion of
citizenship into three different periods of time and into its civil, political and social
aspects. Civil rights mainly developed during the 18th century and refer to
individual freedom and civil society. They describe the "liberty of the person,
freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude
valid contracts, and the right to justice"19. Secondly, political rights of the 19th
century emphasise "the right to participate in the exercise of political power"20, i.e.
the right to vote. They find expression in the respective representative democracies,
such as the newly emerging Parliaments. Thirdly, social rights evolved during the
beginning of the 20th century. They prescribe a minimum standard of welfare and
income. Welfare state policies, services and institutions involved "the whole range
from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share
to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to
the standards prevailing in the society"21. This also included the right to education.
Marshall argues that social rights, next to civil and political rights of
citizenship, are essential in order to achieve a basic human equality which can be
"associated with the concept of full membership of a community"22. After the
Second World War, welfare benefits increased and triggered an expansion of state
responsibilities towards its respective citizens. Modern society, therefore, began to
increasingly rely on the state to organise its moral obligations, and it is still feared
that society's moral commitment may diminish as society looks to the state for
solutions. In return, this reliance on the state makes its interventionist means more
and more legitimate.
18 O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept ofCommunity Citizenship, p. 9.
19 Marshall, Thomas H. (1950); Citizenship andSocial Class, p. 10.
20 Marshall, Thomas H. (1950); Citizenship and Social Class, p. 11.
21 Marshall, Thomas H. (1950); Citizenship and Social Class, p. 11.
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But does this "politicisation of cultural values"23 - at the expense of
individualism and individual freedom - foster a collective identity? The rights,
duties and political participation possibilities which citizenship implies have surely
contributed to the collectivity's sense of identity. Nevertheless, it is not the single
most important factor. Citizenship is socially and politically excluding since it helps
to define "you as a member of the polity with full political and civil rights and
duties".24 Non-citizens are excluded. They remain outsiders and become subject to
different rights and duties than citizens. This delimitation between citizens and non-
citizens engenders the 'us' versus 'them' thinking' and contributes strongly to 'our'
sense of identity. Citizenship is hence a statal term which carries national
connotations with it. It is inward-looking and describes the individual's relationship
with the state. Citizenship is, foremost, inclusive rather than exclusive. Citizenship
excludes by including. It first creates the 'us' and then compares it to the 'other'
which is external to 'us'.
The debate on inclusion and exclusion, 'us' versus 'them' and citizens/non-
citizens is closely linked to the relation between citizenship and nationality.
Citizenship and nationality are often used interchangeably. They are two sides of
the same coin, namely state membership. Both terms define the citizen and the
national against the stateless individual and/or the foreigner. The confusion between
citizenship and nationality might be the result of the difficulties defining the term
'nation'. The distinction between citizenship and nationality could thus be described
as resulting from the distinction between civic nation (citizenship) and ethnic nation
(nationality), as well as the distinction between multi-national states and the
assumed homogeneous nation-state. Furthermore, "the acquisition of nationality
22 Marshall, Thomas H. (1950); Citizenship and Social Class, p. 8.
23 Wolfe, Alan (1989); Whose Keeper? Social Science andMoral Obligation, p. 183.
24 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 262.
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and the assignment of citizenship follow... different criteria."25 These criteria are
subject to the legal or historical traditions of different nation states26, and
the two terms are used to define different concepts, different aspects of the same
concept or even the same concept in an interchangeable fashion. The difference in
the use of the terms nationality and citizenship reveals a more important difference
in the substance of the concepts of national political identity and belonging in
Europe.27
According to Rainer Baubock, the term citizenship
designates a political status of individuals as well as a particular quality of a
political system. As a normative concept citizenship is a set of rights, exercised by
individuals who hold the rights, equal for all citizens, and universally distributed
within a political community, as well as a corresponding set of institutions
guaranteeing these rights28.
Citizenship hence describes a rights and obligations relationship between
the citizen and the state. The relationship is primarily defined "in terms of
individuals"29. It is an individualistic concept with a social edge, since the
relationship between the citizen and the state is so multi-faceted that it also brings
citizens in relation with each other. The citizen's entitlements become public and
social, because citizens seek, enjoy and exercise particular rights which are granted,
guaranteed or might even be enforced by the respective institutions of a polity. But
although citizenship relations occur within and between collectivities, it cannot
operate through and by organisations.30 Citizenship "combines in rather unusual
ways the public and social with the individual aspects of political life"31.
25 PreuB, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.) (1995); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of
Europe, p. 118.
26 This refers to the differentiation between the ethnic and the civic nation, which has already been
explored in chapter two.
27 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National Identities and Citizenship in the European Union" in
European Public Law, Vol. 1/ No. 4, p. 633-634.
28 Close, Paul (1995); Citizenship, Europe and Change, p. 5.
29 Held, David (1991); "Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship" in Andrews, Geoff (ed.);
Citizenship, p. 21.
30 Close, Paul (1995); Citizenship, Europe and Change, p. 1 and 3.
31 Held, David (1991); "Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship" in Andrews, Geoff (ed.);
Citizenship, p. 21.
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Citizenship "presupposes the capacity of the individual to play a responsible role in
the maintenance and development of the polity"32.
Citizenship is a more open and embracing concept than the more narrowly
defined concept of nationality. It can be more easily acquired. It refers to the
citizen's "internally oriented relationship"33 to the state, and is based on fairly
rational and practical values. Nationality, on the other hand, describes one's
belonging to a particular nation rather than state.
Nationality is often associated with descent, ethnicity and territorial
affiliation and does not confer any rights and obligations upon the national. One
may be a citizen without being a national, since citizenship-status is much easier
obtained than nationality. However, in order to enjoy "the full scope of citizen
rights a person must be or become a national beforehand"34. In this sense,
nationality determines citizenship. There are cases, however, where nationals are
not full citizens, where nationals are not eligible to active democratic participation.
In the past, gender, age and property were important criteria determining political
participation in a polity. Nowadays it is primarily age. Also criminals, and
individuals which are considered as insane, are generally stripped of their
citizenship rights, while their nationality remains. In addition, feminists would
argue that states still have a dualistic and patriarchal approach towards gender
issues. They claim that women are disadvantaged in citizenship rights, the
distribution of social resources and in social policies and employment structures -
but this is a different topic which cannot be elaborated here.35
Traditionally, nationality "conveyed a position of passive submission... [it]
had the meaning of being subject to the government of a particular state and thus
32 PreuB, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.) (1995); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of
Europe, p. 118.
33 Close, Paul (1995); Citizenship, Europe and Change, p. 253.
34 PreuB, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.) (1995); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of
Europe, p. 110. My emphasis.
35 European Union efforts at gender equality, though, would undoubtedly promote the sense of
European identity in this - the larger - section of European citizenship.
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served as a demarcation against aliens"36. Nationality is automatically conferred
upon individuals by birth. This either happens on the basis of the ius solis as, for
example, in France, or the ius sanguinis as, for instance, in Germany.37 The ius solis
usually defines the adoption of nationality in the civic nation. The ius sanguinis, in
contrast, presupposes a common descent, a distinctive ethno-cultural and even
political history and identity. The individual may, however, change his/her
nationality later in life. It then becomes what Habermas calls a "voluntary
adhesion"38. Accordingly, one may "gradually absorb cultural forms shared by the
native majority."39
Nationality describes the "individual's externally oriented relationship with
the state [which] comes into play in the individual's relationship with those nation-
states of which s/he is not a national"40. This relationship between individuals and
the state apparatus hence becomes most evident in the diplomatic protection and
assistance of individuals in other than their own nation-state. Nationality is more
exclusive than inclusive. It is an instrument which includes by excluding: 'we'
imagine ourselves to be a community41 which delineates 'us' from 'them'.
The inclusion/exclusion principle is twofold in the European Union - and
the implications of European citizenship, together with the phenomenon of
immigration, are most strongly felt at the internal and external borders and in the
36 PreuB, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.) (1995); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of
Europe, p. 109.
17 The new Red-Green government in Germany envisages a change of the German citizenship law: a
move away from the ius sanguinis towards the ius solis. This move is regarded as a fundamental
change to "the identity of the German nation" (Traynor, Ian (1999); "German right fights citizenship
plan" in The Guardian, January 5, 1999. My translation.). According to this bill, which would also
make dual citizenship possible, 'foreigners' born in Germany and immigrants who have lived legally
in Germany for eight years would be allowed to obtain German citizenship and voting rights. See
also Fietz, Martina and Middel, Andreas (1998); "Das neue Staatsbiirgerschaftsrecht tragt grune
Handschrift" in Die Welt, October 16, 1998.
38 Habermas, Jiirgen (1992); "Citoyennete et identite nationale" in Lenoble, Jacques et Dewandre,
Nicole (eds.) (1992); L'Europe au soir du siecle, p. 24. My translation.
39 Portes, Alejandro and Fernandez Kelly, M. Patricia (1989); "Images of Movement in a changing
world: a review of current theories of international migration" in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.);
Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, p. 28.
40 Close, Paul (1995) Citizenship, Europe and Change, p. 253.
41 See Benedict Anderson's argument in chapter two, section a.
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border regions. It is at the borders - particularly external borders - where the
concept of the free movement of Europeans and others is put to the test and the
distinction between EU and non-EU citizens is most clearly made; in addition,
border regions often carry the consequences of immigrants who settle there, either
temporarily or ultimately, in seek ofwork or asylum42.
On the other hand, some internal borders distinguish between European
citizens themselves, depending on whether the particular border in question is
shared by Schengen signatory countries or not. Although Schengen was primarily
regarded as an instrument to guarantee the right to free movement, the incongruous
application of the Schengen agreements within the EU area has, in fact, brought
about internal divisions - it has created a division between 'us', i.e. Schengen
signatories, versus 'them', i.e. non-members of the Schengen agreement. Based on
these internal divisions, the Schengen agreements run in part counter to the
principle of European citizenship and the right to free movement. Governments are
increasingly able "to carry out checks and controls, to store and exchange
information, while the judicial protection of the individual is, if anything,
weakened."43 In addition, it is frequently alleged that the Schengen agreements may
generate "an increased atmosphere of intolerance and exclusion of others.... The
focus at Schengen shifted noticeably from free movement to control."44 In part, this
seems to create a
fortress mentality within the Community..., the emerging Schengen network
[made] governance in the EC... even less transparent than previous to the new
border politics... [and] generated an important insight into the problematic link
between the three historical elements of citizenship - rights, belonging and access -
in the context of the Community as a non-state polity.45
42 Ferry, Jean-Marc (1992); "Pertinence du postnational" in Lenoble, Jacques et Dewandre, Nicole
(eds.); L'Europe au soir du siecle, p. 40.
43 David O'Keefe cited in Ward, lan (1997); "Law and other Europeans" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 82.
44 Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and other Europeans" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/
No. 1, p. 82 and 83.
45 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 11, 10, 11.
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European citizenship as introduced in the 1992 Treaty on European Union
Origins of European citizenship
The 1952 ECSC and the 1957 Euratom Treaties were concerned with the
regulation, production, distribution and pricing of steel and coal on the one hand,
and with the control and co-ordination of the nuclear power industry on the other. It
was only in the Treaty of Rome/EEC in 1957 that the citizen was mentioned for the
first time, albeit indirectly. The preamble of the Rome Treaty implies that the
project of the European Economic Community must go beyond economics, namely
the EEC should work towards "an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe"46. To this end, provisions in the Treaty ofRome guaranteed the nationals of
member states certain rights and benefits akin to those of nation-states, even ifmost
of these rights and benefits were indirect.
About twenty years later, and partly due to economic crisis and
Eurosclerosis, the "[e]arly 1970s marked a turn from the 'Europe of materials' to the
'Europe for citizens'."47 During the 1972 Paris summit, the Belgian and Italian
Prime Ministers sought to include "the European Citizen [in] the construction of
Europe" more directly and by means of establishing "a European citizenship which
the inhabitants of our countries now possess"48. It was suggested that "Europe
should be personalised."49 To this end, the 1974 Paris summit introduced a concrete
version of the concept of European citizenship for the first time. The heads of states
or governments established a "working group to study the possibility of establishing
a passport union and, in anticipation of this, the introduction of a uniform
passport."50 Another "working group was "instructed to study the conditions and the
timing under which the citizens of the nine Member States could be given special
rights as Members of the Community"5'. The establishment of both these study
46 European Communities (1957); Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Text of
the Treaty. My emphasis.
47 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 4.
48
European Communities (1972); EC Bulletin; 11/1972, Vol. 5, p. 37, 39 and 43.
49 Etienne Davignon, Commissioner (1973) cited in Agence Europe (1973); Europe Documents, No.
713/ 5, January 1973, p. 4.
50
European Commission (1974); EC Bulletin', 12/1974, p. 8, point 10.
51 European Commission (1974); EC Bulletin', 12/1974, p. 8-9, point I!.
Chapter 3.B.ii - 177
groups was the first step which contributed to the creation of European citizenship.
In 1975, the Tindemans Report on European Union52 included a section entitled "A
Citizen's Europe" which made reference to these 'special rights'.
'Special rights' were not special in themselves, but symbolic and special in
the sense that they were an extension to the rights nationals enjoyed vis-a-vis their
own state. Special rights were to include civil and political rights, such as the right
to vote in municipal and the European Parliament elections. They were based on the
EC's basic principle of equal treatment and only to be accorded to nationals of the
European Community's member states. This meant that 'special rights' were also
applicable to nationals resident in member states other than their own. The Passport
Union was to become the ultimate manifestation of these special rights. Nationals
of non-member states were thereby excluded; but in order to avoid increasing
tension between those included and those excluded of'special rights', the 1974 Paris
Summit contained a clause which provided "for stage-to-stage harmonisation of
legislation affecting aliens and for the abolition of passport controls within the
European Union"53. "[Pjeople began to speak of a 'Citizens' Europe'."54
Since these 'special rights' shed some light on the complex relationship
between the right of free movement, the right to access the European labour market
and the abolition of border controls, the Commission presented a proposal for a
Directive on a general right of residence in 1979. The proposal detached the right of
free movement from the individual's exercise of an economic activity and hence
made the right of free movement and residence independent of economic activity.
This was a first step away from the economic domain of the European Community.
A second launch of the concept of European citizenship were the two
Adonnino reports in 198555. They addressed issues which would benefit
Community citizens directly in their everyday lives, such as the abolition of border
controls and formalities. The Adonnino Committee understood that the aim of the
52 Tindemans, Leo (1975); Report on European Union to the European Council.
53
European Commission (1974); EC Bulletin-, 12/1974, p. 8, point 10.
54 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 6.
ss
European Commission (1985); "A People's Europe" (Adonnino Report) in Bulletin of the
European Communities, Supplement 7/1985, Luxembourg, pp. 5-33.
Chapter 3.B.ii - 178
European Community/Union cannot be purely based on economic political factors,
and that cultural integration will not automatically come about once economic and
political union are achieved. As a result, the reports put forward proposals to
enhance cultural, educational and communication exchanges. These proposals were
substantiated under the many successive Citizens' Europe initiatives and
may be characterised as... 'socio-political', for [they] involved Community elites
worrying about the degree of public support for their policies and popular
identification with European institutions"56.
Following the Adonnino reports, the Commission published a report on
'Voting Rights for Community Nationals in Local Elections' in 1988". This was an
essential breakthrough from the traditional notion that member states' nationals only
enjoy full civil and political rights in their own state, while being stripped of their
democratic rights elsewhere. The right to vote in local elections was based on the
argument that the right of free movement and residence should imply that
being a citizen of one Member state confers rights in the other Member state too.
Citizenship is thus disassociated from the national limits on rights attached to a
given nationality.... There is no doubt that Community legislation has had the
effect of breaking the link between national territory and legal implications of
nationality. The gradual achievement of a Peoples' Europe will consolidate the
trend.58
The Single European Act of 1986 was to lay the foundations to achieve this
'Peoples' Europe'. Its objective was to establish, by the end of 1992, a frontierless
area, within which free movement of goods, people, services and capital was
guaranteed. Furthermore, 'Europe 92' aimed at developing the feeling among
Europeans that they belong to one great unit, where they can move freely, work,
study and live where they wished. To this end, Article 13/8a in Section II of the
Single European Act ensured the right to free movement of persons, and not just
56 Anderson, Malcolm, Boer den, Monica and Miller, Gary (1994); "European Citizenship and Co¬
operation in Justice and Home Affairs" in Duff, Andrew et. al. (eds.); Maastricht and beyond, p.
106.
57
European Commission (1988); "A People's Europe: Voting Rights for Community Nationals in
Local Elections" in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/1988, Luxembourg, pp. 6-
38.
58 O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept ofCommunity Citizenship, p. 20.
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economic actors59. At the same time, however, Art. 8a also began to mark a
difference between those privileged by and those excluded from this right. This was
further highlighted by the Schengen agreements signed in 1985 and 1990.
However, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that the concept of
European citizenship was introduced into an official text and received a legal basis.
Interestingly enough, there is little literature on how the concept of citizenship was
actually introduced into the TEU, but abundant literature about the content and
effect, the flaws and complexities of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty.
Yet, the coming about of the concept of European citizenship may be as important
as the manifestation of European citizenship itself. It may provide an explanation
for the problem of the current right to European citizenship.
During the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in 1990 in
Dublin, the Spanish government presented a Memorandum on European
citizenship. It emphasised that, so far, the European integration process only had
had a limited influence on the Community citizens' daily lives. It regretted that the
citizens were not actively involved in the progress of the Community since they
remained nothing but "privileged foreigners"60. In order to overcome this, the
memorandum argued that European citizenship would foster a
personal and inalienable status of the citizen of member States, which by virtue of
their membership in the Union, have special rights and tasks, inherent in the
framework of the Union, which are exercised and protected specifically within the
borders of the Community, without this prejudicing the possibility of taking
advantage of this same quality of European citizen also outside the said borders.61
Consequently, European citizenship would add a dynamic to the European
Community integration process, "overcome the inequalities which subsist between
Community citizens because they live in different areas of the Community and
through different means reinforce the economic and social cohesion in a concrete
framework"62.
■ Article 13/8a in Section II of the Single European Act states: "The internal market shall comprise
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital
is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty."
60 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 1.
61 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
62 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
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According to the Spanish text, there are three spheres of rights and
obligations for Community citizens: those stemming from national citizenship of
member states, those stemming from the Treaties and those which make "the citizen
of the Community, who is for the moment no more than a 'privileged foreigner', a
citizen of the European Union"63. The Spanish memorandum suggests that
European citizenship should be based on these three general rights. Their full
implementation would "eliminate the negative effects presently accompanying the
condition of foreigner for a citizen of a member state living in another member
state."64 Although some of these rights are already part of other EC Treaties, the
Spanish text concluded that they still need to be widened and extended to all
European citizens: European citizenship would guarantee the right to the complete
freedom of movement, the right to free choice of residence and the right to political
participation.
In addition, the Spanish government argued that new policies should be
introduced: "social relations, health, education, culture, environmental protection,
consumers, etc."65. The extent and adoption of these policies would depend on the
direction political union would take. The report also suggested an 'European
Ombudsman' to protect and safeguard citizens' rights. Furthermore, consular
protection and assistance to nationals of member states in third countries where
their own member state is not represented was proposed.
All of these proposals for a European citizenship would, the Spanish
proposal concluded, establish a new relationship between the "European Union as a
whole, and the European citizen as a holder of rights derived from his 'status
civitatis' and, as such, holder of specific rights of the Union"66. European citizenship
would represent a "qualitative jump which allows an area of essentially economic
character to be transformed into an integrated area which would be at the direct
63 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
64 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
65 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 3.
66 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 3.
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service of the citizen."67 The Spanish memorandum stressed that European
citizenship should become
one of the three main pillars of the European Union [since it is] one of the basic
elements of the credibility of Political Union in the eyes of public opinion and an
essential condition to guarantee the functioning and development of all the
constituent elements of the Union, as the European citizen is the basis itself of
democratic legitimacy.68
Ultimate reasons for introducing European citizenship in the TEU
As we have seen, the attempts to introduce the concept of European
citizenship initially came from 'above' rather than 'below'. According to Martiniello,
there are five reasons which explain the introduction of citizenship of the European
Elnion 'from above'69:
The first reason is closely linked to the single market and its principle of the
freedom of movement. The mobility of European workers and people in a single
market without internal frontiers requires the implementation of social rights at the
European level for their public and personal protection. The granting of political
rights, such as the right to vote on the local and European level, would be an
extension to social rights and the freedom ofmovement. Although Article 8 of the
TEU does not offer much in terms of Marshallian socio-economic and civic rights
mentioned earlier, the concept of European citizenship, as the European Union
itself, is based on this premise of free movement in an area without internal
frontiers.
The second reason is linked to the democratic deficit and the lack of popular
democratic participation in the European Union. The European Parliament is the
only directly elected body of the European Union. Despite the co-decision
procedure introduced in the TEU, the European Parliament still has only limited
powers in comparison to the Council of Ministers and the European Commission.
European citizenship can be seen as an attempt to overcome this democratic deficit.
67 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 4.
68
Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents', No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 4.
69 Martiniello, Marco (1994); "Citizenship of the European Union" in Baubock, Rainer (ed.); From
Aliens to Citizens, p. 37.
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It should develop and increase public participation in the European integration
process. However, it is questionable whether the right to vote in local and European
elections can actually contribute to a rise in democratic participation in the
European Union. The importance of both local and European elections still remains
minimal compared to national elections. Local elections have so far not had an
important impact on the development or degree of democratic legitimisation of the
European Union. European elections, on the other hand, seem to be second rate
national elections to the European citizen. Turnout at European elections is uneven
and low - turnout for the June 1994 elections was as low as 56.5%70. Voters tend to
express national discontent and disillusionment with national politics rather than
vote for European issues. European elections do usually not imply a possible
change of policy orientation. Furthermore, the differing national electoral systems,
party campaigns and the fact that the outcome of the European elections does not
result in the establishment of a government seem to indicate that there is no direct
relation between citizens' reaction and (EU) public power71. This is further fostered
by the non-existence of a genuine European party system. Transnational manifestos
rely on the national parties' campaigns. Their electoral agendas hardly exploit
highly visible, salient and common issues of central concern (such as social and
green issues, including racism, drugs, AIDS, cancer, the environment, etc.) which
would increase credibility and win more votes.
Thirdly, European policy-makers saw the need to bring the European
integration process closer to the people and to reduce the elitist and technocratic
character of the European Union. The European project is not just about the
integration process amongst European member states, but also the European
peoples. Economic reasons alone are insufficient to advance the European
integration project. Socio-political and cultural factors also play an essential role, in
order to achieve a fully integrated European Community/Union. European
70 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Europaische Union und Europa: eine Problemskizze\
http://altavista.com/european.identity/, p. 2.
71 Neunreither, Karlheinz (1995); "Citizens and the exercise of power in the European Union" in
Rosas, Alan and Antola, Esko (eds.); A Citizens' Europe: In Search ofa New Order, p. 12.
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citizenship would strengthen the rights and interests ofmember states' nationals and
make them feel part of the European integration project.
The fourth reason for the introduction of the concept of European
citizenship in the TEU was to create a European identity and a sense of belonging.
It is questionable which form of identity would emerge - identification with the
Union or identification with other citizens? Irrespective of the form, it is certain,
however, that a European identity would be a means to obtain full public support
for the European Union. It would provide the European Union with a strong degree
of legitimacy, since citizens would be willing to participate in the EU integration
process. Popular sovereignty would allow the European Union to be fully accepted
as a political actor internally as well as externally. Yet, it is difficult to create a
European identity, when local, regional and national allegiances are still strong. The
effects of the European symbols - the European flag, passport and anthem - upon
the creation of a European identity are limited. Nevertheless, they still remain
essential means to increase and foster an awareness for the European Union.
The fifth reason incorporates all other reasons, since "it is not possible to
conceive of a political Union without an accurate previous delimitation and without
defining the persons belonging to the Union"72. Since the concept of citizenship
would be a means to include by excluding, the members of the European Union
would need to know who belongs to them and who does not. In this sense,
European citizenship
is not so much a relation of the individual vis-a-vis Community institutions but
rather a particular socio-legal status vis-a-vis national member states which have
to learn how to cope with the fact that persons, who are physically and socially
their citizen, are acquiring a kind of legal citizenship by means of European
citizenship without being their nationals.73
However, restricting European citizenship to the member states' nationals
only leads to a great degree of exclusion of immigrants. Only truly European
citizens would become beneficiaries of the economic and limited socio-political
72 P. S. Mira cited in Martiniello, Marco (1994); "Citizenship of the European Union" in Baubock,
Rainer (ed.); From Aliens to Citizens, p. 40.
73 PreuB, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p.
551.
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rights the European Union has on offer. In the extreme case, this conception of
"Europeanity"74 could in future become a strong and dangerous cultural and ethnic-
laden value for Union citizens. Current claims of the existence of a European
culture are based on the delimitation with the 'others' living beyond the frontiers of
the EU. Sadly enough, this also affects the large immigration communities living
within the frontiers of the European Union. The reappearance of racism and
xenophobia during the late 1980s and early 1990s has been mainly directed against
non-Community nationals and migrants.75 In the extreme case, one could assess
these manifestations as signs of exclusion, as "forces moving from 'fortress Europe'
towards 'ethnic Europe'."76
European citizenship as it exists today11
Prior to the Treaty on European Union, the concept of European citizenship
was "rudimentary"78. Citizenship-like rights kept adapting continuously to the
historic evolution of the internal market, "whereby citizenship-like rights have
gradually been extended to Member State nationals on the basis of Community
law"79. Citizenship rights were scattered around the Treaties, but never to be found -
summarised - in one single article (as, for example, the right of economic actors to
move, reside and work).
Art. 8 of the TEU seems to be the result of the "Community legal
disorder."80 European citizenship is still not a cohesive concept. The "reference to
rights alone does not say enough about the character of this supranational
74 Martiniello, Marco (1994); "Citizenship of the European Union" in Baubock, Rainer (ed.); From
Aliens to Citizens, p. 41.
75 See chapter two.
76 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National Identities and Citizenship in the European Union" in
European Public Law, Vol. 1/ No. 4, p. 659.
77 See annex for a more detailed analysis of this.
78 Vandamme, Jacques (1994), "La citoyennete europeenne comme element d'identite europeenne"
in Picht, Robert (ed.) ; L'identite europeenne, p. 263. My translation.
70
O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept ofCommunity Citizenship, p. 21.
80 D'Oliveira, Hans Ulrich J. (1995); "Union citizenship: pie in the sky?" in Rosas, Alan and Antola,
Esko (eds.) (1995), A Citizens' Europe: In Search ofa New Order, p. 76.
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citizenship"81, since the connection between rights and obligations remains unclear.
European citizenship carries virtually no duties with it, and one could argue that
European citizenship rights are merely symbolic, since a "right is not effective by
itself, but only through the obligation to which it corresponds."82 The few
obligations of European citizenship are indirect - as, for instance, the duty to
comply with Community law83 and to vote in those countries where voting is
compulsory.
According to Chris Shore and Annabel Black, European citizenship has
become "mandatory" and to become so, the decision and introduction of European
citizenship "was taken without reference to the citizen at all"84. European
citizenship is inscribed in the EC pillar, the first pillar of the Treaty on European
Union. It has received "further constitutional affirmation with the Treaty of
Amsterdam"85 which confirms that European citizenship is complementary to
national citizenship. European citizenship remains dependent on the member states'
nationality and passport policies, and is - not by definition, but practically - subject
to the Justice and Home Affairs pillar (Title VI), the third pillar of the Treaty on
European Union.
This may imply that granting European citizenship is firmly in the hands of
the member states and intergovernmental negotiations. European citizenship is not
subject to the democratic control of the European Parliament, but given that EC law
is superior to national law, European citizens may address the European Court of
Justice for individual rights embedded in EC law. Nonetheless, member states may
restrict benefits for nationals of other member states. This is probably one of the
81 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-
Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 17, p. 1.
82 Weil, Simone (1949); L'enracinement, p. 9. My translation.
83 In the van Gend en Loos case it is made specifically clear that "Independently of the legislation of
Member States, Community law... not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended
to confer upon them tights which become part of their legal heritage". As Weiler states, this "phrase
wonderfully sharpens the issue, for here are obligations imposed on individuals independently of the
legislation ofMember States". Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in
Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 521.
84 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 275.
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reasons - bar Denmark and the United Kingdom - why the introduction of European
citizenship was "one of the less controversial topics"86 in the TEU. Had European
citizenship or the entire Schengen agreements been brought within the first
'Community' structure and procedures, an important element of supranational
initiative and control [would have been] introduced into areas of criminal law
enforcement, immigration control and asylum - previously regarded as part of the
regalian core of the sovereign state.87
Although European citizenship is now embedded within the legislative
framework of the European Union, much remains to be done. Co-operation between
member states should be improved. The right to residence and access to
employment should be facilitated. Language training should be developed in order
to advance the free movement of people and cultural exchanges and integration.
Overall, European citizens need to become aware of their rights and benefits laid
down in the EU's legal framework88, as well as be capable and willing to accept
European citizenship.
European citizenship and European identity
If the terms 'nationality' and 'citizenship' are used interchangeably within the
traditional dimension, does this also apply to European citizenship and nationality?
The answer is no, since European citizenship does not yet correspond to the
traditional concept of citizenship. Nor should European citizenship be
misunderstood as a "mere expansion of the traditional concept of citizenship of
nation-states"89, which usually describes the direct link between citizens and state,
based on faith, allegiance and common values. Although European citizenship is
85 Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in Kershen,
Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 230.
86 Anderson, Malcolm, Boer den, Monica and Miller, Gary (1994); "European Citizenship and Co¬
operation in Justice and Home Affairs" in Duff, Andrew et. al. (eds.); Maastricht and beyond, p.
107.
87 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU Enlargement, p. 32.
88 For further suggestions of reforms to make European citizenship a more genuine concept, see
O'Leary, Siofra (1996); European Union Citizenship, specifically pp. 105-127.
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bestowed on all member states' nationals, it seems to be divorced from nationality
and "appears to be inferior in status to that of national citizenship."90 Indeed,
"[nationals of the Member States are European Citizens, not the other way
around."91 European citizenship still depends on the member states' nationality laws
and is not yet a conceptper se. Accordingly, and coming back to Neil McCormick's
argument referred to in the second part of this chapter, European citizenship is a
thin concept as opposed to the thicker concept of nationality or national citizenship.
One could add that European citizenship is even thinner, since it needs to respect all
of the member states' nationalities. This gives enough reason to believe that
European citizenship is based on the lowest possible common denominator.
Since European citizenship attempts to embrace the large array of multiple
cultures and identities that exist in the European Union, European citizenship has
been defined as
a new kind of citizenship... that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is
multiple in the sense that identities, rights and obligations... are expressed through
an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states,
national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of
regions.92
Indeed, European citizenship allows nationals of EU member states to claim
certain rights as either EU citizens or nationals. European citizenship enables
individuals to address the European Court of Justice for issues which are not laid
down in national legislation. In the extreme case, individuals may circumvent
national legislation by approaching the European Court of Justice.93 European
citizenship, understood in terms of a supranational citizenship, helps to abolish the
hierarchy between the different loyalties "to look to one another across national
89 PreuB, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p.
549.
90 Wilkinson, Brian (1995); "Towards European citizenship? Nationality, Discrimination and Free
Movement of Workers in the European Union" in European Public Law, Vol. 1/No. 3, p. 435.
91 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 528.
92 Meehan, Elizabeth (1993); Citizenship and the European Community, p. 1.
93 As we have seen earlier, this may specifically be the case for women's movements which support
the European Union's efforts at gender equality.
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boundaries."94 "European citizenship does not mean membership in a European
nation,"95 The institutional attempt to create a European identity through citizenship
is clearly a political elite-led top-down rather than bottom-up project.
Was European citizenship introduced as a means to create a European
identity internal to the European Union? The concept of citizenship seemed to be
the proper means to create a European identity, because citizenship - as we have
seen - has a broader meaning than the concept of nationality, referring to the
individual's relation to civic institutions rather than ethnic communities. Therefore,
the introduction of European citizenship is plausible, whereas the introduction of a
European nationality is not. If the leaders of the European Union had seriously
intended to build a European nation, they would have included the narrower
concept of a European nationality within the TEU. However, if this had been the
case, there would have been an outcry amongst the populations of the European
member states. The introduction of a European nationality would have indicated the
attempt to build a homogeneous entity, the much-dreaded 'European superstate'.
Still, if one were to take the definitions given above and reduce citizenship
as being internal and inclusive, and nationality as being the external and exclusive
component to state membership, one may argue that the clash between nationality
of the member states and European citizenship has more than one conflictual
dimension to it.
On the assumption that the concept of citizenship is inclusive and internal to
a specific entity, the introduction of European citizenship should be an effective
instrument to create a strong feeling of belonging amongst the citizens of the EU
and a strong feeling of European identity within the European Union. However, as
has been suggested in chapter two, a European identity has essentially been
manifest against an 'other', especially a threatening 'other', such as the Ottoman
Empire, Central Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and the current waves of
immigration targeting Europe since the end of the Cold War. This suggests that the
54 O'Higgins, Thomas F. (1995); "Foreword" in Hyland, Niamh, Loftus, Claire and Whelan,
Anthony (ed.); Citizenship ofthe European Union, p. 6.
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term 'European identity' should not restrict itself to citizens holding European
citizenship only. European identity, as will be argued in chapter five, goes beyond
the boundaries of the European Union and should give way to "forms of blended
identity and transnationalism."96
Following this reasoning and the assumption that the concept of nationality
is external and representative to the outside, the introduction of a European
nationality (rather than citizenship) would actually be more logical; in the sense that
a European identity and feeling of togetherness is already detectable towards the
non-European 'other'. This kind of identity could have been reinforced even more
by the introduction of a European nationality. But at the same time, it would have
been incredibly controversial, since nationality still remains at the centre of the
nation-state and strikes at the heart of common national social, cultural and political
values and identities.
Consequently, the traditional connotations of both the concepts of
citizenship and nationality are not yet applicable to the European Union, but
restricted to the national dimension. European citizenship "brings about a new level
of complexity in relation to the constellation of identities within Europe"97, in
particular because European citizenship seems to delink citizenship from
nationality. This underlines that the European Union was intent to create a civic
polity and a European civil society which, according to Meehan, necessitates
actively to involve citizens in the European integration process. It attempts to meld
the diverse models of citizenship of the member states into a European one, thereby
ensuring that each EU member state maintains its own belief-system and
contributes to the EU's multicultural character and diversity.
95 Ulrich Preuft cited in Shaw, Jo (1998); "Citizenship of the Union: Towards post-national
membership?" in Academy of European Law (ed.); Collected Essays of the Academy of European
Law, Vol. 6/ Book 1, p. 282.
96 Kurti, Laszlo and Langman, Juliet (1997); "Introduction: Searching for Identities in the New East
Central Europe" in Kurti, Laszlo and Langman, Juliet (eds.); Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural
Identities in the New East and Central Europe, p. 3.
97 Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in Kershen,
Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 230.
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It has been mentioned above that European citizenship has so far not created
a feeling of belonging, which is necessary for the creation and fostering of a
European identity. The presence of national differences, particularities and
identities is still too strong as to allow a European identity to emerge. European
citizenship does not yet represent the EU's diversity and multiculturalism, nor is it
identified with all three traditional dimensions of citizenship - legal, political and,
specifically, social98. Instead, it seems that Article 8 of the TEU corresponds to a
hasty composition which does not say much about citizenship - at least not about its
definitive legal status. It rather constitutes a bundle of options within a physically
broadened and functionally more differentiated space.99 Indeed, one may agree with
Joseph Weiler that European citizenship resembles a tourist-carnet with freebies.100
Nevertheless, one should not dismiss the concept of European citizenship
altogether. Although it is questionable whether a European citizenship is able to
create a European identity101, one must admit that European citizenship is, in fact, a
step into the right direction. Neo-Functionalists like Elizabeth Meehan, for instance,
contend that each policy area of the European Union is influenced by the spill-over
effect. Taking the area of European social policy as an example, Meehan argues that
"social rights, together with civil and political rights, form a triad, which must be
regarded as interlocked"102. Community law can therefore be no longer restricted to
market forces, since it also affects the status of the individual in the European
Community. No individual is any longer immune to changes in European policy
areas, the institutional arrangements of the European Union and the supremacy of
European law over national law. The individual in the European Union can no
98 See Thomas Marshall, mentioned earlier in this section.
99 Ulrich PreuB cited in Shaw, Jo (1998); "Citizenship of the Union: Towards post-national
membership?" in Academy of European Law (ed.); Collected Essays of the Academy of European
Law, Vol. 6/ Book 1, p. 282.
100Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The 1997 Jean Monnet Lecture: European Union citizenship and
national citizenship", paper presented during New Forms of Citizenship in the European Union,
Seminar at the London School of Economics, March, 20 - 22, 1997.
101 Ulrich PreuB (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of Europe, p.
119. PreuB's argument that citizenship is able to create identity stands in contrast to the argument
that citizenship presupposes the existence of a community. This means that citizenship is the
consequence of a strong feeling of identity; and those who do not belong to this particular
community have no right to claim the status of citizenship.
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longer be regarded as a worker only, but needs to be perceived as a citizen. The
introduction of European citizenship therefore
coincides with movements towards political union.... [a] pattern... of horizontal
avenues and a more plural set of institutions through which citizenship, as both
entitlements and 'lived' experience, may be realised.103
European citizenship should renew the association between citizenship and
nationality in a slightly different way,104 without imposing a false sense of common
identity upon the community concerned. In this sense, European citizenship should,
by definition, become complementary to national citizenship. This would mean - as
we have seen earlier in this chapter - that European citizenship would be subject to
a "joint legitimacy"105 - Weiler's two 'demoi' legitimacy - which describes an ethnic
legitimacy to the nation(-state) on the one hand, and a civic legitimacy to the
European Union on the other. Yasemin Soysal also suggests that European
citizenship would disengage the two major components of citizenship - rights and
identity.106 European citizenship would cosmopolitanise the traditional relation
between the citizen and the state, but leave the concept of nationality and identity in
tact. Both concepts - nationality and identity - cannot be taken away from the
European citizens, but are able to co-exist with a European citizenship and a
subsequent European identity.
Similarly, Habermas argues that both European citizenship and national
identity may be united under his model of Constitutional Patriotism. According to
Habermas (and as we will see in chapter five), Constitutional Patriotism allows
European citizenship and nationality, political identity and national identity, to be
complementary. Constitutional Patriotism implies that "to be a citizen has not only
the meaning of being a member of a particular political community, but of being
102 Meehan, Elizabeth (1993); Citizenship and the European Community, p. 2.
103 Meehan, Elizabeth (1993); Citizenship and the European Community, p. 147; and Meehan,
Elizabeth (1997); "Political Pluralism and European Citizenship" in Lehning, Percy and Weale,
Albert (eds.); Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe, p. 73.
104 Martiniello, Marco (1994); "Citizenship of the European Union" in Baubock, Rainer (ed.); From
Aliens to Citizens, p. 35.
105 Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz,
Ulf and Hallstrom, Par (eds.); Principles ofJustice and the European Union, p. 45.
106 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook,
Mary (eds.); Citizenship, Nationality andMigration in Europe, p. 18.
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part of a common identity of that very community".107 Constitutional Patriotism
may hence be a means to accommodate an individual's multiple loyalties, including
national identity, within the supranational sphere of the European Union. Being
aware that the question of multiple loyalties is not easy to answer, Weiler proposes
a model of variable geometry108, or a
'concentric circles' approach'.... [0]ne feels simultaneously as belonging to, and
being part of, say, Germany and Europe; or, even, Scotland, Britain and Europe.
What characterises this view is that the sense of identity and identification derives
from the same sources of human attachment albeit at different levels of
intensity.109
This would represent a kind of '"social contract' among the nationals of
states... [who will] regard themselves as associating as citizens in this civic
society."110 Identities may shift, according to circumstances and context.
Access to this kind of citizenship would be made easier, and the emerging
broad identity would be based on 'otherhood' rather than 'brotherhood'.111 The
boundary between 'us' and 'them' would be far lower, and the idea of inclusion
rather than exclusion would prevail. European identity would
denote a common tradition of thought and culture rooted in that constant
interchange over two millennia which has given this part of the world a certain
unity of the mind."2
Meanwhile, however, "[i]f a European citizenship is to truly emerge in the
future, then the very notion of constitutional order will have to change
107 PreuB, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of Europe, p.
111.
108 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The 1997 Jean Monnet Lecture: European Union citizenship and
national citizenship", paper presented during New Forms of Citizenship in the European Union,
Seminar at the London School of Economics, March, 20 - 22, 1997.
109 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 526.
110 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 270.
111 PreuB, Ulrich (1997); "Legal Aspects of European Citizenship", paper presented during New
Forms ofCitizenship in the European Union, Seminar at the London School of Economics, March
20 -22,1997.
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profoundly"113. European citizenship should be coupled with openness and
equality114 and not become a "instrument of closure"115. Both the notions of
'openness' and 'equality' are pre-conditions for a successful European integration
process which is supportive of the development of cultural pluralism. Equating
European citizenship with "tendencies towards uniformity"116 is dangerous, since
"national identities [could be] articulated in new ways, either in exclusionary
narratives, or as search for new national identities."117
In order to avoid European citizenship becoming a component for the
inclusion/exclusion debate, Ulrich PreuB suggests that European citizenship should
be based on a "common European criterion"11S, such as residence rather than
nationality. To this end, the Euro Citizen Action Service (ECAS) suggests that
European citizenship should be granted to third country nationals if they are legally
resident in the European Union for a minimum of five years.119 This acquisition of
European citizenship "may be called the status path, because the acquisition of the
status of citizenship takes logical precedence over the consequential rights attached
to it. Rights are derived from the status."120 According to ECAS, this status path
would also be congruent with the TEU's Art. 14 on anti-discrimination121 and the
universal principles of human rights.122 More importantly, however, it would be the
112 Tassin, Etienne (1992); "Europe: a political community?" in Mouffe, Chantal (ed.); Dimensions
ofRadical Democracy, p. 171.
113 Balibar, Etienne (1996); "Is European Citizenship possible?" in Public Culture, No. 8, p. 356.
114 Balibar, Etienne (1996); "Is European Citizenship possible?" in Public Culture, No. 8, p. 362.
See also Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in
Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 243.
115 Brubaker, Roger (1992); Citizenship andNationality in France and Germany, p. 31.
116 Martiniello, Marco (1995); "Introduction" in Martiniello, Marco (ed.); Migration, Citizenship and
Ethno-National Identities in the European Union, p. 1.
1,7 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook,
Mary (eds.); Citizenship, Nationality andMigration in Europe, p. 23.
118 PreuB, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p.
548.
119 Similarly, the new German citizenship law envisages residence of minimum eight years. Fietz,
Martina and Middel, Andreas (1998); "Das neue Staatsbtirgerschaftsrecht tragt grtine Handschrift"
in Die Welt, October 16, 1998.
120 PreuB, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p.
548.
121 Euro Citizen Action Service (1997); European Citizenship: giving substance to citizens' Europe
in a revised Treaty, http://www.eurplace.org/.
122 The European Union has not acceded to the European Convention of Human Rights, but only
makes reference to it in Article F.2 and in the fourth pillar of Justice and Home Affairs.
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first step to a European citizenship in which European citizens' rights and benefits
would be based on a multiplicity of memberships which are legitimated by global
ideologies.123 Rights which once belonged to the national community, would hence
become increasingly universal (for instance, human rights), but at the same time
allow identities to remain ethnically or territorially bound124.
This chapter has shown that European integration theories have paid little
attention to the concept of European identity. In general, European integration
theories tend to focus on explaining the process of integration rather than the
possibility of involving the individual in the EU's new governance arrangements.
Nonetheless, European integration theories should not be dismissed altogether,
since they shed some light on the EU's problem of system design, problem of
governance and lack of legitimacy. It has been argued that the European Union is
built on "a formal vertical relationship between the EU structures of government...
[and that] we can derive no assumptions... about the... existence of the horizontal
relationship... between those citizens which binds them together."125 The
institutional architecture and policy procedures of the European Union are complex
and have so far not created a sense of popular identification amongst the European
citizens. European citizens feel alienated from the EU's governance structures, and
given the growth of the European integration process, citizens' loyalty can no longer
be taken for granted.
In an attempt to obtain citizens' loyalty, the European Union has introduced
a number of measures that aim at 'Europeanising' the individual beyond the
boundaries of the nation-state.126 Moreover, these measures are also aimed at
constructing a European identity from the top down. They are similar to statehood
symbols and include the introduction of the freedom of movement, the European
123 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook,
Mary (eds.); Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, p. 22-23.
124 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook,
Mary (eds.); Citizenship, Nationality andMigration in Europe, p. 18.
123 Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in Kershen,
Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 231.
126 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the European
Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, pp. 441-442.
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flag and anthem, the European single currency, as well as the concept of European
citizenship. It is possibly too early to tell in how far these measures have been
successful. It is for certain, however, that the introduction of European citizenship
"is undoubtedly a landmark with implications for the future."127 Although European
citizenship has so far not spelt out the citizens' duties vis-a-vis the European Union,
it summarises and emphasises the citizens' rights within the European Union.
On the assumption that the European integration process is to remain a
"dynamic, open-ended"128 project, European citizenship is an important stepping
stone to foster the citizens' double sense of belonging. European citizenship "could
support the development of a European polity based on an open political
community"129, possibly with open borders. Despite the present incongruities
between the European Union's territorial and political borders which, as we have
seen earlier, challenge the traditional definition of citizenship, make it difficult to
ascribe a familiar concept of governance or a additional notion of identity to the
European Union - one should not dismiss the identity-building project altogether.
In an effort to demonstrate that open borders, particularism and unity may
be brought together and reconciled in the European project, the next chapter will
draw on the concepts of borderlands and transborder co-operation projects on the
Eastern frontier of the European Union, trying to argue why borderlands on the
Eastern frontier of the European Union seem to be laboratories from which a wider,
inclusive European identity may emerge.
127 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 285.
128 See also Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in
Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 236.
129 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National Identities and Citizenship in the European Union" in
European Public Law, Vol. 1/No. 4, p. 660.
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4 EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE EASTERN
FRONTIER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Eastern border of the EU and its adjacent borderlands are currently
undergoing a transformation which has its origin in the events of 1989/90. In
view of future EU enlargement towards the East, the current Eastern frontier of
the EU is not to remain, but prospective integration of the Central Eastern
European countries will push the Eastern EU frontier further towards the East.
This process will "overcome the division of Europe in its political dimension"1,
and affect the Eastern frontier of the European Union, its borderlands and
Europe as a whole.
On this assumption, this chapter argues that 'Europe' - often incorrectly
seen as synonymous with Western Europe - does not end at the Oder-NeiBe
rivers. In order to demonstrate this, this chapter will first focus on the
Mitteleuropa debate, specifically on Mitteleuropa's cultural heritage. With
prospective enlargement towards the East, the Central Eastern European
countries do not want to revert back to the old concept ofMitteleuropa, fearing
that this could generate the return of a Europe in-between, as indicated by Jiri
Grusa.2 Instead, they wish to assert their affiliation to the West.
Since the 1989/90 velvet revolutions, transformation processes have
been taking place in and around the Central Eastern European countries,
affecting various actors and levels. "In Mitteleuropa", as Krystian Heffher
asserts, "these manifestations are most apparent where state structures come into
contact, that is in the regions close to the frontier, borderlands and border
regions."3 It seems as if theses processes have given borderlands on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union a new meaning. Borderlands on the Eastern
1 Stihl, Hans Peter, President of the German Chamber of Industry and Trade (1998); "Die EU
muB nun fur die Osterweiterung fit gemacht werden" in Handelsblatt, December 31, 1998. My
translation.
2 Grusa, Jiri (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard
(eds.); Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier ofthe European Union, p. 32.
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frontier of the European Union may become a hinge for European enlargement;
and they can be seen as laboratories in which the parameters of a genuine
European identity may crystallise with consequences for the wider European
territory.
In order to foster this new two-dimensional status of borderlands,
projects of transfrontier co-operation, most of them in the form of Euroregions,
have been introduced. There is not one model of transborder co-operation
applicable to all borderlands, since each project of transfrontier co-operation has
been specifically modelled to the individual border region's political, economic,
social and topographical problems, as well as diverse cultural, historical and
political understandings. Each project of transborder co-operation has come into
existence at a different time and
as social and economic activities spill over the frontiers or their consequences
come to be strongly felt across the frontier, different levels of transfrontier
political and administrative co-operation become necessary.4
The analysis of each individual transborder co-operation project,
including its aims and obstacles, would hence be a difficult task. Instead, and
despite the flaws involved, this section will be based on a general approach to
transborder co-operation, asserting that the objective common to all projects of
transfrontier co-operation is to overcome and to abolish the divisive nature of
the frontier5 and "to attempt to solve the problem of regional underdevelopment
by taking the opportunities created by... European integration"6.
In general, one may argue that transborder co-operation has been
established
3 Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen
Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende
Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 49. My translation.
4 Anderson, Malcolm (1983); "The political problems of regions" in Anderson, Malcolm (ed.);
Frontier regions in Western Europe, p. 2.
5 Malchus von, Viktor (1975); Partnerschaft an den europaischen Grenzen, p. 13. My
translation.
6 Veen van der, Anne and Boot, Dirk-Jan (1995); "Crossborder co-operation and Regional
Policy" in Eskelinen, Heikki and Snickars, Folke (eds.); Competitive European Peripheries, p.
78.
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to resolve the practical difficulties encountered by people affected by the
frontier, to develop good neighbourly relations between people, to obtain
remedies for harm and to gain information about decisions and developments
which may affect the material interests of neighbouring regions.7
To avoid confusion between transfrontier co-operation and other kinds
of co-operation, the definition and development of transfrontier co-operation
will be explained first. This will then be followed by an analysis of the
challenges and problems inherent in transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union. Controls along the Eastern frontier of the
European Union "had to be strengthened to allow for the dismantling of the
EU's internal frontiers."8 Yet, these controls should not be restrictive in
character, but foster cross-border co-operation. Accordingly, this chapter will
not focus on the Eastern frontier of the European Union as a barrier with its
challenges and problems, but also take into account its role as a bridge.
Raimund Kramer argues that "borders, by nature, are barriers... At the same
time, however, they represent points where political, economic and cultural
systems meet and come into contact."9 In this sense, it is in the interest of this
chapter to show that borders are not necessarily barriers but can be bridges.
Borderlands on either side of the Eastern frontier have common interests, and it
seems as if they represent original ways for multi-ethnic societies to co-habit
within the framework of European integration. Effective co-operation, according
to Jacques Santer, "will stabilise Europe in the long-term... and turn it into a
centre of co-operation and togetherness."10
7 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier co-operation - History and Theory" in Brunn,
Gerhard and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenzuberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa:
Theorie - Empirie - Praxis, p. 81.
8 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort,
Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 94.
9 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europdischen Union, p. 23. My translation.
10 Santer, Jacques (1998); "Der Euro gibt der EU eine neue okonomische Dynamik" in
Handelsblatt, December 31, 1998. My translation.
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4. A The Mitteleuropa debate
The term Mitteleuropa is difficult to define, since the concept is vague
and used too generously. Mitteleuropa has no precise geographical existence
since there are no clearly delineated geographical boundaries to delimit the area.
Mitteleuropa is commonly understood as "the fertile mix of lands, tongues,
peoples that was once the Hapsburg Empire"11, stretching from the Polish plains
in the north over the Czech Carpathian area towards Austria and Hungary. This
definition situates Mitteleuropa somewhere between Germany and Russia and
gives rise to the following questions: where does Mitteleuropa begin and where
does it end? Is Germany, even as a member of the European Union, part of
Mitteleuropal Is the Western frontier of Mitteleuropa delineated by the Oder-
NeiBe rivers or is it running through the middle of Germany? Will the notion of
Mitteleuropa diminish once the Central Eastern European countries have
attained full membership of the European Union?
Mitteleuropa is often used interchangeably with Central Europe or even
Central Eastern Europe. Each of these terms has different historical
connotations, which is largely a question of semantics. Many Central Eastern
European scholars respond negatively to the term Mitteleuropa}2 For Jiri Grusa,
the German term Mitteleuropa refers to something undefinable which lies in
between two defined concepts - East and West (middle=intermediate). Also,
from a historical point of view, the term Mitteleuropa is associated with German
imperialism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, the drive towards the East,
aggression and chaos. This association stems from misunderstandings of the
concept of Mitteleuropa developed by Friedrich Naumann.13 It has often been
11 White, Michael (1998); "In which Middle Europe gets to be central" in Independent on
Sunday, July 5, 1998.
12 See, for instance, Grusa, Jiri (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm and
Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier of the European Union,
p. 31.
13 After World War I, Naumann sought a Mitteleuropa that consisted of a confederation of states
(not a state). According to Naumann, existing states were too small to meet any military threat
or compete with larger states. A united Mitteleuropa, however, could become a strong
competitive force in the world market. In such a confederation, the interests of all states should
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condemned as an 'ideal of pan-germanistic imperialism'14 and given the term
Mitteleuropa, unjustifiably, a negative meaning.
Instead of describing the area between Russia and Germany as
Mitteleuropa, the terms Central Europe or Central Eastern Europe are much
more acceptable to Grusa (centre=in the centre/essential).15 The area between the
European Union and Russia would no longer be associated with any notion of
in-betweenness, but "opting instead for 'Western' Europe, being part of the
'centre' will bring with it the temptation to draw the line towards the East, to
erect a new frontier."16 Central Europe or Central Eastern Europe, according to
Grusa, are neutral terms. They come close to describing actual facts: the area in
the European centre with its Eastern extensions.17 Central (Eastern) Europe may
even "evoke the idea of bridge"18, especially since
[accession to the centre actually increases the need to relate to neighbours, to
build bridges, particularly as there is the high likelihood of new buffer states
caught in-between an enlarged European Union and Russia.19
Historical legacy ofMitteleuropa
Since the eleventh century, Mitteleuropa has been subject to a wide
range of geographical, political, economic and social changes. Due to its
be respected, but managed by a German core. Naumann claimed that Germany should be at the
centre of this Mitteleuropa confederation, since Austria-Hungary and Germany were at the
geographical centre of the area.
14 Schubert, Markus (1993); Die Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich Naumanns und die
Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre, p. 18.
15 See also Kurti, Laszlo and Langman, Juliet (1997); "Introduction: Searching for Identities in
the New East Central Europe" in Kurti, Laszlo and Langman, Juliet (ed.); Beyond Borders:
Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe, p. 9.
16 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.);
Schengen and the Southern Frontier ofthe European Union, p. 33.
17 Grusa, Jiri (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard
(eds.); Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier of the European Union, p. 31. See also
Kusy, Miroslav (1989); "We, Central Europeans - Eastern Europeans" in Schopflin, George et.
al. (eds.); In Search ofCentral Europe, p. 91; Hanak, Peter (1989); "Central Europe: a historic
region in modern times" in Schopflin, George et. al. (eds.); In Search ofCentral Europe, p. 57;
Milosz, Czeslaw (1989); "Central European Attitudes" in Schopflin, George et. al. (eds.); In
Search ofCentral Europe, p. 116.
18 Kundera, Milan (1984); "A Kidnapped West or a Culture Bows Out" in Granta-Journal Vol.
11, p. 102.
19 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.);
Schengen and the Southern Frontier ofthe European Union, p. 33.
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geographical landlocked position at the heart of the European continent,
Mitteleuropa was often regarded as a useful buffer zone against any outside
threat by powers situated to the East (primarily) and to the West. Mitteleuropa
came under the influence of the Turkish/Ottoman, Tsarist, Austrian/Habsburg,
German and, most recently, the Soviet empire. Each empire was a product of
force, and the principal aim was to dissolve the many different Mitteleuropa
states in order to merge them under the empire's strong rule. As a reaction to
these aggressive regimes, the different peoples living in the region of
Mitteleuropa developed a common interest of self-defence, even a wish for
integration. They engaged in a "constant struggle against forceful oppressive"20
powers, but remained unsuccessful.
The constant re-drawing of boundaries in Mitteleuropa provoked a
hostile reaction by cultural groups which felt that their identities were
threatened. The continuous suppression of states under the vast umbrella of the
respective supranational empires, ironically, formed the multi-ethnic and multi¬
cultural character of the area. Boundaries came under dispute, to the degree that
"[t]o reflect on Central Europe is to raise the question of frontiers and centres."21
In the vast majority of cases, political frontiers did not correspond with ethnic
ones, geographical boundaries clashed with cultural ones. Historical, ethnic and
geographical claims were incompatible, since they did not coincide. The
majority of new states enclosed peoples within their national frontiers who
claimed different national allegiances. As a result, Mitteleuropa was
characterised by a large degree of unrest, so that the countries "never knew
stability and quiescence"22.
During the mid-1930s, the term Mitteleuropa allegedly "died with
Hitler"23 and his idea of Lebensraum im Osten. Mitteleuropa was deeply
20 Chaszar, E. (1970); "The place of Eastern Europe in Western civilization" in Wagner, Francis
(ed.); Toward a new Central Europe, p. 105.
21 Matvejecic, Predrag (1989); "Central Europe seen from the East of Europe" in Schopflin,
George et. al. (eds.); In Search ofCentral Europe, p. 186.
22 Macartney, Carlile A. (1944); Problems ofthe Danube Basin, p. 7.
23 Ash, Timothy Garton (1989); "Does Central Europe exist?" in Schopflin, George et. al. (eds.);
In Search ofCentral Europe, p. 191.
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affected by Hitler's subsequent atrocities, especially by his persecution of Jews.
Large Jewish populations used to live in the cities of Budapest, Prague, Warsaw
and Cracow. Jews contributed greatly to the political, economic and cultural life
of theses cities, as well as to Mitteleuropa as a whole. The cities became
Mitteleuropa's principal commercial trading centres, since they were ideally
located at the heart of the European continent. The German and Yiddish
languages were widely spoken. Mitteleuropa attracted many people, especially
the German nobility, to its universities. Academic research and exchange of
ideas was at a height during the middle of the 14th century. Prague was, in fact,
the first German university, founded in 1348.
These facts are often forgotten when speaking ofMitteleuropa, since the
region was devastated by Hitler and subsequently "entered into a cultural
limbo"24. The Cold War split Europe into two - East and West - with the divide
running right through Germany. Given that East Germany and the Central
Eastern European countries came under Russian influence, this situation left no
room for the Central European states to develop their own potential and
identities, independently of Soviet control.
Mitteleuropa became a "Europe-in between two".25 In the late 1970s, the
former Soviet Union and the United States changed their military policies from
long range, strategic, continental missiles to the SS20 and Pershing mid- and
short-range missiles. Each superpower deployed these on either side of the Cold
War divide.26 This meant that in the event of a nuclear military conflict between
Russia and the United States, Central Europe would have become the
superpowers' battlefield.
Paradoxically, this threat of becoming the superpowers' theatre of war
helped the Mitteleuropa countries to overcome their paralysis. It brought the
peoples of Mitteleuropa closer together, since the "overpowering threat of the
24 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); Eastern
Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 26.
25 Bardos-Feltoronyi, Nicolas (1993); "Quelle geopolitique pour l'Europe centrale?" in
Phillipart, Eric (ed.); Nations etfrontieres dans la nouvelle Europe, p. 107. My translation.
2h Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-
Dokic, Nada (ed.) (1996); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 137.
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'other' in East and West [prompted] the peoples of Mitteleuropa [to
rediscover],... a sense of a shared and endangered cultural heritage"27. Leading
Central Eastern European intellectuals, such as Milan Kundera from
Czechoslovakia and Gyorgy Konrad from Hungary treated such developments
in their writings and affected a cultural re-discovery. Milan Kundera's famous
statement that"Mitteleuropa is not a state, but a culture, a fate"28 stems from this
time. In addition, Gyorgy Konrad claimed that Mitteleuropa is not traceable on
the map, as for instance, Mittelamerika. It is not possible to define Mitteleuropa
in terms of an existing nation state, but only as a Kulturnation. By virtue of its
political system, Mitteleuropa was attached to the East as part of the Soviet
Empire; geographically, however, it lay in the centre, and culturally in the
West.29 Mitteleuropa exists in the beliefs of the different cultural communities
of Mitteleuropa. Konrad concluded that Mitteleuropa is a matter of
Weltanschauung rather than Staatsangehorigkeit30.
Given this cultural definition of Mitteleuropa, both Gyorgy Konrad and
Milan Kundera saw the need to unite the peoples of Mitteleuropa. They
supported the idea of a Mitteleuropa federation which aligned itself to the
West.31 According to Konrad and Kundera, a Western-oriented Mitteleuropa
federation was to bring peace and good neighbourliness to a region of such great
ethnic and cultural diversity. It was a means to overcome the differences
between the peoples in the Central European countries, to develop a feeling of
solidarity and to gain a greater degree of self-confidence, as well as a stronger
sense of national identity, independent of any hegemonic power. For Konrad
27 Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-
Dokic, Nada (ed.) (1996); The Cultural Identity of Central Europe, p. 137. See also the socio-
psychological approach to identity in chapter two, which indicated that people feel drawn
together when they experience a common threat or, as in this case, foreign subjugation.
28 Kundera, Milan (1984); "A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out" in Granta, No. 11, p. 106.
29 Kundera, Milan (1984); "A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out" in Granta, No. 11, p. 118.
30 Gyorgy Konrad cited in Ash, Timothy Garton (1989); "Does Central Europe exist?" in
Schopflin, George et. al. (eds.); In Search ofCentral Europe, p. 198.
31 This was against the background that such an attempt had already failed at the beginning of
the 20th century: the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania under
French leadership only lasted from 1920/21 until 1938 because, "instead of bringing together
their own forces,... the members of the Little Entente preferred to base their defense on the
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and Kundera, Mitteleuropa was a means to rejoin the West.32 Some Polish
intellectuals, however, such as Adam Krzeminski and Michal Misiorny, only
partly accepted the idea of a Mitteleuropa confederation rejoining the West.
They pleaded for a third way, a federation of a third Europe between West and
East. Poles emphasised the difference between 'us' in Central Europe and 'them'
in Western Europe. Due to their close immediacy to Germany, the Poles feared
another German hegemonic drive towards the East. Misiorny emphasised that he
could not imagine a Mitteleuropa in which "Poles would gather around a
German hegemon and finally feel good and secure."33
Mitteleuropa after the end of the Cold War
With the end of the Cold War, the concept of Mitteleuropa has received
a new meaning. The "concept of East and West [has lost] its common
principium divisoris"34 and brought the question of Mitteleuropa back into the
centre of the debate. Mitteleuropa is no longer understood in the sense of
Naumann's pan-Germanism, nor as an undefined area squeezed between two
centres. Resuming its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identity of the past,
Mitteleuropa has become a "region orientated to Western models in an Eastern
European medium"35, or as "precisely that part of Europe which has not been
penetrated by those sources which have effectively created 'Europe' (Western
Europe): Russia."36
sanctions guaranteed by the Great Powers" (Padanyi-Gulyas, B. (1970); "Missed opportunities
for federalization" in Wagner, Francis (ed.); Toward a new Central Europe, p. 254).
32 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); Eastern
Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 43.
33 Michal Misiorny cited in Schubert, Markus (1993); Die Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich
Naumanns unddie Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre, p. 33. My translation.
34 Kusy, Miroslav (1989); "We, Central Europeans - Eastern Europeans" in Schopflin, George
et. al. (eds.); In Search ofCentral Europe, p. 91.
35 Jeno Sziics cited in Schubert, Markus (1993); Die Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich
Naumanns und die Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre, p. 30. My translation.
36 Schwarz-Liebermann, Hans-Albrecht (1989); "Identite culturelle de 1'Europe? Quelle
Europe?" in Genicot, Anne and Vaeren van, Charles (eds.); Action de la Communaute dans le
monde et identite culturelle europeenne, p. 58. My translation.
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Central European states - in the process of consolidating their own
national identity - continuously emphasise their connection to the West37,
particularly to the cultural movements of "Humanism, Reformation, Counter-
Reformation, Enlightenment, Classicism, Romanticism, as well as movements
of the modern age"38. They do this, "by habit and necessity, for support
(practical if not moral)... in search of confirmation of their European identity...
But", Tony Judt continues,
this does not mean that they for one second accept the audience's view of
them, or that they define their own identity and existence via that audience's
acknowledgment appreciation.39
Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has repeatedly stressed, and
assured the Central Eastern European countries, that cities like Cracow,
Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest are at the heart of Europe. Berlin,
Germany's new capital in the East of the country, increasingly fosters relations
with the Central Eastern European countries. This suggests that the EU's vital
triangular axis Bonn-Paris-London might soon undergo changes, as the "centre
of gravity of the European continent is moving East. There is no doubt about
that. Central Europe is back and well under way to become an integral part of
the European Union."40 1994 opinion polls in Poland and the Czech Republic,
for example, showed that an "overwhelming majority" of their populations are
in favour of European integration.41 In Poland, 65% supported European
integration, whereas 24% were against. 48% believed that the European Union's
37 Seton-Watson, Hugh (1989); "What is Europe? Where is Europe?" in Schopflin, George et. al.
(eds.); In Search ofCentral Europe, p. 40.
38 Chaszar, E. (1970); "The place of Eastern Europe in Western civilization" in Wagner, Francis
(ed.); Toward a new Central Europe, p. 112.
39 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); Eastern
Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 51, 34, 51.
40 Carlo Trojan, former vice Secretary General to the European Commission, (1995) cited in
Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September
28-30, 1995, Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 47. My
translation.
41 Rosa, Jacek and Labudek, Vladislav, Polish and Czech Diplomats (1996) during
Understanding Europe Symposia, Seminar at AEGEE in co-operation with the Robert Bosch
Stiftung GmbH in Mainz, March 22 - 23, 1996. See also Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der
Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.);
Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 145.
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interest in Poland is genuine, and 31% thought that the European Union seeks to
dominate Poland.42 In Hungary, 1993 figures show that 35.4% of the population
think that the aims and activities of the European Union are positive (down from
45.2% in 1991), 32.1% gave a neutral response (1991, 28%) and 8.3% believed
them to be negative (up from 4.3% in 1991).43
The Central Eastern European countries' "race towards accession to the
EU and Nato"44 seems to have brought them closer together, despite the
"reluctance to see anyone else go first."45 For Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary, Nato membership has become reality in 1999. EU enlargement,
incorporating these three Nato forerunners, plus Slovenia and Estonia, is
envisaged for the years 2002-5 - once the EU has managed its internal reforms
and the Central Eastern European countries are economically, politically and
legally fit for EU membership. Talks on EU enlargement started in London in
March 1998 and ministerial-level negotiations opened in November 1998,
affirming that the "enlargement process... is broadly on track"46. Prior to the
negotiations for EU enlargement, Associations Agreements with the Central
Eastern European states were signed in the early 1990s.
In order to allow these countries to adapt their political, economic and
social systems to EU level (and to allow the European Union to reform its
internal structure and emphasise the deepening as well as widening aspect of the
European integration process), the creation of a Central Eastern European
Economic Community first could act as a potential forerunner to the Central
Eastern European countries' accession to the European Union. However, such
proposals fall on stony ground in the accession countries. The Central Eastern
42 Figures based on a CBOS 1994 opinion poll in Holzer, Jerzy (1996); "Polen in Europa:
Zentrum oder Peripherie?" in Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung (ed.); Europabilder in
Mittel- und Osteuropa, p. 92.
43 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort,
Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 103.
44 Adam Michnik cited in Bort, Eberhard (1997); "Introduction" in Anderson, Malcolm and
Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 8.
45 The Economist {1998); "Awkward would-be partners", February 28, 1998.
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European countries "warn against any kind of 'bloc mentality' in the West with
regard to the individual applications of Central Eastern European states."47 For
one, there is a high level of distrust between the Central Eastern European
countries. Relations amongst the small Central Eastern European countries
hardly existed under Soviet rule, since absolute priority was given to foster
relations with the Soviet Union alone.48 There are still many territorial conflicts
and border disputes and "the collective memory of each Central Eastern
European country has not forgotten the long list of atrocities and genocides."49
More importantly, however, the Central Eastern European countries fear that a
Mitteleuropa union would isolate them from the European Union and delay their
full membership to the European Union. The Central Eastern European
countries would then, once again, run danger of becoming the faint and
uncertain "zone of small nations"50 somewhere between Russia and the Eastern
frontier of the European Union.
The other extreme of building such a Mitteleuropa union, would be to
'rush' into European Union membership. Due to the Central Eastern European
countries' unstable and insecure situation this could be interpreted as
undermining their newly gained independence and different national identities.
The Central Eastern European states could be transformed from Soviet satellites
to European satellites. With EU enlargement towards the East, the Central
Eastern European countries will have to accept the EU's acquis communautaire,
without having participated in the formulation of its policies. This allows critics
to argue that "the East has largely been the property of the West"51 and that "the
46 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The Week in Europe, November 5,
1998.
47 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort,
Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 102.
48 Gautron, Jean-Claude (1991); Les relations entre la Communaute Europeenne et I'Europe de
I'Est, p. 665.
49
Dogan, Mattei (1993); "Le nationalisme en Europe: declin a l'Ouest, resurgence a l'Est" in
Phillipart, Eric (ed.); Nations etfrontieres dans la nouvelle Europe, p. 167. My translation.
50 Namier, Sir Lewis B. (1947); Facing East, p. 52.
51 Grass, Gunter (1997); "Beautiful dream becomes a crisis" in The Guardian, May 31, 1997.
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West [does] not intend to learn or adopt anything from the East."52 According to
another point of view, there already seems a tendency amongst Central Eastern
European countries to view the existing EU framework as a perfect recipe for
success, with the result that they might not contribute their own input to the
larger European project.
Hence, helping the Central Eastern European countries in the transition
process should include self-help and an "intensive familiarisation strategy"53, in
order to foster a positive participation by them in the European integration
process. The Central Eastern European countries should make their voice heard,
which would enhance their self-confidence and help towards the preservation of
their many cultural differences.
The emergence of a strong Mitteleuropa, however, still lies in the distant
future. But ifMitteleuropa "has been quietly reinventing itself, and is now ready
to rejoin the European mainstream"54, the question arises whether Germany, or
at least the territory of the former Democratic Republic of Germany, is part of
Mitteleuropa'? Should one sub-divide Germany into Westdeutschland,
Mitteldeutschland and Ostdeutschland'? Germany oscillates between the terms
Westeuropa and Mitteleuropa, knowing that it is a key regional power in the
latter area with the power to bring about change. So, will Germany, once again,
become the driving force within Mitteleuropa? Is there any chance of a revival
of Naumann's Pan-German Mitteleuropal Is Mitteleuropa's historic legacy still
traceable today?
At present, it seems as if "Central Europe as a theme has become
inextricably interwined with debates over German identity"55, and that Germany
52 Harold James cited in Bort, Eberhard (1998); "German Identity after Reunification" in
Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question of Identity, p. 198.
53 Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate,
Jurczek, Peter and Hila, Peter (eds.); Grenzubergreifende Zusammenarbeit im ostlichen
Mitteleuropa, p. 149. My translation.
54 Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in The Independent on Sunday, June 7,
1998.
55 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); Eastern
Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 42.
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seems to be unable to escape its historic legacy. Whilst other countries can
legitimately pursue and insist upon protecting their self-interests, for Germany
to do so would immediately cause concern, with renewed fears of German
hegemony associated with Naumann's Mitteleuropa.56 In addition, "the
homogeneous nation-state is the exception"57 in Central Europe. Central Europe
is still composed of many different national and ethnic identities which could
again become the source of ethnic conflicts in the area. These conflicts
were buried under the Cold War conditions,... the dissent between Hungary
and Slovakia over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system on the Danube, the
Italian-Slovenian border frictions over the status of the Italian minority in
Slovenia, and the German-Czech dissonances about coming to a final
agreement on the Sudeten question.58
These kinds of disputes could be heightened by disagreements between
national policy and regional interests, and one may therefore ask whether
"former injustices can be peacefully corrected by changing frontiers"59? The
Central Eastern European countries' territorial and administrative organisation
remains fairly centralised, and existing plans for regionalisation have not yet
been fully translated into action. Policy making happens on a 'national' rather
than 'subnational' or 'regional' level. Minorities, regions and borderlands are,
therefore, subject to central governments' decisions and good-will.
Since transborder co-operation acts on a subnational level and focuses on
the borderlands' specific problems, it can be regarded as a means to strengthen
56 Britain, France and the Mediterranean countries, for instance, look at these developments with
scepticism. France and Britain, in particular, fear a repeat of history. To avoid this situation, and
in order to balance out an enlarged European Union and weaken a possible, newly emerging
Mitteleuropa, France supported Romania's accession to the EU (in vain) during the first
negotiations on European Eastern enlargement. Similarly, and with the interest of establishing a
'Baltic Union' as a counterweight to Mitteleuropa, the EU's Nordic states attempted to press the
EU to accept all four Baltic states as EU member states. Only Estonia's application has been
successful; however, the European Commission is stepping up preparations for Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania an Slovakia to join the EU (European Commission Representative Office -
UK (1999); The Week in Europe, March 4, 1999). The Mediterranean countries of the EU might
likewise envisage the creation of a Mediterranean Union, in order to balance out Europe's
distribution of power and strength.
57 Gyorgy Konrad cited in Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co¬
operation" in Svob-Dokic, Nada (ed.) (1996); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 138.
58 Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-
Dokic, Nada (ed.) (1996); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 137.
59 Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontieres, p. 473. My translation.
Chapter 4.A - 210
the various identities that are part of Mitteleuropa. It will be argued in the
following section that borderlands and their organisation into Euroregions are
the first step to one important aspect ofNaumann's conception ofMitteleuropa -
the idea of establishing a confederation, in which the interests of all participants
must be respected.60
60 Schubert, Markus (1993); Die Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich Naumanns und die
Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre, p. 8.
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4. B Transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union
Borders and border crossings are usually associated with passport controls,
customs clearance, queues, delays and traffic jams. Hidden behind these symptoms
are usually economic, infrastructural, cultural and political problems. They hinder
the free movement of persons, goods and services and they may be the cause for the
lack of human interaction across the border and the degradation of the environment
along the border in question.
In order to alleviate these problems, projects of 'transfrontier co-operation'
have been developed. According to the Madrid 1980 Council of Europe Outline
Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, transfrontier co-operation is defined as:
any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations
between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or
more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement
necessary for this purpose. Transfrontier co-operation shall take place in the
framework of territorial communities' or authorities' powers as defined in domestic
law. [Article 2.1]
[Territorial communities or authorities shall mean communities, authorities or
bodies exercising local and regional functions and regarded as such under the
domestic law of each State. [Art. 2.2]
Whereas the above definition of the term transborder co-operation does not
focus on transborder co-operation amongst border regions alone, but could
theoretically imply transfrontier co-operation beyond any frontier, the Preamble of
the Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation emphasises that transborder
co-operation should contribute to the economic and social progress of frontier
regions. The Convention then implies the need to include other local and regional
authorities in the building of Europe, since a decentralised organisation of
transborder co-operation would develop "the spirit of fellowship which unites the
peoples of Europe"1.
In order to differentiate transfrontier co-operation amongst border regions
from other forms of regional co-operation, Malcolm Anderson points to five main
reasons which make transfrontier co-operation between border regions distinctive:
1 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, Preamble.
Chapter 4.B - 212
(i) It gives citizens of one country the voice in the affairs of another country, (ii)
The right to participate in this activity, on the part of any group or individual is
often unclear, (iii) The territory covered by co-operative arrangements cannot be
clearly delineated because the boundaries of the transfrontier regions are often
drawn in different ways for different purposes, (iv) The balance of advantages
across the frontier has to be either unclear or evenly balanced otherwise groups are
likely to invoke the aid of an external actor - their central government - to redress
the balance, (v) In populous frontier regions, large numbers of people are using
the territory of neighbouring states to work, to live, to participate in leisure
activities and to own property. They are not fully enfranchised but nonetheless
have extensive legal rights. If their activities are noticeable, they become -
willingly or unwillingly - actors in the local political system.2
Supporting this argument, Anthony Asiwaju suggests that frontier regions
"have always been recognised as ideal laboratories in which one may undertake a
comparative measurement of state performance"3. He further indicates that
the interactions between limitrophe states in terms of the localised impact of their
policies (domestic and foreign) are as clearly seen as they would have been if such
interactions have had to be placed under a microscope.4
For the European Union, this would mean that border regions may be regarded as a
barometer from which the degree and level of development of the European
integration process is readable.5
During the 1960s, the Council of Europe began "working intensively on
cross-border questions... which have dealt specifically with this special topic and its
problems."6 In 1972, for example, it held the first symposium on borderlands. Ever
since, the Council of Europe has sought to promote the overcoming of frontiers as
dividing lines. The Council of Europe represents a setting in which regional
authorities and communities can communicate and, in 1980, it adopted the afore¬
mentioned Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation. This Convention is
based on international law and fills
2 Anderson, Malcolm (1983) "The political problems of regions" in Anderson, Malcolm (ed.);
Frontier Regions in Western Europe, p. 7-8.
3 Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalization" in Nolutshungu, Sam
C. (ed.); Margins ofInsecurity: Minorities and International Security, p. 277.
4 Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalization" in Nolutshungu, Sam
C. (ed.); Margins ofInsecurity: Minorities and International Security, p. 277.
5 Jean-Pierre Berg, Head of DG XVI, (1997) during Forum: Regions and cities: co-operation
beyond the borders ofthe Union in the European Parliament in Brussels, June 11-12, 1997.
6 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europaischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Institutional Aspects of
Crossborder Co-operation, p. 15.
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a legal gap by offering forms of transfrontier co-operation particularly suited to
the needs of territorial communities and capable of providing an additional legal
basis for any agreement which such authorities may conclude.7
Given the 1989/90 developments in Central Eastern Europe and their impact
on transborder co-operation along the Eastern frontier of the EU, the "Council of
Europe's intergovernmental work in the field of local democracy and transfrontier
co-operation has taken on greater importance."8 Keeping in mind that the political
status of the individual territorial communities or authorities vary greatly from
member state to member state, the work of the Council of Europe in this area
focuses on: fostering local and regional self-government, analysing the
administrative and legal structure of local administration, facilitating transfrontier
co-operation of municipalities and regions, and promoting regional cultural
diversity.9
Up to the present day, the 'Select Committee of Experts on Transfrontier co¬
operation'10 constantly develops the Convention and adds protocols to it. The 1995
Protocol signatories affirmed the importance of transfrontier co-operation and
confirmed to take further measures to secure transfrontier co-operation between
territorial communities or authorities.11 The most recent Protocol was opened for
signature in May 1998 "to give interterritorial co-operation an international legal
framework"12. The Council of Europe also provides a 'Handbook on transfrontier
co-operation for local and regional authorities in Europe'13, which includes the
7 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, General Remark
10, p. 8.
8 Council of Europe (1998); Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation, http://www.coe.fr/.
9 Council of Europe (1998); Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation, http://www.coe.fr/.
10 The 'Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy' - an advisory committee to the
'Select Committee' - is particularly dedicated to transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of
the European Union (Becquart, Aygen, Responsible for Transfrontier co-operation - Council of
Europe, Directorate of Environment and Local Authorities (1998); Transfrontier and Inter-
Territorial Co-operation, information received by fax on August 18, 1998).
" Council of Europe (1995); Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on
Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, Preamble.
12 Council of Europe (1998); Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier
Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning interterritorial co¬
operation, Preamble.
13 Council of Europe (1996); Handbook on transfrontier co-operation for local and regional
authorities in Europe.
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various possible definitions of the term region and gives advice on forms of
possible transborder co-operation projects and organisations.
Regional transborder co-operation gained in importance during the late
1970s and early 1980s. The European integration process seemed to go through a
period of 'Europessimism' and 'Eurosclerosis'. It was stagnating due to a "decision¬
making gridlock and a dysfunctional institutional structure"14, so that "politicians
and academics alike lost faith in the European institutions."15 The European
Parliament was one of the first EEC institutions which openly supported
transborder co-operation. From 1976 to 1986, it argued for the intensification of
transborder co-operation and put forward several proposals to formalise transborder
co-operation between the various regional authorities and communities. The
European Parliament regarded itself as a channel of communication which brings
together regional, national and political interests. It endorsed the EEC's accession to
the Council of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation and "repeatedly
stressed the significance of border regions for the construction of the European
Union in 'all its dimensions'"16.
Shortly after the signing of the Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation,
it was suggested that the European Commission adopted the Convention and
14 Leonardi, Robert (1995); Convergence, cohesion and integration in the European Union, p. 12-
13.
15 Moravcsik, Andrew (1994); "Negotiating the Single European Act" in Nelson, Brent and Stubb,
Alexander (eds.); The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practivce of European
Integration, p. 212.
16 John Cushnahan cited in Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co¬
operation" in Svob-Dokic, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity of Central Europe, p. 134. Since the
demise of the Cold War, MEPs from the German and Austrian Lander on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union, in particular, have endorsed transborder co-operation in their area. Due to the
Eastern borderlands' delicate, but also challenging, position, their MEPs are especially interested in
taking part in the organisation and direction of the European integration process (Glante, Norbert,
MEP Brandenburg, (1995); "Die Rolle des Europaischen Parlamentes zur Vorbereitung des Beitritts
der mittel- und osteuropaischen Staaten zur Europaischen Union" in Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst
(eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995, Europaische
Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, pp. 52-3) and to wish develop relationships with
the new democracies in Central Eastern Europe (Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities:
Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-Dokic, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p.
134).
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persuaded non-members to sign as well.17 The Commission, however, remained
passive and it was only in 1990 that the European Commission drafted a
communication on "The living and working conditions of Community citizens
resident in frontier regions"18 which contained a section on "Co-operation between
regional and local authorities"19. This report focused on internal EEC transborder
co-operation, possibly taking the first institutionalised Euroregion between
Germany and Netherlands - the Euregio Maas-Rhein - as an example. While the
European Commission does not offer any universal remedy to the problems
addressed by transborder co-operation projects, it encourages the institutionalisation
of transborder co-operation projects according to the principle of subsidiarity.20
Both the Council of Europe and the European Commission have established "Joint
Programmes for the benefit of several countries of central and eastern Europe"21 in
1993. In 1996, both organisations also concluded covenants for thematic
programmes, concerning national minorities, the fight against organised crime and
corruption.22
Despite these efforts to develop transfrontier co-operation on a 'European'-
level, the Council of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation has not
yet managed to eliminate transfrontier co-operation conflicts which may be subject
to the conflict between European regional policy and national regional policy.
Although the Convention stresses that regions should have the right to choose their
adequate forms of transborder co-operation "best suited to their problems"23, it also
"furnish[es] States with various means of supervision and control for ensuring
17 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 39.
18 European Commission (1990); Communication from the European Commission on the living and
working conditions of Community citizens resident in frontier regions, with special reference to
frontier workers, COM(90) 561 final, November 27, 1990.
19 European Commission (1990); Communication from the European Commission on the living and
working conditions of Community citizens resident in frontier regions, with special reference to
frontier workers, COM(90) 561 final, November 27, 1990, part I, point 8, p. 23.
20 Kurt Hotte, DG XVI, cited in Schwab, Oliver (1995); "Kurzdokumentation" in Jaedtke, Eckard
and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995,
Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 23.
21 Council of Europe (1998); Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation, http://www.coe.fr/.
22 Council of Europe (1998); Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation, http://www.coe.fr/.
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observance of the principle of State sovereignty wherever necessary"24. The latter
ensures that transborder co-operation takes place according to the territorial
communities' and authorities' powers as defined in domestic law.25 Differences
between national regional policy and European regional policy place transborder
co-operation in a potentially awkward position - in a position 'in between' member
states, 'in between' possible dividing lines within the European Union and 'in
between' the European Union and non-European Union territory.
Many scholars have classified the rise in transborder co-operation within the
bottom-up model of European integration, also called the 'horizontal' European
integration process: subnational authorities deal with each other directly rather than
through the means of central government. Interregional and transborder co¬
operation is not restricted by national jurisdiction or in need of central government's
approval. This perspective of 'horizontal' European integration does not need to
conflict with the idea of a top-down or 'vertical' European integration process.26 The
structure of these two processes may differ, but their aims can be considered as
complementary. In the vertical integration model, borderlands may engage in
transborder co-operation within the European framework, working in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity.
We have seen, in chapter three, how the intergovernmental model, which
has dominated the European decision-making process so far, appears to be broken
up from both above and below. The nation-state's sovereignty and identity seem to
be challenged, since the nation-state sees a considerable part of its territorial and
political decision-making power exposed to 'foreign' influence. However, as we
have seen in chapter two, it may be too soon to proclaim the demise of the nation-
state and its sovereignty. So rather than proclaiming that EU governance and
23 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, General Remarks
No. 12.
24 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, General Remarks
No. 10.
25 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, Article 2,
Paragraph 1.
26 This falls in line with the Domestic Politics Approach, as seen in the preceding chapter.
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transfrontier co-operation represent a "potential 'attack' on state sovereignty"27, it is
necessary, as was indicated in chapter three, to redefine the traditional principle of
sovereignty. The EU's multi-level governance, together with transborder co¬
operation projects and the institutionalisation of Euroregions, seem to be
appropriate and sufficient means to do so.
Transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union: challenges and problems
Eastern borderlands as a hinge for European enlargement
As was indicated earlier, the events of 1989/90 have given the Eastern
frontier of the European Union a new dimension. Before 1989, transfrontier co¬
operation across the external border of the EU mainly concentrated on EU member
states and stable non-EU member states (e.g. Germany, France and Switzerland in
the Regio Basiliensis whose origins date back to 1963)28. During the Cold War, any
form of co-operation - even communication - between borderlands of former
Communist countries and the European Union was difficult if not virtually
impossible. Subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, transborder co¬
operation is no longer confined to internal regional and national frontiers between
EU member states or stable non-EU member states, but includes co-operation
between regions of member states and those of former Communist countries. To
date, "transfrontier co-operation associations... cover all the land frontiers of
countries of the European Union and some of the sea frontiers"29. Accordingly, one
27 Delli Zotti, Giovanni (1996); "Transfrontier co-operation at the external borders of the European
Union: Implications for Sovereignty" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders,
Nations and States, p. 59.
28 These transborder co-operation projects may be classified as models of internal transborder co¬
operation, since they transcend a relatively 'soft' international border. This is particularly the case of
Switzerland where border controls for EU citizens were lifted in December 1998 (bringing
Switzerland closer to possible EU membership). Other examples for transboundary associations
which transcend the European frontier, but do not face the same problems as transborder co¬
operation on the Eastern frontier, include EFTA countries like Norway, as well as Austria, Finland
and Sweden before their EU accession in 1995.
29 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier Co-operation - History and Theory" in Brunn, Gerhard
and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenziiberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie -
Empirie - Praxis, p. 79.
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can see a virtually unbroken stretch of transborder co-operation and Euroregions30
on the Eastern frontier of the European Union - they stretch from the North of
Finland down to Slovenia in the South. (Figure 3) Eberhard Bort argues that the
Eastern Euroregions are modelled on their Western examples and he summarises
their main objectives under the following three headings31:
Economic co-operation: The Euroregions' objective is to strengthen the
borderlands' industries and economies by optimising available resources and co¬
ordinating possible investment and infrastructure programmes. More border
crossing points have been opened, in order to diminish bottlenecks, reduce transport
times and costs, and meet problems generated by increasing border-crossings for
both transport and commuters. Borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union also receive a new meaning with the Trans-European-Networks which
attempt to develop an adequately functioning - transeuropean - transport network
with appropriate connections, communication and transport systems.32
Environmental protection: The increasing flow of transfrontier transport
may have a damaging effect on the environment if nothing is to be done.
Transborder co-operation, therefore, aims at tackling these problems by way of
30 A Euroregion is a body in which borderlands on either side the frontier find together, in order to
overcome the frontier and resolve transfrontier problems, which are subject to the existence of the
frontier. Euroregions on the Eastern frontier of the European Union include: on the Finnish-Russian
border Kuhmo-Kostamuksha (1992); on the German-Polish border Pomerania (1995), Pro Europa
Viadrina (1993) and Spree-NeiBe-Bober (1993); on the German-Polish-Czech border NeiBe-Nysa-
Nisa (1992); on the German-Czech border Elbe-Labe (1992), Erzgebirge/Krusnohori (1992),
Egrensis (1992) and Sumava/Bayerischer Wald (1993). Other transborder co-operation projects
include the Regio Triagonale between Austria, Hungary and Slowakia, as well as the wide reaching
Working Community Alpe Adria and the Working Community Danube-countries. See Bort,
Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzraume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming. For an
overview of the German-Polish and German-Czech transfrontier co-operation, see also Nuss, Jean-
Jacques and Trautman, Henrike (1995); "Darstellung der Euroregionen" in Jaedtke, Eckard and
Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995,
Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, pp. 25-33.
31 Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzraume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming.
See also Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen
Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende
Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 58.
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ecological projects which range from issues concerning sewage and refuse
problems to the establishment of nature reserves and national parks. This holds
especially true for border regions which attract a large degree of tourism, because of
their landscapes or geographical and natural interests. Since pollution does not
respect national state borders, Euroregions have set environmental issues high on
their agenda.33
Culture and communication: Euroregions aim to bring people on either side
of the frontier closer together. They wish to promote a mutual understanding which
could in time lead to the emergence of a regional consciousness and identity. To
this end, Euroregions organise cultural events which celebrate the common cultural
heritage of borderlands. Furthermore, they are engaged in the development of
tourism or youth meetings, school or university educational exchanges, organisation
of sports events or the creation of twintowns.
32 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europdischen Union, p. 45. See also Kinnock, Neil
(1996); "The Transport Challenge" in European Commission; Frontier Free Europe, Monthly
Newsletter, November/December 1996, No. 10.
33 One would expect that the degradation of the environment and environmental pollution will be
likely to concentrate and to be felt most strongly in the Eastern borderlands of the EU. However,
and paradoxically enough, the ecological heritage has been preserved in the majority of borderlands
on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, due to their former peripheral position (Council of
Europe and European Commission (1996); The regional planning ofgreater Europe in cooperation
with the countries ofCentral Eastern Europe, p. 74). Environmental conditions are not as devastated
as predicted. Nevertheless, the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union witness
the EU's attempt to implement EU environmental protection measures and to "ensure the
maintenance of environmental standards within the EU itself." (Baker, Susan (1996); "Punctured
sovereignty, border regions and the environment within the European Union" in O'Dowd, Liam and
Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 26). See also European Commission
Representative Office - UK (1998); "Greening enlargement plans", December 17, 1998.
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So far, it seems as if the practice of transfrontier co-operation along the
internal frontiers of the European has been successfully translated onto the Eastern
frontier of the European Union. Problems between internal and external
transfrontier co-operation practices may vary in degree rather than practice, and
while "borders in Western Europe have become increasingly unimportant, those of
the [sic] Eastern Europe have evolved into the opposite direction"34. The Eastern
frontier of the European Union is still a relatively 'hard', as opposed to 'soft' frontier.
Transborder co-operation has made the Eastern frontier 'softer'35 - a bridge rather
than a barrier.
On the assumption that transfrontier co-operation projects "go in the
direction of providing an 'as if situation... - as if the adjoining borderlands in the
East were already part of the EU"36, one could argue that transborder co-operation
represents
a means to prepare the way for the regions outside the European Union to join the
Europe of Regions.... [I]t is also a way of making use of the associate membership
status... social and economic links can be strengthened, value systems can be
acquired and norms and standards employed which all prepare the way towards
integration.37
Regions in Central Eastern Europe will need to increase their presence on
the transnational European platform, in order to take part in the European decision¬
making and integration processes38. This may have significant consequences for the
Central Eastern European countries' regional planning projects39 - Eastern
34 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 264.
35 Evidence for this may be collected from the increased cross-border interaction on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union. See Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, pp. 91-92 for a detailed
breakdown of cross-border activities.
36 Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-Bokic,
Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 141.
37 Council of Europe and European Commission (1996); The regionalplanning ofgreater Europe in
co-operation with the countries ofCentral Eastern Europe, p. 73.
38 Morhard, Bettina (1995); "Lokale grenziiberschreitende Kooperation in der deutsch-polnischen
Grenzregion im Spannungsfeld regionaler, nationaler und europaischer Politik" in Jaedtke, Eckard
and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995,
Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 35.
39 Monika Wulf-Mathies, European Commission DG XVI; "Official Opening" of Forum: Regions
and cities: co-operation beyond the borders of the Union in the European Parliament in Brussels,
June 11-12, 1997.
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borderlands may serve as prototypes - and the development of regional, national
and European identities.
It seems as if this regional context may even become the deus ex machina40
to solve problems and crises within the framework of a 'Europe of regions'. To
support this view, Kaisa Lahteenmaki has argued that
state-centric initiative in co-operation has in the post-Cold War era been
increasingly replaced by regional initiatives.... [Tjhus the direct cooperative ties
created across the border have become of growing importance.41
So far, however, the decision-makers of the Central Eastern European states
do not see regional initiatives - regionalism - as a solution to their instability and
conflict.42 Warsaw, for example, looks at regional ties and organisations with
distrust, because in the past they have "often been the cause of... suffering and even
a threat to... integrity."43 Their like have led to Balkanisation. But is it really the fear
of regionalism why some Central Eastern European central governments do not
support transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union
whole-heartedly44? The Central Eastern European countries' "self-awareness is still
somewhat fragile since complete unity has only come about recently"45. They wish
to preserve their integrity as a state - as one national, democratic, market economy-
oriented unity - separate and independent from the former Soviet hegemony. Their
focus is primarily set on "decommunisation"46, national integration, state- and
nation-building and the "creation of formal democratic institutions, rights and
procedures,... enforced by the vigorous development of civic societies with liberal
40 GroB, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p. 15.
41 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 265.
42 GroB, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p. 15.
43 Lasic, Stanko (1992); Three essays on Europe, p. 11.
44 Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum"
in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im
ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 54; Jurczek, Peter (1998); "Chancen und Probleme der
grenzubergreifenden Zusammenarbeit an der deutschen Ostgrenze" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter
und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 117.
45 Lasic, Stanko (1992); Three essays on Europe, p. 10.
46 The Economist (1998); "Poland rootles out its reds", June 27, 1998.
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and multi-cultural 'civic' concepts of the nation-state"47. The construction of one
national (ethnic) identity might prove to be difficult in some of the Central Eastern
European states, which experience strong demands for recognition from ethnic
minorities.48
Beate Neuss suggests that the Central Eastern European countries have just
attained their national sovereignty, which is now demanded from them.49 But rather
than putting it into such extreme words, is it not rather the case that the Central
Eastern European countries are not yet willing - possibly unable - to re-define the
concept of national sovereignty? As was mentioned in chapter three, even the actors
within the European Union still have their difficulties with the re-definition of
sovereignty, since they continue to think in 'either/or' terms.
Challenges on the Eastern frontier of the European Union
The Eastern frontier of the European Union can be regarded as an interface
which connects the European Union and its prospective new member states. On the
assumption that the Eastern frontier of the European Union represents a challenge
to both the European Union and its neighbours, this challenge is three-dimensional:
The periphery challenge: For over 40 years, borderlands on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union were at the periphery of their respective nation-state,
and either the European Union or Comecon. The legacy of the Cold War worsened
this situation, since the borderlands were next to the Communist or Capitalist threat.
Both sides were - literally - a cul-de-sac.
47 Bideleux, Robert (1996); "Bringing the East back in" in Bideleux, Robert and Taylor, Richard
(eds.); European Integration and Disintegration: East and West, p. 226.
48 This will be explored further in the following section of this chapter. Also - although Poland is
now almost completely Polish in ethnic composition, since there has been a great mixing of the
Polish population after the Second World War - understandings of Polishness/Poland vary according
to different historical situations for different people: In the 18th century, Poland was divided three
times between its Slavic and Germanic neigbours. In the 20th century, Poland achieved
independence for twenty years between the two World Wars, only to be invaded again, first by the
Germans and then by the Russians. After each invasion, Poland's boundaries were redrawn,
especially affecting its borderlands and the identities of its peoples.
49 Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek,
Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 150.
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Whereas the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme created
new opportunities and challenges for internal borderlands to become an integral
part of the European integration process, it accentuated rather than diminished the
level of disparity between the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union and the centre of the EU.50 The Eastern German Lander on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union are a case in point. Although Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Brandenburg and Saxony are often taken as prime examples of how
quickly and well they have become an integral part of the European Union, they
continue to suffer from characteristics similar to all Eastern borderlands of the
European Union (see below).51 Nevertheless, they still seem to be relatively better
off than their Eastern counterparts in the Central Eastern European countries.
The peripheral situation of borderlands within the former Communist
countries is largely a legacy of the Cold War. Former Comecon countries which
bordered on the frontier of the European Union - for instance the former German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia neighbouring the Federal Republic of
Germany - invested in industries near their Eastern frontier rather than in their
Western borderlands. This development induced some mobility of labour (Polish
workers, for instance, worked in former East Germany's industries on the Eastern
border)52 and co-operation with their respective Eastern neighbours, other Soviet
satellites and specifically the former Soviet Union. Spatial planning ensured that
these industries, which were essential to national economy and defence, were as far
away as possible from the West and as close as possible to the former Soviet Union.
It was a strategy to protect these industries in case of conflict with the West, since
Western border regions were considered as "prohibited zones due to defence
50 Compare this situation with the above-mentioned Regio Basiliensis. South Baden is peripheral to
the rest of Germany, but its close contacts to Switzerland offsets its national peripheral location, so
that it may act as an international bridge between Germany and Switzerland.
51 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 53; Neuss, Beate (1998);
"Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz,
Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 160.
52 Lepesant, Gilles (1996); Geopolitique des frontieres orientates de I'Al/emagne dans la perspective
d'un elargissement de I'Union Europeene et de I'OTAN, Ph.D. thesis, unpublished, p. 49.
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considerations"53. As a result, these economies languished and barracks and Soviet
training camps predominated the landscape.54 Until the Oder-NeiBe Treaty, signed
on November 14, 1990 between Germany and Poland, Polish authorities remained
reluctant to invest in the territories next to the Oder-NeiBe border, since they
doubted the permanence of this long "contested frontier"55.
Since 1989/90, however, it often seems as if the Western borderlands in the
Central Eastern European countries are privileged, due to their immediate
geographical proximity to the West. They tend to profit from transborder co¬
operation with their Western counterparts, a rise of imports and exports, increasing
funds from the European Union and transfer of know-how and expertise, as well as
the socio-economic by-effects of it. This, however, should be taken with a pinch of
salt. In order to assure their competitiveness with their EU counterparts and in order
to be prepared for prospective EU enlargement, the Western borderlands of the
Central Eastern European countries need to overcome the great economic and social
disparity between themselves and their Western neighbours. "[PJroblems of
extreme economic inequality with Western neighbours have caused anxieties about
economic and political subordination to them."56 However, the challenge does not
stop there. The Central Eastern European borderlands must also counterbalance
their respective national centre-periphery disparity, as well as the increasing East-
West borderlands divergence emerging in their own countries57.
The economic and social challenge: The Eastern frontier of the European
Union "is part of the economic frontier and border of affluence which divides
53 Council of Europe and European Commission (1996); The regional planning ofgreater Europe in
co-operation with the countries ofCentral Eastern Europe, p. 73.
54 Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des ffontieres orientales de l'UE" in Collection
DIEM; L'Europe mediane en transition, chapter 10. See also Bafoil, Franqois (1996); "Un conflit de
representations: Le cas de la frontiere Oder-Neisse" in Sciences de la Societe, No. 37/ February
1996, p. 66.
55 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier co-operation - History and Theory" in Brunn, Gerhard
and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenzuberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie -
Empirie - Praxis, p. 90.
56 Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 180.
57 In order to avoid an increasing economic level of disparity between the Eastern and Western
borderlands, Poland - once it has joined the EU - wishes to "stop other Europeans from buying land
in rural and border areas" (The Economist (1998); "Politics this week", March 14, 1998).
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Europe into East and West"58. It marks these economic asymmetries between East
and West, as well as between centre and periphery. Problems characteristic to all
borderlands are: weak and badly integrated economies, poor infrastructure, lower
levels of income per head and higher rates of unemployment than the national and
general EU average.
Since 1989/90, a considerable number of industries have been relocated
from the Eastern to the Western borderlands of the Central Eastern European
countries. The Central Eastern European countries' Western borderlands have
become attractive locations (Standorte). However, this only accounts for the
borderlands' urban centres59, as well as those areas which may become subject to
the cohesion effect.60 Szczecin's harbour, for example, was modernised, and mining
58 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europdischen Union, p. 73. My translation.
59 In Poland, the main urban centres are Szczecin, Slubice and Gubin. In the Czech Republic, they
include Usti nam Labem, Most and Cheb.
60 The European Commission has envisaged four possible scenarios - cohesion effect, draining
effect, island effect and exclusion effect - which may emerge in the medium-term on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union. The cohesion effect is the most positive (and would fall into
Martinez' interdependent and integrated borderlands' categories). It implies the integration of
neighbouring borderlands in a 40 to 60 km wide strip, with good topographical and demographic
conditions, as well as a lack of attractive centres in the hinterlands. Borderlands will pull in
economic, political and social forces from these unattractive hinterlands and become centres of
competition. According to the findings of the European Commission, it is suggested that the
majority of borderlands situated on the German-Polish border may be subject to the cohesion effect.
This is due to the rise in transborder co-operation and the rising importance of this area as a bridge
between Western and Central Eastern Europe. Other parts affected by the cohesion effect may be
found around the Trieste area and its high economic potential. The draining effect sets in when the
borderlands suffer from a low development potential, as well as from the pull effects of larger
agglomerations near to the respective borderlands. An example of this would be the borderlands
around Gorlitz and Dresden. These areas suffer from a high concentration of agricultural activity
and, consequently, a low level of economic development. Due to the push-pull effect, these regions
are in danger of experiencing migration from rural areas to the urban centres of Gorlitz, Dresden
and Szczecin. Another underlying factor for the draining effect is the lack of infrastructure and low
population density. This is especially the case in mountainous areas, such as between Italy and
Slovenia, Bohemia and Saxony, as well as in the south of the Euregio Egrensis between Bavaria and
the Czech Republic. The island effect is subject to similar topographical conditions of borderlands
on both sides of the frontier which grow together into an economic unit, while each of them remains
subject to a different political system. Examples of the island effect are visible on the German-
Polish border, where joint projects, such as ferry services on Oder and NeiBe, are made impossible
due to lack of financial means, the different administrative political structures and "too many
incompatible decision-makers"60. The exclusion effect describes the circumstances in which the
opening of the border has a positive effect only on one side of the border, exerting a strong pull
effect on the other. So far, the EU does not foresee an example for this effect on the Eastern border
of the European Union. The European Commission concludes its report that "it is impossible... to
definitely classify the regions according to one of the four categories of effects as mixed forms
prevail,... of all possible effects the cohesion or draining effects are likely to predominate, island or
exclusion effects will probably play a subordinate role." (European Commission (1996); Impact of
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communities, especially those in Silesia and in the Czech area stretching from Usti
nam Labem to Most, also underwent modernisation changes. Other areas, however,
such as those in which agricultural activities predominate, do not benefit from these
developments, but remain fairly isolated, often being abandoned for the nearby
urban centres.
Joint ventures and outsourcing currently dominate the economic landscape
along the Eastern side of the EU's external border. In the textile and timber
industry, for example, products are half-finished on the Eastern side of the frontier
and then sent back to the Western side to be finished. Full investment in the
Western borderlands of the Central Eastern European countries is still lagging
behind, because the questions surrounding the restitution of properties have not yet
been settled. Investors remain hesitant and reluctant, since some splinter groups in
Silesia and the Sudeten's Landsmannschaften still claim property refunds for these
territories.
But despite these economic success stories the economic disparity still
remains. The frontier crosser immediately notices a difference in price of everyday
goods as well as services. Specifically "bread, sausages and garden gnomes"61, and
services, such as hairdressers, are usually cheaper on the Eastern side of the
frontier. Eastern borderlanders, on the other hand, cross the border, in search for
more pricey quality goods62.
Western borderlanders and Western investors tend to take advantage of the
economic disparity, because labour costs and wages are lower on the Eastern side of
the frontier. This has given rise to fear of unemployment in the EU-borderlands; in
the adjacent borderlands, it has created an increase of employment prospects and
opportunities and attracted a migration flow of people in search of work. Population
has increased in the Polish Western borderlands, whereas the reverse is true for the
the Development of the Countries of Central Eastern Europe on the Community territory, p. 133-
139, p. 138).
61 Matussek, Matthias (1996); "Grenze ohne Schatten" in Der Spiegel, No. 41/1996, p. 158. My
translation.
62 Lesch, Markus (1997); "Man spricht Polnisch" in Die Welf, April 4, 1997.
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German part of the region/'3 The borderlands' rates of unemployment remain higher
than the respective national average. In the Euregio NeiBe-Nisa-Nysa, for example,
the rate of unemployment has reached the 20% mark - whereas "[unemployment in
Poland and Hungary is... dipping below 10 per cent"64, and Germany's rate of
unemployment is around 12%. This makes the borderlands on either side of the
Eastern frontier of the European Union competitors rather than partners. Each
borderland wishes to prioritise and act in its own interest, so that joint projects in
this area become deeply affected by these different self-interests.
The psychological challenge65: After the Second World War, population
changes took place on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Germans left the
borderlands in both Poland and former Czechoslovakia and new populations moved
into the area. "In 1950, for example, only 3% of the population in the Polish
borderlands came from this same region."66 The common ties and heritage that had
been formed throughout history became distorted. Living together had to be learnt
from scratch, not just within the borderlands, but also - where possible - between
the borderlands. In addition, the separation of Europe into two blocs overshadowed
similarities and emphasised political, economic, social and cultural differences
between 'East' and 'West', that is, differences between 'us' and 'them'. Prejudices
about the 'other' were quickly formulated, but the discourse of prejudice only
vanishes slowly. This is also fostered by the language barrier - at present, there are
63 Kennard, Ann (1995); "The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West European Regional
Integration" in German Politics, Vol. 4/ No. 1, 143.
64 Karacs, Imre (1998), "Coming in from the Cold" in The Independent on Sunday, June 7, 1998.
65 Since it is in the interest of this thesis to look at European identity and the Eastern borderlands of
the European Union, the psychological challenge of the Eastern frontier will be considered in more
detail in section 4c. It will argue that Euroregions constitute an ideal framework in which personal
and social contacts may be fostered.
66 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 70. My translation.
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more Central Eastern Europeans learning English, German and French67 than EU-
Europeans learning Polish, Czech or Hungarian.68
Problems inherent to transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of
the European Union
When speaking about the challenges on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union, one should also refer to transfrontier co-operation as an ideal framework
which enables Eastern borderlands to co-operate and to receive EU-funding. One
should keep in mind, however, that transfrontier co-operation is not a panacea for
the borderlands' social and economic problems. It is rather a complex framework
which is subject to legal, financial, organisational and bureaucratic problems,
explained below.
Legal problems: The different legal systems of neighbouring states are often
cited as major obstacles to transborder co-operation.69 They may conflict with one
another and have a considerable impact on transborder co-operation projects and the
distribution ofEU funding opportunities.
Transborder co-operation may take different legal forms, in private, public
or international law.70 No legal matter has the same legal validity on either side of
67 According to a survey in The Economist (1997), 13% of Poles speak German, 11% speak English
and 3% speak French. The Economist argues that these figures are changing fast and that they are on
the increase {The Economist (1997); "Euro-tongues wag in English", October 25, 1997). A study in
Franfurt/Oder-Slubice in autumn 1998 suggests that 97% of Poles are in favour of learning German,
compared to 70% of Germans willing to learn Polish (Kiipper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein FluB, zwei
Stadte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in Siiddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999)
68 This problem was particularly noticeable during the Conference on Euroregions in Frankfurt/Oder
in September 1995, during which there was no interpreter from Czech into German. According to
the Gazeta Lubuska, the German participants did not understand anything, except that it is high time
to learn the language of their Eastern neighbour {Gazeta Lubuska, "Europroblems", September
30/October 1, 1995).
69 Beyerlin, Ulrich (1998); "Neue rechtliche Entwicklungen der regionalen und lokalen
grenziiberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit" in Brunn, Gerhard and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.);
Grenziiberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie - Empirie - Praxis, p. 119.
70 According to GroB, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p.
74 - 78, public, private and international law refer to the following: Public law includes those
Euroregions which, due to their different public duties, receive assistance from both public
authorities and legal bodies. Private law, however, refers to Euroregions who have characteristics of
an association, society or organisation and whose members originate from private organisations,
such as Chambers of Industry and Trade. International law touches upon questions of national
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the frontier. Recent developments of transborder co-operation on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union have shown the need to adopt the Convention - or at
least a document similar to it - as a legal basis for all transborder activities
involving the European Union.71 Major problems arise, for example, in Germany
where activities of transborder co-operation are primarily in the hands of the
Lander, whereas federal government is hardly involved. In Poland, on the other
hand, transborder co-operation is managed by central government, the individual
voivodships having virtually no say in transborder projects. The German Lander
and localities thus face relatively powerless and weak partners72 - a situation which
might change with Poland's prospective regional reforms.
Financial problems: Responding to the challenges posed by the demise of
the Cold War, the European Commission has introduced two development
programmes, Phare and Interreg, in order to help the Central Eastern European
countries with their transformation process. They are the European Union's most
important instruments which aim at the support and development of the EU's
Eastern border, its borderlands and the Central Eastern European countries in
general. Although established for different purposes at the outset, both Phare and
Interreg aim to foster the economic development and socio-economic integration of
borderlands sharing a common border with the EU73. This is done in harmony with
the EU's structural policies, in an attempt to ensure coherence and complementarity.
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction. It may be summarized under the 'loi unique' principle which
covers both spheres of private and public law. So far it has been impossible to "choose a legal status
which [is] valid on both sides, (... but the 'loi unique' principle) implies that cooperation - even with
participation by member from different Member States - can be assessed only within the framework
of one legal system. If, however, the system of laws on either side of the border differ, it is not
possible to acquire legal personality on the basis of one of the two national legal systems"
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europaischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Institutional Aspects of
Crossborder Co-operation, p. 4).
71 To this end, Title II, title XII, Art. 129b-d, title XIV, Art. 130a-e and title XVI, Art. 130r-t of the
Treaty on European Union could be used as a basis to implement transborder co-operation within
the Treaty framework.
72 Morhard, Bettina (1995); "Lokale grenziiberschreitende Kooperation in der deutsch-polnischen
Grenzregion im Spannungsfeld regionaler, nationaler und europaischer Politik" in Jaedtke, Eckard
and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995,
Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 42.
73 Please note that a small amount of funds are also available for other areas than the borderlands on
the Eastern frontier of the EU, e.g. the Eastern borderlands of the Central Eastern European
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Emphasis, as was mentioned above, is placed on the elimination of border-crossing
bottlenecks, the development and advancement of the transport system, the
communication infrastructure, and the environment, which is the foundation upon
which future economic development is based. In future, however, it is assumed that
there might be a shift from infrastructure and advancement to training and socio¬
economic related issues.
The Interreg initiative was first introduced in 1990 to help the internal
borderlands of the European Union to overcome their specific structural and
development problems. It "aimed to assist regions on internal borders to... make use
of the Single Market"74 and to enhance the internal borderlands' economic role in
the European integration process. Cultural aspects were then virtually ignored, since
it was taken for granted that, once the economic basis was in place, they would
follow automatically.
After the end of the Cold War, and with EU enlargement towards the East
on the cards, Interreg II came into being in 1994. Its primary aim "is to contribute
towards understanding, promoting and making the most of the border regions'
endogenous development potential"75. Interreg II is a kind of 'Outerreg' which
extends the former Interreg initiative to the external frontiers of the European
Union, specifically the Eastern frontier of the EU. For the 1994 -1999 period, the
European Communities will fund the Interreg II initiative with 29 billion ECU.
According to the European Communities' guidelines concerning Interreg II, the
initiative
should promote the development of the areas [the external borders] so that they
can adapt to new situations and encourage co-operation between external border
areas of the European Union and border areas of neighbouring non-Community
countries. Where appropriate, their planning and implementation should be
undertaken on a cross-border basis, in conjunction with cross-border schemes
supported in the neighbouring non-Community countries and under other
Community programmes, particularly Phare.76
countries. In general, these are often implemented in coordination with other measures financed
with Structural Funds support.
74 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europaischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Institutional Aspects of
Crossborder Co-operation, p. 17.
75 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europaischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Institutional Aspects of
Crossborder Co-operation, p. 17.
76 European Communities (1994); Official Journal of the European Communities, No. CI80/62,
1.7.1994, Art. 13.
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Nevertheless, Interreg initiatives only focus on areas and borderlands within
the EU territory. As a result, the borderlands on either side of the Eastern frontier
found themselves engaged in an unequal partnership.
Phare - an acronym for 'Poland and Hungary-Assistance for Economic
Restructuring' - was set up in 1989. Phare is the financial instrument of the EU's
pre-accession strategy77. It provides non-refundable grants, and its main objective is
to support the Central Eastern European countries in their economic and political
reorganisation and help them resume their place in 'mainstream' Europe. This
includes primarily transport and environmental measures, as well as soft actions,
such as communication, education, tourism, human resources and culture. Phare is
one of the most important instruments to support and promote the Central Eastern
European countries in their transition process to democracy and free market
economy.
Since the Council's decision in Essen in December 1994, Phare also devotes
a greater share of its funds to transborder co-operation, known as Phare-CBC
(Phare-Cross Border Co-operation). It complements Interreg II on the Eastern side
of the frontier. From 1994-1999, Phare-CBC has 24 billion ECU at its disposal.
This amount was estimated according to the German borderlands' needs for
development help, thus ignoring that the Central Eastern European borderlands are
subject to distinct problems, usually in greater need of economic support and
funding.78
Furthermore, Phare member states cannot decide on the distribution of
funding according to their national and their borderlands' priorities alone. Other EU
member states - especially Germany, together with other states who do not profit
directly from transborder co-operation on the Eastern border of the EU - also have a
77 It is complemented by ISPA, the pre-accession instrument of the Structural Funds, and SAPARD
which assists agriculture and rural development in the accession countries.
78 Until 1999, German borderlands will have received approximately 150 million ECU out of the
Interreg II budget, whereas Polish and Czech borderlands share a grant of approximately 55 and 25
million ECU respectively (Funk, Albert (1995); "Phare und Interreg" in Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, October 8, 1995). Although this takes into account the disparity of purchasing power
between either side of the Eastern frontier, it still makes joint projects, as for example the sewage
plant in Guben/Gubin, impossible, due to the lack ofmoney on the Eastern side.
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great influence on Phare's decision-making process. This greatly reduces the
Central Eastern European countries' independence in allocating Phare's economic
means.
Payments for EU-borderlands are made in ECU - thus not taking into
account any conversion criteria into the national currency of the country in
question. As a result, if
there is a devaluation of that currency, then it may be that the payment becomes
inadequate; even a revaluation is not helpful, since any extra money which
emerges in this way cannot be used, as it was not budgeted for. Also, project
sponsors need to reserve monies for the duration of the approval process, which
can be anything up to three or four years, and this obviously causes financial
difficulties for the authorities concerned.79
Organisational problems; The introduction of Interreg II and Phare has been
a vital step in the right direction. The co-ordination between these two programmes,
however, poses problems for the actors involved. The programmes seem to treat the
symptoms, and thereby ignore the underlying problems. In 1995, only 10 out of the
130 Interreg funding application forms were successful; and out of the 59 Phare
proposals only 9 have been successfully translated into action. The rest is managed
by separate projects.80 This lack of co-operation is subject to the borderlands'
differences in interests and priorities. Polish authorities, for instance, emphasise the
need to improve their borderlands' infrastructure and socio-economic situation,
whereas German authorities wish to prioritise the development of touristic,
environmental and socio-cultural projects. Disagreements may also occur
concerning advantages and disadvantages of specific projects, as well as the
subsequent distribution of profits and losses resulting from some projects. But the
low number of successful joint projects may also be due to the fact that each
programme is subject to a different policy area: Interreg is considered as being part
of the EU's 'domestic' policy, regional policy, which is under the direction of DG
XVI; Phare, on the other hand, belongs to the EU's 'external' policy area and falls
under the auspices of DG I. This difficult relationship between European 'foreign'
70
Kennard, Ann (1997); "A Perspective on German-Polish Cross-Border Co-operation and
European Integration" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU
enlargement, p. 57.
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and 'domestic' regional policies and the two programmes' principle of territoriality
has negative effects on the application procedures for funding. There are loopholes
in both initiatives and some parts of projects cannot be subsumed under either
programme.81 Furthermore, the separation of the two programmes complicates the
decision-making processes and co-operative activities between Phare and Interreg.
The monies from Phare's one year plans have been aligned to Interreg's five year
projects, but the border which should be overcome with these two main
programmes, seems to remain insurmountable for financial resources.82
To overcome some of the organisational problems, it has been suggested
that the merging of both Phare-CBC and Interreg II to one common programme, for
example 'Interreg/External frontier' or 'Outerreg', would alleviate the decision¬
making procedures considerably.83 It could ensure that Phare and Interreg aid is
used correctly and efficiently, since a closer link between these two initiatives
would contribute to a simplification of application procedures, decision-making
processes, assistance to reform public administration and a more decentralised
management84. Furthermore, it would also balance the amounts of monies
borderlands on either side of the frontier currently receive. The European
Commission, however, affirms that joining the two programmes is not envisaged
and impossible because of legal and political reasons.85
Bureaucratic problems: The programmes' different, difficult and lengthy
application and decision-making procedures add another layer of complexity and
intransparency to the process. Co-ordination problems exist between the various
governmental and administrative actors - localities, regions, central governments
80 vwd Europa, October 4, 1995.
81 Rottenburg von, Irmgard, Ministery for Justice, Federal and European Affairs of Brandenburg,
(1995); "Euroregionen als Briicken iiber die Grenzen nach Mittel- und Osteuropa" in Jaedtke,
Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995,
Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 51.
82 Schwab, Oliver (1995); "Brtickenschlag nach Mittel- und Osteuropa" in Europaische Zeitung,
November 1995.
83 Tagesspiegel (1995); "Wirrwarr in EU-Programmen erschwert Zusammenarbeit", September 28,
1995.
84 European Court of Auditors (1993); Co-operation with the countries ofCentral Eastern Europe,
p. 20.
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and European bodies - which are involved in transborder co-operation.86 Joint
institutions for communication, implementation and programming have been
established87, in order to ensure cohesion and complementarity between these two
programmes. But deadlines and the many other existing binational frameworks
remain, which make the co-ordination of projects and the funding application an
even lengthier and more problematic process. As a result,
[tjhe entire process takes approximately two years, from the submission of the
Operational Programme with its financial plan, approval via the Commission
(which may include returning the Programme for modification), distribution of the
project sponsors by the co-operating partners, carrying out the work by the project
sponsors and finally payment for the projects by Brussels via the central banks of
the member states (or associated states in the case of Phare monies) for the
regional partners to distribute to the project sponsors.88
Despite these complexities, the European Commission still sees a positive
side to its transborder co-operation support, because "the dialogue between the
relevant border regions has been intensified... [and a] reinforced 'bottom-up'
approach is now used involving local actors, and the programmes have become
increasingly diversified"89. The Commission therefore concludes that the
participation of local actors in devising and implementing cross-border projects is
very important for their successful development. The continuous involvement of the
regions in the conception and operation of Interreg guarantees that policies are
carried out in conformity to the principle of subsidiarity90. It also contributes "to the
85 Rottenburg von, Irmgard, Ministery for Justice, Federal and European Affairs of Brandenburg,
cited in Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (1995) (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder
September 28-30, 1995, Europdische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 19.
86 In the Land Brandenburg, for example, the bureaucracy is shared between the Euroregions
Pomerania, Viadrina and Spree-NeiBe-Bober, three different Landerministries, the federal
government and the European Commission's DG I and DG XI.
87 For Germany and Poland, for instance, this includes the 'German-Polish Programme Monitoring
Committee (1995-1999)' and the 1994 'Convention between the Project Manager responsible for
Phare in Poland and the German Federal Ministry for Economy managing the distribution of
funding from the European Union for the use of transborder co-operation in the period of 1995-
1999'.
88 Kennard, Ann (1997); "A Perspective on German-Polish Cross-Border Co-operation and
European Integration" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU
enlargement, p. 57.
89 European Commission (1996); Phare cross-border co-operation programme, p. 6.
90 Operational plans for transfrontier co-operation sometimes include national authorities and
various different regional authorities which may by-pass central government. This problem of
inconsistency becomes especially problematic at the implementation of different policies.
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integration process in dismantling internal frontiers and in many cases... [revives]
historical ties".91 One should not forget, however, that on the Eastern side of the
EU's external frontier, it is still central governments, rather than the borderlands,
which determine the eligible areas for collaboration with the European Union. The
administrative environment in the Central Eastern European countries is still in a
state of flux, and it is feared that recognising borderlands and their institutionalised
transborder co-operation projects could provoke a "crumbling away on the
margins."92
These problems will certainly influence the borderlands' role as a hinge for
European Union enlargement towards the East. It is questionable, however, to what
extent. Judging from the above-mentioned problems, the situation may look grim
for borderlands to act as a bridge - a bridge which does not only reach the other
shore, but which leads further into the interior93 - to the Eastern borderlands of the
Central Eastern European countries which are "actually facing greater problems
now than they did during the Cold War era"94, and which may run the danger of
becoming more peripheral.
The following section will look at the Eastern border of an enlarged
European Union. In future, the Eastern borderlands of the Central Eastern European
countries will have to share the 'new' border with their Russian counterparts. So far,
it seems as if this border will be a
very concrete dividing line... and countries that once were forced to co-operate
with each other (within the Eastern bloc) are reluctant to continue this co¬
operation; at least its role is less important than that of co-operation with the
91 Baker, Susan (1996); "Punctured sovereignty, border regions and the environment within the
European Union" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p.
27.
92 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 84. My translation.
93 Rottenburg von, Irmgard, Ministery for Justice, Federal and European Affairs of Brandenburg,
(1995), "Euroregionen als Briicken tiber die Grenzen nach Mittel- und Osteuropa" in Jaedtke,
Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995,
Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 51.
94 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 265.
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Western European countries and the attempt to integrate into its organisations and
institutions.95
Some central governments in Central Eastern European countries already
tend to re-direct part of the Phare monies to their Eastern borderlands, in order to
aid their development and security. Funds - provided under Tacis (the programme
for assisting the CIS countries and Mongolia with 4 billion ECU for the period
2000-2006) - are also made available from the European Union to this purpose.
Some parts of both Phare and Tacis, for instance, include first approaches which
take into account transborder co-operation, such as the Euroregion Carpathia
"which is supposed to include administrative units from Southern Poland, Northern
Slovakia, Northeastern Hungary, Northern Romania and Western Ukraine."96 In
general, these funds are often implemented in coordination with other measures
financed by the Structural Funds, such as "local development projects... including
business, human resources and socio-economic development."97
Transfrontier co-operation in the wider European context
Since the 1989/90 events, the Central Eastern European countries have,
arguably, become a kind of buffer zone of defensive character for the Western
European countries and, in some respects, for Nato. The Association agreements
between the European Union and the Central Eastern European countries, together
with Phare assistance employed at the Eastern borderlands of the Central Eastern
European countries, could be represented as being primarily in the interests of the
European Union member states. They were a means to create a buffer zone against
the feared - but greatly exaggerated - immigration influx from the (farther) East,
which was predicted to flood the member states of the EU after the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989.
95 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 265.
96 Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its Long-lasting Variable Geography" in Bort, Eberhard and
Keat, Russell (eds.); The Boundaries of Understanding: Essays in Honour ofMalcolm Anderson, p.
168.
97
European Commission representative office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 19 February 1998.
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With prospective Eastern enlargement of the EU, and especially if all the
countries of Central Eastern Europe attain EU membership, this buffer zone may be
moved further to the East. This process will affect the Eastern borderlands in the
Central Eastern Europe countries, as well as the borderlands in South Western
Europe. If changes in Central Eastern Europe continue to shift the centre of gravity
of Europe further to the East, then the Western borderlands of the EU's
Mediterranean member states may run the danger of becoming more peripheral than
they already are. Will they inherit the problems of the Eastern borderlands on the
Eastern frontier of the European Union? German unification, as was indicated
above, together with EU's enlargement towards the North, has already affected the
fragile internal balance of the European Union.98 The need to balance East-West
disparities and to close the North-South gap becomes increasingly important in
order to maintain a certain degree of cohesion within the European Union.99
Transborder co-operation must also be seen in the context of Europe's newly
emerging security framework which is "connected to people's perceptions of
security and identity"100. Hegemonies have changed, and "particularly border
regions are dependent on shifting hegemonies and all the developments in power
structures have clear repercussions on them."101 The Eastern frontier of the
European Union has ceased to be a defence line between the capitalist West and the
communist East. However, a fortress Europe with tight immigration controls
exercised at the frontier does not seem
possible nor plausible... The answer is a plea for co-operative borders that offer
each individual enough space for communication and exchange in an open society,
borders which guarantee enough democratic accountability not just to protect the
individual person.102
98 Glante, Norbert, MEP Brandenburg, (1995); "Die Rolle des Europaischen Parlamentes zur
Vorbereiung des Beitritts der mittel- und osteuropaischen Staaten zur Europaischen Union" in
Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-
30, 1995, Europaische Kommission und Europaisches Parliament, Berlin, p. 53.
99 Martin Walker and Michael White of The Guardian argue that the "price of resolving the North-
South split could be paid by the eastern European countries". Martin Walker and Michael White
(1998); "Britain off the hook at European summit" in The Guardian, December 12, 1998.
100 Foucher, Michel (1998); "The Geopolitics of European Frontiers" in Anderson, Malcolm and
Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 235.
101 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 259.
102 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 95. My translation.
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The developments on the Eastern frontier of the European Union are of
concern to all the EU member states, especially to the signatories of the Schengen
agreements, since the Eastern frontier of the European Union has also become
Schengen's external frontier and "the former internal border controls are... being
transferred to the external frontiers of the Schengen countries."103 Central Eastern
European countries, and especially Slovenia whose borders, as one expert argued,
had been "more open than the Schengen frontier will be allowed to be", had no
doubts that the EU's reinforced external border controls would have negative effects
on them104. Governments in Central Europe feared that a new Iron Curtain would
emerge and thus become "an affront to good neighbourliness and future common
membership of the EU."105
EU enlargement will transfer the major responsibilities of border controls
from the present Eastern frontier of the European Union - mainly running along
Austria and Germany - to the Eastern border of the Central Eastern European
countries. It will enhance the Central Eastern European countries' role to protect the
European Union from unwanted immigration, human trafficking and crime.
Poland's eastern borders, for example, will become "both the EU's future frontier
and a second line of defence against migration into Western European states"106,
and "the question of policing what will soon be the EU's... eastern border continues
to cause friction."107
At present, the Central Eastern European countries act as a filter for the
European Union. The Central Eastern European countries are transit countries for
most migrants who wish to reach the European Union for asylum or for economic
reasons. Since Germany changed its asylum laws in May 1993, immigrants who
come to Germany via so-called 'safe countries' can no longer claim the right to
asylum. They are sent back to the last country they passed through: Poland and the
103 Schlogl, Karl (1997); "Schengen will not mean a new Iron Curtain between Austria and
Hungary", in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 15.
104
Gasperlin, Marko (1997); "Schengen needs modification: a Slovenian Perspective", in Anderson,
Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 102 and 103.
105 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls", in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 29.
106 Bowler, Neil (1997); "Leaking frontier alarms the EU" in The Guardian, November 15, 1997.
107 Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in The Independent on Sunday, June 7, 1998.
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Czech Republic in particular. This has also enhanced a change in the Central
Eastern European countries' immigration policies. Poland and the Czech Republic
have already tightened their border controls on their Eastern frontiers, and a
'"Budapest process' has been started to stop illegals from such countries as Russia
getting into, say, Poland or Hungary."108 This represents an attempt to meet some of
the EU member states' general asylum and immigration criteria, which will increase
the openness of the Central Eastern European countries' borders to the European
Union.
It is in the Central Eastern European countries' "common interest that no
persons cross the eastern borders,... about whom the West assumes that it would not
be good if they crossed the eastern frontier of the European Union."109 But in order
to fully attain the necessary standards, the Central Eastern European countries need
further financial support. They "rely on the Western countries and organisations to
realise that they defend their own countries' interests when they contribute to
bringing the technical equipment of... [their] border protection up to a Western
level"110. "Conscious that Poland is still largely just a stop-off point for migrants
heading West, the EU has identified the improvement in provisions on Poland's
eastern borders as a key priority."111 New border crossings are planned and, funded
by the EU, new technical equipment should also be available soon.112 The German
government, in particular, wishes to alleviate its national Eastern frontier from
playing a dual role - national frontier and Eastern frontier of the European Union.
Having the Eastern frontier of the European Union further East would alleviate
Germany's national Eastern frontier of immigration pressure and other important
functions. Similarly, Austria would also profit. Enlargement would place "Austria
at the centre of the fastest-growing region of Europe... Austrian firms have profited
handsomely from burgeoning trade and investment with the countries pressing for
108 The Economist (1998); "Millions want to come", April 4, 1998.
109 Kuncze, Gabor (1997); "Schengen and Eastern enlargement: Hungary's way into the European
Union" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 19.
110 Kuncze, Gabor (1997); "Schengen and Eastern enlargement: Hungary's way into the European
Union" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen andEU enlargement, p. 20-21.
111 Bowler, Neil (1997); "Leaking frontier alarms the EU" in The Guardian, November 15, 1997.
112 Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzraume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming.
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EU enlargement."113 At the same time, however, polls in Austria seem to "doubt the
wisdom of the EU's eastward expansion. They fear crime and competition as
easteners come offering cheap and easy labour."114
Adapting the Central Eastern European countries' frontier policies and
measures to the average EU level also requires a rethinking and modernisation of
Schengen. The Schengen acquis has been incorporated in the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam, and "if Schengen and the enlargement of the European Union are to be
processes of unifying, 'Europeanising' Europe, they must not be mutually
conflicting."115 But
[w]hat consequences will [a clash between an enlarged European Union and
Schengen] have for the development of both a regional and a European identity in
this area and beyond? These new border lines could then become dangerous for
the workings of an enlarged European Union, if cross-border conflicts straddling
this new frontier are not fully and satisfactorily settled by the time enlargement
happens.116
The Central Eastern European countries wish to maintain their good
neighbourly relations with their Eastern counterparts. Poland, specifically, seeks to
retain its Eastern frontiers relatively open, despite demands of the European Union
to impose visa requirements. So far, citizens of the CIS (excluding Kazakhstan)
were not obliged to hold a visa when entering Poland - and as far as former Polish
President Kwasniewski proclaimed in 1996, the last thing Poland could imagine, is
the appearance of a new Iron Curtain on its Eastern frontiers.117 Similarly,
113 The Economist (1998); "Jorg Haider, Austria's (and Europe's) border guard", July 11, 1998. See
also Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its Long-lasting Variable Geography" in Bort, Eberhard
and Keat, Russell (eds.); The Boundaries of Understanding: Essays in Honour of Malcolm
Anderson, p. 164.
114 The Economist {1998); "Austria and its eastern neighbours", May 9, 1998.
115 Gasperlin, Marko (1997); "Schengen needs modification: a Slovenian Perspective" in Anderson,
Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen andEU enlargement, p. 103.
116 Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-Dokic,
Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 142.
117
Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontieres orientales de 1'UE" in Collection
DIEM; L'Europe mediane en transition, chapter 10. See also Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und
Grenzraume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming; Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its
Long-lasting Variable Geography" in Bort, Eberhard and Keat, Russell (eds.); The Boundaries of
Understanding: Essays in Honour ofMalcolm Anderson, pp. 166-167.
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Hungarians worry that the impositions of visas "could sour one of their greatest
post-communists feats: the befriending of Romania."118
Both the EU and Nato have opted for a small enlargement strategy, taking in
the strongest countries first. Madeleine Albright argues that this reduces the costs of
expansion and, more importantly, the new members would "export stability
eastward, rather than viewing enlargement as a race to escape westward at the
expense of their neighbours"119. According to President Bill Clinton, "Nato has
erased an artificial line drawn across Europe by Stalin after the Second World
War"120 - and former Polish President Kwasniewski proclaimed on several
occasions that Poland's membership of Nato and the EU would contribute to
Europe's and the Euro-Atlantic security framework. In all these discourses, there is
no mention of a new frontier being erected in Europe. An enlarged Nato and
European Union should not redivide Europe; no new frontier should emerge
between those who are 'in' and those who are 'out' of the European Union or Nato.
(Figures 4.1 and 4.2) How far the incongruity between EU enlargement and Nato
expansion will have consequences for Europe's security framework is questionable,
since it is designed not to 'upset' Russia. Russia, already humiliated enough by
having to give way to capitalism and losing its sphere of influence to the West,
since Nato attracts most of Russia's former satellites, looks on Nato's eastward
expansion with a weary eye.
However, Russia also plays a crucial role in the design of the Euro-Atlantic
security architecture. Without Russia's consent to EU enlargement, and particularly
Nato expansion, Central Eastern Europe would remain a permanent source of
tension and insecurity between the European Union, Nato and Russia. Russia has to
be involved in order to reduce the risk of another Cold War, a new arms conflict
and the revival of old fears. If left out, Russia would have a greater incentive to
118 The Economist (1998); "Austria and its eastern neighbours", May 9, 1998.
119 Albright, Madeleine (1997); "Why bigger is better" in The Economist, February 15, 1997.
120 President Bill Clinton cited in The Economist (1997); "Europe changes shape", July 12, 1997.
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interfere with its former satellites immediately to its West. Russia might even
"develop closer ties with 'old friends... that are suspicious of, or hostile to, the
United States. The list would include China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea... and perhaps
Cuba"121. Russia's disagreement with the United States over the United Nations'
weapons' inspection team in Iraq could be seen as a first sign of this.
Nato expansion has already provoked hostile reactions amongst Russian
leaders. Even Mikhail Gorbachev claimed that an expansion of Nato "would mean
that the West's most hawkish, conservative and aggressive (and also most ignorant)
circles have gained the upper hand"122. Gorbachev considered it as "a chilling
warning that a new Iron Curtain could come crashing down in Europe, reviving old
fears and the threat of nuclear conflict."123 According to George Kennan, Nato
enlargement will stimulate nationalistic, anti-western and militaristic tendencies in
Russian public opinion. It will have negative consequences for the development of
Russian democracy, revive the atmosphere of the Cold War in East-West relations,
direct Russian foreign policy against Nato and it might even make the signing of
Start II impossible.124
As a means to accommodate and appease Russia, first steps have been
undertaken with EU's 'Partnership and Co-operation Programme' and Nato's
'Atlantic Partnership Council' and 'Partnership for Peace Programme', which
reaches out to the Ukraine and Russia. They are an attempt to bring countries
outside the EU and Nato closer to the core. According to Javier Solana, Nato's
Secretary General, Nato follows the course of history. In this sense, "the alliance is
changing beyond recognition, and... it is in Russia's interest to come to terms with
the new order rather than look sulkily the other way - and get left out in the cold"125.
121 The Economist (1997); "Russia's surly answer to NATO", February 1, 1997.
122 Mikahil Gorbachev cited in The Economist (1997); "Russia's surly answer to NATO", February
1, 1997.
123 Herbert Pearson cited in Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 96.
124 Kennan, George (1997); "Die Nato-Erweiterung ist iiberflussig und wird RuBland verbittern" in
Zeitpunkte, 6/1997, bi-monthly magazine ofDie Zeit, p. 13.
125 Javier Solana cited in The Economist (1997); "For NATO, eastward ho!", March 1, 1997.
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4. C European identity and the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of
the European Union
People in the borderlands experience the existence of the frontier most
directly, and frontiers are among the first points of contact for border-crossers.
Border regions are areas of a constant coming and going which has probably
become an important part of the borderlanders' sense of identity. In border regions
with relatively open frontiers, border controls are minimal or even non-existent, and
people from different nationalities and backgrounds meet regularly, even if only
superficially. Closed borders, by contrast, do not permit a high degree of coming
and going. They may, however, play an even more important role for the
borderlanders' consciousness. The presence of a closed border often has negative
connotations, and it is generally associated with exclusion rather than inclusion, as
well as division and separation.
As indicated in chapter two, Oscar Martinez has identified four models of
border interaction. These may apply to the past, present and future of the
borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union.
During the Cold War period, the Eastern frontier of the European Union
came close to be sealed. "[I]t was the ultimate concept of border"1 and the strongest
(physical) expression of this was the Berlin Wall. Borderlands on either side of the
Iron Curtain were relatively "alienated"2 from the 'other' beyond the frontier, as well
as the national centre and - allegedly - from the outside world. Transfrontier co¬
operation or interaction hardly existed. Warfare, disputes and animosity created a
"tension-filled climate"3 which did not allow for normal interaction between the
people on either side of the frontier. Since the opening of the border in 1989/90,
however, borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union have seen a
tremendous increase in economic and political interaction. The Eastern borderlands
1
Langer, Josef (1996); "New Meanings of the Border in Central Europe" in Eger, Gyorgy and
Langer, Josef (eds.); Border, Region andEthnicity in Central Europe, p. 49.
2 Martinez, Oscar J. (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive H. (ed.);
World Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 2.
1
Martinez, Oscar J. (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive H. (ed.);
World Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 2.
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may now be labelled as co-existent, since the border is, in principle, open, allowing
interaction and people to come together. "International relations are possible"4, but
cross-border co-operation continues to have its difficulties.
The overall aim of the European Union is to achieve interdependent and,
even more favourably, integrated borderlands. Some of the internal borderlands of
the European Union can already be labelled as interdependent; only a few of them
have achieved integrated status. Interdependent borderlands generally have open
borders which are only closed to a limited extent. There is a high rate of economic,
social and cultural interaction between these borderlands, overshadowed by
"[c]oncerns over immigration, trade competition, smuggling, and ethnic nationalism
[which] compel the central governments carefully to monitor the border, keeping it
open only to the extent that it serves the agenda of the nation-state".5 Although
there is very little evidence to date, interdependent borderlands may witness the
emergence of a frontier-transcending regional identity. Finally, integrated
borderlands presume an advanced form of European integration. "Barriers to trade
and human movement across the [borderlands'] mutual boundary" are eliminated, as
"each nation willingly relinquishes its sovereignty to a significant degree for the
sake of achieving mutual progress"6.
By virtue of European integration and prospective Eastern EU enlargement,
border regions generally "have to face up to the challenges of integration (whether
they want to or not) and to do so they must somehow find a common approach."7
Future developments in Europe will decide upon the borderlands' 'status' - external
and isolated or internal and integrated - and determine the changes or adaptation
processes necessary in these regions. Borderlanders may develop a "sense of
4 Martinez, Oscar J. (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofleld, Clive H. (ed.);
World Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 2.
5 Martinez, Oscar J. (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive H. (ed.);
World Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 5.
6 Martinez, Oscar J. (1994); "The Dynamics of Border Interaction" in Schofield, Clive H. (ed.);
World Boundaries, Vol. 1, p. 5.
7 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 274.
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cultural 'localism'"8, focused on a territory that is comprehensible and where
borderlanders feel at home9. Borderlanders are often "comfortable with the notion
that they are tied culturally [and ethnically] to many other people in neighbouring
states."10 This "feeling of local distinctiveness"11 may transcend state and national
boundaries and suggests that the borderlanders' identification with the 'other' on the
other side of the frontier might sometimes even be stronger than their identification
with the respective national centre. This shows that
[t]he discreteness of local experience is all the more important in societies whose
communities see themselves as peripheral or marginal, and in which the reality of
difference is continually being glossed by the appearance of similarity.12
Thomas Wilson suggests that some borderlands' common historic or cultural
affiliation may be a burden to the nation-state building process and national
identity. He sees borderlands as "areas of cultural contest and integration, in which
national identity and citizenship are often not the same thing"13, but he seems to
play down the fact that concepts of citizenship, political representation and civic
nationalism continue to tie borderlanders to the culture and national centre of the
state. Wilson concludes that "border cultures continue to be important forces in the
perceptions, if not the shaping, of regional and national identities"14, and, in a
different article, he defines borderlands as
contradictory zones of culture and power, where the twin processes of state
centralisation and national homogenisation are disrupted, precisely because most
borders are areas of... cultural diversity.15
8 Cohen, Anthony (1982); "Belonging: the experience of culture" in Cohen, Anthony (ed.);
Belonging: identity and social organisation in British rural cultures, p. 1.
9 Engel, Christian (1991); "Regionen im Netzwerk Europaischer Politik" in Bullmann, Udo (ed.);
Die Politik der dritten Ebene, p. 91.
10 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 4.
11 Cohen, Anthony (1982); "Belonging: the experience of culture" in Cohen, Anthony (ed.);
Belonging: identity and social organisation in British rural cultures, p. 1.
12 Cohen, Anthony (1982); "Belonging: the experience of culture" in Cohen, Anthony (ed.);
Belonging: identity and social organisation in British rural cultures, p. 13.
13 Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European
integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 200.
14 Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European
integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 204.
15 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 26.
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Borderlanders have usually no say in determining the course of the frontier.
They may, however, have witnessed the struggles involving the position of borders
and endured the changing nature of frontiers. This seems to be especially the case if
a political decision on the frontier's institutionalised role leads "to an artificial
interruption"16 of former common bonds of either historical, cultural or economic
character.
It is mostly central governments that decide what role their national frontiers
should assume. It is of the central governments' interest to determine the frontier's
role, since
smuggling, migration, cross-border shopping and other kinds of trans-border
movement occurring within or outside the limits of the law may challenge and
even undermine state efforts to define the identities of those who live at the
border.17
The role of 'open' borders may not be as clearly defined as the one of 'closed'
borders. Whereas the latter borders are closed, 'open' borders may be open for some
and closed for other influences. Paradoxically enough then, a formerly closed or
hard border might possibly be more easily transcended than a border which has
been open for a longer period of time. According to Prof. Hans Weiler, director of
the European University Viadrina, "peoples have never accepted borders in their
restrictive function only - the most fruitful moments of humanity were its attempts
to overcome frontiers."18 The East-West sales route across the Oder-Neifie, as well
as current developments on the Eastern frontier of the European Union are but two
important examples in support of this statement.
On the assumption that there are many different models of hard and closed
frontiers and that hard borders may be easier overcome than soft borders, what is
the situation of the present Eastern frontier of the European Union? Is the Eastern
frontier of the European Union between Poland and Germany actually that hard a
16 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 265.
17 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 21-22.
18 Prof. Hans Weiler cited in Rottenburg, von, Irmgard (1995), "Euroregionen als Brucken iiber die
Grenzen nach Mittel- und Osteuropa" in Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der
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border? Until 1989/90, the Eastern frontier of the European Union used to coincide
with the dividing line between East and West Germany. It was a relatively sealed
border, whereas the frontier between the former GDR and Poland - the present
Eastern frontier of the European Union - was relatively open for some co-operation,
but remained more closed than the ideology of international socialism would
suggest. Co-operation between the two former Socialist countries was not as intense
as it could have been and their borderlands only maintained a certain degree of
interpenetration. This co-operation could not have taken place if the frontier had
been completely sealed; and surely had an implicit - rather than explicit - effect on
the borderlands' common identity. But whereas the former GDR and Poland were
engaged in bilateral agreements - no visa requirements for example19 - the former
GDR-FRG border remained virtually closed.
Confusion over the changing nature of the Eastern frontier of the European
Union, however, leads to the mistaken belief that the current state of affairs between
Polish and former GDR borderlands equals the situation of the former GDR-FRG
frontier. Although political and economic circumstances seem to imply so, and
restrictions continue to apply, the present Eastern frontier of the European Union
may actually be classified more as a soft than hard border. This is specifically in
view of the opening of new crossing points, massive increases of traffic, border
markets and the current transborder co-operation projects.
Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995, Europaische Kommission und Europaisches
Parliament, Berlin, p. 49. My translation.
19 It was only under Soviet pressure that the former GDR recognised the Oder-NeiBe border in the
post WW II period. Following the Treaty of Gorlitz in 1952, cultural and political co-operation
between Poland and the GDR began, only to be troubled by the Polish social movements with the
rise of Gomulka in 1957. 1959 marked the end of these troublesome years of social unrest, allowing
the two countries to find together again, culminating in the liberation of visa requirements. Poland
and former East Germany agreed on a free movement of peoples across the border, resulting in the
abolition of visa requirements. This, however, was soon to be restricted again, due to the higher
influx of Polish nationals entering the former GDR. Obligation to hold a visa was re-introduced for
Polish citizens wanting to enter the former GDR. East Germans, on the other hand, continued to
enjoy the relatively free entry into Poland and only required a valid identification card. This partial
opening of the frontier gave borderlands on either side of the frontier an opportunity to engage in
some form of co-operation projects, such as cultural exchanges, school and business co-operation,
as well as local associations, e.g. sport and youth. In addition, co-operation also had a great impact
on the tourist industry of the area.
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Could this be the underlying reason why the present Eastern frontier of the
European Union does not seem to be too difficult to overcome? Has German
unification eased Eastern EU enlargement? German unification seems to have
absorbed some of the present problems on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union, even if differences of affluence continue to exist between the borderlands on
the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Yet, the former dividing line in
Germany may present a useful example for further developments on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union. David Marsh argues that
the economic and social divisions between East and West Germany provide a
reflection and a reminder of the large disparities in the organisation of lives,
economies and states throughout Europe. Germany is the focus and mirror of a
continent united in disunity.20
Euroregions on the Eastern frontier of the European Union
On the present Eastern frontier of the European Union, cross-border co¬
operation is mainly institutionalised and highlighted in the form of Euroregions. As
was mentioned above, the development, characteristics and overall structure of
these Euroregions are based on their Western counterparts, specifically the Euregio
model, which was first established on the German-Dutch border in the mid-1960s.21
The Euregio soon became a prototype for the institutionalisation of transborder co¬
operation projects on the internal frontiers of the European Community - and since
1989/90, Euroregions have been established on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union. They represent "an attempt to transfer the experience of the highly
developed Western European countries to the Mitteleuropa area external to the
European Union."22
In 1991, the first Euroregion - the Euroregion NeiBe-Nysa-Nisa - was
founded on the Eastern frontier of the European Union between Germany, Poland
20 David Marsh cited in Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: The Difficult Frontier" in Anderson,
Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 91.
21 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 33. The first Euregio- the Euregio
Maas-Rhein - was established on the German-Dutch border between the three communes of Rhein-
Ems, Twente-Oost Gelderland and Oostelijk Gelderland.
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and the Czech Republic. Other Euroregions followed soon. The roots of some
Euroregions reach far back in history, suggesting that "[institutionalised forms of
co-operation represent the 'old' structures that were essential in the former European
system where the predominance of states was not contested."23 The Euroregion
Pomerania, for instance, is based on historical roots - mainly of German character -
which go back to the Middle Ages. Similarly, the Euroregion Egrensis is modelled
on the historical and cultural province of the Regio Egire of 1135 and the Provincia
Egrensis of 1218.
As was indicated in the previous section, the principal aim of transborder
co-operation projects is to reduce "the problem of marginality and insecurity of
European borderlanders who once ranked... as typical examples of marginal
populations"24. In line with Asiwaju's assertion that borderlands are ideal
laboratories25, Euroregions and transborder co-operation represent an "imaginative
attempt to achieve regional integration and a new trans-national identity."26 Since
Euroregions tend to be the result of former occasional cultural, educational or
sporting contacts and activities between border regions27, they seem to be models
for the European integration process at a micro-level, acting as a bridge over the
Oder/NeiBe rivers. Two objectives are at stake: to develop transparency and to
promote democracy.
Euroregions may be good examples to bring the European integration
process closer to the people, because "[cjross-border regionalism seems the best
22 Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen
Grenzgebiet" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende
Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 58. My translation.
23 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 273.
24 Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalization" in Nolutshungu, Sam
(ed.); Margins ofInsecurity, p. 276.
25 See chapter 4b.
26 Kennard, Ann (1995); "The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West European Regional
Integration" in German Politics, Vol. 4/No. 1, p. 141.
27
European Commission (1995); Presseerkldrung zum Abschlufi der ersten Konferenz der
Euroregionen an der deutsch-polnischen bzw. an der deutsch-tschechischen Grenze, p. 2, Jerabek,
Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenzuberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im tschechisch-
deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.);
Grenzubergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 90.
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way forward... to build a bottom-up democratic Europe."28 As has been argued
before, this approach could, in fact, be another step towards a 'Europe of regions', in
which borderlands and regions, including Euroregions, become key players. In
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, a 'Europe of regions' would be a
means for both the European Union and the regions to bypass the nation-state. It
would provide room for decision-making at the sub-national and supra-national
levels. It would also vindicate the idea of a genuine - diversified and unified -
European Union. For regions in the Central Eastern European countries in
particular, regional policy may represent an example to break with the traditions
and legacies of Communism. European regional policy seems to be a supplement to
the EU's Association Agreements with the Central Eastern European countries.29
Regional policy, at first glance, seems to be a paradox within the unitarian
and common economic policy of the European Union.30 Yet, EU regional policy has
been a convenience for the Community, a means of building political coalitions
for policies of redistribution which is more widely acceptable than would be
policies based on transfers between countries or classes.31
Article 146 of the 1993 Treaty on European Union lays down the
opportunity to regional direct participation and Art. 198 a-c establishes the
'Committee of Regions'. The regions welcomed "this greater measure of
organizational independence", and it was proposed that the democratic legitimate
"Committee of Regions... should become an institution with a fair and balanced
representation of local and regional authorities in each member state to ensure its
effective contribution to European policy -making"32. However, this is far from
enough to ensure direct and efficient regional participation in the European Union.
The Committee may address the collective of all regions and is likely to ignore the
28 Bort, Eberhard (1997); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Svob-Bokic,
Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity ofCentral Europe, p. 144.
29 Kalbe, Peter, DG 1A, (1995) during Conference on Euroregions in Frankfurt /Oder, September,
28-30, 1995, proceedings, p. 14
30 GroB, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p. 131.
31 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998); "Introduction: Networking Europe" in Bort, Eberhard and
Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 9.
32 Council of European Municipalities and Regions (1996); The Valencia Appeal, January 18, 1996,
http://www.kenpubs.co.uk/cemr/.
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needs of individual regions. In addition, some of the regions have established
representative offices in Europe - "one recent count ended at 54 such offices."33
Notwithstanding, Alfred Grosser warns us that in this 'Europe of regions',
there exists a risk that regions will act to satisfy their own need. By this, it would
follow that we would be missing the opportunity that could make the regions a
place where the necessary solidarity to construct Europe could be rediscovered. A
Europe of regions will not be creative unless it shows the example of solidarity,
beyond the frontiers.34
Euroregions and transborder co-operation projects affect the different people
on either side of the frontier directly with their activities and this
refocusing of development from the national to the regional level also causes a
shift in identity, sense of belonging and legal remedy to the transregional and
crossborder level.35
Euroregions and transborder co-operation represent a form of European
framework in which regional and national interests are respected. They are - as will
be indicated below - generally met with enthusiasm at the regional and European
level, since they seem to take into consideration the different regional and local
economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the borderlands. Common
projects are usually developed and adapted according to the borderlands' mutual
needs. In contrast to the EU, borderlands generally36 do not have a large
bureaucratic apparatus attached to them, and are therefore seen as being closer to
the people.
In order to maintain this degree of transparency, visibility, and a certain
degree of democracy, however, Euroregions and transborder co-operation must not
develop, as was indicated in the preceding section, into complicated administrative
bureaucracies. Nor should they add another administrative layer to the already
existing national and European authorities. Ideally, Euroregions should include all
33 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998); "Introduction: Networking Europe" in Bort, Eberhard and
Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 9.
34 Alfred Grosser cited in Hingel, Anders Joest (1993); "The prime role of regional co-operation in
European integration" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks,
border regions and European integration, p. 12.
35 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europaischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Citizen's Europe: the case of
border regions, p. 3.
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possible models of transborder co-operation projects - regardless of the many
different structures. It seems as if Euroregions and transborder co-operation projects
are already a challenge to the nation-state as the best provider to the borderlands'
welfare. Hence the following statement of Kaisa Lahteenmaki may hold true:
Though the state as an actor is not disappearing from the stage of international
relations - in some cases quite the opposite - it is increasingly only one among the
many relevant actors, and in the border regions this is strikingly clear.37
The impact of transborder co-operation on national affairs may be illustrated
by taking transborder co-operation on the Polish-German border as an example.
Here, Euroregions and transborder co-operation projects already seem to have a
certain degree of influence on inter-governmental relations and decisions. In return,
these relations and decisions also have an important impact on the respective border
regions. In his speech to the German Bundestag in November 1990, German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl implied that transborder co-operation on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union is the most important bilateral arrangement between
the German and Polish governments. He emphasised that transborder co-operation
projects play an important role for the common future of both the German and
Polish nations and suggested that borderlands on either side of the frontier should
soon be subject to a balanced development.38
Euroreqions and European identity
Euroregions break through the traditional institutionalisation of frontiers and
seem to "outmode"39 the nation-state, in some respects, a virtually closed system.
Euroregions explode the traditional notion of the nation-state, and make national
boundaries, even the Eastern frontier of the European Union, porous. It is the aim of
36 With the exception of Lombardy, Bavaria and Rhone-Alpes, which may be classified as
borderlands, but which have more civil servants than the EU.
37 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 279.
38 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (1990); "Regierungserklarung des
Bundeskanzlers vordem Deutschen Bundestag" in Bulletin, No. 134, 16.11.1990, p. 1390.
39
Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998); "Introduction: Networking Europe" in Bort, Eberhard and
Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 17.
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this thesis to suggest that it is exactly this kind of explosion and surmounting of
frontiers which is necessary to create a fully integrated Europe with integrated
borderlands and to foster a genuine European identity. Within the European Union,
the 'withering away' of frontiers between member states has already become one of
the most important expressions of the European integration process - developed and
fostered through Schengen and the four freedoms of movement. Internal
borderlands have become connecting points between two, if not more, member
states. Perhaps the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union may
soon find themselves subject to the same development.
But "ifborders are becoming irrelevant, what will the future of the European
border regions be like?"40 At present, Euroregions "do not correspond to existing
territories"41, but represent new regions that may be delimited from the rest.42 Their
boundaries can solely be found and traced on maps developed by the European
Union or the Euroregions themselves. Euroregions and their borders have not yet
found their way into the traditional atlases. But on the assumption that Euroregions
may increase their stance in the future European integration process, this might
change, since
we must accept that borders must be placed somewhere, and if we eliminate
borders between states, local communities will create their own. Experience shows
that, as the borders of the state become more open, communities will set up their
43
own.
Euroregional boundaries may then become more apparent and "indicate
future territories and correspond to actual tendencies of development within
them."44 Euroregions might even give rise to a new kind of region. They may follow
Storm Pedersen's idea of the 'meso-region', describing a region which is subject to
40 Lahteenmaki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and
Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 258.
41
Cappellin, Riccardo (1993); "Interregional co-operation in Europe: an introduction" in Cappellin,
Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European
integration, p. 2.
42 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europdischen Union, p. 45.
43 Walzer cited in Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 166.
44
Cappellin, Riccardo (1993); "Interregional co-operation in Europe: an introduction" in Cappellin,
Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European
integration, p. 2.
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regional co-operation based on large transborder co-operation.45 Euroregions could
become melting pots in which subnational culture, inter-regional structural policy
(including transborder co-operation) and European integration policy may become
complementary46. Further, and in order to come back to the analogy used in chapter
two, Euroregions could become toolboxes in which various different identities
meet. The various cultural, educational and sporting activities - illustrated in the
following section - seem to suggest that different values and interests may be shared
across a frontier. In future, this may lead to the emergence of a Euroregional
identity.
If Euroregions were indeed able to develop a Euroregional identity on their
own, based on an amalgamation of many different identities, the transfer of this
model to the entire European integration process would present a giant step towards
a new European society. Although there is little evidence to date, integrated
Euroregions, such as the Euregio Maas-Rhein or the Euroregion Saar-Lor-Lux47
may serve as a model for a European society with a "deterritorialised"48
supranational identity. This kind of identity would be separate from the traditional
understanding of identity. Euroregional identity would, as Weiler argues, decouple
the term nation from the respective state and its boundaries, as it already seems to
be the case in the borderlands where
the battle for the hearts and minds of 'the Europeans' must be won if the EU as a
sociocultural system is to develop in support of further political and economic
49
union .
This kind of identity may be defined by the coexistence of commonalities as
well as differences. It would most possibly be based on an kind of 'differentity'50 - a
45 Storm Pedersen, J. (1993); "The Baltic Region and the New Europe" in Cappellin, Riccardo and
Batey, Peter W. (eds.); Regional Networks, Border regions and European integration, p. 143.
46 GroB, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p. 132.
47 Although the Euregio Basiliensis between Germany, France and Switzerland represents one of
Schengen's external frontiers, it may also be considered as an integrated Euroregion, since it has
achieved a high level of integration.
48
Burgess, Peter J (1997?); "European Borders: History of Space/Space of History" on
www.ctheory.com/a-european_borders.html, p. 10.
49 Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European
integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations andStates, p. 213.
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'differentity' in which the 'us' versus 'them' dynamic would still exist, but on a
different level: 'we' interiorise 'them' as much as 'they' interiorise 'us'. Translating
this model to the European territory would allow the European peoples to continue
to think in national or regional terms - such as their language or culture since
these differences remain essential components of the individual's human psyche,
his/her sense of belonging, and perceptions of past, present and future.
Eastern borderlands as a laboratory for the emergence of a genuine
European identity?
It has been indicated above that each Euroregion focuses on different areas
of action. Each project of transfrontier co-operation is subject to different
conditions, since "not all border communities have the same characteristics, [and]
not all are dissected by the border in the same way."51 Assessing the success and
performance of individual transfrontier co-operation projects is a difficult task - one
may either concentrate on the difference between proclaimed objectives and actual
performance of Euroregions, or one may solely focus on the Euroregions' individual
success stories. There is no uniform standard to which one may compare or measure
the Euroregions' achievements or reputation. Someone who crosses the border just
to buy a cheap packet of cigarettes will have a different conception of the
neighbouring borderland than someone who works on the other side of the
frontier.52
According to a 1995 opinion poll in the border towns of Frankfurt/Oder and
Slubice, only two out of twenty people knew that representatives of either side of
the frontier meet in Euroregions to solve frontier problems.53 This stands in contrast
so Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The 1997 Jean Monnet Lecture: European Union citizenship and
national citizenship", paper presented during New Forms of Citizenship in the European Union,
Seminar at the London School of Economics, March, 20 - 22, 1997.
51 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 14.
52 Malchus von, Viktor (1975); Partnerschaft an den europaischen Grenzen, p. 80.
53 Svensson, Birgit (1995); "Pomerania: Die schwere Geburt einer Euroregion" in Markische
Allgemeine October 30, 1995. This lack of information may also be compared with an opinion poll
in 1970 in the Euroregions Basiliensis and Haut-Rhin. In both cases, analysis showed that relatively
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to the 1996 Czech-German Euroregion Elbe/Labe survey, in which 50% named the
Euroregion as a concrete example for transfrontier co-operation projects - Phare-
CBC was only known by 33% and Interreg II by 5%.54 36% were unable to assess
the Euroregions' activities, but 56% of those asked considered the Euroregions'
activities as positive. Negative perceptions were mainly based on criticisms about
the Euroregions' lack of self-management55 and possibly their inability to mobilise
mass political support. Euroregions' successes may be most strongly felt in the
cultural domain, particularly educational exchanges, youth encounters, sport events
and cultural activities.
The European University Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder in the Euroregion Pro
Europa Viadrina, for instance, is a good example to demonstrate the coming
together of both German and Polish academic traditions and relations. However, it
is a coming together of the German and Polish traditions, rather than a melting
together of the two. There is a higher number of German students attending the
University and, linguistically, the German language predominates.56 As a
counterweight to this, a Collegium Polonicum has been founded in Frankfurt's twin
town Szczecin, which will be much more oriented towards Polish students and the
Polish language. Although both educational institutions pursue a more national than
trans-boundary approach, they are nevertheless an important step to bringing both
the German and Polish peoples together. Similarly, although not at university level,
other Euroregions, such as the Euroregion NeiBe-Spree-Bober and the Euroregion
NeiBe, have bilingual Kindergartens in Gorlitz and Guben respectively.
On the cultural side, specifically, the Euroregion NeiBe witnesses "regular
contacts between various organisations, societies for the elderly, schools and young
few borderlanders were aware of their neighbours' problems and showed little transnational interest.
In Malchus von, Viktor (1975); Partnerschaft an den europaischen Grenzen, pp. 81-83.
54 Jerabek, Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenzuberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im
tschechisch-deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.);
Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 98.
55 Jerabek, Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenzuberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im
tschechisch-deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.);
Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 98-99.
56 The predominance of 'Western' languages over 'Eastern' languages was already indicated in
chapter 4b.
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people."57 The Euroregion also supports the German-Polish-Czech orchestra
"Europera" and has organised a steamship on which Polish and German poets read
their poetry. This steamship, however, does not reach the lower part of the NeiBe,
which is part of the Euroregion Bayerischer Wald/Bohmerwald, because here the
Euroregion Bayerischer Wald/Bohmerwald has helped to re-introduce the tradition
of the Holzfldfierei™.
In the Euroregion NeiBe-Spree-Bober, the old town centre of Gorlitz, which
is situated on the German side of the border, was only recently accepted as the
common centre of the double border town Gorlitz/Zgorzelec.59 Similarly, the border
towns of Guben/Gubin aim to become a true Euro-city "which will give German
and Polish citizens a new identity and future"60.
The cross-border towns of Gorlitz/Zgorzelec, Frankfurt/Slubice and
Guben/Gubin have incorporated border-crossing into their everyday co-existence.
The free movement of goods and persons across the border is still restricted, due to
the existing customs barrier between the European Union and the Central Eastern
European countries. Incredible improvements to this situation, however, have taken
place in order to overcome the Eastern frontier of the European Union as a 'hard'
border.
"Co-operation works best where people with the same interests come
together"61. One should perhaps add that co-operation also works well where people
are subject to the same fate62, as was the case during the Oder floods during the
summer of 1997. After receipt of considerable German donations for the Polish
victims of the floods, the Polish Ambassador in Bonn diplomatically remarked that
"one recognises true friends when one is in need. The Germans have helped in
57 Schweinert, Michael, vice-representative of the Landrat Lobau-Zittau, (1995); "Deutsch-Polnische
Euroregionen" on Deutschlandradio in September 1995. My translation.
58 Holzfldfierei is an old tradition in the Bayerischer Wald/Bohmerwald area. Individual tree trunks
are left floating on the rivers. They are then collected behind weirs and dams, where they might be
used to build big rafts.
59 Lesch, Markus (1997); "Man spricht Polnisch" in Die Welt, April 4, 1997.
60 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 76. My translation.
51 Marein Zawila, member of the Polish Sejm cited in Markische Oderzeitung (1995); "Europas
Sorgen im Mikrokosmos", September 29, 1995. My translation.
62 This falls in line with the argument made in chapter two, the socio-psychological approach to
identity.
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solidarity."63 In reality, however, the effects on German-Polish relations of the
floods were more complicated. The Germans were generous in their donations for
the victims of the floods, but only "[s]ome donations were earmarked for
reconstruction projects in Poland and the Czech Republic,... most were directed at
German fellows in the eastern state of Brandenburg"64, although the Czech Republic
and Poland were far worse hit by the floods than their German counterparts. This
being so, one may ask whether the neighbours on either side of the Eastern frontier
of the European Union are really growing together?
One possible, negative, answer is that some communes next to the Eastern
frontier of the European Union, specifically on the Czech and Polish side, do not
actually take part in Euroregions. This may either be due to the respective Polish or
Czech spatial planning organisation; more importantly, however, it may be linked
to their reluctance to work in close co-operation with Germany which may be
attributed to the historical fear of a revival of German hegemony and German
economic expansionism.65
A second negative answer may be based on recent opinion polls in the
Polish-German borderlands in Frankfurt/Slubice during autumn 1998. Although
33% of borderlanders feel that their geographical situation is privileged and that the
opening of the border has decreased existing prejudices and Feindbilder - 82% of
Germans think that Poles are friendly, compared to 86% of Poles who think that
their German neighbours are sympathetic66 - the same opinion polls have also
shown that 58% of Germans and 33% of Poles believe that former prejudices
towards the 'other' have been strengthened and new ones have been created. In a
different survey, 24% ofGermans and 35% of Poles assert that their former positive
attitude towards the 'other' has changed to negative, 19% of Germans do not like the
63 Polish Ambassador Byrt in Bonn cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1997); "Polens
Botschafter dankt ftir Hilfe aus Deutschland", July 28, 1997. My translation.
64 Staunton, Denis (1997); "Pfennigs from heaven for Germany's flood victims" in The Guardian,
September 27, 1997.
65 Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum"
in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im
ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 54.
66
Kupper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein FluB, zwei Stadte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999.
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Poles and 26% of Poles do not find the Germans sympathetic. To this, one should
add that 29% of young Germans and 4% of young Poles believe that 'the majority
of Poles/Germans are criminals'.67 In Frankfurt and Slubice, 47% ofGermans would
welcome Poles 'as citizens of the same city; whereas only 36% of Poles think the
same about Germans.68 Despite the fact that Gorlitz is being praised as the double
border town on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, its Mayor Matthias
Lechner has only recently referred to Gorlitz as the town with two nations.69
The Polish grievances may be attributable to a mixture of disappointment
and resentment. On the one hand, the promises made about the flourishing West,
wealthy capitalism and Germany as the rich helpful neighbour, have partially
remained unfulfilled. On the other hand, the feeling of apprehensiveness vis-a-vis
the 'aggressive Germans' was heightened in October 1997, after allegations that
German border police had arrested and beaten Polish lorry drivers, because they had
protested about the long waiting hours/days at German-Polish border controls.
Particularly amongst the younger generation there is a widespread fear that the
Poles could become a "nation of waiters and cleaning ladies. Second status
citizens."70 A young Polish girl already feels that, in Germany, she is "treated worse
than somebody who comes from a poorer country... like an inferior."71 To this come
the problems of economic competition,72 smuggling and car theft, as well as
67
Kiipper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein FluB, zwei Stadte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999. See also Sudwestfunk - ARD (1997); "Europamagazin",
December 13, 1997, 13:05; Institute for Western Affairs of Poznan (1995); "Otwarta granica, Raport
z badan na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim 1991-1993" in Lepesant, Gilles (1996); Geopolitique des
frontieres orientates de I'Allemagne dans la perspective d'un elargissement de 1'Union Europeenne
et de I'OTAN, Doctoral Thesis, p. 255; According to an opinion poll on the German-Polish border in
1994, 26% of Poles found the Germans sympathetic - this was an increase of 3% from the preceding
year (1993), in Holzer, Jerzy (1996); "Polen in Europa: Zentrum oder Peripherie?" in
Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung (ed.); Europabilder in Mittel- und Osteuropa, p. 92.
68 Kiipper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein FluB, zwei Stadte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999.
69 Lesch, Markus (1997); "Man spricht Polnisch" in Die Welt, April 4, 1997. According to Matussek,
Matthias (1996); "Grenze ohne Schatten" in Der Spiegel, No. 41/1996, p. 160, the same may be said
about Frankfurt/Oder.
70 Sudwestfunk - ARD (1997); "Europamagazin", December 13, 1997, 13:05. My translation.
71 Sudwestfunk - ARD (1997); "Europamagazin", December 13, 1997, 13:05. My translation. Also in
Matussek, Matthias (1996); "Grenze ohne Schatten" in Der Spiegel, No. 42/1996, p. 145.
72 Jurczek, Peter (1998); "Chancen und Probleme der grenzuberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit an der
deutschen Ostgrenze" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende
Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 116.
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prostitution - for a primarily German clientele - on the Eastern side of the frontier.
Germans, on the other hand, may show disapproval towards their neighbours and
content themselves with Polenwitze, jokes about the Poles, which are full of
prejudices and generally portray the Poles as poor, unorganised, untidy, lazy and
avaricious people.
These negative perceptions of the 'other' make the psychological challenge
of the Eastern frontier of the European Union and the civil differences between its
borderlands more apparent. These differences are possibly nurtured and
strengthened by the economic gap and border of affluence. Is it therefore too early
to talk about a coming together of people on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union? Has the increase of economic and political co-operation on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union - praised by politicians as a sign of rapprochement
between EU and non-EU member states - not been accompanied by a veritable
coming together of people on either side of the frontier?
According to Gilles Lepesant, borderlanders still live back to back and
continue to be "in search of security and identity."73 He attributes this partly to the
socio-economic context, such as the gap in standards of living and the fact that
borderlands are still dependent on central government and its policies, as well as
judicial restrictions. But there are also historical reasons - German hegemony and
the expulsions of populations from these areas.74 To overcome these negative
feelings and "the walls in the head"75, a great deal still needs to be done.
Transborder co-operation and Euroregions are not, as was mentioned above, a
panacea to resolve the "[rjeally difficult issues of conflict in frontier regions.... The
main potential sources of conflict... are of various kinds."76 Transborder
73 Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontieres orientales de l'UE" in Collection
DIEM; L'Europe mediane en transition, chapter 10. My translation.
74 Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontieres orientales de l'UE" in Collection
DIEM; L'Europe mediane en transition, chapter 10.
7- Harvie, Christopher (1995); "Boundaries and Identities: The Walls in the Head", Lecture given at
ISSI, Edinburgh, October 25, 1995.
76 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier Co-operation - History and Theory" in Brunn, Gerhard
and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenziiberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie -
Empirie - Praxis, p. 93.
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associations are vital - but on their own not sufficient- instruments to join the EU
and the Central Eastern European countries or to absorb the social economic
problems of the borderlands.
Euroregions are first steps to bring the people on either side of the frontier
closer together, to intensify personal and official contacts, as well as to correct
existing stereotypes and prejudices. Euroregions on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union may "minimise conflicts, [but] cannot make them disappear.
Cross-border co-operation on paper does not solve the problems on the ground".77
Cross-border co-operation must be complemented by the people's willingness to co¬
operate. Obstacles to this co-operation continue to be the language barrier, as well
as the difference between the currencies' purchasing power and the different
national characters. Historical events and insufficient information on cross-border
co-operation also play an important role.78 As seen in the section above, borderlands
and their respective Euroregions do not yet enjoy the necessary degree of autonomy
to handle their own economic and political affairs, but their problems are being
bureaucratised by the respective central governments. They "are struggling for
national, European Union and even local recognition"79, since they "are often
hemmed in and consequently isolated from national - and a fortiori European -
decision making centres."80 According to a 1996 Czech opinion poll on the
German-Czech border, borderlanders in Bohemia wish to attain more self-
governing powers and stronger forms of transfrontier co-operation.81
In addition, more should be done on a European level, particularly in the
domain of human resources and the transfer of civil and social rights, namely social
77 Monika Wulf-Mathies, European Commission DG XVI; "Official Opening" of Forum: Regions
and cities: co-operation beyond the borders of the Union in the European Parliament in Brussels,
June 11-12, 1997. My translation.
78 Jerabek, Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenziiberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im
tschechisch-deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.);
Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 93-98.
77 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier Co-operation - History and Theory" in Brunn, Gerhard
and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenziiberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie -
Empirie - Praxis, p. 91.
80
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europaischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Citizen's Europe: the case of
border regions, p. 3-4.
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security and related rights, the freedom of movement for workers, social protection
and the mutual recognition of diplomas82. Extending these rights to the future EU
member states would mean the implementation of: "(i) Formal systems of
representation of the populations affected by these matters, (ii) Reciprocal
citizenship rights, (iii) Special legal rules and courts to deal with conflicts."83 These
rights would constitute a big leap towards enlargement and extension of European
citizenship rights. Furthermore, this transfer of rights would also open up new
dynamics and opportunities to the borderlanders, as well as to the minorities living
in the borderlands of the Eastern frontier of the European Union.
The role of minorities in the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the
European Union
After the Second World War, European border settlements trapped
significant minorities inside the 'wrong' states. Specifically, minorities in the
Communist Central Eastern European states were either ignored or expelled as a
result of the radical homogenisation processes taking place in these regimes.
Despite some steps taken towards reconciliation in the post-Cold War period, the
minority problems still remain delicate, since "ethnic minorities resist
assimilation"84 with the national culture of the heartland. Minorities' demands for
recognition seem to be a pull into the opposite direction of the consolidation
process. Minorities have taken it upon themselves to keep issues of ethnicity and
identity on the national agenda. They induce central government to loosen control
over them and wish to attain some degree of autonomy, in order to secure some
degree of local democracy. Brigid Laffan argues that
81 Jerabek, Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenziiberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im
tschechisch-deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.);
Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 93-98.
82 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europaischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Citizen's Europe: the case of
border regions, p. 6-7.
83 Anderson, Malcolm (1983); "The political problems of frontier regions" in Anderson, Malcolm
(ed.); Frontier regions in Western Europe, p. 12.
84 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From Barrier to Junction, p. 11.
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[minority problems are potentially explosive because of the historic weakness of
liberalism in this part of Europe. The nation-state link is very different in the two
parts of Europe because of radically different stages of development.85
The German-Polish Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly
Co-operation, signed in June 1991, is a "social pact which lays out the conditions
for the living together between Poles and Germans."86 The Treaty addresses the
Silesian question in particular. Silesia is not directly situated on the German-Polish
border, but 200 kms away on the Polish-Czech border. Nevertheless, Silesia is
considered as a German-Polish border region, whose complicated status may only
be resolved by both the German and Polish governments. The Treaty on Good
Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation stresses that the German
minority question must be approached and worked out in co-operation between the
two countries.
The German government has supported the Silesian minority since 1990 by
providing financial means to promote the German language and German culture,
but the Polish government is still reluctant to follow the German example. The
Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation guarantees that
the Polish national government will respect the Silesians' sense of identity, under
the condition that the minority pays allegiance to the Polish state.87 For some
Silesians, this means that they "must accept that they belong to Polish society (as
constituted by the state), if not to the Polish nation (in the Herderian sense of the
ethnic nation)."88 As a reaction to this, some Silesians are engaged in a struggle for
self-determination, demanding a greater degree of autonomy from the Polish
government. The 'Movement of Silesian Autonomy', for example, "wants the
historical regions of Upper Silesia... to control everything except the police, the
85 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 1, p. 92.
86 Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontieres orientales de l'UE" in Collection
DIEM; L'Europe mediane en transition, chapter 10. My translation.
87
Lepesant, Gilles (1996); Geopolitique des frontieres orientales de I'Allemagne dans la perspective
d'un elargissement de I'Union Europeenne et de I'OTAN, Doctoral Thesis, p. 87.
88 Dressier Holohan, Wanda and Ciechocinska, Maria (1996); "The recomposition of identity and
political space in Europe: The case of Upper Silesia" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M.
(eds.) Borders, Nations and States, p. 165.
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army, the courts and foreign policy."89 Together with the Polish 'League of
Regions', the Silesian Movement advocate a German-style federalism for Poland, as
well as the alignment to European structures in order to facilitate Poland's entry into
the European Union. The Polish government has already introduced plans to
decentralise government and to render it more democratic. It envisages to reduce
the present 49 voivodships to 12 or 14 regions and to create two new tiers of
government. But according to The Economist,
the new Poland will not be a German-style federation. Poland is still too twitchy
about its newly regained sovereignty to give regions and counties the wide powers
that the German Lander (states) enjoy.... Nationalist MPs from Solidarity Electoral
Action... fret that devolution will encourage western regions to co-operate more
closely with Berlin than with Warsaw.90
Similar to the Silesian situation, the Sudeten are also engaged in a struggle
for legal and political rights of self-determination. The Treaty on GoodNeighbourly
Relations and Friendly Co-operation between Germany and former Czechoslovakia
was signed in February 1992. The Treaty confirmed the course of the German-
Czech border and laid down the foundations for German-Czech cross-border co¬
operation. Co-operation between the two countries was and - to a certain extent -
still is influenced by Sudeten interest groups.91 It was only in January 1997 that a
Treaty on the 'settlement' of the Sudeten question was signed between the Czech
Republic and Germany. The Sudeten came from Bohemia to Bavaria after the end
of the Second World War.92 The Czech official text refers to the "deportation of
civilian population from occupied territories"93, but other sources suggest that the
89 The Economist, "Poland: Not so pure?", November 29, 1997.
90 The Economist (1998); "Poland's devolutionary battleground", February 7, 1998.
91 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europdischen Union, p. 78.
92 In Bavaria, however, many cities and towns were destroyed during the war and could not provide
any means of accommodation to the newcomers. Rural areas, on the other hand, were not as
severely affected by the War, but they also did not offer many job opportunities. A great majority of
Sudetendeutsche emigrated from these rural areas to North Bavaria where they founded enterprises.
Bohemia itself had been one of the major industrial regions of the world. The integration of the
Sudetendeutsche into the Bavarian society was very successful, as there were "no apparent
communication problems" (Bauerlein, Heinz (1970); Die Bayern in Bonn, p. 23. My translation).
Since the Sudetendeutsche "contributed to the democratic institutions in the Federal Republic of
Germany by doing a lot of political and cultural work at the local level"( Habel, Fritz Peter (1984);
The Sudeten Question, p. 12), the then Bavarian Prime Minister Hans Erhard showed his
thankfulness to the Sudetendeutsche by assuming their guardianship on behalf of Bavaria in 1954.
93 Habel, Fritz Peter (1984); The Sudeten Question, p. 3.
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Sudeten were expelled from Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1949, with
estimates that over 250,000 people died during this 'transfer'.94 It was the row over
whether the Sudeten were expelled or evacuated, together with the adequacy of the
subsequent apology, that led to the lengthy procedure of the signing of the Treaty
on the settlement of the Sudeten question. Yet, the Sudeten question seems to
remain unsettled, since a "large part of Czechs still opposes a Silesian exertion of
influence."95
Both minority groups of Sudetendeutsche and Silesians were forced to
construct an identity on ethnic grounds. Silesia, for example, was "[s]ituated
throughout the centuries at the cross-roads of differing political and cultural
influences"; Silesia
has never become entirely German or Polish but has generated a mixed identity
which is more regional than national.... Silesia nowadays demonstrates a
borderland consciousness which is indigenous rather than imposed and which
reflects the interaction of the economic, linguistic and political influences of
Germany with those of Poland.96
From this account, one may conclude that Silesians have developed an
identity which is neither Polish nor German. For Silesians, there seems to be no
polarisation between a German or Polish identity, but an interiorisation of both. In
an attempt to compensate for the gap between their dual sense of identity and their
nationality, Silesians seek recognition from central governments on either side of
the frontier. They wish to defend their specific regional identities, which were long
suppressed under the communist regime. Turning to the respective central
governments has proven difficult, and it seems as if Silesians seek the attention and
protection of the European Union. Some experts argue that Silesians support the
establishment of a Silesian Euroregion, in which they may accommodate aspects of
both their German and Polish identities within a broader European framework:
94 Habel, Fritz Peter (1984); The Sudeten Question, p. 11.
95 Jurczek, Peter (1998); "Chancen und Probleme der grenztiberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit an der
deutschen Ostgrenze" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzubergreifende
Kooperation im ostlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 119. My translation.
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One example is the demand for the autonomy of Silesia and for a Silesian
Euroregion which is aimed at limiting the sovereignty of the Polish State and
putting Upper Silesia under the protection of Europe.... Broad public opinion and
many intellectuals considered it to be the first step toward autonomy in the lands
acquired after the Second World War. In particular, such plans put to the test the
very nature of bonds linking the region to Poland and led some to believe in the
gradual incorporation of the cross-border regions into the German state. Some
were convinced that entrance into the European fold could be achieved only
through alliance with the Germans and by transforming Silesia into an
autonomous zone. Many saw in Euroregions a possibility for some countries to
extend their influence beyond their borders and to fulfil long-standing territorial
claims. In this context, the debate quickly took on dramatic and emotional
overtones ,97
This chapter has suggested that the Eastern frontier of the European Union
is subject to a number of paradoxes.98 The border seems to be a barrier and a bridge,
at which various political, economic and cultural systems collide and where co¬
operation and many personal contacts have resulted and benefited from this coming
together (individual transfrontier co-operation projects and Euroregions alike). Yet,
cross-border co-operation cannot make the border disappear, but foster border
experience.99 Transborder co-operation and Euroregions suffer from a lack of self-
management, so that their success remains in the hands of the political atmosphere
between national capitals.100 Yet, one should not dismiss that social and cultural
transborder activities at local level are important initiatives that offer both
borderlanders and minorities a framework, in which they may assert their
submerged identities101 and foster their stance in the European integration process.
The increasing number of contacts between borderlands, are primary
examples which demonstrate that political and cultural frontiers do not always
96 Dressier Holohan, Wanda and Ciechocinska, Maria (1996); "The recomposition of identity and
political space in Europe: The case of Upper Silesia" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M.
(eds.) Borders, Nations and States, p. 155, 156.
"7 Dressier Holohan, Wanda and Ciechocinska, Maria (1996); "The recomposition of identity and
political space in Europe: The case of Upper Silesia" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M.
(eds.) Borders, Nations and States, p. 167, 171.
98 For a detailed account of these paradoxes, see Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzraume
in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming.
99 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europaischen Union, p. 95.
100 Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate,
Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenziibergreifende Kooperation im ostlichen
Mitteleuropa, p. 161.
Chapter 4.C - 269
coincide. They seem to show that cultural frontiers may actually be "just as strong,
and... may one day pose a threat to the state's power at its borders or at its core."102
The incongruity of political and cultural frontiers may create porous or fluid
frontiers, or, as Michel Foucher argues "a 'fuzzy logic', less rational but allowing
historical transition to take place in remote places."103 Assessing the consequences
of this 'fuzzy frontiers model' for the emergence of a European identity, fuzzy
frontiers seem to strip the term European identity from its traditional meaning of
European Union or Western European identity. Acknowledging this could be a step
towards bringing Mitteleuropa, specifically the Central Eastern European countries,
back into Europe, reasserting the European dynamic in full. Both Euroregions and
Mitteleuropa are a "laboratory for the design of the essence of a 'new' Europe."104
Having suggested that Central Eastern European countries may not
contribute their own input to the larger European project if they rush into European
Union membership - without suggesting that Eastern EU enlargement should rely
on a one-to-one reciprocity - prospective members, and specifically borderlands,
could set an important example for the emergence of a genuine and diverse
European identity. Drawing on what once was "a near-paradise of cultural, ethnic,
and linguistic multiplicity and compatibility, producing untold cultural and
intellectual riches"105, Central Eastern European countries and borderlands on the
Eastern frontier of the European Union have the perfect prerequisites to
accommodate inter-ethnic relations within and between states. They seem to
represent new models of co-habitation for (Europe's) multi-ethnic societies at the
threshold of the new millennium.
101 phrase adapted from Brigid Laffan (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe"
in Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 1, p. 92.
102 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 11.
103 Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its Long-lasting Variable Geography" in Bort, Eberhard
and Keat, Russell (eds.); The Boundaries of Understanding: Essays in Honour of Malcolm
Anderson, p. 169.
104 Steiner, M. and Sturm, D. (1993); "Interregional Cooperation and Transborder Activities in a
middle European Context" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks,
border regions and European integration, p. 177.
105 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (eds.); Eastern
Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 48.
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On this assumption, the next chapter will attempt to assess in how far a
'new' Europe may develop a genuine European identity. It will draw on culture,
since European culture seems to constitute the basis on which the many different
national, regional and sub-regional cultures could co-exist. But why necessarily
culture? Why should culture become a primary factor and no longer solely play a
compensatory role in the European integration process106? Is European culture able
to transcend the deep-seated psychological and political Eastern frontier of the
European Union?
106 GroB, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regional. p. 132.
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5 EUROPEAN IDENTITY
In chapter three, it has been argued that European integration theories,
together with EU measures such as the introduction of European citizenship,
directed towards the fostering of a European identity, are important approaches, but
on their own insufficient to explain the emergence a European identity. The
European Union still seems to be a "half-way house"1 whose objectives and finalite
politique remain ill-defined. Efficiency and impact of EU means and policies to
define or promote a European identity could become even more moderate, if not
negligible, in view of further EU enlargement towards the East.
Therefore, it is high time to adopt a modified, if not altogether different,
theoretical framework for the European integration process and European identity.
This chapter will draw on the theory of Liberal Nationalism, to demonstrate that
local, regional and national identities are able to co-exist with an EU identity and a
wider European identity: they are complementary and mutually re-enforcing.
Liberal Nationalism "is predicated on the idea that all nations should enjoy
equal rights, and in fact derives its universal structure from the theory of individual
rights found at its core"2. Accordingly, Liberal Nationalism supports the idea that
the modern nation-states are composed of different national groups, while being
embedded in a network of international relations. For the European Union and
Europe, this would mean that Liberal Nationalism acknowledges and gives
expression to Europe's plurality of cultures. Liberal Nationalism would secure the
member states' individual interests and uniqueness vis-a-vis one another, and set out
the framework for a common identity at the same time. It can then be argued that
encouraging co-operation among nations is advantageous on three counts. First, it
allows members of small nations to lead a full and satisfying national life. Second,
it contributes to individual freedom by relieving pressures to assimilate as a way
of improving the economic or occupational prospects of members of minorities.
Co-operation aims, as far as possible, to equalise the prospects of all national
communities regarding their chances of becoming objects of choice. Third, it
1 Wallace, William (1983); "Less than a federation - more than a regime: The Community as a
political system" in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William and Webb, Carol (eds.); Policy-making in the
European Union, p. 434.
2 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 9.
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fosters the idea that developing a prosperous national life is not contingent on
closure and isolation but rather on the development of transnational ties, serving to
allay the more ethnocentric and xenophobic aspects of nationalism.3
But to ensure co-operation across European countries, and specifically
between the European Union and the Central Eastern European countries,
transborder co-operation projects - supplementing the Association Agreements - are
not enough. What is necessary is an all-encompassing approach which affects the
people ofEurope directly.
The development of transnational ties would engender a "pluri-
appartenance"4 which could be fortified with the concept of European citizenship,
based on Jurgen Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism. Since Constitutional
Patriotism is not subject to a hierarchical order of identities or membership, but
subject to co-operation and mutual recognition, it is often taken as a primary
example able to lock the concept of European identity in. Similarly, but on a
different level, the previous chapter indicated that borderlands may also represent
ideal prototypes, in which parameters for a genuine European identity may evolve.
Combined with the notion of culture, this chapter will detach itself from
concentrating on the large amount of traditional literature available on European
identity. Instead, it will complement, as well as add a new dimension to the analysis
of European identity by arguing that Constitutional Patriotism and the multi¬
cultural character of borderlands seem to be useful means to foster a genuine
European identity. Culture has soft borders, it is as fluid and abstract as the concept
of Europe itself. More importantly, however, one may argue that Constitutional
Patriotism and the concept of European culture are based on Friedrich Riickerfs
idea that
Nicht die Verschiedenheit soil ausgestrichen sein,
Doch des Verschiednen Streit soli ausgeglichen sein.5
3 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 153 - 154.
4 Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions europ^ennes et leur contribution & la constitution d'une
identity et d'une politique culturelle europdenne" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p. 73.
My translation.
5 Friedrich Ruckert cited in Sven Papcke (1992); "Who needs European identity?" in Nelsen, Brian,
Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The idea of Europe - Problems of national and
transnational identity, p. 62. "Difference should not be extinguished/Rather the conflict of
difference harmonized".
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5. A Which theoretical approach is best applicable to the emergence
of a European identity?
The answer to this question certainly depends on one's conception of the
nationalist doctrine. If one were to consider the creation of a genuine European
identity in primarily ethnic terms, then the possibilities for its emergence are fairly
slim. On the other hand, a civic perspective on identity, which views the nation as a
political community held together by common laws and institutions, would make
the assertion of both national and European identities into a common European
project much more feasible. National and European identities could then become
complementary and, in the unlikely event of conflict between the two, differences
would be subject to pragmatic and situational solutions.
It will be a challenge for a genuine European identity to combine both these
civic and ethnic conceptions of identity, since every identity "contains civic and
ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and
territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular
components that are emphasized."6
According to Anthony D. Smith, "there can be no collective identity without
shared memories or a sense of continuity on the part of those who feel they belong
to that collectivity."7 Smith is very pessimistic about the emergence of a European
identity, because
[gjiven the multiplicity of language groups and ethnic heritages in Europe, it is
reasonable to expect the persistence of strong ethnic sentiments in many parts of
the continent, as well as the continuity or periodic revival of national identities,
fuelled by the quest for ethnic traditions and cultural heritages of distinctive
myths, memories and symbols.8
Smith stresses the importance of strong, well-established ethno-national
aspects and traditions of the various existing identities. However, Smith argues,
these aspects and traditions are only applicable to the national level and not the
6 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 13.
7 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 58.
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European dimension. According to Smith, Europe "lacks a pre-modern past - a
'prehistory' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth."9
At the same time, however, Smith acknowledges that the future success of the
European integration project is in need of a European identity. This identity cannot
be created overnight; it must grow. The various European policies, mentioned in
chapter three, can be seen as stepping stones into the right direction.
It is difficult to manufacture a common European history and ethnicity.10
Rewriting history from a European perspective, such as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's
Europe: a history of its people11 is tentative, but inadequate, since history and
identity evolve "through the age of old mechanisms."12 Furthermore, it also proves
to be problematic to foster a European identity from the top. To take an example,
we have seen in chapter three that the introduction of European citizenship as a
means to create a European identity is not, on its own, strong or sufficient enough
to develop a European identity. To use Smith's words, the concept of European
citizenship is the search for "something 'beyond' national identity"13.
But, even if it were possible to override the various national identities for a
European identity, this kind of European identity could imply the creation of a
European ethnicity that could come close to the idea of homogeneity. And notions
of homogeneity are not only dangerous14, but also impossible to achieve, since a
political state border
8 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 64.
9 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 62.
10 Howe, Paul (1995); "A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 1, p. 33.
11 Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people.
12 Jo Shaw cited in Kershen, Anne J. (1998); "Introduction: A Question of Identity" in Kershen,
Anne J. (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 10.
13 Shaw, Jo (1998); "Citizenship of the Union: Towards post-national membership?" in Academy of
European Law (ed.); Collected Essays ofthe Academy ofEuropean Law, Vol. 6/ Book 1, p. 279.
14 According to Karlheinz Reif, the idea of creating a homogeneous European demos or nation is
dangerous, because "Nation Europa was one of Hitler's propaganda instruments during the 1939-45
war" and because '"European Political Union' would be and will remain a multinational and
multilingual political system for handling affairs no longer manageable at national or regional level"
(Reif, Karlheinz (1993); "Cultural convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European
Identity" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European Identity and the Searchfor Legitimacy, p. 151).
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can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or it can include them
all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not
incorporating all the national and yet also including some non-nationals.15
Smith agrees and argues that "the lack of congruence between the state and
the nation is exemplified in the many 'plural' states today"16:
[T]he vast majority of contemporary states are 'plural' in character - that is, they
have more than one ethnic community within their borders and so cannot claim to
be true 'nation-states' in the strict sense - they aspire to become at least 'national
states' with a common public culture open to all citizens. Their claim to
legitimacy, in other words, is based on the aspiration of a heterogeneous
population to unity in terms of public culture and political community, as well as
popular sovereignty.17
Homogeneity, however, "is not among the requisite underpinnings for a
community of Europeans."18 Nor does Smith believe in complete homogeneity, that
is a homogeneity which is based on pure 'cultural homogeneity'. Rather, Smith
supports the idea of "unification and identification around core values, myths,
symbols and traditions, expressed in common customs and institutions, as well as a
common homeland."19 In order to illustrate this, Smith refers to the example of
Switzerland: the Swiss have resisted cultural homogenisation, but achieved
"political unity; they have also retained a clear sense of historical individuality,
despite their linguistic, religious and cantonal divisions."20
National identification can thus be "fundamentally multidimensional...
composed of analytically separable components - ethnic, legal, territorial, economic
and political."21 This model of multiple identities may be summarised under the
term of 'collective identity'22, which, Smith argues, should not be confused with an
individual's possession of multiple identities, since individual identity refers to the
15 Gellner, Ernest (1983); Nations andNationalism, p. 1.
16 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 15.
17 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 62.
18 Howe, Paul (1995); "A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 33/ No. 1, p. 28.
19 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 146.
20 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 146.
21 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 60.
22 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 59.
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identification with "families, villages or towns, regions, age and sex groups, classes,
religious, ethnic and national communities, as well as humanity as a whole."23
According to Smith, these individual identity factors rarely conflict, since
individuals tend to move between them as the situation requires. He states that
individual identity is "usually 'situational', if not always optional."24 This means that
an individual may identify oneself and be identified by others in different ways in
different situations: "when one goes abroad, one tends to classify oneself (and be
classified by others) differently from one's categorization at home."25
At the collective identity level, however, the individual is no longer the
focus of attention. Here, "it is not the options and feelings of individuals that
matter, but the nature of the collective bond."26 Collective identities "tend to be
pervasive and persistent. They are less subject to rapid changes and tend to be more
intense and durable"27. An example for collective identities is "national
identification [which] has become the cultural and political norm, transcending
other loyalties in scope and power."28 The majority of European nation-states enjoy
a large degree of legitimacy and popular sovereignty from their respective peoples.
The state is usually seen as representing the will of the nation, and the nation seems
willed to be represented by the state.
This, however, is not the case for the European Union. The construction of
the European Union differs considerably from the development of the nation-state.
The European nation-states generally, came about as a result of internal drives,
external forces, or even coercion.29 The European integration process, however, is
the result of political and economic choices established by the nation-states. Its
fundamental basis was "more rational than passionate, so that it was difficult to gain
23 Smith, Anthony D. (1993); "The ethnic sources of nationalism" in Survival, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 49.
24 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 59.
25 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 59.
26 Smith, Anthony D. (1995); Nations and Nationalism, p. 154.
27 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 59.
28 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 58.
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the interest of the majority of citizens."30 It is an economic and political union
which is rationally constructed and deliberately created for a particular purpose.
The European project may be characterised as a "voluntary association"31 of
European nation-states. Adopting Alan Milward's argument that European
integration came to the rescue of the nation-state, the European integration process
can be seen as subject to national interests. National identities continue to remain, if
not to grow, and "experience suggests that the European Union will not
automatically develop into something more than the Zollverein kept together by
expectations of profit on the part of individual member states."32 Furthermore, M.
Spiering argues that:
[o]nly if an ideology of Europeanism were to develop, as an ideology of
nationalism has developed in the past, would it be possible, after a period of
conflict and identity destruction, for a sense of a common European identity to
come into being.33
This would suggest that the achievement of full European unity and a
genuine European identity could only follow the same development as that of the
nation-states and their respective national (ethnic) identities. For Smith, "the only
way in which a truly united Europe could emerge is through the slow formation of
common European memories, traditions, values, myths and symbols, in the image
of the ethnie and the nation."34 To do so, and according to Hobsbawm, new
traditions must be invented, in an "attempt to establish continuity with a suitable
historical past."35
29 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 124.
30 Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions europ^ennes et leur contribution a l'emergence d'une
identite et d'une politique culturelle europeenne" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite europeenne, p. 62.
My translation.
31 Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.);
European identity and the searchfor legitimacy, p. 78.
32 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 124-125.
33 Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and
Identity in Europe, p. 125.
34 Smith, Anthony D. (1995); Nations andNationalism, p. 142.
35 Hobsbawm, Eric (1983); "Introduction" in Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, T. (eds.); The Invention
ofTradition, p. 1.
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But is this the only solution? The present situation suggests that it is
impossible to override, or at least to deconstruct, existing national identities so that
they give way to a European identity. A European identity may not be created in the
same way as a national identity:
attempts to persuade Europeans to regard themselves as homogenized Europeans
are bound to fail. Moreover, there is the widely accepted view in current literature
that, at present, it is not possible to speak of a 'European nation'. There is no EU
people. When speaking of 'the people', this term is not yet used in its singular form
as far as the EU is concerned. It is still the 15 'peoples' of the Member States
which constitute the Union.36
Similarly, Anthony Smith argues that "Europeans differ amongst themselves
as much as from non-Europeans in respect of language..., territory..., law..., religion
... and economic political system - as well as in terms of ethnicity and culture."37 He
agrees, however, that most European traditions are shared to varying degrees.
Therefore, he does not advocate the well-known principle of 'unity in diversity', but
proposes a model of 'families of cultures', a "rich melange of cultural assumptions,
forms and traditions, a cultural heritage that creates sentiments of affinity between
the peoples of Europe."38 For him, 'families of cultures' "tend to come into being
over long time-spans and are the product of particular historical circumstances,
often unanticipated and unintentional."39 Families of cultures do not do away with
national identities, but would incorporate them as the bedrock for a European
identity - an identity based on 'trans-national' identities, possibly leading to a "post-
national"40 identity.
The continuing co-existence of national identities is seen as necessary, since
national identities, together with a sense of belonging, "play an important part in
36 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies. Vol. 34/ No. 2, p. 213. Chapter three, section aii, discusses the implications if the
Treaty on European Union had introduced the term 'people' rather than 'peoples' in its Preamble.
37 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 70.
38 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 174.
39 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 71.
40 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. ix.
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individuals' self-understanding."41 National identities are fundamental to each
citizen. A Pan-nationalist movement with "popular resonance" would be needed
which "overarches but does not abolish individual nations.... The forging of a deep
continental cultural identity to support political unification may well require an
ideology of European cultural exclusiveness."42
If European identity cannot be defined along ethnic lines and may not yet be
defined in civic terms, on what basis could a European identity emerge? How may
the uneasy co-existence between the Community and its constituent member states
be overcome? Should traditional concepts of identity be abandoned in order to give
way to a new or alternative concept of identity? Which theoretical approach
accommodates best a newly emerging European identity?
The European Union, it has been continuously stressed, is not a state, nor a
nation. Instead, as we have seen in chapter three, the European Union is a new form
of governance which incorporates multiple levels of decision-making, as well as
various different national identities. Therefore, one of the ways to make the concept
of European identity feasible would be to, as Weiler says, decouple the notion of
identity from the concept of the nation and, particularly, from the nation-state. What
then remains is "man, with his desires and his needs"43, that is the individual who is
"the slave neither of his race, nor his language, nor his religion, nor of the windings
of his rivers and mountain ranges."44
Nations are certainly not eternal. However, the claim that they will have
ends is very far reaching.45 Is it not rather the case that a nation - existing at a
certain moment in history - is subject to change, while the core remains? Looking at
41 McCormick, Neil (1996); "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political
Studies, No. 44, p. 565. This has already been explored in chapter two and the significance for the
individual's sense of him/herself.
42 Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 175 and Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National
identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 76.
43 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmem, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 204.
44 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmem, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 205.
45 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmem, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 204.
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Renan's approach to the nation seems to turn the majority of traditional theoretical
approaches on their head. What has become important is to focus on both the
individual and the nation. This bottom-up rather than top-down model is also
endorsed in Anthony Cohen's idea of "personal nationalism" which sees nations as
"socially given". For Cohen, a nation's consciousness is experienced by individuals
as persons who know where they belong and do not belong. The individuals'
various identities resemble a "puzzle"46 of partially overlapping ideas and
interpretations about the nation-state.
Similarly, the theory of Liberal Nationalism also attempts to attach national
identity to personal identity, representing a "new nationalism, an acceptable and
perhaps even mandatory nationalism that is intrinsically liberal in character."47
Liberal Nationalism
breaks away from the liberal tendency to describe nationalism as resting merely on
irrational... fears of "the stranger", as motivated by a morally irrelevant attraction
to what is similar, by an unscrupulous desire for power, or as an excuse to grab
advantages for one nation at the expense of others.48
Liberal Nationalism relies heavily on the concept of liberalism49, in which
the human being is seen as an individual, rather than as a member of a social group
or community. On the level of international relations, supporters of the Liberal
Nationalist theory, like Realists, accept the condition of anarchy50 as the primary
starting point of all relations. They fear that a world of sovereign nations, without
any international laws or organisations, would degenerate into a 'state of nature'.
Unlike Realists, however, Liberal Nationalists believe in possibilities to maintain
order by way of establishing common institutions and organisations. These would
help to foster co-operation between states, in order to achieve greater benefits and
46 Cohen, Anthony (1994); Self-consciousness: an Alternative Anthropology ofIdentity, p. 12.
47 MacCormick, Neil (1996); "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political
Studies, No. 44, p. 562.
48 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 4.
49 Liberalism is often understood as a political ideology which is heavily based on individualism. In
this sense, Liberals seek to create a society - even a national society or community - in which
individuals can develop their identity freely and pursue their individual 'good'. To this end,
individuals enjoy rights against their respective government, and more importantly rights of equality
of respect.
50 According to this view, anarchy gives rise to uncertainty which one tries to overcome by
increasing one's power, but, by doing so, one makes others feel insecure.
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the common purpose of peace and prosperity. The United Nations and, particularly,
the European Union are examples of this.
The creation of peaceful and co-operating communities, is in accordance
with Hugo Grotius' idea that interstate relations should be based on the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Similarly, in the 18th century, Kant suggested "rules which
may help states continually to live in peace with each other."51 Kant called these
rules permissive laws, since he believed that
human beings are possessed of an unsociable-sociability. By this he means that not
only do we love to be with others but also we love to separate ourselves from
them. Our best qualities develop only in co-operation and competition with our
fellow human beings, and to enjoy the warmth and reassurance of others we need
their company. Yet we are also fond of our own company.52
Similarly, Yael Tamir argues that the "contextual individual combines
individuality and sociability as two equally genuine important features." 53 On a
practical level, the 'contextual individual' signifies that each
of us occupies a physically distinct human body from every other, each with a
unique (identical twins aside) genetic inheritance, and each with a unique
(identical twins included) social situation, in the form of a set of relationships to
other individuals, and to communities and cultures, and social organisations,
associations, and institutions.54
On a more theoretical level, and in order to illustrate the theory of Liberal
Nationalism better, the 'contextual individual'
allows for an interpretation of liberalism that is aware of the binding, constitutive
character of cultural and social memberships, together with an interpretation of
nationalism that conceives of individuals as free and autonomous participants in
communal framework, who conceive of national membership in Renan's terms, as
a daily plebiscite. The concept of the contextual individual thus brings liberal and
national theories a step closer.55
Since Liberal Nationalism seeks to bring together "personal autonomy and
communal belonging"56, it may be described as being "both universalistic and
51 Williams, Howard (1992); International Relations in Political Theory, p. 84.
52 Williams, Howard (1992); International Relations in Political Theory, p. 81-82.
53 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 33.
54 MacCormick, Neil (1994); "What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World" in The Hume
Papers on Public Policy, Vol. 2/No. 1, p. 84.
55 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 33.
56 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 14.
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individualistic"57. Liberal nationalism shows that the development of personal
identity does not need to conflict with the universal features of human nature or
humankind. In fact, Liberal Nationalism contains one important aspect of Henri
Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (as discussed in chapter two), namely the social
aspect of an individual's identity, which sees "individuals as rooted in society, and
as dependent on communal relations for their moral and personal development."58
This brings us back to chapter two and the socio-psychological definition of
identity - the definition against the 'other' - and the idea that an individual's personal
identity may be subject to the context or environment in which s/he prevails.
Concepts such as culture, history, myths, language and religion are essential
features for the shaping of an individual's personal identity. The individual may
undergo changes which make it even more important not to regard the individual as
an unchangeable variable, or as totally independent of external circumstances.
Accordingly, Clifford Geertz does not believe in the "constant human nature
independent of time, place, and circumstance, of studies and professions, transient
fashions and temporary opinions"59, but asserts that human beings are "incomplete
or unfinished animals who complete or finish [them]selves through culture - and
not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it."60
What is sought, then, is a society in which each individual may develop his
or her personal identity to the best of his/her abilities. In other words, the
development of social relations between individuals should be to the benefit of each
individual concerned, so that the individual is "free to develop those aspects of his
personality which are bound up with his sense of identity as a member of his
community."61 This sense of individual self-realisation or development is not about
upholding my interest against your interest, but about upholding my interest
together with your interest without making too large a sacrifice. This comes close to
57 MacCormick, Neil (1994); "What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World" in The Hume
Papers on Public Policy, Vol. 2/No. 1, p. 80.
58 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 19.
59 Geertz, Clifford (1973); The interpretation ofcultures, p. 35.
60 Geertz, Clifford (1973); The interpretation ofcultures, p. 49.
61 J. Raz cited in Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 9.
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the principle of self-determination which is, according to Yael Tamir, central to
Liberal Nationalism.
In international relations, the principle of self-determination refers to the
universal right to national self-determination.62 The universal right to national self-
determination was specifically developed in the 1966 International Covenant on
Human Rights. According to this document, all nations are equal and "(a)ll peoples
have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development"63.
Within the realm of the Liberal Nationalist theory, however, the right to
national self-determination focuses on the cultural rather than political aspects of
national life. This cultural definition of national self-determination understands the
right to national self-determination "as the right of a nation or, more precisely, the
members of a nation, to preserve their distinct existence, and to manage communal
life in accordance with their particular way of life."64 Together then, the cultural and
political version of national self-determination indicates that "those who belong to
distinct nations ought to have distinct governments based upon their distinctive
laws and customs."65
Notwithstanding the question whether each nation has the right to its own
sovereign state, the discourse on the right to self-determination begs the question
62 One should note, however, that the principle of self-determination has been subject to various
definitions and interpretations in the past and present. Self-determination has been interpreted as a
national principle during the French Revolution, followed by cultural aspirations for the unification
of Italy and Germany during the nineteenth century. After the First World War, the Wilsonian
principle of self-determination was specifically oriented towards minorities, and during the period of
decolonisation the racial aspect of the principle to self-determination was emphasised. Today, the
right to self-determination is mainly understood in ethnic terms. However, in all cases, the principle
to self-determination has never just meant independence, but the free choice of people to "choose
their own political, economic and social system and their own international status" (Cristescu,
Aureliu (1981); The right to self-determination, p. 39). This objective has its roots in the Fourteen
Points elaborated by American president Woodrow Wilson after the First World War. In 1917, he
declared that national aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed
only by their own consent. "Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle in
action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril... Peoples and provinces are not be
bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game"
(in Wambaugh, Sarah (1933); Plebiscites since the World War, p. 11).
63 Verdross, Alfred (1984); Universelles Volkerrecht, p. 316. My translation.
64 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 69.
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about 'who' or 'what' is the self in the principle of self-determination? Is it the
individual human being or the nation? And if it is the nation, how would this nation
be defined? In any case, problems may arise if the recognition of one 'self entails
the denial of the rights of a competing 'self: the altering of political and cultural
boundaries in favour for one 'side' might create new problems on the 'other'. Ideally
then, as we have seen in chapter two, political and cultural frontiers should
coincide.
This brings us back to Anthony Smith's idea that state and nation should
ideally be congruent. As we have seen, however, this is highly unlikely. It is rather
the case that the right to self-determination applies to a "recognized national
majority"66, since the "attempt to match up nations with states, and then to accord
sovereignty to each state may be the true source of evils we perceive."67 This is best
illustrated by the war in Yugoslavia, when the constituent nations of former
Yugoslavia claimed the right to national self-determination and independence as
separate independent states. Minorities within the old Yugoslav state structures
became the majority within the new state borders, and since every majority and
virtually every minority has its own minorities, the demand to the right to self-
determination "gets pushed further down the pyramid"68. The assumption that
nations are generally homogenous is misleading.
In addition to the definition given in chapter two, and with the theory of
Liberal Nationalism in mind, one may again ask, "what is a nation?"69 Renan's
famous answer that "the existence of a nation... is a daily plebiscite"70 sees the
nation in "possession... of a rich heritage ofmemories", with "the will to continue to
65 MacCormick, Neil (1982); Legal Rights andSocial Democracy, p. 260.
66 Alexander, Yonah and Friedlaender, Robert A. (1980); Self-determination: National, Regional
and Global Dimensions, p. 88.
67 MacCormick, Neil (1996); "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political
Studies, No. 44, p. 554.
68 Higgins, Rosalyn (1994); Problems and Process, p. 125.
69 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines.
70 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 203.
Chapter 5.A - 285
make the most of the joint inheritance".71 He argues that the nation is a "moral
consciousness which... is created by a great assemblage of men with warm hearts
and healthy minds"72. Benedict Anderson refers to nations as "imagined
communities"73, since "the members of even the smallest nation will never know of
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each
lives the image of their communion."74 Anderson adds that each community is
imagined differently, particularly given "the convergence of capitalism and print
technology which... created the possibility of a new form of imagined
community"75.
According to Anderson, communities and the belief in similarities amongst
members are created through culture, so that individual nations may be described as
"cultural artefacts of a particular kind."76 Each cultural artefact is demarcated by a
community's boundaries which distinguishes between a community's members and
non-members. Human imagination may thus bind communities together and
consider them as sovereign. This imagined sovereignty, Anderson argues,
was bom in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the
legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to
maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any
universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such
religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and
territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and if under God, directly so. The
gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.77
In order to preserve their uniqueness, imagined communities tend to draw
boundaries - visible or invisible ones - between themselves and the 'other'. On the
one hand, this boundary might be a protective measure to enclose or bundle a
community's political, linguistic, social and cultural aspects. On the other hand, the
71 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 203.
72 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political
Doctrines, p. 205. My emphasis.
73 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 6.
74 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 6.
75 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 46.
76 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 4.
77 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 7.
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boundary may foster a community's exclusiveness. The community's identity may
be forged
out of shared experiences, memories and myths, in relation to those of other
collective identities. They are in fact often forged through opposition to the
identities of significant others, as the history of paired conflict so often
demonstrates.78
Would therefore the "hardening of the external frontier... gradually promote
a sense of solidarity across the EU territory"79, including an enlarged European
territory?
If this means a 'fortress Europe' mentality, it seems neither feasible nor
desirable. Europe should remain open. Borrowing Neil McCormick's terms 'thin'
and 'thick' to describe a civic or ethnic nation80, Europe should be based on the thin
concept of the civic nation. Its relative openness allows Yael Tamir's 'contextual
individual' to "assimilate, break cultural ties, and move from one national
community to another."81 Contextual individuals may "retain their own culture"82
and are "able to exist in a plane of equality with only limited assimilation among
them"83. The civic model of the nation is thus a means to accommodate both an
individual's personal autonomy and national membership. It seems to be congruent
with the theory of Liberal Nationalism which is best suited to explain the
reconciliation of local, regional and national exclusivities within the wider
framework of the European Union - specifically in view of the fact that it is a
fundamental aim of the European Union to preserve the plurality of cultures, as well
as to develop a genuine European identity.
78 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 75.
79 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen andEU Enlargement, p. 33.
80
see section 3. a. ii.
81 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 32.
82 Portes, Alejandro and Fern&ndez Kelly, M. Patricia (1989); "Images of Movement in a changing
world: a review of current theories of international migration" in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.);
Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, p. 29.
83 Portes, Alejandro and Ferndndez Kelly, M. Patricia (1989); "Images of Movement in a changing
world: a review of current theories of international migration" in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.);
Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, p. 29.
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European identity should incorporate all of the existing different identities,
in order to be defined as "multiple and potentially integrational"84, a collective
toolbox which has different features at its basis. To this end, the following two
sections question in how far European citizenship - bolstered by Jurgen Habermas's
Constitutional Patriotism - and European culture are essential means to
accommodate and reconcile different identities within the overall framework of a
European identity?
84 Wintle, Michael (1996); Introduction: Cultural diversity and identity in Europe" in Wintle,
Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 2.
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5. B Emergence of a European identity?
Since the Liberal Nationalist theory implies "a right and duty of mutual
respect among diverse national traditions, with appropriate political expression of
national identities"1, it has been argued in the preceding section that Liberal
Nationalism may be the best theoretical framework to reconcile national identity
with European identity. Accordingly, there is
no reason why a European identity should not exist alongside a national one, in the
same way the nation already exists alongside gender, race, age, and all the other
aspects of identity which we have.2
To demonstrate this, European citizenship will be taken as an example to
illustrate that the European integration process is not about creating "one European
identity as was originally aspired by policy makers in the 1970s"3; instead,
European citizenship "modelled various identities thus adopting a perception of
citizens with multiple identities."4
This is also suggested by the Eurobarometer public opinion polls5, whose
1992 figures show that 62% of European citizens regarded "a sense of European
identity as being compatible with a sense of national identity." 23% believed their
"country's identity [would be] disappearing over time if a European Union came
about", while 46% thought that the European Union protected their national
identities. 30% saw the European Union as a threat to their national identities and
cultures.6
1 MacCormick, Neil (1994); "What place for Nationalism in the Modern World?" in Hume Papers
on Public Policy, Vol. 2/ No. 1, p. 92.
2 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Introduction: Cultural diversity and identity in Europe" in Wintle,
Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 2.
3 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship" in European
Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 17, p. 13.
4 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship" in European
Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 17, p. 13.
5 Please note that the following figures do not take into account socio-political, socio-structural,
socio-economic, socio-cultural, gender or demographic variables or affiliations. In addition, results
also vary across countries.
6 The 1992 Eurobarometer survey did not distinguish between questions concerning 'nationality
only', 'nationality and European', 'European and nationality', 'European only', but concentrated on
questions concerning loss or compatibility of national and European identity in general. European
Commission (1992); Eurobarometer: Report Number 38, pp. 44-47.
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Four years later, in 1996, the results of the Continuous Tracking Surveys of
European Opinion1 were fairly similar. "'In the near future', 12% of Union citizens
see themselves as 'European only', 36% still hold on to their nationality only, and
one in two claim to identify with both European and national identity."8 Merging
the figures of this 'double identity' (approx. 50%) with the sense of 'European only',
one may argue that the figure referring to citizens who see a European identity as
being compatible with their national identity has remained the same (62%) as in the
1992 Eurobarometer poll. In contrast to these 1996 figures, the Eurobarometer
1998 results9 show a decrease of the 'nationality and European identity' category by
4% to 47%. This is accompanied by a 7% downward trend of the feeling of
Europeanness from 12% to 5%, as well as an increase of 8% for the nationality only
category (44% in total).
Despite these fluctuations, the figures seem to demonstrate a strong
correlation between the citizens' sense of identity and whether citizens consider
their country's EU membership a 'good' or a 'bad' thing. The 1992 Eurobarometer
polls show that 71% were very much or to some extent supporting European
unification, whereas opposition was at 20%.10 During the 1996 and 1998
Eurobarometer surveys, the wording of the questions changed and citizens were
only "generally speaking" about their country's membership in the European Union.
Accordingly, in 1996, 58% thought that EU membership was a 'good thing',
whereas 14% regarded it as a 'bad thing'. The downward trend from 1992 continued
in 1998, when only 51% regarded EU membership as positive, but the number of
those who perceived it as negative fell by 8% to 12%.
Related to these polls, the Forward Studies Unit of the European
Commission (FSU) tabled a summary of a survey looking at public opinion and
7 European Commission (1996); Continuous Tracking Surveys of European Opinion, April 1996/
No. 8. (Surveys conducted January - March 1996).
8 European Commission (1996); Continuous Tracking Surveys of European Opinion, April 1996,
section VI.
9 European Commission (1998); Eurobarometer: Report Number 49, p. 41.
10 European Commission (1992); Eurobarometer: variables trend 1974-1992, p. 7.
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government positions in December 1995." Rather than asking samples of
populations, the FSU sent out questionnaires to the Commission's representative
offices in the EU's member states, asking them to assess the respective
government's position, as well as public opinion on the subject of European
integration.
Given the relationship between national and European identity, member
states were classified into three broad groups, according to the possible level of
conflict between national and European identity. Member states with no conflict
between national identity and European identity were the three Benelux countries,
Spain and Italy. Potential conflict was seen in Austria, Ireland, Finland, Portugal
and Greece. In France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Germany,
political union and economic and monetary union were regarded as being at odds
with traditional views of national identity. In general, the FSU's assessment about
the compatibility between national and European identity is congruent with the
national populations' breakdown from the Eurobarometer polls - except in the cases
of France, Austria, Finland and Greece and, to a certain extent, Germany.
Whereas the FSU study suggests that French national identity might be at
odds with European identity, Eurobarometer shows that the French actually feel
more European than the overall EU average and that the French regard both
national and European identities as compatible. The opposite applies to Austria,
Finland and Greece. The FSU study suggests that the national identity ofAustrians,
Finns and Greeks does not necessarily need to clash with a European identity,
although the potential of a clash exists. Eurobarometer results show, however, that
these three countries feel far more national than European. The answers given by
the Austrians, Finns and Greeks fall below the Germans' answer, whose national
identity, according to the FSU study, was seen to be at odds with a European
identity.
Due to the fact that access to the formulated questions and the
questionnaires of the FSU is limited, one should be careful to draw any firm
11 Forward Studies Unit (1995); Summary of the replies from the Commission office in Member
States to the questionnaire on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.
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conclusions. This is, primarily, because identity is difficult to measure. Moreover,
Eurobarometer 1996 and the FSU study were not carried out within the same time
frame. One could speculate that the disparity of the French, Austrian, Finnish and
Greek results may highlight a few possible problems: does the disparity signify that
the European Commission's representative offices, or even the national
governments, attempt to portray their respective citizens according to their own
policy approach? Does the disparity illustrate a possible lack of the permissive
consensus?
Judging from the Eurobarometer results and considering the general upward
trend in 'nationality' which is matched by a decline of 'European' identity, it looks as
if the prospects for the emergence of a genuine European identity are decreasing.
National identity12 is still predominant and "there are few signs of a European
identity emerging to replace old national loyalties."13 It will be "difficult to
resuscitate enthusiasm for Europe at this time of declining support"14, and reasons
for this decline in support may be found in problems concerning unemployment,
cuts in the social security budgets and the lack of a credible European foreign and
security policy. Unable to find a solution to these problems, the European Union
seems to be distant from its peoples. It seems, furthermore, that "[o]lder loyalties to
smaller nations also survive, even though these nations - the Welsh, the Basques,
the Bretons, the Bavarians - were assimilated inside the larger nation-states."15 In
surveys of 1981 and 1990, allegiance to the city and local community was stronger
than to the region, the nation-state and Europe.16 However, given the different
regionalisation structures among the European member states, it seems that a good
proportion of citizens still rather trust their national governments when it comes to
problem-solving. These governments seem to be closer to the citizen than the
12 Local and regional identities are, despite the flaws involved, taken as being part of national
identity.
13 The Economist (1995); "More-or-less European union", August 26, 1995.
14 Tindemans, Leo (1993); "Stance de cloture" in Economic and Social Committee (1993); L'Europe
des citoyens, p. 73. My translation.
15 The Economist (1995); "More-or-less European union", August 26, 1995.
16 Kerkhofs, Jean (1994); "Les valeurs des Europeens" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identite Europeenne,
p. 41.
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European Union, so that citizens wish that their national governments retain a large
degree of decision-making powers. They dread Brussels becoming an overpowering
machinery able to regulate everything. Instead, the European Union should respect,
if not protect and promote, its various constituent identities and plurality of
cultures. Assuming that citizens with a strong sense of 'nationality' are
Eurosceptics, Karlheinz Reif concludes that
the Europe they [Eurosceptics] do not want, but believe to exist already and to
have been strengthened by 'Maastricht'... never existed. On the other hand, the
'Europe' they are perfectly willing to accept if not actively to support, is more or
less the 'Europe' that currently exists, and - to an ever greater extent - the 'Europe'
defined in the Maastricht Treaty.17
In a related way, and despite the downward trend in the feeling of a
'European identity' and its compatibility with national identity, the above figures
also
show that the EU's cultural goal of fostering multiple identities is not unattainable,
although they give no indication of whether it is something that can be engineered
or must be left to evolve.18
The attempt to engineer a European identity suggests an approach 'from
above'. This may be based on the "existing institutional structure of the Union,
while little attention is given to concepts of political identity and belonging in the
Member States."19 In contrast, leaving a European identity to evolve, may be
congruous with the attempt to create a European identity 'from below'. This would
"take the experiences of political identity in the nation-state as the starting point in
the search for a post-national European political identity."20 Pulling both these
approaches together, does not induce homogenisation, nor the attempt to bind the
different European peoples into one European demos. Arguably, the present trend
in Europe's political landscape - that is the victory for centre-left parties in
17 Reif, Karlheinz (1993); "Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European
Identity" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the searchfor legitimacy, p. 150.
18 Bakir, Vian (1996);"An identity for Europe? The role of the media" in Wintle, Michael (ed.);
Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 180.
19 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National identities and citizenship in the European Union" in
European Public Law, Vol. 1/ No. 4, p. 634.
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Germany, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and the Czech
Republic - has not been reflected in a drift towards homogenisation of national
traits and idiosyncracies. According to an Eurostat study of March 1998, national
lifestyles
remain as pronounced as ever - despite persistent scares over the EU's desire to
standardise everything from money to bananas... Even within individual countries
there is [sic] lots of diversity. The thing about Europe is that the people all over
see the advantages ofworking together.21
Working together, however, does not seem to be enough to create a
European identity. The different European peoples might also need to be bound
together under a European telos, held together by European citizenship.
Emphasising a European telos, as opposed to demos,22 would allow citizens to
exercise European political civic rights and obligations that have no ethno-cultural
implications directly attached to them. As has already been argued in chapter three,
European citizenship does not aim to supersede, replace or eliminate national
citizenship. Based on the member states' nationality, it complements national
citizenship and
has evoked multiple identities as citizenship practice involved a growing number
of target groups, such as workers, wage earners, students, etc. and created access
to certain social rights, new voting rights, a 'European' passport, changed rules of
border crossing and practices that would contribute to create a feeling of
belonging.23
This brings us back to the theory of Liberal Nationalism, in which the
contextual individual, here the European citizen, may find her/himself belonging to
two different demoi simultaneously: the ethno-national one and the civic-European
one. To recall the argument made in chapter three, both demoi are "based on
20 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National identities and citizenship in the European Union" in
European Public Law, Vol. 1/ No. 4, p. 634. The same point has already been made in chapter five,
section a; see specifically Spiering's and Smith's arguments.
21 Millar, Stuart (1998); "Europe: a single market divided by a common set of statistics" in The
Guardian, March 21, 1998.
22 The idea about a genuine European demos is, as we have seen in chapter three (section 3. b. ii),
not feasible, since a European demos, as opposed to a national demos, cannot and should not be
based on ethnic-national factors.
23 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship" in European
Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/No. 17, p. 13.
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different subjective factors of identification."24 In support of this argument, Weiler
argues that
I am, say, a German national in the far-reaching ethno-cuitural identification and
sense of belongingness. I am simultaneously a European citizen in terms of my
transnational affinities to shared values which transcend the ethno-national
diversity. So much so, that in a range of areas of public life, I am willing to accept
the legitimacy and authority of decisions adopted by my fellow European citizens
in the realization that in these areas we have given preference to choices made by
my out-reaching demos, rather than by my in-reaching demos.25
All identities are to be treated as equal, and a European identity could
become the expression of the various existing identities. Weiler further suggests
that this "would be fully consistent with, say, Habermas's notion of Constitutional
Patriotism."26
As has been touched upon in chapter three, Jtirgen Habermas argues that the
connection between citizenship and national identity is purely socio-psychological
and that "[cjitizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity"27. For him,
Constitutional Patriotism would leave space for the development of a transnational
and multidimensional identity. Based on, but different to, the American and Swiss
models ofmulticulturalism,
[i]n a future Federal Republic of European States, the same legal principles would
also have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different national traditions
and histories.... [A] European constitutional patriotism would have to grow out of
different interpretations of the same universalist rights and constitutional
principles which are marked by the context of different national histories"28.
Constitutional Patriotism would imply that "to be a citizen has not only the
meaning of being a member of a particular political community, but of being part of
24 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 270.
25 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 270.
26 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 270.
27 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorising
Citizenship, p. 259.
28 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorising
Citizenship, p. 264.
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a common identity of that very community".29 And, according to Weiler, there is no
antagonism between European and national citizenship, since the allegiance to the
nation would be different from the allegiance to the European Union.
But can a European citizenship, based on Habermas's Constitutional
Patriotism, provide a shelter for the peaceful co-existence of Europe's plurality of
cultures and identities? Will it automatically bring about a European identity? It is
for certain that Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism breaks with the traditional idea
of citizenship which was "originally tailored to the size of cities and city-states"30
and which required the citizen to identify "himself 'patriotically' with a particular
form of life"31, or more precisely, a particular political culture.
In contrast to this, Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism derives from the
idea that the term nation has changed its meaning over time, suggesting that the
ethno-cultural definition of the term nation has developed into what, as we have
seen in the preceding chapter, Renan calls a 'daily plebiscite'. Renan's 'daily
plebiscite' seems to imply that citizens no longer derive their identity from an
ethnic-cultural bond, but from exercising their civil rights and obligations.
Accordingly, national identity may be formed through a citizen's allegiance to the
principle of liberal democracy and the constitutional state. Habermas argues that the
role of the citizen is given an individualist and instrumentalist reading in the
liberal traditions and natural law, starting with Locke, whereas communitarian and
ethical understanding of the same has emerged in the tradition of political
philosophy that draws upon Aristotle. From the first perspective, citizenship is
conceived in analogy with the model of received membership in an organization
which secures a legal status. From the second, it is conceived in analogy with the
model of achieved membership in a self-determining ethical community.32
Related to the Liberal-Nationalist theory, Constitutional Patriotism suggests
that the citizen is no longer solely seen as part of the whole community. Instead,
29 Ulrich PreuB (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of Europe, p.
111.
30 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorizing
Citizenship, p. 264.
31 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorizing
Citizenship, p. 263.
32 Habermas, Jtirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorizing
Citizenship, p. 261.
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"isolated individuals [are set] against a state apparatus, the two being linked only
via a relation ofmembership that regulates an exchange of benefits for functionally
specified contributions."33 Increasing globalisation contributes to the fact that
modern capitalist economies and communication systems no longer bind citizens to
their respective nation-state alone. Global markets have developed an integrative
dynamic on their own and seem to be beyond the control of the individual actors
involved. Moreover,
this system integration competes with another form of integration running through
the consciousness of the actors involved, that is, social integration through values,
norms, and processes of reaching understanding. Just one aspect of social
integration is political integration via citizenship.34
Political integration via citizenship allows, as argued in chapter three, the
dissociation - not isolation - of nationality from citizenship and of the nation from
the state. However, this new approach to citizenship leads many to believe that
"some flattened non-descript unauthentic and artificial 'Euro-culture'"35 would
develop. It would be a demos specifically created by the Community - an imagined
community - in which the loyalty towards others are feared to "go beyond the
immediate 'natural' (blood) or self-interested unit."36 However, sceptics forget that
the conceptualization of a European Demos should not be based on real or
imaginary trans-European cultural affinities or shared histories nor on the
construction of a European 'national' myth of the type which constitutes the
identity of the organic nation.37
The idea that a citizen may be a member of two polities simultaneously and
develop a double loyalty - an ethnic and a civic one - stirs some uncomfortable
feeling. There is fear that a double loyalty would "come to replace the deep, well-
33 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorizing
Citizenship, p. 262.
34 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorizing
Citizenship, p. 265.
35 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 271. This point is also raised in chapter three.
36 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 265.
37 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, Vol. 44, p. 526.
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articulated, authentic and genuine national version of the same... [and] that either
one or both loyalties have to be compromised."38 However, the old moral and ethnic
loyalty does not need to recede in order to give way to a new economic and civic
loyalty. Both loyalties need not compete with one another, because they are not cast
in the same mould. They may reinforce each other and, complementary to Weiler's
above citation on the 'in-reaching' and 'out-reaching' demos, one could add that
the national in-reaching ethno-cultural demos and the out-reaching supranational
civic demos by continuously keeping each other in check offer a structured model
of critical citizenship. Maybe, we should celebrate rather than reject with aversion,
the politically fractured self and double identity which dual membership involves
which can be seen as conditioning us not to consider any polity claiming our
loyalty to be tiber alles. This understanding of the European demos could also
constitute an understanding of its deepest telos.39
On this reading, Etienne Tassin believes that a European identity might
emerge in the future. Stressing political rather than traditional identity values,
Tassin suggests that
participation in the life of public opinions takes precedence over nationality; that,
whatever the citizen's cultural or national identity, his or her insertion in public
space is elective and not 'native'... A European political community will be born
not so much from the idea of Europe as from the idea of a public space of fellow-
citizenship which is alone capable of giving meaning to a non-national political
community. A community identity cannot give birth to a politically organized
public space; rather, a common citizenship of European peoples can emerge from
the political institution of this space.40
We have seen in chapter three that the democratic basis and legitimacy of
the European Union's political institutions are widely questioned. This is, partly,
because the European Union has evolved into a complex and sometimes
incomprehensible network of bureaucracy and institutions, and partly because
European issues are still seen through the national lens. Politics in the European
Union seem to be a reflection of the EU's member states' political cultures. This
38 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 271.
39 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics ofEuropean Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 272.
40 Tassin, Etienne (1992); "Europe: a political community?" in Mouffe, Chantal (ed.) Dimensions of
Radical Democracy, p. 189.
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gives rise to the question whether the European Union has a political culture of its
own?
Political culture is often seen as "the property of a collectivity - nation,
region, class, ethnic community, formal organization, party, or whatever"41 and a
"'mind-set' which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of
alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible."42
Similarly, Almond and Verba define political culture as the "attitudes towards the
political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the
system"43. Civic culture is, according to them, a culture in which "beliefs, feelings
and values significantly influence political behaviour and these beliefs, feelings and
values are a product of socialization experiences."44 It is a culture in which
"political culture and political structure are congruent"45. Accordingly, and
translating David Garland's argument, culture influences politics and politics
influences culture.46 Public opinion and attitudes are - traditionally - inseparable
from institutional arrangements and the introduction of new policies. Policy-makers
need to take into consideration public opinion and attitudes before introducing new
policies or institutional arrangements. This does not mean, however, that culture
and structure need to coincide, nor does it mean that all political cultures are the
same. In fact, political cultures "differ from one another"47, since each political
culture is subject to different historical events, various class systems, levels of
wealth, beliefs of political activists and a number of distinct and sometimes
antagonistic sub-cultures.48
41 Elkins, David J. and Simeon, Richard E. B. (1979); "A Cause in Search of Its Effects, or What
Does Political Culture Explain?" in Comparative Politics, Vol. 11/ January, p. 129.
42 Elkins, David J. and Simian, Richard E. B. (1979); "A Cause in Search of Its Effects, or What
Does Political Culture Explain?" in Comparative Politics, Vol. 11/ January, p. 128.
43 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (1963); The civic culture: political attitudes and
democracy in five nations, p. 13.
44 Almond, Gabriel A. (1989); "The intellectual history of the civic culture concept" in Almond,
Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, (eds.); The civic culture revisited, p. 29.
45 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (1963); The civil culture: political attitudes and
democracy in five nations, p. 31.
46 Garland, David (1994); Punishment andModern Society: a study in social theory, pp. 193-199.
47 Woshinsky, Oliver (1995); Culture and Politics, p. 68.
48 Woshinsky, Oliver (1995); Culture and Politics, p. 70-74. Political cultural theorists may be
criticised for applying the abstract concept of 'political culture' too uniformly to a collectivity.
Instead, a collectivity may contain a multiplicity of units, just as the self has a variety of 'selves'. It
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However, assuming that political cultures are "belief and value systems with
a coherence of their own"49, one may easily run danger of objectifying50 or
nationalising51 culture and, simultaneously, assimilating culture with attitudes.
Opinion polls or referenda are no reflection of a European public opinion. It could
even be argued that the European Union has no public opinion52, since the public
opinion in question "may be different from the opinion of any of the groups in the
public. [It] might be a composite opinion formed out of several opinions held by the
public."53 Similarly, it is erroneous to take culture as a uniform and "sui generis
phenomenon"54, since
culture is a not a monolithic kind of thing which can feature as a simple variable in
an explanatory formula. It is, instead, a rich composite of densely interwoven
meanings which loses all its content wherever it is discussed in generic terms.
Cultures are bric-a-brac ensembles of specifics, local details and peculiarities....
[W]hen we talk of 'culture' we refer not just to intellectual systems and forms of
consciousness but also to structures of affect and what might be called emotional
configurations or 'sensibilities'.55
Culture should not just be understood in terms of high culture, but more
importantly in 'ways of doing things'.56 So far, one cannot speak of one 'European'
way of doing things, although cynics would remind us that the EU's intransparency,
democratic deficit and the technocratic machinery of Brussels certainly constitute a
'European' way of doing things. Although there might be some truth in this
may hence be argued that political cultural theorists take homogeneity of whatever collectivity for
granted, ignoring any possible sub-groups in that collectivity.
49 Lane, Jan-Erik and Olson, Svante O. (1994); Politics andSociety in Western Europe, p. 29.
50 Wilson, Thomas and Hastings, Donnan (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international
borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Hastings, Donnan (eds.); Border Identities, p. 8.
51 Cohen, Anthony (1998); "Boundaries and Boundary-consciousness: Politicizing Cultural Identity"
in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 24.
52 Delors, Jacques (1993); "Discours d'ouverture" in Economic and Social Committee; L'Europe des
citoyens, pp. 23-29.
53 Key, Valdimer O. (1964); Public Opinion andAmerican Democracy, p. 10. See also Lane, Robert
E. and Sears, David O. (1964); Public Opinion, especially pp. 1-15.
54 Keraudren, Philippe (1996); "In search of culture: Lessons from the past to find a role for the
study of administrative culture" in Governance: An International Journal of Policy and
Administration, Vol. 9/No. 1, p. 76.
55 Garland, David (1990); Punishment andModern Society: A study in social theory, p. 200 and 195;
see also Gellner, Ernest (1996); Nations andNationalism, pp. 37-38.
56 The difficulties of defining 'culture' have been touched upon in chapter three. It generally refers to
"the sum of numerous parts amongst which we can count language, ideas, beliefs, customs, codes,
rituals, ceremonies, religion, laws and so on" (Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of
Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 15).
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statement, one should not forget that European governance operates under different
conditions, which is, to a large extent, democratically legitimised by national
politics. The European Union seems to struggle between its various national
political cultures and the need to create a political culture of its own. In how far
these two, allegedly opposing, strands may be brought together is questionable.
Jiirgen Habermas takes an optimistic approach and argues that the increasing
mobility between the European member states
will set in motion even more extensive horizontal mobility and multiply the
contacts between members of different nationalities. Immigration... will intensify
the multicultural diversity of these societies. This will give rise to social tensions...
for which coordinated solutions are available only at a European level. Given
these conditions, communication networks of European-wide public spheres may
emerge... In the future, however, differentiation could occur in a European culture
between a common political culture and the branching national traditions of art,
literature, historiography, philosophy, and so forth."
If a European political culture will ever emerge, one would expect that this
type of European political culture - together with Habermas's Constitutional
Patriotism - would set the conditions for a common public opinion. This would be
necessary for the European Union to "develop a new political self-confidence
commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of the twenty-first century".58 In
future, this may also culminate in a
shared 'we-feeling' sufficient to persuade groups and citizens to accept recurrent
and structural sacrifices of their interests in the furtherance of the interests of
others or of the system as a whole.59
57 Habermas, Jiirgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald Theorizing
Citizenship, p. 270-271.
58 Jiirgen Habermas cited in Waever, Ole (1995); "Europe since 1945" in Wilson, Kevin and Dussen
van, Jan (eds.); The history ofthe idea ofEurope, p. 208.
59 Wallace, William (1983); "Less than a federation - more than a regime: The Community as a
political system" in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William and Webb, Carol (eds.); Policy-making in the
European Union, p. 420.
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5. C European culture as a means to foster a genuine European
identity?
Jiirgen Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism may be a model answer to
European citizenship, since it is able to dissociate nationality from citizenship.
However, it seems to ignore the strong influence nationality has on the human
psyche, the value of belonging and originality.1 Furthermore, it does not seem to
deliver an answer to the European citizenship's "problem of inclusion and exclusion
among member state nationals and 'other' European residents, namely the so-called
third country nationals."2 And although European Union citizenship may represent
"an attempt to replace narrow nationalism with a wider identity,... the preoccupation
with what is a European can simply reproduce some of those ancient divisions on a
wider stage."3 There is danger, as Weiler argues, that
[njationality as referent for interpersonal relations, and the human alienating effect
of Us and Them are brought back again, simply transferred from their previous
intra-Community context to the new inter-community one. We have made little
progress if the Us becomes European (instead ofGerman or French or British) and
the Them becomes those outside the Community.... [T]he new Europe must adopt
a distinctively post-modem approach to 'otherness', which moves away from
established theories of citizenship and human rights, and which is instead based on
the kind of 'humane' human rights.4
So far, the lack of progress is particularly evident at the international entry
points into the European Union, such as airports or border crossings. Despite future
EU enlargement towards the East, the distinction between EU-citizens and non-EU
citizens is still specifically made on the Eastern frontier of the European Union.
When it comes to border and passport controls, holders of a European passport
1 Nationality is closely linked to the ethnic understanding of the nation, in the sense that it gives the
respective citizen a past and a future - Constitutional patriotism does not do this and would hence be
too weak to sustain a demos in the fullest sense of the term. See also Weiler, Joseph (1995); "Does
Europe need a constitution? Reflection on Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht decision",
European Law Journal Vol. 1/No 1, pp. 219-258.
2 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the constructive potential of Union citizenship" in European
Integration Papers Online, Vol. 1/No. 17, p. 13.
3 Jacques, Martin (1998); "Even continents can't buck trends" in The European, January 19-25,
1998.
4 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in
Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after
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usually clear the customs area without many obstacles. The queue for non-EU
citizens, however, involves long waiting hours, a more thorough investigation of
papers of the border-crosser and, if applicable, the goods s/he wishes to take across
the border. This unequal treatment of EU and non-EU guarantees discontentment
amongst citizens of the Central Eastern European, even a feeling of discrimination5
and humiliation6.
As was indicated in chapter four, the non-conferment of European
citizenship rights to the prospective EU member states runs counter to the
introduction of the many other economic and political measures which were
introduced to ease the enlargement process and to overcome the lack of "authority
of local and regional bodies to make contacts, negotiations and decisions with their
transfrontier partners."7
When Neil Smith argues that "it is at the periphery where the contradiction
between a pre-national and a post-national Europe is most intensely felt"8, one may
translate this into 'it is at the Eastern frontier of the European Union where the
tension between an EU-Europe and a European Europe is most intensely felt' or, as
Michael Smith puts it, here "the tension between 'the politics of exclusion' and the
'politics of inclusion'"9 comes to the fore. The Cold War was close to legitimise this
tension, as well as the Eastern frontier of the European Union. As the boundaries
within the European Union came down, a boundary between 'us' and 'them', 'us
Europeans' and 'them Central Eastern Europeans', was drawn. It seemed to foster
Europe's exclusive club membership of member states who attained a specific level
1992, p. 40; and Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and the Other Europeans" in Journal ofCommon Market
Studies, Vol. 35/No. 1, p. 79.
5 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls", in
Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen andEU enlargement, p. 29.
6 Richter-Malabotta, Melita (1998); "Some Aspects of Regional and Transfrontier Co-operation in a
Changing Europe" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (1998); Schengen and the Southern
Frontier ofthe European Union, p. 41.
7 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie(1983); "Legal aspects of transfrontier regional co-operation" in Anderson,
Malcolm (ed.); Frontier regions in Western Europe, p. 57. This problem is specific to the
borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, where federal Austria and Germany
neighbour face centralized Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
8 Smith, Neil (1995); "Remaking Scale: Competition and Co-operation" in Eskelinen, Heikki and
Snickars, Folke (eds.), Competitive European Peripheries, p. 71.
9 Smith, Michael (1996); "The European Union and a changing Europe" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 1, p. 6.
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of GDP or rate of inflation. Within this 'fortress Europe', the introduction of
European citizenship and various other measures were an important medium to
promote a European identity and a sense of solidarity amongst citizens of EU
member states.
Since the events of 1989/90, however, the European Union has been faced
with the challenge of accommodating this exclusive, bureaucratic, technocratic
Europe with the wider and more open concept of Europe. It has become apparent
that it is difficult to draw a geographical line around Europe and to find Europe's
significant 'other'. Michel Foucher's examples of Ukraine and Belorussia show that
it is difficult to demarcate the geographical or cultural finitude of Europe - despite
the fact that it is geopolitically important that they be defined as European as well.
On the other hand, one may argue that because Europe's borders are "fuzzy"10, they
can function as bridges and transitional points at which features, values, identities
and definitions flow into one another. On the Eastern frontier of the European
Union, Euroregions and border regions are cases in point. By virtue of being in
between, and hence close to two or more national cultures, regional cultures are
diverse, and "it is this mixture which gives (them their) specific identity rather than
any homogeneous and essentialist idea of culture."11 Within the European
framework, then, borderlands seem to incorporate the ultimate requirements for the
emergence of a European identity, based on a "cultural identity that will be both
distinctive and inclusive, differentiating yet assimilative"12.
As we have seen in chapter four, intellectual elites of the Central Eastern
European countries have continuously stressed their allegiance to Europe, as
opposed to Russia. For them, the "postwar division of Europe did not correspond
with the long term cultural structures prevailing in Europe."13 Accordingly, the
10 Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its long-lasting variable geography" in Bort, Eberhard and
Keat, Russell (eds.); Boundaries ofUnderstanding: Essays in Honour ofMalcolm Anderson, p. 165.
" Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans,
Neil (eds.)\ Networking Europe, p. 18.
12 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, No. 68/ Vol. 1, p. 76.
13 Brix, Emil (1994); "About the Reality of Central Europe", paper presented during Poland in
Europe, International Centre for Development and Democracy Foundation and the International
Cultural Centre, Cracow, p. 77.
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Polish editor and columnist Gerbert describes Poland as a "normal, poorly
performing European country, rather than a European wannabe."14 Similarly, the
Hungarian writer and journalist Fran?ois Fejto feels even more European when he
travels. "When meeting a Pole, French or English person in either Hong Kong or
San Francisco", he says, "one becomes even more aware of being European."15 And,
Polish intellectual Jerzy Jedlicki asserts that
intellectual elites from Tallin to Tirana have for centuries turned to the West for
their cultural aspirations, their material products, their scientific or technological
knowledge and even for their social institutions.... We now feel European, but
with a certain hesitation that makes us Europeans of the peripheral type.16
Although this perception of periphery may point to the emergence of a
Central European identity in particular, the expression 'Europeans of the peripheral
type' carries negative connotations with it. It implies, as was argued in chapter four,
the undefined which does not belong to either East or West. To do away with this
feeling of periphery, Czech President Vaclav Havel asserted in his 1994 speech to
the European Parliament that if the European Union,
this great administrative work, which obviously should simplify life for all
Europeans, is to hold together and stand various tests of time, then it must be
visibly bonded by more than a set of rules and regulations.17
This indicates, and rightly so, that the European Union must not become an
exclusive club and that "European unity cannot safely or effectively be built on an
emotional foundation of fears of the world outside."18 Instead, the European Union
should rethink itself in the wider European framework, its "solid intellectual basis
of shared values."19 Havel suggested that the European Union needs a "charter of its
own that would clearly define the ideas on which it is founded, its meaning and the
14 Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in The Independent on Sunday, June 7, 1998.
15 European Communities (1997); La Commission Europeenne a Tecoute du changement, p. 58. My
translation.
16 European Communities (1997); La Commission Europeenne a Tecoute du changement, p. 59. My
translation.
17 Havel, Vacl&v (1996); "De l'identit6 europ^enne" in Europa, 3/4 1996, p. 8. My emphasis and
translation.
18 Vacldv Havel cited in Fizgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our European identity" in
The Irish Times, March 6, 1999.
19 Vacldv Havel cited in Fizgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our European identity" in
The Irish Times, March 6, 1999.
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values it intends to embody."20 It could be a charter based on the 'Charter of
European Identity'21, drawn up by the Europa-Union Deutschland in 1994, which
defines Europe as a community of destiny, values, life and responsibility, as well as
an economic and social community. Policies "which strengthen the sense of
common purpose while establishing the credibility of the European Union and
making its citizens proud to be Europeans"22 must be brought to the fore, in order to
stimulate the redefinition of the European Union and Europe.
Ideally, Europe should be defined "in terms of history, or historical
geography;... in terms of observed patterns of social, economic and political
interaction; ...in terms of values, culture, and psychological identity -... [a]
perceived community."23 Compared to the traditional historic or political definitions
of Europe, this broad definition seems to leave a lot of scope for the definition of
'Europe'. Political definitions have long been restricted to the European Union
alone. Geographical definitions, as we have seen in chapter two, vary according to
history. And culturally, Europe is equally difficult to define. This is partly so
because the understanding of culture, as was suggested in chapter three and the
preceding section, "is so imprecise and changeable a phenomenon that it explains
less than people realise."24 Culture is not an effective marker for Europe's
boundaries, since it is not limited to a "single locale"25, but, according to Renato
Rossaldo, "can... be conceived as a... porous array of intersections where distinct
processes crisscross from within and beyond its borders."26 Furthermore, culture is a
process, a "product of social interaction"27. The concept of culture
20 Havel, Vaclav (1996); "De 1'identife europdenne" in Europa, 3/4 1996, p. 8. My translation.
21 Europa-Union Deutschland (1994); Charter on European Identity, http://europlace.org/.
22 Europa-Union Deutschland (1994); Charter on European Identity, http://europlace.org/, Part VI.
23 Wallace, William (1991); The transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 9-10.
24 The Economist (1996); "Cultural Explanations: The man in the Baghdad cafe", November 9,
1996.
25 KUrti, Ldszld and Langman, Juliet (1997); "Introduction: Searching for Identities in the New East
Central Europe" in Kiirti, L&szlo and Langman, Juliet (eds.); Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural
Identities in the New East and Central Europe, p. 1.
26 Renato Rosaldo cited in KUrti, Ldszld and Langman, Juliet (1997); "Introduction: Searching for
Identities in the New East Central Europe" in KUrti, Ldszld and Langman, Juliet (eds.); Beyond
Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe, p. 2.
27 Cohen, Anthony (1998); "Boundaries and Boundary-consciousness: Politicizing cultural identity"
in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers ofEurope, p. 23.
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can vary from one school of thought to the another, from one society to another
and from one era to another. It may include the Fine Arts, literature, etc., but may
also include all types of knowledge and features which characterise a society and
make it possible to understand the world.28
The vague definition of culture allows French sociologist Alain Touraine to
claim that it is impossible to identify a monolithic, clearly defined European
culture. He states that
a single European culture does not exist, because - thanks God - there are more
than one European cultures. To reduce all these European cultures to one
European culture would impoverish Europe. Communication between the different
European cultures is important. If there is a European identity, it is the recognition
of the other.29
Similarly, Sven Papcke understands Europe as an '"unitas multiplex',
something of an exercise in variety"30, and Jose Ortega y Gasset, at the middle of
this century, perceived "European culture to be an interconnected system."31 With a
common cultural heritage at its basis, a European culture encompasses, and is
composed of, many different identities existing within Europe.
There is no intention of squeezing all existing cultures into a single
European one. Aiming at "uniformity is as anti-European as those politicians who
are still wearing their nation-state-colored spectacles while planning transnational
cooperation in Brussels."32 Similarly, "to over-emphasise narrow cultural identity is
to work against cross-cultural communication."33 Instead, European culture should
be best defined as multiform and open. One cannot single out one determining or
outstanding European identity factor, because Europe's "precise scope, nature,
28 European Commission (1996); First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in the
European Community Act, COM(96), 160 final, 17. 04. 1996, p. 3.
29 European Communities (1997); La Commission Europeenne a i'ecoute du changement, p. 36. My
translation.
30 Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity?" in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit,
Walter (eds.); The idea ofEurope - Problems ofnational and transnational identity, p. 64.
31 Jos6 Ortega y Gasset cited in Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity?" in Nelsen,
Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The idea of Europe - Problems of national and
transnational identity, p. 63.
32 Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity?" in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit,
Walter (eds.); The idea ofEurope - Problems ofnational and transnational identity, p. 64.
33 Ethelyn Orso cited in Bat Smit de la, Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change
prompt changes in personal and social identity?", paper presented during European Student
Chaplain's Conference, Conference in Visegrad, June 1-7, 1994.
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content and distinctive features are not identified."34 To be "European means
precisely having more than one culture and mediating between cultures, being
intercultural"35. This allows us, though contradictory at first glance, to describe
European culture as being subject to its common heritage and diverse cultures, its
distinctiveness and universality. Slogans, such as 'unity in diversity', 'family of
cultures' and 'concentric circles of allegiance' would complete the list illustrating
the many possible definitions ofEurope.
When becoming a member of the European Union, member states accept the
acquis communautaire, the overall conditions necessary for the European Union's
economic, political and social integration process. This does not mean that the
future European Union will be based on the idea of a "European 'super-nation'
[which might] resemble, in its external as well as internal policies and relations, [...
a] national model"36. Nor does it imply that the recognition of one culture entails the
denial of another. European cultures are not "rival cultures"37, but they are mingled
and grew together. "Cultures in contact produce varieties rather than mixtures."38
They foster transnationalisation39. The "simultaneous interaction and parallelism of
different cultural levels within given social formations"40 and the political -
democratic - framework of the European Union allow cultural freedom.41 The idea
of democracy is fundamental for the preservation of the different identities in a
European 'family of cultures'. It is therefore
no wonder that Central European, and particularly smaller and more vulnerable,
nations want to integrate into Western Europe by accepting democratization and
34 Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 2, p. 214.
35 Jude Bloomfield cited in Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in
Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 21.
36 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, No. 68/ Vol. 1, p. 76.
37 Young, Hugo (1999); "Why I'm glad to be European" in The Guardian, January 2, 1999.
38 Europe House Zagreb (1996); "Europe of Cultures: Cultural identity of Central Europe",
Conference Programme, http://mairmo.irmo.hr/~clink/coming/eucult.html.
39 Schlesinger, Philip (1991); "Media, political order and national identity" in Media, Culture and
Society, Vol. 13, p. 306.
40 Schlesinger, Philip (1991); "Media, political order and national identity" in Media, Culture and
Society, Vol. 13, p. 305.
41 Oberndorfer, Dieter (1996); "Die politische Gemeinschaft und ihre Kultur" in Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, B 52-53, p. 37.
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observance of human rights. Acceptance of universal European identity limits
collective obsessions with state-nation ideology. The interplay of universalism and
particularism may be balanced by a strong intercultural communication that helps
the full emancipation of cultures and provides for democratization of their
relationships.42
This process also allows European culture to remain open, and to be defined
as an "open communication field"43. European ideas, values and culture have
influenced (and in the extreme case imposed themselves on) other parts of the
world, so that "this psychological community of shared assumptions and attitudes
spread a good deal further east and west."44 On the other hand, European culture has
also absorbed non-European influences and thoughts. These range from influences
of immigration to Americanisation, specifically McDonaldisation and the screening
ofHollywood films in virtually all European cinemas.
Given the incoherent, and to a large extent undefinable, nature of culture,
and specifically European culture,
[t]he idea ofEuropean unity has recently and rightly been called a myth... Its name
is taken from an obscure Greek myth with little real connection with the territory
and was not commonly used before the eighteenth century.45
Accordingly, Anthony Smith argues that Europe is composed of
"unacceptable historical myths and memories... a patchwork, memoryless scientific
culture held together solely by the political will and economic interest that are so
often subject to change."46 The idea of a myth is perhaps a shaky ground for the
European Union to build its legitimacy, because "just as pure geography itself,
42 Europe House Zagreb (1996); "Europe of Cultures: Cultural identity of Central Europe",
Conference Programme, http://mairmo.irmo.hr/~clink/coming/eucult.html.
43 Nolte, Josef (1991); Wir guten Europder, p. 13. My translation.
44 Margaret Thatcher cited in Wallace, William (1991); The transformation of Western Europe, p.
28.
45 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans,
Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 1. This Greek myth refers to the rape of princess Europa by
Zeus, the King of Gods. When Zeus looked down and saw Europa, he was infatuated by her beauty.
By transforming himself into a grand white bull, Zeus attracted Europa's attention. She climbed onto
the bull's (Zeus') back, whereupon Zeus rode off to the island of Crete and made Europa the mother
of three of his children.
46 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 74.
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mythology is unable to give an answer about Europe's nature and frontiers."47 Is it
precisely the question of European culture which constitutes the principal problem
inherent to the European integration process? Hence, any
attempts to promote the idea of a distinctive European culture, tradition or set of
values, are thus of high political significance - whatever the apparent banality of
arguments about the European passports and postage stamps, frontier formalities,
car number plates, 'Eurovision' programmes and youth exchanges.48
Since culture has so far been analysed through the national lens, it remains
difficult to bring European culture closer to the peoples. Yet, European culture is
"probably the strongest link between Europe's different regions."49 To make this
link more apparent, European culture needs a new approach which reflects the
interplay of European social forces which are able to shape a new European socio¬
political order.50 One of these approaches could be found in projects of transfrontier
co-operation and examples of transfrontier regionalism. It would show to what
extent various aspects of culture are "denationalised"51, but at the same time part of
a European "'family of cultures'..., through which over several generations some
loose, over-arching political identity and community might gradually be forged."52
Such a community "will only find its identity in a critical attitude towards its own
traditions, and a constant openness towards external contributions."53 Similarly,
Soledad Garcia reminds us that the
idea of Europe which is being rescued from philosophical and cultural traditions
should not be confused with the modern idea of Europe, which results from the
47 Munkler, Herfried (1995); "Die politische Idee Europa" in Delgado, Mariano and Lutz-
Bachmann, Matthias (eds.) Herausforderung Europa: Wege zu einer europaischen Identitat, p. 17.
My translation.
48 Wallace, William (1991); The transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 33.
49 Riekmann, Sonja (1996); "The Myth of European Unity" in Hosking, Geoffrey, and Schopflin,
George (eds.); Myths andNationhood, p. 66.
50 Europe House Zagreb (1996); "Europe of Cultures: Cultural identity of Central Europe",
Conference Programme, http://mairmo.irmo.hr/~clink/coming/eucult.html.
51 Jiirgens, Christian (1997), "Die Wettgemeinschaft" in Die Siiddeutsche Zeitung, No. 66, 1997. My
translation.
52 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National Identity and the idea of European unity" in International
Affairs, Vol. 68/ no. 1, p. 74.
53 Camps, Victoria (1992); "L'identit6 europeenne, une identite morale" in Lenoble, Jacques et
Dewandre, Nicole (eds.); L'Europe au soir du siecle, p. 103. My translation.
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political practice of the past 45 years and has involved a strong will to create a
peaceful and prosperous environment.54
A great number of intellectuals draw on Europe's common values, history
and cultural aspects in order to identify a European identity, leaving behind "the
perennial story of nation- and empire-building"55. Praxis has shown that definitions
for a European identity or culture keep revolving around the same narrative of
values, such as humanism, democracy, solidarity, civil rights and the afore¬
mentioned historical currents. "Nineteenth-century historiography is a
historiography drunk with the superiority of'European civilisation"'56 and its glories
of the past; Europe's dark period of colonialism and imperial wars are conveniently
ignored. But apart from being selective57, this retrospective approach also seems to
ignore that culture and identity are subject to processes and developments. It
attempts to ascribe specific features to Europe, rather than take into consideration
that Europe's identity is marked through its "changeability and transitoriness"58, its
"oscillation between unity and diversity"59. It also fails to take into account that it is
not enough to base the idea of a European idea "solely on democracy, liberty,
tolerance and social justice".60 One should rather emphasise "the need for a
European memory"61, based on Europe's cultural heritage and its mix of ideas which
54 Garcia, Soledad (1993); "Europe's fragmented identities and the frontiers of citizenship" in
Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the searchfor legitimacy, p. 3.
55 Riekmann, Sonja (1996); "The Myth of European Unity" in Hosking, Geoffrey, and Schopflin,
George (eds.); Myths andNationhood, p. 61.
56 Pieterse, Jan (1994); "Unpacking the West: How European is Europe?" in Rattansi, Ali and
Westwood, Sallie (ed.); Racism, Modernity and Identity, p. 130. In addition to this, Chris Shore and
Annabel Black argue that it is rarely addressed what the list of common European features and
"historical currents amounts to, or what makes them exclusively European" in Shore, Chris and
Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard,
Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope, p. 294.
57 Malcolm Anderson made a similar argument when speaking about "history a la carte" in
Anderson, Malcolm (1998) "Selective memories: The Cases of Clovis and the French Revolution",
paper presented during Commemorating Ireland: History, Politics, Culture - A Comparative
Approach, Seminar at the University of Edinburgh, September 11-12, 1998.
58 Nolte, Josef (1991); Wir guten Europaer, p. 10. My translation.
59 Scardigli, Victor (1993); "L'homog&iisation culturelle, question scientifique et enjeu politique" in
Scardigli, Victor (ed.); L'Europe de la diversite, p. 13. My translation.
60 Urbain, Robert in "Stance de cloture" in Economic and Social Committee (1993); L'Europe des
citoyens, p. 74. My translation.
61 Polish Foreign Minister Mr Geremek cited in Fizgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our
European identity" in The Irish Times, March 6, 1999.
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interact differently and partially in different situations, contexts and moments in
time.
Given Europe's evolutionary and, to some extent, incoherent character, one
should note that "[t]here is no historically homogeneous Europe, and those who
look for it are on the wrong track."62 The concept of European identity in the post-
Second World War period, for example, should not be confused with the Cold War
European identity or the post-Maastricht notion of European identity. Whereas the
first was an attempt to "foster a more distinctive 'European identity', to replace the
warring national identities which had brought the states of core Europe into
repeated conflict"63, the second concept of European identity may be classified as a
European Community identity which sought to manifest itself to the outside. The
post-Maastricht notion of European identity, in contrast, may describe the effort to
incorporate all European peoples via primarily social and cultural factors, in
addition to the economic political ones. It is an attempt to combine the various
internal and external aspects of identity, in order to reinforce the "parallel
development to the construction of a European Union - a development... which
could give the European project the internal and external legitimation that it so
sorely needs."64 More importantly, however, it is an attempt to look into the future,
because
being European cannot simply be defined in terms of a single legal nationality or
even a constitution guaranteeing equal rights to all citizens and all cultural groups,
important though that is.65
62 Hobsbawm, Eric (1997); On History, p.226.
63 Wallace, William (1991); The transformation ofWestern Europe, p. 30.
64 Garcia, Soledad (1993); "Europe's fragmented identities and the frontiers of citizenship" in
Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the search for legitimacy, p. 2.
65 Jude Bloomfield cited in Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in
Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 21.
Chapter 5.C - 312
6 CONCLUSION
It has been argued throughout the thesis that the concept of European
identity can no longer be taken synonymously with an EU identity. The concept of
European identity incorporates more than just the European Union. It reaches
further than that - how far? And how may a European identity be defined? It has
been suggested that Europe is strong because of its political, economic and cultural
diversity. Yet, Europe also seems weak, since it lacks a genuine European identity.
Europe is in need of a European identity, in order to be able to legitimise its future
European integration process vis-a-vis its citizens and the wider international
community.
Since 1989/90, Europe seems to be in a state of flux. Given the assumption
that 'as internal borders of the European Union dismantle, external ones rise', the
effect of the present transformation processes within Europe has been the
emergence of some pressing questions about Europe's geographical limits, and its
core sense of identity. With the changing nature of the Eastern frontier of the
European Union from a hard to a soft border, Europe's political division has been
overcome. However, it has given rise to new problems, since it looks as if the
disappearance of the 'other' beyond the Eastern frontier of the European Union has
left Europe, and specifically the European Union, with a sense of restlessness1 - an
identity crisis. In view of prospective EU enlargement towards the East, population
movements within and into Europe will increase, so that the Community can no
longer rely on its exclusive club membership. Its definition of identity - as far as
such a thing exists - can no longer be solely outwards looking towards something
non-European. Such an approach might invoke the future 'Europe' to keep
everything non-European out and to "slide into Euro-protectionism or Euro-
racism."2 Instead, it has become increasingly evident that the concept of European
1 Fenet, Alain (1994); "L'identit6 europeenne: variations contemporaines sur une interrogation
ancienne" in Chevallier, Jacques (ed.); L'identitepolitique, p. 397.
2 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 297.
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identity faces the challenge of having to define itself by finding a balance between
internal and external perspectives, in order to be unique and universal at the same
time. Characteristics for such a European identity may be found in the borderlands
on the Eastern frontier of the European Union.
Due to its potential multiplicity of different identity layers, as well as the
many possible ways from which the concept may be approached, identity is a term
difficult to define. This poses perennial problems for the definition of European
identity, since one is confronted with the double question: what is Europe and what
is identity? Acknowledging that identity is procedural, the definition of Europe and
European identity changes as well. A multifaceted picture of Europe emerges
which, on a smaller scale, is also applicable to the European Union.
But what kind of Union is this? Traditional European integration theories
seem insufficient for the definition of the European integration process. Each
European integration theory explains the European integration process differently,
adding to the confusion over the European Union's system of governance and
legitimacy. Is the European Union subject to a supranationalism,
intergovernmentalism or a multi-level governance? Is it legitimate? It seems that
the European Union's legitimacy is an extension of the legitimacy of its member
states, rather than its citizens. To the majority of its citizens, the European Union
still represents a bureaucratic and remote apparatus.
Even the EU's various policies and measures directed towards fostering a
European identity have not yet been able to change this. These policies seem
artificial and insufficient. So far, their influence is reduced to symbolic significance
only, specifically since it seems difficult to graft "a political and cultural unity to an
economic union"3 from the top down. However, one should not dismiss these
policies altogether. Although European citizenship is not the ultimate policy to
create a European identity - since flaws and problems inherent to the concept of
European citizenship remain, in particular, because European citizenship has been
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'imposed' from above, without any "social input from the bottom up"4 - once
reformed and developed, the concept of European citizenship could provide a basis
for a European identity, in which citizens would feel a double sense of belonging - a
national and a supranational one.
Moving to the European Union's Eastern frontier, the thesis has drawn on
the historical and multi-cultural concept of Mitteleuropa, preparing for the
subsequent discourse concerning the effects of transborder co-operation in the
Eastern borderlands. This transborder co-operation has already led to a great
number of interregional partnerships and regional alliances. This has allowed a
regional tie-in into the structures of EU governance and impacted greatly on the
traditional role and understanding of (nation-) states. Arguably, transborder co¬
operation has transcended and blurred the boundaries of sovereignty, as well as
geographical, economic, political, social and cultural boundaries - even if gradually
and slowly.
Transborder co-operation projects seem to underline the "linkage between
the internal EU and the development of the broader European and international
arenas"5, and it looks as if Europe's destiny and the emergence of a European
identity are to manifest themselves most clearly in the borderlands on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union. Considering borderlands as laboratories, it has been
suggested that these borderlands already possess a number of collective multi¬
cultural identities. Borderlands may become a prototype for the co-habitation of
Europe's various multi-ethnic societies, since it is here where cultures and identities
come together, co-exist and "cross-fertilise"6. Emphasising the multi-cultural aspect
of borderlands, one may argue that "borders of states still stand as simultaneous
3 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 296.
4 Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question
ofIdentity, p. 10.
5 Smith, Michael (1996); "The European Union and a Changing Europe" in Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 34/No. 1, p. 7.
6 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders"
in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border Identities, p. 11.
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markers of homogeneity and heterogeneity. Perhaps the external borders of the EU
function in this way too".7
By virtue of the borderlands' and Europe's multi-cultural and multi-ethnic
character, the European Union's politics of inclusion and exclusion seem to fade
away and give way to a pattern of identity politics which is "patchy and confused as
states, nations, regions, cities and individuals come to terms with a changing
political and economic order and their place in it."8 Given the changing nature of
frontiers, specifically the different transformation processes taking place on the
Eastern frontier of the European Union, and the diverse economic, political and
socio-cultural developments which vary from country to country, the Central
Eastern European countries seem to lie in different time zones9. The resulting
patchiness and confusion - even insecurity and doubt - enables a wider and open
definition of the concept of Europe and European identity. It allows, according to
Jose Ortega y Gasset's argument in the 1950s,
European civilisation to doubt about herself. Luckily this is so! I cannot remember
one civilisation which died from a crisis of doubt. However, I think to remember
civilisations that died because of their petrification of their traditional faith,
because of their arteriosclerosis of their beliefs. Today, we should repeat the
Cartesian principle, reformed: 'I doubt, therefore I am.10
But is, one may rightly ask, "European self-reflection... already the index of
its non-self-identity"11? Is Europe's non-self identity a result of Europe's multi-
identity12? Paradoxically, doubt seems to give strength and seems to be able to bind
people together. Self-confidence or, rather, self-centredness and impertinence, may
7 Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European
integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 206.
8 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 1, p. 92. See also Michel Foucher's "fuzzy frontiers" in
Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its Long-lasting Variable Geography" in Bort, Eberhard and
Keat, Russell (eds.); The Boundaries of Understanding: Essays in Honour ofMalcolm Anderson, p.
165.
9 The Economist (1998); "Good Fences", December 19, 1998. Indeed, the Estonian-Russian border,
the future Eastern frontier of the European Union, marks two different time zones.
10 Jos6 Ortega y Gasset cited in Camps, Victoria (1992); "L'identit^ europeenne, une identite
morale" in Lenoble, Jacques and Dewandre, Nicole (eds.); L'Europe au soir du siecle, p. 104. My
translation.
11 Burgess, Peter J (1997?); "European Borders: History of Space/Space of History",
http://www.ctheory.com/a-european_borders.html, p. 4.
12 Jacques Delors cited in Massart, Franfoise (1993); L'Europe et ses Etats, p. 223.
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ignore fundamental central issues. In the case of the European Union, the strength
of its internal social and cultural richness and diversity seems to have long been
neglected for political and economic values necessary for the definition against the
'other'. Recently, however, it has increasingly become evident that these political
and economic considerations are no longer sufficient for the development of a
European identity.
European integration is a process of the future13 and European identity
would therefore represent a kind of shell which contains multiple senses of identity
- including ethno-national ones. Speaking from a French perspective, Jacques
Delors, concluded that the "larger project is to assert oneself as a citizen of the
world, a convinced European, while remaining fully faithful to France, to its
heritage."14 This brings to the fore what has been ignored for long: the essential role
of the citizen. The European Union's legitimacy has been vested in its member
states' political-economic sphere, rather than the European citizens. Economic and
instrumental benefits outweighed any affective considerations. This has led to a
problem of governance and legitimacy within the European Union, exemplified by
the Maastricht ratification crisis. Indirect democracy, the shift from "democracy in
the national state to democracy in the transnational state"15, has been unsuccessful,
and has not been accompanied by a shift of allegiance from the national state to the
European Union. Multilevel governance may be a new concept for the average
European citizen. For the borderlander on the Eastern frontier of the European
Union, where the planning and implementation of various transborder co-operation
projects depends on multiple administrative and governmental bodies and levels, it
is less so.
Acknowledging the plurality and transcendence of political, social and
cultural boundaries, it has been argued that the theories of Liberal Nationalism and
Constitutional Patriotism offer a workable framework for a European identity. At
13 Lubkemeier, Eckard (1997); "Woran es noch fehlt" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 28,
1997.
14 Jacques Delors cited in Foucher, Michel and Oyarzabal, Jose (1996) (eds.); Visions ofEurope, p.
72.
15 Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion?" in Journal of common Market Studies, Vol.
35/No. 2, p. 291.
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this stage of the European integration process, national identity does not yet seem to
be fully complementary with a European identity. Since Constitutional Patriotism is
primarily based on democratic principles, it may be best suited to accommodate and
to preserve the European citizens' multiple loyalties.
However, Constitutional Patriotism only represents one important aspect of
the emergence of a European identity. In order to ensure the emergence and
fostering of a wider and genuine European identity, the dimension of European
culture must be added. European cultural events and titles, such as the European
city of culture or the patrimony of historic buildings, seem to be more sophisticated
and successful than is apparent at first glance. They are held in high esteem and in
the field of education, Jo Shaw asserts that "funding programmes have proved
exceptionally popular and have encouraged widespread mobility of students and
staff in universities"16. It seems that the young enjoy education in other countries,
and that their cross-cultural contact rather than the memory of the "second world
war is... a touchstone for shared experience."17 Ultimately, 71% of young people
support the European integration18, suggesting that ""the desire for true [European]
integration lies with the young."19
Since there is not just one European culture, but a European 'family of
cultures', the search for a common and homogeneous European culture and identity
can only be bound to fail. Identity factors which apply to personal, local, regional
and national identities cannot simply be transferred to the European level.
Accordingly, European identity cannot be based on the national identity model, nor
is European identity or culture the summation of the various existing identities.
European culture and identity reach further than that. European culture is a term as
porous, open and diverse as identity itself. Developing a European identity on such
a concept of European culture would ensure that the concept of European identity is
16 Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Union Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in
Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question ofIdentity, p. 232.
17 Woollacott, Martin (1999); "Goodbye to all that" in The Guardian, January 2, 1999.
18 1998 Eurobarometer results cited in European Communities (1998); "Do young people support
the Union?" in Eur-OP News, 1998/ No. 2.
19 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology ofEurope,
p. 296.
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based on the 'unity in diversity' principle, encompassing "not just variations but -
especially - contradictions"20. It would allow Europe to become both: coherent,
unique and united, and open, diverse and assimilative.
20 Vignon, Jerome (1996); "What does it mean to be a European?" in Forward Studies Unit of the
European Commission (ed.); Carrefours: European Science and Culture, p. 3.
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APPENDIX
Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union, Article 8
Article 8: Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person
holding the nationality ofa Member State shall be a citizen ofthe Union.
Citizens ofthe Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall
be subject to the duties imposed thereby.
Art. 8 defines who Union citizens are. The definition of Union
citizenship is based on the member states' nationality. European citizenship
does not (yet) exist per se. The recent 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam underlines
the thin concept of European citizenship by adding to the Treaty on European
Union that "\c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace
national citizenship"1.
The dependence of European citizenship on the member states'
nationalities allows the member states to preserve their unique relationship
with their nationals, rather than losing it to the European Union. So far and
despite the introduction of European citizenship, one may certainly argue that
individuals still have a stronger allegiance to their respective nation-state,
rather than to the European Union.
The importance of member state nationality for European citizenship
also underlines the exclusionary nature of European citizenship. Non-
Community nationals cannot benefit from most rights which Union citizens
enjoy. Further complexity is added, when one considers that member states
nationality laws are not unilateral, but remain subject to each member state.
Nationality laws strike at the core of each member state and attempts to
homogenise them on an European level have failed. National laws must
remain in accordance with the objectives of the Community, in order to avoid
conflicts of interest.
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Article 8a: Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the
limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by measures adopted
to give it effect.
This article attempts to create the right of free movement and
residence within the area of the European Union in the same way as it exists
in the member states themselves. Nevertheless, the veritable right to free
movement and residence in the European Union is restricted to citizens,
namely member states' nationals only. Furthermore, the freedom of
movement and residence is also subject to secondary legislation which is not
specified in the Treaty. This secondary legislation particularly refers to the
economic inactive Union citizens, such as students and retired persons. It
allows each member state to determine the minimum level of subsistence
(that is, financial resources and sufficient medical insurance) necessary for the
individual to enjoy the right to free movement and residence in that particular
member state. In this way, member states can ensure that individuals and their
families do not become a financial burden to their social welfare systems.
Consequently, one could say that Article 8a creates three different
categories of Union citizens (which are not clearly defined in the Treaty):
first, those EU and EFTA citizens who are allowed to move freely within the
borders of the European Union, second, those (economically active) Union
citizens who can benefit from the full range of Union citizenship rights, and
third, those (economically inactive) Union citizens who cannot benefit from
the full range of Union citizenship rights, since they are subject to the
limitations and conditions of Directives.
'
European Communities (1997); Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 8(1), section "Citizenship,
Travel, Regions and Animals".
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Article 8b/1: Every citizen ofthe Union residing in a Member State ofwhich
he is not a national shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at
municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same
conditions as nationals ofthat State.... [T]hese arrangements may provide for
derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.
Article 8b/2: Without prejudice to Article 138(3) and to the provisions
adopted for its implementation, every citizen of the Union residing in a
Member State ofwhich he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to
stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member
State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that
state.... \T\hese arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted
byproblems specific to a Member State.
Since the term citizenship traditionally describes the relationship
between citizens and their respective polity, Article 8b/1 underlines the
association of European citizenship with political rights in the European
Union. This ignores, however, the fact that in some member states non-Union
citizens have nonetheless the right to vote and stand for election during local
elections.
Since the degree of decentralisation within each member state is not
the same across the territory of the European Union and levels of autonomy,
competence and decision-making power still vary from member state to
member state., the Community defines municipal governments as
administrative units,... which, in accordance with laws of each member state,
contain bodies elected by universal suffrage and are empowered to administer, at
basic level of political and administrative organisation, certain local affairs on their
own responsibility.2
The prospects of harmonising the organisation and composition of
regional and local government is slim, since Article F/l in the TEU states that
2 O'Leary, Siofra (1996) European Union Citizenship, p. 53.
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"\t\he Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose
systems ofgovernment are founded on the principles ofdemocracy".
Despite these national restrictions, the right to vote in local elections is
a step towards detaching the notion of political participation and citizenship
from nationality. Even ifmunicipal elections are of minor importance for the
Union's legitimacy and transparency, the symbolic importance of the
European Community to legislate over the right to vote in the municipal
elections - which in some countries, as in France, has led to constitutional
changes - should therefore not be ignored.
Article 8b/2 again emphasises that political participation plays an
important role in the definition of citizenship. It is reserved to European
citizens only, but should not the same rules apply to European elections as do
to some local elections? The right to vote in elections to the European
Parliament has more symbolic rather than practical value.
Article 8c: Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third
country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not
represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular
authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of
that State.
If citizenship is a concept which is traditionally understood as being
internal to a national polity, then Article 8c contributes to the detachment of
citizenship from nationality. Article 8c is a complementary factor to the
principle of equal treatment which lies at the basis of the European
Community. The main problem, as with many other Community rights, is
though, that the member states' nationals are not aware of the fact that they
can seek assistance from any other EU member state if their own is not
represented in the respective third country. Up to the introduction of this
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clause, this mutual assistance guarantee was based on a bilateral basis
between member states. But can a EU member state act unilaterally on behalf
of another member state? In principle yes, since intergovernmental
negotiations are allowed according to the TEU. The main problem is,
however, whether third countries accept diplomatic protection by another
state than the individual's own.
Article 8d: Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to petition the
European Parliament in accordance with Article 138d.
Every citizen of the Union may apply to the Ombudsman established in
accordance with Article 138e.
Article 8d codifies, rather than introduces the right to petition. The
right to petition exists since 1987 and has been institutionalised in the
Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament. It applies to all natural
and legal persons resident in the Community and is therefore not a right
exclusive to the holders of Union citizenship only. However, the right to
petition only applies to all those individuals who are directly affected by the
respective petition they specifically put forward. Furthermore, the right to
petition is only limited to the Community's field of activities rather than the
Union's.
Similar to the right to petition, the right to complain to an
Ombudsman is also open to all. The Ombudsman is independent from any
government, organisation or body. He attempts to "secure the position of the
European citizen by promoting good administrative practices and enhancing
relations between the Community institutions and citizens."3 Indeed, the
major task of the Ombudsman is to solve problems related to Community
institutions or bodies in order to eliminate instances of mal-administration. He
vindicates the rights of Union citizens before judicial bodies and secures a
degree of openness in administration.
Appendix - 346
Article 8e is a monitoring clause which describes the way legislation
should be implemented. Article 8e is not binding and should be in accordance
with the constitutional requirements of each respective member state.
Member states still have discretion over the implementation of Article 8e,
since citizenship is such a sensitive topic which lies at the heart of each
member state.
3 European Communities (1996); Eur-Op News, Vol. 5/ No. 3, p. 1.
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